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ABSTRACT 
 
Modern diplomacy is very different in form and substance from the diplomacy of 30 
years ago. The five main components of modern diplomacy are personal diplomacy, 
economic diplomacy, foreign aid, conference diplomacy and public diplomacy. Personal 
diplomacy and conference diplomacy have much in common and have played a promi-
nent role in the late 20th and early 21st century. 
 
Since 1949, the Republic of China (ROC) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
have been two separate political entities competing for influence internationally. So when, 
in the 1960s, most African countries gained their independence and joined the UN, both 
the ROC and the PRC jostled to win their friendship in a zero-sum game that has lasted 
for the past 50 years. In the 1960s and early 1970s, the ROC used foreign aid in the form 
of “Operation Vanguard” as the main tool to help its African allies. It proved to be very 
helpful and successful and in 1969, 22 African countries had established diplomatic re-
lations with the ROC. Yet when the ROC withdrew from the UN, its former African allies 
switched recognition to Beijing. By the 1980s, only South Africa, Malawi and Swaziland 
still maintained diplomatic ties with the ROC. In the 1990s, the ROC achieved some 
positive gains with ten African countries having Ambassadors in Taiwan by 1997. Also, 
official delegations from the ROC were established in Kinshasa, Antananarivo and 
Luanda. This was a setback for China, to some extent. 
 
The thesis will analyze the relations between the ROC and the five geographic areas 
of the African continent. Since their independence, Malawi and Swaziland have estab-
lished and kept diplomatic ties with the ROC for 40 and 38 years respectively. Countries 
like Senegal, Lesotho, Chad and the Central African Republic have switched recognition 
as their needs have changed. The ROC and the Republic of South Africa (RSA) ex-
changed consular offices beginning in 1905 until in 1976 when they upgraded to full 
diplomatic relations until their demise in December 1997. During the period from the first 
democratic elections in RSA in April, 1994, until December, 1997, frenzied diplomatic 
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efforts, bargaining and negotiations set a new record in world diplomatic history. Since 
January, 1998, the ROC and RSA have had substantive relations. 
 
Without doubt, the PRC has made much progress in its influence in the domains of 
international politics and its economy. Beijing released an official China-Africa policy 
white paper, a document remarkable for the broad range of issues it covers. As a member 
of the UN Security Council, China has provided large amounts of donations and foreign 
aid to Africa, has convened the “China-Africa Cooperation Forum” and offset foreign 
debt, all of which have served to squeeze the ROC’s diplomatic space in Africa. Since 
2000, Liberia, Senegal and Chad have added their names to the long list of the PRC’s 
diplomatic allies.    
 
This thesis also examines the kinds of diplomacy that the ROC has employed in 
Africa to win friendships. Among them are three modern diplomatic tools which have 
proved the most useful and successful. These will be looked at in terms of their strength, 
weakness, opportunity and threat. Given that South Africa has been the most significant 
and influential country in Africa for the ROC, and bearing in mind that interactions be-
tween the ROC and the RSA have lasted for over a century, it is also worthwhile to further 
understand the highs and lows of these relations. Through the joint efforts and coopera-
tion between governments, private sectors and third sectors, it is anticipated that bilateral 
relations between Taiwan and African states will continue to develop and blaze new 
trails. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis will expand upon and update the study of the Republic of China 
(ROC)-African relations, specifically within the context of modern diplomacy. It seeks to 
elucidate ROC-African diplomatic relations by advancing and deepening knowledge on 
this important international relationship. The ROC’s application of a range of modern 
diplomatic measures, as well as the roles of key foreign policy decision-makers and im-
plementers shall be discussed. This thesis will contribute to the knowledge and under-
standing of the diplomatic status and the ultimate sovereignty of the ROC, one of the 
most vexing issues in the post-Cold War diplomatic arena. The aim of diplomacy is to 
sustain and protect the national interest of a country and to execute its national policy. In 
international relations, a nation’s conduct is judged by its ideology, geographic envi-
ronment, historical background, national heritage, experience and present needs. With so 
many variables, foreign policy must be goal-orientated, yet remain flexible to allow for 
adjustments in order to obtain the best possible outcome. 
The continent of Africa and the ROC on Taiwan could not be more different. Africa 
is comprised of a vast area of 30 million square kilometers, inhabited by about 600 mil-
lion people; Taiwan is a comparatively tiny island of 36,000 square kilometers, with a 
population of 23 million. Almost all the known natural resources can be found in Africa, 
yet it remains one of the poorest regions in the world. Taiwan, on the other hand, has 
virtually no major natural resources, and yet has become one of the largest economies in 
the world. With all its vast natural resources, Africa accounts for only 3.3 percent of 
world exports, less than 2 percent of world industrial production, and 3.4 percent of world 
trade. On the other hand, the island of Taiwan is the world’s 17th largest economy and 15th 
largest trading nation, and has the third largest foreign exchange reserves in the world.  
Prior to World War II, the only African countries to be independent were Egypt, 
Ethiopia, Liberia and South Africa. By the 1960s, 17 African countries had achieved 
independence and subsequently joined the United Nations, a fact which had a profound 
impact on world politics. The gradual conversion of these European colonies into inde-
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pendent countries that urgently needed technical and financial aid created an opportunity 
for Chinese involvement.  
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is one of the five permanent members of the 
UN Security Council. For historical and practical reasons, the UN is of great significance 
to both the PRC and the ROC. The 1960s marked the end of the colonial era and almost 
all countries on the African continent gained their independence. With their new-found 
independence, these countries gradually became members of the UN and started to play 
influential roles therein. Both the PRC and the ROC lobbied these countries to win their 
friendship and support in the United Nations. Both the PRC and the ROC campaigned 
vigorously to establish diplomatic relations with as many African countries as possible. 
These countries were faced with a choice of establishing diplomatic relations with either 
the PRC or with the ROC.  
The ROC government on Taiwan came into being in 1949 when it was forced to 
move as a result of civil war in China that saw the rival communists establish the PRC 
there. Since that time, both the ROC and the PRC have had different diplomatic agendas 
and have implemented different policies in the conduct of their foreign relations as well 
as in the context of the United Nations. In spite of the difficulties stemming from its 
unique position vis-à-vis the communist regime in China, the ROC has shown remarkable 
resilience and resourcefulness in its conduct of foreign relations, and has persevered in 
maintaining a diplomatic role in the international community. Owing to their distinct 
political and economic systems and to the different styles and policies followed by each 
country in their national conduct, the PRC and the ROC are perceived differently in the 
international community.  
As the former representative of all of China, the ROC was a founding member of the 
UN, with its role and influence widely recognized. However, after 1949, the situation 
changed due to the PRC’s efforts to replace the ROC as a member of the UN. Thereafter, 
the ROC-PRC diplomatic interaction became a highly competitive process as the two 
states sought to expand influence in the diplomatic arena. The ROC was soon to be ex-
pelled from the UN. Subsequent to a proposal by the Albanian representative to the UN 
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that the PRC should replace the ROC in the UN, Resolution 2758, which mandated that 
the PRC take the ROC’s UN seat, was passed. The ROC had been a member of the UN for 
21 years from its move to Taiwan in 1949 until its expulsion in 1971. Those 21 years were 
very important for the ROC and for its African campaign, in which the ROC assisted 
developing countries intensively by raising the standard of living and providing infra-
structure to those countries in return for their friendship, for African countries played an 
influential role in the UN, and would be instrumental in determining the diplomatic fu-
ture of the PRC and the ROC in the UN. 
Diplomacy and foreign policy reflect the domestic affairs of a country. For example, 
Singapore is not inclined to build foreign relations with Africa. Consequently, African 
countries have never formed an important part of Singapore’s foreign policy. The ROC, 
however, relied heavily on relations with Africa as mirrored in its actions in, and inter-
actions with, African countries. The techniques of diplomacy vary, in regard to both time 
and the individual countries involved. Back in the 18th century, diplomacy was essentially 
the art of negotiation used by nobility; the most trusted nobles were usually rewarded by 
the royals with ambassadorships. During a typical career, an ambassador could make 
crucial decisions without the prior authorization of the king. This has all changed with the 
onset of the information age. The influential position and role of an ambassador became 
largely overshadowed by modern technological communications. 
Techniques used in modern diplomacy can be classified as follows: 
a. Personal diplomacy – a distinguished figure exerting his or her personal character and 
influence for diplomatic purposes. The role model for this category is Dr. Henry 
Kissinger, who secretly flew to communist China in 1969 and laid the foundation for 
the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and the PRC in 
1979.  
b. Economic diplomacy – a powerful tool applied by the strongest and most influential 
countries in pressuring usually smaller developing countries into undertaking certain 
actions, or following a particular direction that is advantageous to the dominant country. 
For example, economic sanctions are often used as a means to pressure countries into 
changing their original policies or attitudes. Libya and South Africa are examples of 
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where the international community has imposed economic sanctions to exert pressure 
and thus influence countries. 
c. Foreign aid – helping countries in need to develop economically so that they are able to 
help themselves and thus prosper. This can be achieved through monetary means, 
provision of raw materials, transfer of technical know-how, training and cooperation 
ventures. The recipient must be willing to accept the foreign aid from the donor. For-
eign aid still plays an important role in international politics and is a very important 
instrument for indirectly manipulating a country’s behavior and policies. The donor 
will normally secure political support from the recipient in return for aid.  
d. Conference diplomacy – a tool that can be used to address any dispute, argument, 
discord or crisis. Through negotiation at meetings, consensus can be reached on deli-
cate issues in which all parties have a vested interest. It is often impossible for one 
meeting to solve problems in their entirety; more meetings will be required to address 
an issue fully. In practice, major issues can be reduced to smaller problems, and 
sometimes smaller problems can be conceded or exchanged for more substantial gains 
in more influential meetings. In a complicated and modern world, conference diplo-
macy is widely used by all countries and international organizations, such as the United 
Nations. 
e. Public diplomacy – this is a very common and easy way of introducing a country’s 
culture, image and beliefs to the government and people of other countries. Usually, 
foreign missions work jointly with other institutions to facilitate and coordinate special 
functions, such as film and food festivals, book and cultural fairs, trade shows or even 
to publish special supplements in newspapers. As the promotion of tourism has be-
come a priority, foreign missions have embarked on a number of tourism promotion 
campaigns to highlight their countries’ tourist attractions. 
The ROC has employed all of these techniques at one time or another in imple-
menting its African policy. The ROC of today is very different to that of 1949, and it has 
had to overcome many political, economic, military and social problems. While the 
people and the government have gone through difficult times, foreign aid received from 
the US helped the ROC move forward and improve its lot. US aid provided strong support 
and invigorated the ROC government to the great benefit of the country. Through 
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in-depth research, this thesis will examine the modern diplomacy techniques that the 
ROC has employed in its Africa policy. The study will focus on Mr. H K Yang’s ideology 
and methodology in establishing and advancing the ROC’s African policy and will 
evaluate the results of the policy, as well as his contributions. 
Mr. Yang was a pioneer and leader of the ROC’s diplomatic campaign in Africa. He 
began his career in the United Nations in 1950 and joined the Permanent Mission of the 
Republic of China as Technical Councilor and as Substitute Representative in the Trus-
teeship Council. Meanwhile, between 1952 and 1955, he visited the so-called West Af-
rican Trust Regions as a member of the United Nations Visiting Mission. His connection 
with Africa led to, inter alia, contact with the late Dr. Hilgard Muller, who later became 
South Africa’s Minister of Foreign Affairs. H K Yang became increasingly involved with 
problems concerning the United Nations and the African continent on one hand, and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China on the other. He participated in Af-
rican affairs for nearly 40 years and, having initiated and implemented Taiwan’s African 
policy over an extended period of time, was widely regarded as the key ROC policy 
maker on African affairs. His contributions to Taiwan’s foreign policy and his achieve-
ments are venerated and valued by the ROC foreign policy-making elite.  
The ROC used foreign aid to help newly independent African countries. Following 
independence, most African countries faced food shortages, poverty, unemployment and 
other social problems. The ROC government, under the guidance of Mr. Yang, introduced 
Operation Vanguard to help its African friends. In brief, Operation Vanguard included the 
dispatch of numerous agricultural missions to Africa to teach, assist and develop agri-
culture so that African countries could feed themselves. Agricultural aid, which at the 
time was the only assistance that the ROC provided to Africa, won the friendship of Af-
rican countries and earned their respect and support in the UN. 
Mr. Yang was the key figure in the drafting of the policy framework and imple-
mentation of Operation Vanguard. Within two years, the ROC had successfully estab-
lished diplomatic relations with 17 countries in Africa. In return, those African countries 
became the ROC’s allies in the UN and helped prevent participation by the PRC in the 
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UN. From 1969 to 1979, Mr. Yang was the vice foreign minister and later the deputy 
foreign minister of the ROC. Owing to the importance of Africa, he established the De-
partment of African Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and visited more than 40 
African countries. As a consequence of impressive economic achievements, the ROC was 
later capable of dispatching agricultural, fishery and other technical missions abroad to 
aid less developed countries. The export of technological expertise won the ROC great 
respect and admiration in the conduct of foreign relations. 
Relations between the ROC and its African allies reached a pinnacle in the late 
1960s and early 1970s. This was due to deep-rooted friendships built on the basis of 
mutual cooperation. After the ROC was forced to withdraw from the UN, many African 
allies turned their backs on the ROC and made friends with the PRC. This was a real blow 
and marked the beginning of years of hardship in the ROC’s foreign relations. Although 
the ROC today still finds itself in a difficult diplomatic position, nonetheless six African 
countries still maintain full diplomatic ties. On the basis of friendship and cooperation, 
personal diplomacy at the head-of-state level manifests itself frequently and has proved to 
be beneficial to both sides. 
The aim of this thesis is to evaluate the relations between African countries, the PRC 
and the ROC from the 1960s to the present day, in the context of the ROC’s foreign policy 
towards African states, especially South Africa. Furthermore, the study will assess the 
contributions of Ambassador H K Yang and Ambassador I-Cheng Loh to policy-making 
and implementation specifically since diplomatic recognition, thus outlining a compre-
hensive and critical foreign policy framework. 
Regarding South Africa, the first Chinese Consulate-General was opened in 1905 in 
Johannesburg, illustrating the close and friendly relations between South Africa and 
China. While isolated by the international community, both South Africa and the ROC 
were united in the common goal of advocating anti-Communism. Hence, South Africa 
and the ROC supported each other to alleviate their diplomatic isolation. The ROC up-
graded the relations to full diplomatic status in May 1976. During his term of office from 
1979 to 1989, Ambassador Yang endeavored to enhance the cordial relations between the 
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two countries. Prime Minister Sun paid an official visit to South Africa in March 1980 
and invited the South African Prime Minister, P W Botha to make an official visit to the 
ROC in October 1980. These important contacts paved the way for closer and genial re-
lations between the two countries, which signed 16 treaties during this period, addressing 
agricultural and technical cooperation as well as aviation, medical, extradition, industrial, 
military, cultural and press exchange programs. Ambassador Yang looked after the in-
terests of overseas Chinese in the four homelands of South Africa and encouraged Tai-
wanese businessmen to invest there, thus creating work opportunities for the local people. 
Relations between the two countries reached new heights through this cooperation.  
Following the restoration of the African National Congress (ANC) in 1990, the ROC 
responded with a new strategy. Ambassador I-cheng Loh went to South Africa to initiate 
contact with the ANC and invited Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu to visit the ROC, 
which paved the way for mutual cooperation and broader political support. Relations 
between the Republic of South Africa (RSA) and the ROC were full of challenges and 
opportunities after 1990. A detailed exploration of this relationship will provide a better 
understanding of RSA-ROC relations in the post-1994 period. 
The struggle against international isolation and the shared belief in an 
anti-Communist foreign policy were the main reasons for the RSA and the ROC to 
promote good relations and establish full diplomatic ties in May 1976. While Ambassa-
dor Yang kept contact with the South African ministers and government officials at all 
costs, Ambassador Loh worked painstakingly to promote mutual cooperation on the 
economy, the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), the military, and on 
political, diplomatic, and even cultural, ties between the two countries. Ambassador 
Loh’s efforts and achievements in this period shall be examined. On November 27, 1996, 
President Mandela announced that as of January 1, 1998, South Africa would recognize 
the PRC. Following this announcement, there were numerous negotiations and ar-
rangements to be made concerning future interactions between the ROC and South Af-
rica. In January 1998, the Taipei Liaison Office in Pretoria began its new role. 
Key issues in this thesis can be summarized as follows: 
  8
- African countries’ attitudes towards the ROC and the PRC after their independence. 
African votes in the UN were perceived to be of great importance, as reflected in the 
foreign policies of both the PRC and the ROC.  
- Examining the impact of Operation Vanguard – its aims, methodology, results and, 
most importantly, the relationship between foreign aid and foreign policy. 
- Understanding the techniques of modern diplomacy and how the ROC gained the 
support of African countries. 
- Enriching our understanding of the relations between the ROC and African countries 
under the influences of the African countries themselves, the PRC and a number of 
other factors.  
- Examining Ambassador Yang’s and Ambassador Loh’s contributions and work in 
South Africa.  
- Examining South Africa’s reasons for switching diplomatic recognition from the ROC 
to the PRC. 
Ambassador Yang worked in the UN in the early 1950s and his experience and 
understanding of Africa and its leaders enabled him to contribute significantly to the 
ROC’s foreign policy on African affairs for more than 40 years. He initiated Operation 
Vanguard as the ROC’s instrument for African diplomacy, which proved to be very useful 
and successful in eliciting the support of African countries. Partly as a result of Ambas-
sador Yang’s efforts, support in Africa for the PRC was effectively blocked for 21 years. 
His endeavors earned him the nickname “Mr. Africa” from African leaders. 
In the 1990s, South Africa found itself in a new environment. In those changing 
times, Ambassador Loh went to South Africa with instructions to keep diplomatic rela-
tions intact for as long as possible, for it was one of the ROC’s most important allies, 
along with the Republic of Korea, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the Vatican. When 
Korea terminated diplomatic ties with the ROC in 1992, South Africa, a key African 
country, became the ROC’s most important ally. President De Klerk visited the ROC in 
1990, and after the first democratic elections of South Africa in April 1994, President Lee 
was invited to South Africa to attend President Mandela’s inauguration ceremony. But 
with the abolishment of apartheid, PRC officials set up an office in Pretoria entitled the 
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Institute of Chinese Studies, with the goal of accelerating the establishment of diplomatic 
relations with South Africa. Both the ROC and the PRC tried to win the friendship of 
generals, leaders of political parties and so forth, hoping to maintain positive diplomatic 
links through these contacts. Ambassador Loh focused on ANC affairs, promoted mutual 
business interaction, established vocational training centers and provided financial aid, 
which in the short-term proved to be very fruitful. Due to Ambassador Loh’s hard work, 
official ties remained intact until the end of 1997. His contribution was enormous. 
In October 1999, Jiang Zemin wrote a letter to the president of the Organization of 
African Unity (OAU) and the African heads of state proposing the creation of a 
China-Africa Cooperation Forum, in direct contrast to China’s previous approach. For 
example, between December 1963 and February 1964, Premier Zhou Enlai had toured 10 
African states, concluding that “revolutionary prospects are excellent throughout the 
African continent.” China had changed its foreign policy from confrontation to coopera-
tion, from revolution to economic development, and from isolation to active international 
engagements. To date, 47 countries in Africa recognize the PRC compared with the six 
countries that recognize the ROC. In short, this was the tug-of-war between the ROC and 
the PRC in Africa for more than half a century, each side campaigning endlessly for Af-
rican allies.  
This study approach allows an empirical investigation into a contemporary phe-
nomenon within a real-life context using multiple sources of evidence. These include (1) 
theoretical works on diplomacy, foreign policy, methods of modern diplomacy and the 
relationship between national interests and diplomatic recognition; (2) firsthand docu-
ments, such as debates in the Legislative Yuan (Parliament), speeches by presidents, 
conference records and major newspaper and journal reports. In addition, documents in 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, the national archives, and private collections of 
individual ambassadors are also included; (3) personal interviews, including interviews 
with key former ministers, ambassadors, and African and Taiwanese officials; and (4) 
direct observation, since the author has worked in South Africa for over seven years and 
traveled to more than 20 African states to collect material first hand. The structure of this 
thesis consists of an introduction, a body of six chapters, a conclusion and a bibliography. 
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The chapters are as follows: 
Chapter II –Understanding the tools, effects and influences of modern diplomacy, 
namely personal diplomacy, economic diplomacy, foreign aid, conference diplomacy and 
public diplomacy through real-world examples.  
Chapter III – The ROC’s Africa Policy. Explaining Africa-ROC relations, the ROC’s 
Africa policies and their implementation, and reviewing the PRC’s policy towards Africa. 
In different contexts, the ROC has used different approaches to win friendships in Africa, 
which have proved to be effective and appropriate. 
Chapter IV – Operation Vanguard. Examining the origins of Operation Vanguard 
and its effects. This type of foreign aid helped the ROC to remain in the UN for 21 years 
and also blocked the PRC’s participation. The question remains as to what new devel-
opments there will be in the 21st century.  
Chapter V – ROC and its allies in Africa. With more than 50 African countries in 5 
divisions, the author has verified the exact nature of relations between the ROC and its 
current allies as well as former allies. Some African countries alter their preferences 
depending on the president in power, a fact which needs further examination.  
Chapter VI – Relations between South Africa and the ROC before 1990. There have 
been numerous interactions between these two countries due to their similar situations 
and isolation experienced in the international community. High-ranking bilateral official 
visits highlighted the cooperation status. South Africa was the most important African 
country for the ROC, which in turn was the only Asian country that had an embassy in 
South Africa.  
Chapter VII – Relations between South Africa and the ROC after 1991. Close and 
friendly relations between South Africa and the ROC were transformed in the 1990s, 
owing to a fundamental change in South African politics. Mr. Mandela and Mr. Sisulu 
visited the ROC, and the ROC president was invited to attend President Mandela’s in-
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auguration. After January 1, 1998, the two countries set up a new framework to enhance 
cultural, economic, and academic exchange and parliamentary interaction. 
Chapter VIII – Conclusion. There are different kinds of modern diplomacy, but the 
questions persist: what are the most useful for the ROC in conducting foreign policy in 
Africa? Why was South Africa crucial to the ROC? Why did their relations last for more 
than 100 years?  
This thesis is based on the application of diplomatic theory in the overall context of 
ROC-Africa relations, along with firsthand information obtained from interviews and 
official documents. It provides original insights into, and a novel analysis of, ROC-Africa 
and ROC-South Africa relations, adding to the existing body of knowledge. To avoid 
confusion, all African states are referred to by the names they bear today, regardless of 
dates of adoption.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
MODERN DIPLOMACY OF THE WORLD 
The most useful definition of the term diplomacy is to be found in the Oxford English 
Dictionary: “Diplomacy is the management of international relations by negotiations.  
The method by which these relations are adjusted and managed by ambassadors and 
embassies, the business or art of the diplomatist.”1 In fact, the aim of diplomacy is to 
sustain and protect the national interest of a country and to execute its national policy.  In 
international relations a nation’s conduct is judged by its ideology, geographic environ-
ment, historical background, national heritage, experience and present needs.  Therefore, 
foreign policy is both a goal-oriented and flexible. 
In short, foreign policy and diplomacy constitute the two sides of a coin.  While one 
is theory, the other is practice.  Foreign policy by contrast is used to describe the objec-
tive and actions of a state or states.  This is distinct from international relations, a term 
used to refer to all forms of interaction in the international system, including states as well 
as societies.2 Diplomacy is thus but one of a set of foreign policy instruments through 
which decisions are implemented.3 States utilise a number of tools to influence one an-
other, including diplomacy, military information and economic instruments that are 
generally co-ordinated and used with skill to achieve foreign-policy objectives.4 
Diplomacy, as an art of maintaining organised relations among the states, is obvi-
ously the foundation of state draft.  Initially, the main purpose of diplomacy is to avoid a 
condition of conflict or war.  However, if war breaks out, diplomacy assumes a different 
form with the aim of protecting and promoting the “national interest” of a state.  
Nowadays, diplomacy focuses primarily on political and economic co-operation.  Fur-
thermore, diplomats are all pragmatists since they have to protect and defend the ultimate 
national interests of their own country. 
The work of diplomacy can be broken down into four broad areas within which there 
are a number of subdivisions.  The first and most important of these is representation5 
followed by reporting, negotiation and protecting the interests of the host country. Large 
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nations like the USA, Germany, France and Italy need diplomacy to enhance their in-
fluence, gain some profit and safeguard their interests.  However, small countries like 
Taiwan, Singapore and Belgium also need diplomacy to participate in the international 
community and simultaneously, obtain the best from other countries. 
Personal Diplomacy 
Personal Diplomacy means a distinguished figure exercising his or her personal character 
and influence for diplomatic purposes.  For example, in the earlier 1990s, the official 
visits made by crowned heads and presidents, though largely ceremonial and symbolic, 
also afforded opportunities for diplomatic discussion and negotiations. In diplomatic 
practice the ambassador abroad is the eyes, ears, mouth and even nose of his government; 
hence, the ambassador must be highly resourceful and intelligent. Ambassadors act as 
spokespersons for their governments and serve as channels of communication between 
their countries and the host states.  The interests ambassadors can pursue for their own 
countries are manifold.  In other words, the ambassador plays an important key role in 
international politics.  To some extent, he can promote the interests and enhance the 
good relations between the two countries, so every country in the world is very careful in 
selecting the most appropriate and qualified person to fill this post. 
In fact, the influential post of the ambassador allows him to use his personal  pres-
tige to handle crises and achieve his country’s goals. Without doubt, some of the matters 
should be handled secretly way in order to succeed, and sometimes both sides have to 
exchange benefits or make concessions. These are the special features of personal di-
plomacy. 
There are some influential figures who took personal diplomacy to its ultimate in 
recent Chinese history.  Their contribution to the nation was enormous and had a deep 
influence. 
Dr. Wellington Koo. During his 44 years in Foreign Service, Dr. Koo was ambassador 
of the ROC to the United Kingdom, United States and France and was appointed For-
  14
eign Minister in 1931.  Dr. Koo was involved in the formation of the League of Na-
tions as China’s first representative to the League of Nations and attended the founding 
of the United Nations in San Franscisco, CA, USA in 1945.  Owing to the fact China 
sacrificed a lot of lives during the war against Japan, Dr. Koo was the first delegate on 
behalf of the people of the Republic of China to sign the charter of the United Nations.  
It was a great honour for Dr. Koo himself and an achievement for the government of the 
Republic of China. He was elected as the judge of the Court of International Justice and 
promoted to be Vice President, a position he held for 10 years.6 
Zhou Enlai. Mr. Zhou Enlai was a very prominent diplomat in the PRC’s foreign rela-
tions.  During his 26 years in charge of foreign affairs of the PRC, Mr. Chou was a de-
cision-maker, conductor and pragmatist.  Consequently, most leaders in the world 
praised his performance.  His top priority was making friends and keeping good rela-
tions with neighbouring countries.  Known as an able diplomat, Zhou was largely re-
sponsible for the reestablishment of contacts with the West in the early 1970s. He wel-
comed US President Richard Nixon to China in February 1972 and signed the Shanghai 
Communiqué.7 
Madam Chiang Kai-shek. On 28 February 1943, Soong Mei-ling gave a speech before 
the US Congress and became the first ordinary citizen and only the second woman ever to 
address a joint session of the House and Senate.  In her address she argued forcefully that 
China, as a free and democratic nation, was making a positive contribution to the world. 
Appealing to universal values she transformed China’s national war of defence against 
Japanese aggression into a war of beliefs and principles for the entire world.  Her 
awe-inspiring words won the respect and sympathy of the western nations and a steady 
stream of American assistance resulted.8 In 1995, on the 50th anniversary of the end of 
World War II, at the age of 98 Soong Mei-ling accepted an invitation to appear before the 
US Congress for a second time at a reception held in her home.  She was as radiant and 
elegant as always, moving onlookers to open admiration for this “eternal first lady”.9 
Soong Mei-ling relied chiefly upon her own refinement and talents to make her mark on 
the political stage. 
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Mr. George Yeh. Mr. Yeh was born on 20 October 1904 and was appointed as Foreign 
Minister of the ROC in 1949.  During that period of turmoil, Mr. Yeh signed the Treaty 
of Peace between the Republic of China and Japan with the Japanese delegate on 28 
April 1952 after two months’ negotiations.  Furthermore, Foreign Minister Yeh per-
suaded the American Government to sign the Mutual Defense Treaty between the Re-
public of China and the USA on 3 December 1954, a feat which was a tremendous vic-
tory for the government of the ROC.  Mr. Yeh believed the only way to avert future dif-
ficulties was to integrate the ROC into the world community. It is believed that Taiwan’s 
continuing progress is due to Mr. Yeh’s promotion of the two treaties. The signing of the 
treaties was a very important turning point in history.10  
There are also some influential politicians who during their services for the gov-
ernment made some great achievements which deserve further notice. 
Henry Kissinger. Kissinger was the US Secretary of State from 1973 to 1977.  He 
also held the position of Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, a posi-
tion he assumed in 1969 and held until 1975.  In April 1971 the USA and China were 
engaged in an important communication – the Chinese with “Ping Pong Diplomacy” 
and Nixon with public statements of visiting China.  Mao Zedong’s and Zhou’s interest 
in receiving a visit from Nixon prepared the way for Kissinger’s secret trip in July 1971 
and the beginning of the USA and China’s effort to discuss the issues that had divided 
them over the years.11 Kissinger’s declaration prompted Zhou to say what he had not 
yet said, that he was optimistic about Sino-American rapprochement: “The prospect for 
a solution and the establishment of diplomatic relations between our two countries is 
hopeful.”12 
With the July 1971 announcement of his secret meeting with Zhou Enlai, Kissinger 
emerged into the limelight, achieving unprecedented international celebrity status, and 
the USA and the PRC became partners. Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East 
set in motion the process that culminated in the Camp David agreements in 1977-1979 
and in the Egyptian – Israeli accord.  This has been the only peace treaty signed between 
Israel and an Arab State to date.13 
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In 1973 Kissinger shared the Nobel Peace Prize with Le Duc for secretly negotiating 
an end to the Vietnam War. Kissinger’s diplomacy was personal, yet his style also caused 
many of the problems associated with a successful new diplomatic course.  Kissinger 
sometimes acted as if only he possessed wisdom, knowledge and access to the President, 
awareness of other leaders, and strategic comprehension needed to design a new foreign 
policy.14 
Anwar Al-Sadat. Anwar Al-Sadat was an Egyptian politician and President of Egypt 
from 1970 – 1981. Having achieved a somewhat improved negotiating position vis-à-vis 
Israel in 1973 and 1974 and with the sympathy of the United States, Sadat next pursued 
peace.  After receiving an invitation from Begin, and convinced that peace with Israel 
would reap an enormous “peace dividend,” Sadat initiated his most important ploy.  On 
November 19, 1977, Sadat became the first Arab leader to officially visit Israel when he 
met with Israeli Prime Minister, Menachem Begin, and spoke before the Knesset in Je-
rusalem.15 The goal of his visit was to achieve a durable peace based on justice – peace 
between all the Arabs and Israel together with a “just solution of the Palestinian prob-
lem.”  He was very frank in his speech detailing all the difficulties that had arisen be-
tween Israel and the Arabs and demanding in return for peace and secure frontiers, the 
evacuation of territories occupied in 1967 and the right of Palestinians to 
self-determination and the establishment of a state.16 In April 1979 the first Israeli ship 
passed through the Suez Canal and Egypt returned to the occupied town of al-Arish in 
Sinoit.  In February 1980 an Israeli Embassy was opened in Cairo. This breakthrough led 
to the Camp David talks mediated by the US President, Jimmy Carter, and eventually the 
Camp David Treaty.  For his efforts, Sadat won the Nobel Prize for Peace. 
Margaret Thatcher. Lady Margaret Thatcher was one of the world’s most respected 
leaders.  She served for over 11 years as Britain’s first female prime minister.  She 
was saved politically from the unpopularity of her economic policies by her personal 
handling of the Falklands war with Argentina in 1982, which won her great popular ac-
claim.  Thatcher also pressed ahead with her plans to modernize the British fleet with 
Trident II nuclear submarines and resisted Soviet efforts to include British and French 
nuclear deterrents in the INF treaty negotiations.17 At the end of 1984, Mrs. Thatcher 
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traveled 25,000 miles in 130 hours, principally for the formal signing of the Hong Kong 
agreement in Peking with the People’s Republic of China.  On this journey she also 
held meetings in Bahrain, Moscow, Delhi and Hong Kong, and returned via Guam, 
Honolulu and Washington.  It is obvious that the projection of national images and 
export promotion are the other major purposes of personal diplomacy.18 Mrs. Thatcher 
also became a familiar figure internationally, striking up a famous friendship with US 
President Reagan and gaining the praise of Soviet leader Gorbachev. 
R. F. Botha. R. F. Botha was the world’s longest serving Minister of Foreign Affairs 
since 1977.  He first served as a high profile South African Ambassador to the United 
Nations in 1974 and was then Ambassador to the United States. In 1986 Botha commit-
ted the heresy of telling reporters that South Africa could one day have a black head of 
State.  At the time that statement shocked most.  However, his vision proved that he is 
a man of insight and unusual perception. An excellent public performer with an actor’s 
sense for the dramatic, Botha was always the most popular speaker in defending the 
apartheid government on most international occasions. Two of his major diplomatic and 
political successes were on South Africa’s borders: the Nkomati Accord of 1984, which 
restored neighbourly relations between South Africa and Mozambique, and Namibia’s 
relatively trouble-free transition to independence in 1990.19 Botha played a key role in 
the negotiation process in Namibia.  This led to both Cuban and South African troops 
withdrawing from Angola and Namibia gaining independence.20 
In essence, “Diplomacy is the management of international relations by negotiation, 
the method by which these relations are adjusted and managed by ambassadors and en-
voys, the business or art of the diplomatist”. Ambassadors must, above all, be “inter-
preters” who can serve as channels of communication between the countries that send 
them and the host states.  An ambassador helps the host government understand the 
sending country’s points of view, and also must sensitise their own government to the  
points of view of the host state.  As the conduit of this channel of communication, the 
first concern of the ambassadors is always their own government’s interests.21 
The interests ambassadors can pursue for their own countries are manifold, and their 
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beliefs, attitudes and passions are crucial in facing an important situation requiring de-
cision-making.  In dealing with bilateral relations, an outstanding ambassador can exert 
his personal diplomacy to pursue the best interests of his own country; in contrast, he may 
cause huge damage for bilateral relations. Special envoys are persons sent by one state or 
another entity to meet the representatives of one or more other states or entities.22 The 
special envoy’s task is generally limited in both time and focus, and it may take him 
anywhere. When special envoys are employed in diplomacy between hostile states, it is 
not surprising that they are usually dispatched in secret, especially when contacts are at an 
early stage.23 The fact is that the employment of special envoys in diplomacy sometimes 
has numerous benefits for them.  Special envoys are those who are not only appointed by 
a political leader acting in his personal capacity, but are authorized with credibility in 
order to achieve their objectives in a less difficult way. 
Goodwill Ambassador 
UNESCO’s work and mission is extended and amplified by an outstanding group of ce-
lebrity advocates who have generously use their talents and status to help focus the 
world’s attention on UNESCO.  These special people, UNESCO’s Goodwill Ambas-
sadors, herald from all corners of the world and from the most diverse personal and 
professional backgrounds.24 In short, the Goodwill Ambassadors’ task is to make people 
more keenly aware of the importance of what is at stake and the role that each of us can 
play in the promotion of peace. Due to their successful careers and well-known reputa-
tions, the role they play is invaluable, especially in pursuit of the ideals of peace, justice, 
solidarity and mutual understanding. Goodwill Ambassadors are prominent personalities 
who have lent their names, talents and time to support UN programmes. 
Peter Ustinov. As an Oscar-winning actor, director, prolific author and humanitarian, 
Ustinov was hailed by countless politicians as one of the greatest human beings of the 
20th century. In later life he devoted much of his time to rescuing the reputation of Rus-
sia.  He traveled the world for 35 years as a Goodwill Ambassador and fund-raiser for 
the United Nations Children’s Fund.  UNICEF said his work raised millions of dol-
lars.25 
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Nicolaas Biegman. Ambassador Nicolaas Biegman (The Netherlands) is the only UN-
FPA Goodwill Ambassador whose “day job” is diplomacy.  Ambassador Biegman rep-
resented the Netherlands at the UN for many years and is a long-time friend of UNFPA.  
Mr. Biegman was the co-chairman of the 1994 International Conference on Population 
and Development in Cairo which focused on various aspects of women’s health and 
family planning.26 Mr. Biegman is a board member of the International Women’s 
Health Coalition and Chairman of the World Population Foundation. 
Nadine Gordimer. Winner of the 1991 Nobel Prize for literature, Ms. Nadine 
Gordimer’s commitment to social justice, her outspoken support for the disenfranchised 
and her commitment to the fight against HIV/AIDS have established her as a strong in-
ternational voice of the world’s poor.  Ms. Gordimer was named UNDP Goodwill 
Ambassador in 1998.  Since her appointment she has written articles and commentar-
ies about the plight of the poor for major national and international newspapers and ad-
dressed international conferences, including the Davos World Economic Forum. 
Mpule Kwelagobe. As a teenager, Ms. Kwelagobe was part of a UNFPA funded project 
aimed at teaching students about reproductive health through peer discussion.  She was 
the 1999 Miss Universe from Botswana and was appointed UNFPA Goodwill Ambas-
sador in 1999 as a special advocate on the issue of HIV/AIDS, particularly in relation to 
adolescents.27 Ms. Kwelagobe has lobbied the US Congress for better funding to fight 
HIV/AIDS in Africa and greater funding for UNFPA family planning programs. 
These are all internationally renowned figures, representing different United Nations 
funds and programs, and have devoted their time to fight poverty, HIV/AIDS and intol-
erance in order to improve the status of women.  They have also promoted educational 
and employment opportunities for youth, and protection for vulnerable groups such as 
children and refugees. To some extent, their influence and contribution is due to personal 
charisma and has proved to be very successful. 
Diplomacy has become a vital part of our lives, constituting as it does our principal 
means of tackling international problems and maintaining order in society. In general, the 
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growth of personal diplomacy has been brought about by changes in modern communi-
cations and the spread of regional collaboration in Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean 
and Southeast Asia.  Visits, too, have become synonymous with the presentational as-
pects of foreign policy.28  Furthermore, personal diplomacy plays an important part in 
alliances and other collaborative relations. 
Most heads of state or decision-makers in foreign policy participate in foreign affairs.  
This makes personal diplomacy more important than before.  This is especially true 
when concerning the visits between heads of state and heads of governments.  Those 
important contacts constitute the main theme of international relations. Indeed, personal 
diplomacy lies in proving that harmonious ideological postures, friendly relations, com-
plete amity and co-operation at all levels are not to be regarded as an absolute sine qua 
non for the establishment of diplomatic relations.29  Personal diplomacy has proved to be 
a very practical, convenient way of enhancing bilateral relations and mutual co-operation. 
Economic Diplomacy 
A major change was foreshadowed in the 1960s when trading states such as Britain began 
to grow increasingly concerned about their diminishing share of total world exports.  
This concern intensified against the background of the profound global economic tur-
bulence of the 1970s.  As a result, since that time commercial work has generally been 
regarded as a top priority within a unified diplomatic service.30 At the end of the second 
Clinton administration, newspapers, both in Europe and the United States, agreed that 
economic diplomacy was the most consistent thread in President Clinton’s foreign policy 
legacy.31 In other words, economic diplomacy is not a contemporary phenomenon. 
Economic factors such as an energy crisis, trade protectionism or financial fluctua-
tion greatly influence international relations and demand attention.  The term economic 
diplomacy may be defined in one of three ways; first, as the management of international 
relations to place emphasis on the economic dimension of a country’s external relations.  
A second and equally limited notion sees economic diplomacy as a set of strategies and 
tactics formulated and applied to achieve a fundamental restructuring of the existing in-
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ternational economic order.32  Without doubt, states are the major actors in dealing with 
international relations, and two-way interaction, contradiction and competition are 
common among countries in the international community. 
The third means of economic diplomacy, trade and commerce, promotes a nation’s 
prosperity.  Hence, economic diplomacy plays an important role in world politics and in 
international relations.  To some extent, it is the core work of the diplomatic service, 
whether in powerful countries or in underdeveloped countries.  MOFA has shown a 
remarkable aggressiveness with regard to bilateral commercial activities.  The countries 
that base their power on economic superiority and military supremacy are increasingly 
transferring their foreign policy priorities to the economic sphere.  These countries are 
endeavouring to accommodate their interests through a thrust of economic diplomacy.33 
Furthermore, diplomats of many countries make no secret that their prime task now 
is to look after the commercial interests of the state they represent.  More precisely, 
economic diplomacy involves the promotion of exports and investment as well as par-
ticipation in global economic governance and attempts at changing the global economic 
dispensation. In general, the PRC constantly seeks to disrupt the Taiwanese government’s 
internationalisation strategies, which in economic diplomacy relates to Taiwan’s attempts 
to secure accession to or association with international economic organisations.34  Bei-
jing is able to effectively counteract these efforts due to the recognition by the vast ma-
jority of other states of its “One China” sovereignty claim.  WTO membership would 
significantly enhance Taiwan’s economic diplomacy options.35  
There are some practical examples to prove that economic diplomacy has already 
been involved in modern diplomatic practices. 
Nepal. For the last two centuries trade has always been a key agenda in Nepal’s foreign 
policy.  Nepal’s “Economic Diplomacy” was directed toward India and Tibet in par-
ticular.  After a period of drift and ad-hoc policy formulations, Nepal has attempted to 
adjust to the global economic changes.  The current thrust of Nepal’s economic diplo-
macy focuses on expanding exports, attracting foreign direct investment in industries and 
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water resources and promoting tourism.36 It is obvious that Nepal seeks to prioritize 
foreign investment as a means to generate economic growth. 
Vietnam. Prime Minister Phan Van Khai has emphasised the need to promote Vietnam’s 
diplomacy to better serve economic development, saying “Top priority should be ac-
corded to economic diplomacy.”37 The prime minister instructed the newly-appointed 
ambassadors to carry out three important tasks to effectively serve national economic 
development. The first task was defined as that of seeking more outlets and expanding 
markets, including commodities, labor and service.  The second task was to seek foreign 
investment, expertise and modern technologies in a bid to help increase Vietnam’s labor 
productivity as well as the quality and competitiveness of its products.  The third was to 
further win support and assistance from the international community, including devel-
opment aid to help reduce poverty in the country.38 
Russia. Russia went through a wrenching period of economic decline and periodic po-
litical chaos during the early 1990s. Since Vladimir Putin won election in March 2000, 
the chief priority of Russia’s foreign policy in the sphere of international economic rela-
tions is assistance to the development of the national economy.  In conditions of glob-
alization, this goal cannot be attained without the broad involvement of Russia in the 
system of global economic relations.  The task is to create favorable external conditions 
for the evolution of a market economy in the country and to elaborate a new foreign 
economic line that would guarantee its effective involvement in the international division 
of labor.39 
Belgium. In the mid-1990s, economic diplomacy once again gained increasing attention 
and acquired a new dynamism and political acceptability.  In 1997 the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs of Belgium re-arranged its internal organization to be better equipped for the 
increased international competition it faced in world markets.  The multilateral and bi-
lateral economic desks were merged into the same directorate general.40 Furthermore, a 
number of specific strategies and co-ordination mechanisms were streamlined so as to 
become more effectual.  This included bringing together the people in charge of foreign 
trade in the different federal and regional administrations as well as the relevant profes-
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sional federations and business representatives. 
Nigeria. With regards to the national interest of Nigeria, the aim of the government is to 
concentrate on the effect of economic diplomacy on the promotion of export trade, at-
traction of direct foreign investment, facilitation of a new inflow of external public loans 
and grants and the preservation of the autonomy of the Nigerian state in foreign affairs.41 
A new diplomacy is needed in Nigeria.  There should be a carefully designed and me-
thodically implemented diplomacy of economic liberation with external and internal 
dimensions. The external dimension will consist of strategies aimed at promoting re-
gional economic integration and bringing about a radical restructuring of the existing 
international economic order.  The internal dimension will involve strategies directed at 
damming the sources of capital drain from Nigeria and mobilising the human, material 
and physical resources of Nigeria for self-reliant development.  The central strategy will 
be horizontal multilateralism.42 
South Africa. In the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s South Africa’s main function was to try to 
counter international criticism and condemnation.  South Africa’s ED also changed in 
nature.  During the height of sanctions and disinvestments, countering these forms of 
punitive economic diplomacy became its main focus.  Since the political change there 
and with a renewed emphasis on economic diplomacy, South Africa can join hands with 
“like-minded” countries on multilateral issues for purposes of shaping the global envi-
ronment to make it a “friendlier” place for developing economies.43 
Both the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the Department of Foreign 
Affairs (DFA) are responsible for the promoting of exports and external trade.  
Co-operation between the DTI and DFA would attract investment and new business more 
easily.  Without doubt, the major government agency involved in export promotion is the 
Directorate: Export Trade Promotion of the DTI.  The functions of the directorate are “to 
promote exports by developing the export market and providing assistance to South Af-
rican exporters to encourage the creation of an export culture in SA, to formulate and 
maintain a long-term plan aimed at promoting exports and to manage the personnel and 
functions of the Department’s offices abroad.”44 
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More specifically, the objectives pursued by the foreign trade representatives are to 
promote South African exports, to encourage foreign investment in SA, to encourage 
technology transfers between SA and other countries, and to improve bilateral relations 
between SA and the host country. South Africa maintains formal trade relations with 
various other countries by means of treaties, trade agreements and membership in inter-
national institutions concerned with trade,45 economic and political interests. 
Economic Sanctions 
Economic sanctions means deliberate government actions to inflict economic deprivation 
on a target state or society through the limitation or cessation of customary economic 
relations.46  The recent record of sanctions is a mix of successes and failures.  The Se-
curity Council imposed sanctions only twice between 1945 and 1990 but eight times 
between 1990 and 1994.47  The need to use economic sanctions more often as an in-
strument of modern diplomacy increases the probability of political trade frictions.48 
Sanctions generally serve three functions.  They send a signal of international 
concern to an offending state, seek to modify the unacceptable behavior of a state toward 
other states or against its own citizens and warn of stronger actions to follow, including 
the use of force.  Most importantly, boycotts and embargoes should only be used when 
other non-military measures have failed or are expected to fail.  Moreover, great effec-
tiveness of threats due to greater political and economic linkage may increase demand for 
boycotts and embargoes.49 
The Soviet Union and Afghanistan. After the Soviet Union’s 1979 intervention in Af-
ghanistan, the United States imposed a partial embargo on the sale of grain to the country 
and attempted to organise a boycott of the 1980 Moscow Summer Olympics.  The grain 
embargo failed to stop the flow of agricultural produce to the Soviet Union largely be-
cause of the countries (principally Argentina) which increased their exports to thwart the 
embargo.50 
Yugoslavia. Shortly after the EC decided to impose tighter economic sanctions, the Se-
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curity Council on May 30, 1992, by a vote of 13-0 (with China and Zimbabwe abstaining), 
approved a complete economic embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), 
i.e. Serbia and Montenegro.  Sanctions were not quick, sharp or tight enough to restrain 
FRY support for Bosnian Serb aggression, but they did have a huge impact on the Serbian 
economy and society.  After four years of conflict, the combination of NATO air attacks 
on Serb-held areas of Bosnia and cumulative deprivations caused by sanctions against 
Serbia proper appeared to have brought Serbian leader, Slobodan Milosevic to the bar-
gaining table with Bosnia and Croatia in Dayton, Ohio.51 
South Africa and Apartheid. In 1981, the Reagan administration adopted toward South 
Africa a policy it termed constructive engagement.  The broad purpose was a soft dip-
lomatic approach to the Pretoria regime.  Because the South African economy is rela-
tively small as well as being open and vulnerable to the West, it would suffer considerable 
hardship if certain forms of well-enforced economic sanctions were imposed by its major 
trade and investment partners.52 In April 1994 apartheid was officially demolished; most 
political scientists believe that the economic sanctions contributed towards this historic 
moment. 
Iraq. Within 24 hours of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, the Security 
Council had condemned the invasion and four days later it voted to impose Resolution 
661, at the insistence of the United States, the most comprehensive, rapidly applied 
sanctions in the history of the UN.53 After more than 5 years, it is still impossible to reach 
a definite judgement of the role that sanctions played in affecting Iraqi behavior.  Sus-
taining sanctions after the war has been of undeniable value during the past five years.  
The Iraqi regime then did not have the power to rebuild the military and cannot but 
eliminate weapons of mass destruction. Iraqi officials have mounted a vigorous campaign 
to draw attention to the suffering among children and the elderly in an effort to gain 
unilateral support for lifting sanctions.54 
On 14 April 1995, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Se-
curity Council adopted Resolution 986, establishing the “oil-for-food” program.  This 
gave Iraq another opportunity to sell oil in order to finance the purchase of humanitarian 
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goods, and various mandated United Nations activities concerning Iraq.55  The first Iraqi 
oil under the oil-for-food program was exported in December 1996 and the first shipment 
of food arrived in March 1997. As of March 2003, the programme had helped to improve 
the overall social-economic conditions of the Iraqi people countrywide.  It had prevented 
the further degradation of public services and infrastructure, and in several areas had 
stabilised and improved access to such services.  Despite its achievements, however, the 
Oil-for-Food Programme was never intended to be a substitute for normal economic ac-
tivity, and as of 20 March 2003, much remained to be done to improve humanitarian 
conditions for the Iraqi people.56 
Three kinds of sanctions can be classified: universal, multilateral and unilateral 
sanctions.  Included are embargoes, boycotts, dumping, disinvestments and imposition 
of tariffs or quotas. 
The suitability of sanctions as instruments of persuasion is, therefore, customarily 
questioned whenever they are proposed or imposed.  Recent examples included the OAS 
embargo of Haiti to force the military junta to step down, the embargo of North Korea to 
dissuade it from building a nuclear bomb, the economic sanctions against the rebel army 
Unita in Angola and US threats of trade sanctions against China in 1996 in response to its 
shipment of cruise missiles to Iran and its missile tests near Taiwan.57 
Despite the apparent virtues of UN sanctions in terms of legitimacy and universality, 
attention in recent years has focused on their questionable achievements and adverse 
consequences.  In particular, the cost of imposing sanctions is unevenly spread, while 
comprehensive measures harm the civilian population in the target and spare those re-
sponsible for the offending policies.58 
The use of economic sanctions is a means of exercising influence over the domestic, 
political and economic arrangements of another country. However, economic sanctions 
as an instrument of policy can be effective only under certain circumstances. First, there 
is no absolute means of solving the problems; hence, in selecting proper tools in very 
critical situations and with precise judgement, the problem can be solved smoothly.  
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Second, there are many factors both in the international and internal environment, which 
are hard to control, and this is a common problem in dealing with economic sanctions. 
Furthermore, if sanctions are to move from the realm of symbolic gestures to the world of 
effective diplomatic tools, a distinction must be made not only between unilateral and 
multilateral sanctions, but also between financial and trade sanctions. 
Sanctions nowadays can become a sharper tool of preventive action and can be used 
by nations to protest abuses and enforce norms of behaviour between states.  Conse-
quently, we can expect sanctions to remain popular. Apart from the questions of diver-
gence and primacy, economic diplomacy may become a direct instrument of foreign 
policy.  The American government has always put foreign trade, foreign aid and national 
security into a package for overall consideration.  In Taiwan, the government also deals 
with negotiation and participation in the international economic organizations, estab-
lishing the ICDF as its final priority.  In short, both small and large put emphasis on this 
economic diplomacy. 
Today economic diplomacy can easily be compared in intensity and in scope with 
the commercial diplomacy of the European states during the nineteenth century or with 
the dollar diplomacy under the American president William Howard Taft.  From a global 
perspective, APEC, WTO, OEOD, OPEC, and IAEA among others will become more 
and more important in economic interdependence and interactions, and also in solving 
international economic disputes.  From a state’s point of view, developing countries and 
countries in transition are bound to follow the example of the most advanced countries in 
determining their priorities in the domain of foreign policy and those in the economic 
sphere.59 
It is obvious that conventional French economic diplomacy is adapting and con-
tributing to the bilateral and multilateral success of important economic affairs, and one 
of the ultimate objectives of Japan’s economic diplomacy is to reinforce and advance the 
Japanese economy by contributing to the further development of the global economy.60 
Nowadays, economic diplomacy has become a vital component of foreign policy.  It 
covers a variety of concrete areas such as investment co-operation, interaction with in-
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ternational economic organisations, financial institutions and regional structures, and 
involvement in the analysis and search for solutions to global economic challenges. 
The political uses of trade involve diplomacy in initiatives to develop goodwill, 
promote regional co-operation, gain political influence or strategic assets within another 
state, and to coerce sanctions and other forms of punitive behavior.61 Economic diplo-
macy usually forces relations instead of using discreet activities such as those used in 
traditional diplomacy.  The task is to constantly assess the relationship between national 
trade interests and the country’s foreign policy and reconcile as necessary conflicting 
prospects for external trade co-operation and promotion.62 It is clear that of all the sectors 
of external policy, economic diplomacy had shown the greatest degree of growth. 
Foreign Aid 
One of the truly new phenomena of the post-World War II period has been the emergence 
of international aid as an instrument of foreign policy.  Foreign aid is generally consid-
ered to be the provision of assistance on concessional terms for promoting development.  
The concessional aspect of these resource transfers is usually measured from the donor’s 
point of view although it can also be measured from the point of view of the recipient, a 
measurement that invariably produces a lower valuation.63  More precisely, an aid in-
dustry has evolved with three groups of protagonists, namely the donors, the recipients 
and the facilitators.  The first group includes the governments of the developed world 
operating through their own agencies: multilateral agencies such as the World Bank, 
non-governmental organisations such as the Red Cross; and charities such as Oxfam and 
World Vision.  The recipients are the poorer nations of the world and their citizens.  
They are known variously as less developed countries (LDCs), developing countries 
(DCs) and the third world.  Assistance may be given to the governments, to individuals 
or to organizations in a country.  The final group, the facilitators comprise the firms and 
individuals that assist in the provision of aid.  These include consultants, construction 
firms, auditors and myriad other activities.64 
The United States was the world’s top foreign aid donor in 2003, disbursing a 
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combined $15.79 billion, up 18.8% from the year before.65 The United States, under the 
leadership of President Truman, launched the Marshall Plan and the Point Four Program.  
Although vastly different in scope and resources, the two programs together formed the 
basis for what became known as the US foreign aid program.  Furthermore, the Or-
ganization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and Development As-
sistance Committee (DAC) also played an important role in foreign aid. In essence, the 
donor’s country could provide goods, techniques or funds to the recipient country.  
Usually, there are four ways of processing foreign aid: grants, loans (soft loans and tied 
loans), technical assistance and military aid. 
The study of foreign aid is informed by the three major theoretical approaches of 
international relations: realism, neo-realism and liberalism.  In accordance with a 
worldview that stresses the absence of a supranational coercive authority, realists con-
sider aid as a foreign policy instrument that enables donor states to pursue their national 
interests.  Neo-Marxists, on the other hand, understand aid as a contemporary manifes-
tation of colonialism and imperialism that helps reproduce capital relations between de-
veloped and developing countries.  Finally, for liberals, aid stands as a projection abroad 
of national values and social forces, as well as an instrument used by states to promote 
interdependence and international justice.66 In international politics, the view of realists 
should be given priority. 
Among political scientists, the term “foreign aid” is generally more familiar than 
alternatives such as “development assistance” or “development co-operation”.  All the 
donor countries in the world have almost the same beliefs: namely that it is economically 
correct to help each other, politically correct to form alliances and keep good relations, in 
keeping with human rights to pay respect to all, to keep the protection of the environment 
and development balanced, and give humanitarian aid.67 Foreign aid is a process de-
signed ostensibly to assist the economic development of the less developed countries of 
the world.  However, this aid is often seen as subordinate to motives of self-interest on 
the part of the donor.68 For example, security and strategic goals are the main concern of 
the American Aid policy.  Among all the donor countries the political consideration of 
foreign aid far surpasses the economic consideration.  Diplomatic advantage always is 
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the first guideline. 
The population of Africa is one-eighth of the world population, but it receives about 
45% of all UN aid.  It is known to everyone that foreign aid from wealthy countries is 
necessary, but the task of how to execute and how to judge the priorities, especially the 
ways of processing, will determine its success or failure. Ambassador Yang, who had 
conducted ROC’s foreign aid to African countries for more than 30 years, said there are 
three points that should be considered: 
y Understanding the goal and meaning of foreign policy; 
y The factor of executor; 
y The attitude of the recipient countries.69 
 
Foreign aid is not just a give-and-take game but a tool of foreign policy which in-
fluences relations.  Fifty years have passed since the initiation of foreign aid.  It is still a 
common phenomenon in the international community and has entered into the 21st cen-
tury with new development. 
Development 
United States. Professor Carol Lancaster described the four major purposes of US for-
eign aid as: (1) Peacemaking, (2) Addressing trans-national issues, (3) Providing hu-
manitarian relief, and (4) Advancing humane concerns abroad.70 Surprisingly, American 
diplomacy enabled Israel and Egypt to take the military and political risks.  Thus, Israel 
received the unprecedented grant of US$4 billion to relocate its military bases in the 
Sinan Peninsula to the Negev, and Egypt became a regular recipient of US military aid, 
starting with an initial allocation of US$1.5 billion.71 Israel is the largest recipient of US 
aid in the world.  Three quarters of the military aid to Israel goes for importing US-made 
military equipment such as F-16’s and Apache attack helicopters.  This creates a job 
market for US citizens and transforms Palestine into a test ground for US-made weap-
onry.72 
Foreign assistance has played an important role in US relations with sub-Saharan 
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African countries since their independence.  The establishment of US diplomatic rela-
tions with newly independent governments has been normally accompanied by the ini-
tiation of bilateral aid programs. For so many years the emphasis of US aid to Africa has 
been to promote US security and political interests on the continent.  In May 2004 Le-
sotho and Mozambique were elected among a group of eight African countries likely to 
get a substantial increase in US aid for pursuing what is viewed as sound policies.  Thus, 
it indicates that ruling justly, investing in people and economic reform are also important 
for deciding who receives US aid. In short, US aid is intended to strengthen their Western 
political orientation, to promote long-term economic development, to ensure the stability 
of the African countries and to facilitate access to African markets and resources for US 
business. 
Japan. In the economic development of Pakistan, Japan is the most important donor, 
especially in the fields of education, health and family planning.  By the end of 2002, 
China was the recipient of over $24.2 billion through the Official Development Assis-
tance (ODA) in the form of loans, aid grants and technical assistance.73 As Sri Lanka’s 
largest donor country, Japan has supplied 50% of the entire amount of international aid to 
Sri Lanka, approaching two times the amount of the Asian Development Bank, the 
country’s second largest donor.  The above-mentioned facts prove that Japan plays an 
important role as an economic power in the development of those countries. In Africa, 
Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi said Japan would be giving priority to poverty reduction 
and integration of Africa into the world economy in collaboration not only with other 
donor countries and international organizations, but also with fellow Asian countries with 
interests in Africa.74  Other areas which Japan will address include human resource de-
velopment and private sector growth as well as primary education, health and clean water 
supplies. 
Thrusts of Japan’s aid to Africa are human resource development, providing skills 
training for Africans, promoting Africa’s private sector and setting up an Asian-Africa 
Investment Information centre.  In recent years, even though Japan has faced severe fi-
nancial circumstances, it remains committed to playing a leading role in development 
co-operation with Africa. According to an annual list released by OECD, Japan main-
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tained its position in second place in the ranking of the world’s 22 major foreign aid 
donors in 2003 for the third year in a row.75  Noting the longstanding fact that Japan is a 
country that has renounced the goal of becoming a military superpower, Japan is well 
placed to help developing countries who are seeking to introduce more industrialised 
countries’ institutions and policies.  Economic aid has helped Japan to recover its in-
ternational credibility, while at the same time it could act as a powerful tool in achieving 
its foreign policy goals. 
France. In the 1980s, the Africa policy of France was apparent in the question of military 
support for African states and their regimes, either by direct intervention or by training 
troops and the supply of armaments and equipment.  France expects its close political 
and military co-operation, in particular with the francophone regimes, to balance out its 
competitiveness. Another indicator of Africa’s unique importance to the French economy 
is the fact that about 66% of French investments went to Africa in 1975. 76   A 
non-democratic former colony gets about twice as much aid from its former colonizer as a 
democratic non-colony nation.  Former colonies closed to trade get more than open 
non-colonies.  This is especially true of French aid.77 
In recent years, France has provided a substantial portion of its aid in the form of 
debt relief.  These debt cancellations will be tied to poverty reduction within an inter-
nationally agreed framework.  In order to enhance the friendly and co-operative relations 
between France and Vietnam, the French Minister of Transport, Gilles de Robien, said in 
April 2004 that France has helped finance a number of Vietnamese transport projects 
totaling 90 million euros since 1991.78 France ranks third among the 22 member coun-
tries of the Development Assistance Committee in terms of the absolute amount of its 
official development assistance.  The French development co-operation system is cur-
rently undergoing major reform, with the aid system being refocused around two cores, 
namely the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Finance 
and Industry becoming one main operating agency, the Agence Francaise de Develop-
ment (AFD).79  France decided in February 2002 to unite all of the project aid managed 
by the AFD.  Furthermore, technical co-operation involved in investment projects would 
be united, whatever the amount involved. 
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Russia. Between 1955 and 1976, the Soviet Union approved $3,259 million in economic 
aid to African countries.  Until 1973, the single largest recipient of Soviet economic aid 
was Egypt, which received more than 40 percent of the total.80  All African states except 
Egypt and South Africa have to import Soviet Union’s military requirements. More pre-
cisely, there are four types of Soviet economic assistance: loans, trade credits granted to 
governments, short term credits granted by Soviet foreign trade organizations to finance 
their exports in the context of bilateral cleaning agreements, and scholarship programs.81  
It is obvious that the Soviet Union came to the assistance of African states in order to 
further its own interests.  Aid is concentrated on actual or would be allies, important 
regional powers and where major natural resource development projects of direct interest 
to the Soviet bloc are under way.82 In the 1980s, compared with some western European 
countries and the US, the Soviet aid to Africa was small and concentrated in incidence.  
Not only were the terms of loans harder, but the grant element was lower, than for De-
velopment Assistance Committee aid. Only in the areas of technical assistance and 
scholarship provision does the Soviet Union have an impressive record.83 
Eight years after communism collapsed in 1991, Russia’s Soviet-era debt totals 
about US$69 billion owed to other governments and private banks.  Russia balks at 
paying the Soviet era debts, which includes money owed by republics that are now in-
dependent, in addition to the huge amounts of financial help it has received from other 
developed countries. In June 1999, German Chancellor Schroeder said to the Russian 
Prime Minister that Germany promised to press the International Monetary Fund to re-
lease US$4.5 billion of Western aid for Russia.84  Russia has completely changed from a 
donor country in the 1970s and 1980s to a recipient country.  Since Russia has experi-
enced serious social and economic upheaval, Russia’s aid role nowadays is only hu-
manitarian: for example, in the war in Kosovo in 1999 and the train tragedy in North 
Korea in April 2004. 
Perception 
In order to understand the influence of foreign aid on recipient countries, there are some 
examples that need to be noted.  Eritrea believed foreign aid breeds both corruption and 
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dependency.  Although poor, Eritrea accepts foreign aid only under certain circum-
stances.  It sees how foreign aid in some countries has been used to keep dictatorial, 
repressive regimes in power; and how it thwarts social and political change.  To offset 
what it sees as dangerous and seductive programs, Eritrea insists that foreign aid be ad-
ministered by Eritreans and not by foreigners.85 
Nepal has been a recipient of foreign assistance since 1952.  During the 1950s, with 
the exception of scholarships, all aid was in the form of grants.  In the 1970s 11 UN 
agencies, seven multilateral lending agencies and eight private agencies had participated 
in aid programs.  At least 17 countries offered bilateral assistance.  Between 1984 and 
1987, foreign aid as a percentage of the GNP increased from under eight percent to almost 
13 percent.86  China offered aid to help Nepal to build the Kothmandukodari and Prithin 
highways, clear examples of strategy motives to both reduce Nepal’s economic de-
pendence on India and the West, and create a market for Chinese technical and material 
exports.87 
In order to facilitate foreign capital inflow and for foreign aid programs in Georgia, 
the Georgian Government stipulated goals for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  The main 
activities for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia concerning foreign aid are as 
follows: Co-ordination of financial and technical assistance received from foreign coun-
tries and international organisations, participation in negotiations and meetings with 
foreign countries and international organisations, and participation in the process of 
elaboration of financial and technical agreements.  
India has had one of the lowest rates of growth of all developing countries and re-
mains one of the poorest countries in the world after almost 45 years of aid-financed, 
centrally planned development.  Foreign aid has directly financed and sustained India’s 
centralized-planning and control framework and thereby financed the growth of one of 
the non-Communist world’s largest and most inefficient public sectors.  In short, India is 
a paradigmatic case of the failure of government-sponsored aid; it stands as a dramatic 
testimonial to show that such aid should go the way of the socialist development model it 
has bankrolled for decades.88 
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In fact, foreign aid is predominantly a public activity in which governments deal 
with each other.  Hundreds of millions of people in Thailand, South Korea, Taiwan, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Peru, Singapore, Costa Rica, Chile and other countries have made 
tremendous progress with the help of development assistance.  Aid played a positive role 
in laying some of the key foundations for subsequent development by helping to build up 
the physical and social infrastructure of South Korea.89   
However, there are also some arguments about foreign aid having a number of 
negative effects.  Foreign aid leads to a culture of dependency: dependency theory ar-
gues that aid ensures the continuation of the LDCs on the periphery and the dominance of 
the MDCs in the core.  Foreign aid distorts markets: transfers of low interest conces-
sionary grants to fill the savings or foreign exchange gaps could interfere in the market 
determination of interest rates and exchange rates.  Foreign aid could fall into the hands 
of corrupt officials.90  Foreign aid causes resentment among nations that receive none or 
less than they feel they deserve. 
Various critics have repeatedly pointed out that foreign aid not only fails to en-
courage reform, but often stifles it.  Development economist Peter Bauer has said for-
eign aid has contributed substantially to the politicisation of life in the third world.  It 
augments the resources of government compared to the private sector, and the criteria of 
allocation tend to favour the government which is trying to establish state control. For-
eign aid is often difficult for countries to use.  Recipients generally have weak govern-
ments and they are unable to manage aid projects. Furthermore, third world nations want 
trade, not aid. Decades of financial transfers have not fostered economic growth.  Many 
nations have been losing ground.  Seventy developing states are poorer today than they 
were in 1980 and 43 than they were in 1970.  Aid levels do not correlate with economic 
growth. 
Gunmar Myrdal, the Swedish economist and Nobel Prize winner who has been 
called “the father of all progressive programs to aid the world,” concludes that the only 
acceptable form of aid is that which alleviates extreme poverty or relieves the effects of 
catastrophes such as drought and flood.91 The international community’s experiences 
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with conflicts and national disasters in the 1990s led to big changes in the scope, funding 
and profile of humanitarian aid.  Trends guarantee that humanitarian aid will remain 
enormously important for the United States – the world’s largest humanitarian donor. 
Foreign aid consists of government-to-government subsidies.  They are funded 
through taxes and constitute a wealth transfer between governments.  Any aid that is 
subsequently passed down to the poor of developing countries is secondary and incidental; 
the recipient country’s government decides where and how much money actually reaches 
its citizens.  The most conspicuous result of subsidies is the dependence of the recipient 
countries upon the benefactor.  Loans and grants are tied to the incidence of poverty; 
therefore Third World leaders are motivated to stay within the loan/grant criteria, a per-
verse incentive to keep their nation in poverty.92 
In fact, aid constitutes a fundamental, enduring aspect of north-south relations and a 
major financial transfer.  Even though redistributing wealth from rich to poor does little 
to ameliorate the effects of poverty, aid smoothes international relations and provides 
employment, in both donor countries and in Africa, and in both public agencies and in 
NGOs.  Aid can also be morally justified. In the 21st century, the four major goals of US 
foreign aid are assisting fragile and failing states, providing humanitarian assistance in 
natural and man-made disasters, supporting US geo-strategic interests and addressing 
global concerns such as AIDS.93 Top recipients of US aid are usually countries of high 
security concern, including Israel, Pakistan, Jordan, Columbia and Russia in recent years.  
Most aid from Japan, Korea, Australia and New Zealand, by contrast, goes to neighboring 
Asian and Pacific Island nations. 
In September 2002, Ms. Susan Whelan, Minister for International Cooperation, is-
sued a policy statement that details the direction of Canada’s aid programming.  The aid 
programs run by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) will continue 
to focus on its four social development priorities – Health and Nutrition, AIDS prevention, 
Basic Education and Child Protection – while at the same time strengthening its invest-
ment in rural development, which includes agriculture, water and the environment.94 
Prime Minister Jean Chretien is committed to increasing foreign aid by at least eight 
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percent every year, of which at least half will be directed to Africa.  This should double 
the level of Canadian aid by the end of the decade. 
Taiwan’s economic prosperity is founded on the generous assistance provided by the 
UN and US when Taiwan experienced hardship. As a member of the international 
community, Taiwan has the ability and intention to provide feedback to the countries in 
need, and that’s why Taiwan’s humanitarian assistance can be seen in the earthquake of 
Turkey, in the catastrophe of Iraq and in the winter storm of Mongolia. 
The following main points should be noted: 
y Foreign aid is still the tool of foreign policy in the name of a bilateral act as a means of 
supporting national interests and reaching goals of diplomacy. 
y Foreign aid may play a supplementary role in the development process, but this role 
can always be made more effective if the interests and predictions of donors give way 
to a less selfish desire to assist the development of the third world. 
y The partnership among donors, non-governmental organizations, and the private 
sector and host countries is more important than ever, and with fewer political, eco-
nomic and diplomatic factors involved, foreign aid could be conducted more suc-
cessfully. 
y Often because of domestic political and bureaucratic factors that influence their aid, 
donors have been limited in their capacity to realize the economic, political and social 
changes needed to further development in Africa. 
Today, 22 rich countries run development programs, donating approximately $60 
billion to development areas.  Most important, private and voluntary organizations, 
corporations, churches and individuals are channeling more aid than government bodies.  
Hence, review and renewal of the approach to foreign aid is an urgent matter. 
Conference Diplomacy 
In the 20th century, conference diplomacy has been widely used on many international 
occasions, constitutins a profound influence in diplomatic practice.  As the number of 
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sovereign states has constantly increased over a period of 40 years, the new technological 
environment has made the world progressively grow smaller.  Hence, numerous new 
problems require joint solutions and the search for possible answers to them calls for a 
multilateral effort. Without doubt, the growth of multilateralism has led to the emergence 
of new diplomatic styles and methods in the quest to achieve common objectives.  These 
are observed both at occasional and non-institutionalised international conferences, and 
in the permanent and structurally more defined international organizations. 
Conference diplomacy may be defined as diplomacy as carried out in and in relation 
to conducting diplomatic negotiations and as the best means to settle difficult interna-
tional issues. In fact, the simplest way to distinguish conferences is on the basis of their 
objectives.  Intergovernmental conferences are deliberative, legislative or informative. 
y A deliberative conference concentrates on general discussions and exchanges of points 
of view on certain topics; 
y A legislative conference endeavors to make recommendations to governments or make 
decisions which are binding upon governments; 
y An informal conference has as its main purpose the international exchange of infor-
mation on specific questions.95 
Furthermore, the purposes of conference diplomacy reveal the following eight 
categories: 
y To serve as a forum for general discussion of broad or specific issues; 
y To make non-binding recommendations to governments or international organiza-
tions; 
y To make decisions binding upon governments; 
y To make decisions giving guidance or instructions to the secretariat of an intergov-
ernmental organization, or on the way in which a program financed by governments 
should be administered; 
y To negotiate and draft a treaty or other formal international instruments; 
y To provide for the international exchange of information; 
y To provide for the pledging of voluntary contributions to international programs; 
y To review progress under an agreement or a treaty concluded earlier.96 
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The object of a conference is to discuss problems and find solutions that are so far as 
possible acceptable to all participants, and this process is carried out by the traditional 
methods of diplomacy.  International conferences are a playground and battlefield at the 
same time.  Representatives will fight, ignore and agree. In short, our history is made up 
of many conferences. The imperial conferences, Congress of Vienna, Yalta Conference, 
League of Nations and the United Nations are good examples of conferences.  The 
United Nations has helped in keeping peace and securing justice in international affairs.  
It has also helped to feed poor countries, establish foreign law and keep peace between 
rival countries. 
One of the prevailing assumptions of the protagonists of conference diplomacy is 
that international conflict is essentially the product of misunderstanding and of a failure in 
communications, and that these could be avoided if those ultimately responsible for the 
making of foreign policy could meet together to discuss matters without the complication 
of intermediaries.97 Thus, conference diplomacy is an essential and powerful instrument 
for avoiding potential conflicts, solving actual conflict, and for the development and 
strengthening of peaceful relations between states. 
Conference diplomacy differs from traditional bilateral diplomacy in that delegates 
do not deal with relations between their home country and the host country.  Rather, they 
attend meetings within different organizations and defend their national interests, while at 
the same time pursuing interests that are shared by a large community of nations.98If 
conference diplomacy has prospered because it has been felt to be a valuable device for 
advancing negotiations between numerous parties simultaneously, it has also gained 
support because of the impetus that it can give to bilateral diplomacy.99 This point has 
two aspects.  First, a multilateral conference can provide opportunities for participants to 
discuss matters outside the formal agenda and that are only of immediate concern to 
themselves.  Second, powerful mediators can hold multilateral conferences in order to 
initiate a series of essentially bilateral negotiations that subsequently develop elsewhere. 
Owing to the number of intergovernmental organizations that has raisen dramati-
cally, the number of international conferences has increased at a fantastic rate.  In 1985, 
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there were 3,868 conferences in the UN buildings in New York and 7,138 conferences in 
Geneva.  Furthermore, economic, financial, social and cultural issues have been more 
prominent because of the terms of the agenda, whereas in the old days issues of peace and 
war dominated the international conference scenes.  More specific, in principle, ac-
cording to the statutes and rules of procedure of most organiztions, the old habits of ar-
riving at decisions unanimously has been replaced by majority decision-taking.100 
It is also fair to note that some multilateral conferences have become permanent 
under the impact of the enduring “functionalist” notion that it is out of such structures that 
regional and perhaps even ultimately global integration will grow.101  Nevertheless, it 
seems clear that the multilateral conferences that achieve permanent status do so prin-
cipally because the problem with which they were established to grapple is itself seen as a 
permanent problem. 
Cooperation 
Conference diplomacy reflects the world of today, a world of more than 190 states, many 
of which, habitually, have to get together in order to reach an effective agreement on is-
sues of importance.  Whether multilateral conferences are ad hoc or permanent, they 
tend to share similar procedural problems – though the solutions with which they come up 
are by no means identical.  Among others, these problems include questions of venue, 
participation, agenda, style of proceedings and decision-making.102  In most intergov-
ernmental conferences four main actors can be detected: the delegation, as representa-
tives of their governments; the secretariat and its executive head; the presiding officer; 
and various groups of governments.103 In fact, diplomacy has changed in the course of 
time and has requirements to be met by the ideal diplomatist.  An ideal conference dip-
lomat must have the following characteristics: truthfulness, precision, a  good temper, 
patience, modesty, zeal, adaptability, loyalty, physical and mental endurance, speed, 
linguistic versatility and courage.104  
During conference diplomacy, pre-negotiation plays a crucial role in preparing the 
ground for negotiation.  It includes the agreeing on goals, agenda setting, voting and 
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other aspects.  There are no guarantees for successful negotiations.  A comprehensive 
delineation of topics to be discussed and goals to be reached can go a long way toward 
preventing a breakdown of talks.  In short, the importance of a pre-negotiation procedure 
is crucial, but must address all the involved parties if they are ultimately to succeed.105  
Another important thing is procedure, which can be very useful in inter-state relations.  It 
performs a constructive function in forging compromise, adjuring and softening a crisis, 
and creating a formal basis for a dialogue even if a result is not immediately visible.  
Even if negotiations are long, it is better not to break up a conference, as the summoning 
of a new one may prove very difficult. 
It is either governments themselves or existing international organisations that end 
up sponsoring the larger multilateral conferences that do much of the business of creating 
international regimes.  Beginning in 1972, with a Swedish-sponsored global conference 
on international environmental matters, a regularized but informal global conference 
system has developed.  Governments return to the same topics over and over again, often 
in a ten-year rotation.106  Thus, there were global conferences on women in 1975, 1985 
and 1995; conferences on population in 1974, 1984 and 1994; and governments debated 
environmental questions in a meeting in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in 1992 and in a meeting in 
Johannesburg, South Africa, in 2002. 
It is well known that groups of delegations undertake common functions in the 
conference framework.  There are constant shifts in the alignments of nations in con-
ference diplomacy.  The fundamental types of groups are political and cultural, eco-
nomic development, regional, and economic treaty-linked states.107 The functions per-
formed by groups can be distinguished in the ascending order of commitment by the 
members:  
1. To exchange information on all or part of an agenda of a conference, either in advance 
or during a conference. 
2. To develop common general positions on important agenda items, without definite 
voting commitment. 
3. To develop common positions on certain agenda items or initiatives with agreement on 
how to vote. 
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4. To agree on candidates to be put forward by the group or by a common vote for can-
didates from outside the group. 
5. To agree on a common spokesman and on the contents of the statements to be deliv-
ered. 
6. To undertake joint action for or against a certain proposal 
Where majority voting is employed there are typically differences in the treatment of 
procedural and substantive issues.  Some international organisations employ weighted 
voting while others do not, and some require a special majority while others require only 
a simple majority (over 50 percent).108 Ambiguous formulations are used in diplomacy 
to allow for a degree of consensus when parties in a negotiation cannot come to an 
agreement.  In common parlance the skill of finding formulations which avoid giving 
offence and are at the same time acceptable to all sides is treated with justifiable respect 
and often referred to as a “diplomatic” form of expression.  In conference diplomacy, 
while a party may push for precise language in stipulating claims or limits to commit-
ments, it may seek ambiguity to allay anxieties on either side or to secure a margin for 
subsequent interpretation. 
Some important conferences have had an impact on the social development of hu-
man history. 
Law of the Sea Conference (1982).  This was the longest multilateral negotiation in 
history and lasted for 12 years.  It began in 1970 because it was at that session of the 
General Assembly that the seabed and the ocean floor and their resources as well as the 
resources of the subsoil beyond the limits of national jurisdiction were declared “the 
common heritage of mankind”.  Finally, the conference agreed on a new division of the 
seas of the world, a new definition of the freedom of the seas by the creation of the 
economic zone.  The conference also produced new approaches to the notion of con-
sensus as well as a “cooling-off-period” within which to find a compromise solution. 
United Nations General Assembly’s Special Session on the Critical Economic 
Situation in Africa (1986). The contribution of conference diplomacy to the success of 
the session was careful preparation, and the process of negotiation and the role of the 
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secretariat contributed to the success.  The achievement of the special session was first 
and foremost a political success for Africa.  Its substantive success should rather be 
measured in terms of the responsible, realistic and non-rhetorical way in which for the 
first time in the United Nation’s history internal problems of one continent comprising 
more that 50 member states were addressed.  It was of political importance as the rec-
ognition of a new beginning of Africa’s development was the basis for the consensus 
reached.  Conference diplomacy, its format and its setting at the United Nations, facili-
tated this achievement in an interplay of governments, secretariats and outside inter-
ests.109 
XII Summit Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement (1998).The NAM stood 
firmly for the principles of active, peaceful co-existence and maintenance and consoli-
dation of peace and security, as well as economic development among developing na-
tions of the world.  In its more than 40 years of existence, NAM has always been able 
to forge a strong alliance of developing countries in the struggle against colonialism, ra-
cism and apartheid.  President Nelson Mandela said, “As for my own commitment of 
Africa, our people’s dream of an African Renaissance, as a consequence of which we 
will overcome a devastating past and ensure that ours also becomes a continent of de-
mocracy and peace, respect for human rights, development, prosperity and the restora-
tion of the dignity of all Africans.”110  Then Deputy President of the Republic of South 
Africa, Thabo Mbeki said: “We trust that this movement, which stood firmly with us as 
we fought for the end of colonial and apartheid rule, will walk with us in a firm and 
meaningful South-South partnership, a critical element of whose agenda must be the 
achievement of an African Renaissance.” 
World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Rela-
tion Intolerance (2001).The conference themes were the sources, causes, forms and 
temporary manifestations of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intol-
erance, measures of prevention, education and protection aimed at eradication at national, 
regional and international levels, provision of effective remedies, recourse, redress and 
other measures, strategies to achieve full and effective equality, including international 
co-operation and enhancement of the United Nations and other international mechanisms 
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in combating.111  Deputy President Jacob Zuma said, “Most of these issues are critical to 
the resolution of fundamental problems in the developing world, which are rooted in our 
colonial and slavery past.  By implementing the programme of action and declaration 
that will emerge from this conference, we will be ensuring that this new millennium 
becomes one in which we place value on people, not because of race, colour, creed or 
status in life, but because of their status as human beings.”112 
World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) (2002). Mr. Emil Salim, secre-
tary general for the Summit, said the key goals of the summit would be poverty eradica-
tion, changing unsustainable production and consumption patterns over the next 10 
years and protection of the environment.  WSSD 2002 was a continuation of the 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) held in Rio de 
Janeiro in June 2002. 
On September 4, 2004 the declaration expressed that “we achieved much in bringing 
together a rich tapestry of peoples and views in a constructive search for a common path 
towards a world that respects and implements the vision of sustainable development at all 
levels, for the effective implementation of agenda 21, the Millennium Development goals 
and the Johannesburg plan of Implementation”.  Hosting the WSSD 2002 provided 
South Africa with a unique opportunity to showcase its competence and capacity to 
manage a world event of this magnitude, to take centre stage to put its own case for 
sustainable development in an African context to the World community. 
The Asian-African Conference (2003). Foreign Minister Dlamini-Zuma led the South 
African delegation to the Asian-African Conference in Bandung, Indonesia from 29 to 30 
July 2003.  The Asian-African Conference (AAC) was convened in 1955 on the invita-
tion of the five sponsoring countries (Indonesia, India, Myanmar, Pakistan and Sri Lanka).  
In addition to the sponsoring countries, 24 countries were present at the gathering of the 
first generation of leaders of Asian and African countries in Bandung from 18 – 24 April 
1955.  With reference to the rationale for strengthening co-operation and partnership, 
Africa has much to gain from the development of a deeper long-term and stable part-
nership with Asia.  Africa can learn from Asian experience in a number of key areas, 
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including trade and investment liberalization, human resource development, and capacity 
building as well as information technology.  On the part of Asia, a stable and prosperous 
Africa can serve as a vibrant economic and social partner and a collaborator in the pro-
motion of peace and stability in both continents.  Together, they can gain a stronger 
leverage in the global arena. 
Summit Conference 
Simply stated, summit diplomacy is diplomacy engaged in by political principals senior 
to the cabinet or ministerial rank, including the participation of chief of states, heads of 
government, a few others who qualify by virtue of their official positions and certain 
agents of the heads of government who genuinely represent them at their level.113  The 
type of summit diplomacy that receives the greatest amount of popular, journalistic and at 
times, official attention is the summit conference. There are three main kinds of summits.  
Firstly, there is what might be called the serial summit conference.  This is a summit that 
is part of a regular series.  Secondly, there is the ad hoc summit conference.  This is 
generally a one-time meeting though it may turn out to be the first of a series.  Finally, 
there is the high-level “exchange of views”.  Rather than being concerned with a 
set-piece negotiation, it has the most modest purposes of clarifying intentions, gaining 
intelligence and giving an extra push to a continuing negotiation at lower level.114  Since 
some ad hoc summits are characteristically designed principally for symbolic purposes 
rather than negotiation, it seems reasonable to suggest that, whether they have an em-
phasis on ceremonial functions or not, they are better suited to the promotion of friendly 
relations than the serial summits. 
Official publications and the press variously describe the presidential function in a 
summit conference as discussion, conversations, conferring, exchange of views or just 
plain talks – all of which denote face to face oral communication, the principal quality 
and advantage of this form of summit diplomacy.  Heads of government who visit a 
number of countries on a foreign tour are usually engaged with the highest level exchange 
of views with their counterparts. Pre-summits are supposed to prepare the way for the 
summit proper and thus to be a secret of success.  However, if they are not staged 
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properly they can backfire.  Pre-summits consisting only of a small number of the most 
powerful participants scheduled to attend the summit require special care, as became 
obvious when the leaders of Britain, France and Germany met on 19 October 2001 im-
mediately prior to the European Council in Ghent.  This angered Italy in particular as 
well as the President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi.115 
However, professional career diplomats, diplomatic officials and bureaucrats con-
cerned about the declining importance of their role have been critical of the reliance on 
summit diplomacy.116  The Development of rapid international transport and telecom-
munications has fostered an increase in direct contacts across national frontiers at many 
levels, including the emergence of summitry as a major form of diplomacy.  Summit 
conferencing has become an accepted and vital part of the diplomatic practice and a 
regular feature of contemporary diplomacy. Most people agree that the Cairo Conference 
held in 1955 was an important event in summit conference, which had a huge influence in 
shaping the second half of history of the 20th century.  It is also worthwhile to understand 
more about the Soviet-US Summits and the G8 summit. 
From 1985 to 1988 Reagan and Gorbachev took part in four summits: Geneva, 
Reykjavik, Washington and Moscow.  The Geneva summit of 1985 restarted the process 
of top level dialogue between the two nuclear superpowers, was the beginning of a per-
sonal relationship between the two leaders, and was a return to positive aspects of 
US-Soviet bilateral ties for the first time since the 1970s.  Furthermore, the summit 
improved US-Soviet relations due to careful preparations by participants, frankness in 
US-Soviet talks and adherence to a four part agenda that would become the basis for 
advancements made in later summit meetings.117  At the Moscow summit, both nations 
formally exchanged the instruments of ratification for the Intermediate Nuclear Forces 
(INF) treaty, which banned all intermediate range nuclear missiles. 
As for summitry, American scholar Joseph G Whelan commented: “ the successful 
use of summitry since Geneva has enhanced still further its value as a permanent feature 
of great power relations in modern diplomacy and enhanced as well the vital role of di-
plomacy and negotiations in international relations that is an essential precondition for 
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creating a secure and peaceful world.”118 Since the break-up of the Soviet Union on 25 
December 1991, Presidents Clinton or Bush had met 23 times with Russian Presidents 
Yeltsin or Putin.  They have discussed such issues as reductions in the number of 
weapons, economic aid and reform, and democracy and human rights.  European secu-
rity, peacekeeping in Bosnia, Kosovo and the Middle East, and the conflict in Chechnya 
had also been discussed.  Prior to this, a total of 26 US-Soviet leadership meetings were 
held from 1943 to 1991. 
The concept of the Economic Summit as an informal exchange of views rather than a 
decision-taking body came under strain in 1979 and 1980 in the wake of the second great 
rise in oil prices and the consequent energy crisis.119  Later seven summits focused on 
economic issues and topical political events.  Between 1994 and 1998, the term political 
eight was employed to describe the meeting of the G8 and Russia because their discus-
sions were confined to political and security issues and excluded financial and most 
economic issues.  It was in 1998 that the “Group of Eight” (G8) was born. 
In mid-June 2004, Africa had its fifth encounter with the leaders of the Industrialized 
North at the G8 Summit on Sea Island, Georgia, in the United States.  Development 
NGO’s have predictably criticized the G8, complaining that it did not do enough for Af-
rica.  One cannot really argue with them for Africa always needs more.  The G8 is not a 
development bank that doles out money.  It is an informal meeting of the leaders of the 
world’s strongest states to rank their priorities.  Their decisions filter down from the 
summit into bodies such as their own governments, the EU, the WTO and the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund.120 
Diplomacy is a fundamental human activity conducted between people as well as 
among nations.  Most negotiations in conference diplomacy are not one time events but 
part of a process with ups and downs and should be conducted with long-term consid-
erations.  Nowadays, conference diplomacy has become an essential factor in the daily 
life of nations.  The principal techniques available to the multilateral diplomatist are the 
combined knowledge of procedure tools that can be used in each conference, insight into 
the role of the various actors, and intellectual command of the matter at hand.121 
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Conference diplomacy and normal diplomacy are the two sides of a coin.  They 
have helped each other in many ways including reaching agreements on significant 
matters.  The diplomatic representative speaks not only for his own country, but also 
shares responsibility for the interests of the other nations represented around the con-
ference table.  Being well prepared in advance is the secret of success in any interna-
tional conference and especially the summit conference. 
In practice, any summits held at UN Geneva, including some that paved the way for 
peace, opened doors to poverty alleviation, helped to protect the environment, promoted 
sustainable development and human development, strengthened human rights, increased 
humanitarian aid and helped refugees and displaced persons.  The Geneva canon’s sta-
tistical office estimates that 1,938 intergovernmental meetings comprising 15,175 ses-
sions attended by about 86,000 delegates took place in 1999.  Geneva has strengthened 
its traditional key role as a centre for conference diplomacy and UN operational activities 
and is acknowledged to be the capital city of multilateral diplomacy. With more and more 
conferences like the “Earth Observation Summit” (EOS) which discussed the protection 
of the world weather environment and the “Kimberley Process” (KP) which dealt with the 
conflict in diamond commerce, conference diplomacy will be one of the best ways to 
keep co-operation, find solutions and enhance understanding in the future. 
Public Diplomacy 
In an age of growing democracy and mass communication, it is increasingly important for 
governments to be able to go over the heads of foreign governments to pursue their for-
eign policy agendas.  Whether it is putting together or maintaining international coali-
tions on political or military issues, or trying to compete for a share of global trade, 
tourism or investments, governments will increasingly have to learn to communicate and 
extract a premium for their national reputation. According to the Planning Group for In-
tegration of USIA into the Department of State (June 20, 1997) public diplomacy is de-
fined as follows: “Public Diplomacy seeks to promote the national interest of the United 
States through understanding, informing and influencing foreign audiences.”122  Ac-
cording to Hans N Tuch, author of “Communication with the Word” (St Martin’s Press, 
  49
NY, 1990), “ Public diplomacy is defined as “Official government efforts to shape the 
communications environment overseas in which American foreign policy is played out, 
in order to reduce the degree to which misperceptions and misunderstandings complicate 
relations between the US and other nations.” 
According to the Dictionary of International Relations Terms, “Public diplomacy 
refers to government-sponsored programs intended to inform or influence public opin-
ions in other countries; its chief instruments are publications, motion pictures, cultural 
exchanges, radio and television.”  USIA, which was in the business of public diplomacy 
for more than 40 years, defined public diplomacy as follows: “Public diplomacy seeks to 
promote the national interest and the national security of the United States through un-
derstanding, informing and influencing foreign publics and broadening dialogue between 
American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad.”123 
In 1953, President Eisenhower created the US Information Agency, whose mission 
was to understand and influence international public opinion.  The USIA operated ex-
change programs and the Voice of America (VOA).  It also created American libraries 
around the world and published the Washington File, which provided daily updates about 
Washington’s policies and pronouncements.  In fact, the term “ public diplomacy ” was 
first used in 1965 by Dean Edmund Gullion of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy 
at Tufts University.  It was created with the establishment at Fletcher of the Edward R 
Murrow Centre for Public Diplomacy.  The Murrow Centre, in one of its earlier bro-
chures, describes public diplomacy as follows: “Public diplomacy deals with the influ-
ence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies.  It encom-
passes dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultiva-
tion by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups 
and interests in one country with those of another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its 
impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as be-
tween diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the processes of inter-cultural com-
munications.”124 
There is no doubt that pubic diplomacy entails efforts to inform and influence public 
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opinion in other countries. It also involves monitoring global opinion and engaging in  
dialogue with international audiences.  There are three different dimensions in which the 
term public diplomacy is employed. 
y Public diplomacy, as the opposite of secret diplomacy, is performed with the full 
awareness of the public.  It does not automatically provide the public with endless 
information access related to the substance of diplomatic discourse.  Secret diplo-
macy was made unpopular by US President Wilson, who in 1918 wanted it to be 
outlawed as an instrument in the conduct of international relations.  He was mainly 
against secret agreements standing on their own or as notorious appendixes to publicly 
acknowledged treaties. 
y The internal use of public diplomacy as a way of informing domestic constituencies 
about their country’s diplomatic activities.  The reference to public affairs became 
particularly popular after the end of the Cold War when domestic audiences pressed 
for a higher transparency and accountability of their country’s national diplomatic 
systems. 
y Public diplomacy as a tool of promoting foreign policy objectives abroad.  This di-
mension of the term public diplomacy is used mainly in the United States.  It is a more 
elegant and acceptable term for propaganda activities.125 
Public diplomacy differs from traditional diplomacy in that traditional diplomacy is 
a government-to-government exercise conducted between officials, whereas public di-
plomacy that is broadly aimed at the international public deals not only with governments, 
but primarily with non-governmental individuals and organizations.  Furthermore, pub-
lic diplomacy activities often present many different views as represented by private in-
dividuals and organizations in addition to official views.  In traditional diplomacy dip-
lomats represent their own governments in a host country primarily by maintaining rela-
tions and conducting government business with the officials of the host government, 
whereas public diplomacy primarily engages many diverse non-government elements of 
a society. 
There is a difference between public diplomacy and propaganda.  Since propaganda 
can be based on fact, public diplomacy can be equated with propaganda: that is, ideas, 
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information or other material disseminated to win people over to a given doctrine.  If 
based on untruths, while still propaganda, it is best described as disinformation.  USIA 
officials always contended that their programs dealt with the known facts; to do otherwise 
would be counterproductive as their reliability would be questioned.  In short, truth is the 
best propaganda and lies are the worst.  To be persuasive one must be believable; to be 
believable one must be credible; to be credible one must be truthful. 
The core idea of public diplomacy is one of direct communication with foreign 
peoples with the aim of affecting their thinking and ultimately, that of their governments.  
In terms of content, it describes activities directed abroad in the fields of information, 
education and culture, whose objective is to influence a foreign government by influ-
encing its citizens.  The mass media and international broadcasting in particular are just 
one of the channels used in public diplomacy.  Others include cultural and scientific 
exchange of students, scholars, intellectuals and artists, participation in festivals and ex-
hibitions, building and maintaining cultural centers, teaching a language, and establishing 
local friendship leagues and trade associations.126  The mass media channels are used 
directly to affect the general public while the other mostly cultural channels are oriented 
towards elite audiences believed to have influence on public opinion.  While uses of the 
mass media focus on current affairs, the cultural channels deal more with fundamental 
long-term perceptions of countries and societies. 
Norway. In order to enhance Norway’s image abroad and formulate the specifically 
Norwegian stories, the foreign ministry has entered into co-operation with the British 
research body, the Foreign Policy Centre.  Their report, Norwegian Public Diplomacy, 
was issued in June 2003 and formed the basis for a closed workshop with representatives 
from politics, cultural organizations, research, NGOs and trade and industry.  This was 
an engaging exercise in which people discussed the proposals for four stories about 
Norway, which were based on extensive surveys of Norwegian opinion formers.  Fur-
thermore, a national image must satisfy three requirements: it must be genuine and 
trustworthy, it must be internally anchored and it must be perceived as attractive in those 
markets one wish to target.127 
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Norway understands that public diplomacy is an important tool for creating a posi-
tive national image and hence, the foreign ministries pay more attention to the media, 
international organizations and non-governmental organizations.  Business interests 
have become more active in defining public opinion.  At the same time, the foreign 
ministry has decided to confine co-operation with the foreign policy centre. In short, in 
conducting public diplomacy, the Norwegian government engages in dialogue with wider 
audiences on a wider range of issues than those of day-to-day politics.  This mode of 
working requires building lasting networks and having the staying power to see projects 
through even though long-term effects may not be seen for years to come.128 
China. On March 19, 2004, the Information Department of the Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs invited experts and scholars from the Publicity Department of the CPC Central 
Committee, Peking University, Tsinghua University, Nankai University, Foreign Affairs 
College, Institute of Modern International Relations as well as Xinhua News Agency to 
discuss China’s public diplomacy.  During the seminar, all participants presented their 
views on the definition, operation and mechanism of public diplomacy respectively.  A 
Division for Public Diplomacy was then established under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
The seminar aimed to explore ideas, channels and measures with regard to public di-
plomacy so as to bring about a new situation of public diplomacy in China. It is obvious 
that China wants to meet the requirements of present times, satisfy the expectations of the 
people and catch up with the level of public diplomacy in some developed countries. 
South Africa. The Department of Foreign Affairs played an important role in the 
branding and imaging of South Africa abroad mostly through South African missions. 
The Department serves as a link between other government departments, civic society, 
NGO’s and other private institutions.  The scope of activities in the public diplomacy 
undertaken included the following: 
y Ensuring that South African marketing compaigns were properly co-ordinated as an 
inter-Departmental and national effort. 
y Ensuring that Missions in strategic countries undertook major positioning initiatives 
influencing local and foreign media reporting on South Africa. 
y Improving relations and co-operation with business, civic society, media and the labor 
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movement within the targeted period. 
y Implementing a pro-active communications strategy within the Department for all 
international visits.129 
We can find that many cultural activities were undertaken to promote and project a 
positive image of South Africa, and the department also played an important role in fa-
cilitating and co-ordinating major international sporting events.  Furthermore, the de-
partment also made use of the great marketing platform provided by the hosting of WSSD 
to further popularize the AU and NEPAD through informative leaflets and booklets. In 
short, the department continued to organize media briefings, press conferences and timely 
dissemination of information to the media regarding state, official and working visits, 
joint commissions and bilateral meetings. It also assured the attendance of the Ministry 
and Presidency at important international functions.  These were all done in support of 
South Africa’s efforts to push back the frontiers of poverty and underdevelopment with a 
special focus on South Africa, the African continent and countries of the south. South 
Africa’s leadership of the NAM, the AU and the commonwealth also received positive 
coverage and thus enhanced the status of the country as a global player in international 
relations. 
Yugoslavia. Before the break-up of Yugoslavia, the economic, cultural, scientific, in-
formation and sports blockade of Yugoslavia had its roots in the political and diplomatic 
blockade, from the UN system and its financial and other specialised agencies, the 
Non-Alignment Movement, the OSCE and the Council of Europe, up to the pressures 
exerted on non-political, cultural, sports and similar organisations by individual gov-
ernments or groups of governments.  One of the few remaining channels of communi-
cation with the world that could not be completely severed and that stayed fairly passable 
was parliamentary co-operation.  The reason for that is mainly the pluralist tradition of 
parliamentarism in the world, but also the practical needs of countries hostile to the FRY, 
who wish to preserve a possibility of less formal contact when diplomatic contacts are 
undesirable or impossible.130 
Bilateral parliamentary co-operation exists between Yugoslavia and Austrian Fed-
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eration, China, India, Mexico, Brazil, Cuba, Japan, Vietnam and some sub-Saharan Af-
rican countries, which proved quite useful in connecting FRY(Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia) and the world.  When official diplomacy finds it difficult to reach its goal, 
parliamentary co-operation will be another choice. On November 28, 2000, President and 
Mrs. Clinton hosted and Secretary of State Albright chaired the first White House Con-
ference on culture and diplomacy.  The central purpose of the conference was to focus 
attention on the role of culture in US foreign policy and produce conclusions that could 
inform the future development of American cultural diplomacy.  The role of culture in 
the practice of diplomacy is, of course, one of the four specific, interrelated issues.  
Many diplomats, artists and scholars attended the discussion on how to better integrate 
cultural concerns into the day-to-day conduct of American foreign policy and strengthen 
cultural exchange programmes that serve as invaluable forms of international commu-
nication. 
Obviously, cultural factors are utterly inseparable from foreign policy; culture is not 
marginal, but central to diplomacy.  Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said that 
cultural factors play a pivotal role in many of the international challenges we face, from 
establishing rules for trade to finding common ground in the pursuit of peace.  Fur-
thermore, cultural programs are central to the success of American foreign policy.131  
Noting that the consolidation of the US Information Agency with the State Department 
had provided new opportunities for funding cultural programs, she emphasised that: 
y Cultural factors are inseparable from foreign policy; 
y The United States must do a better job of explaining American culture to the world; 
y Funding for programs of cultural exchange, understanding and collaboration must be 
increased, and; 
y Culture is not elitist, but the way the people of a country express themselves.132 
Conducting successful public and cultural diplomacy to increase cultural programs, 
international scholarships, exchange and visitor programs, as well as artistic and schol-
arly collaborations with other countries, is very crucial.  These include the launching of 
large scale, model cultural exchange projects in China and Nigeria, and the development 
of working partnerships with public and private cultural organizations such as the Na-
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tional Endowment for AIDS, the White House Millennium Council, and the Library of 
Congress. The flagship international educational exchange program, the Fulbright Pro-
gram, designed to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States 
and the people of the countries has provided more than 230,000 participants – graduate 
students, scholars and professionals, and teachers and administrators from the US and 
other countries, chosen for their leadership potential – with the opportunity to learn from 
each other. All in all culture shapes and pervades all aspects of government’s policy.  The 
conference aims to sensitise the US foreign policy establishment to this reality and at the 
same time raise awareness of how culture shapes attitudes, positions and policies. 
Information Technology 
Information is power and today a much larger part of the world’s population has 
access to that power.  The new threats involve drugs, global crime, environmental con-
cerns, worldwide population, migration and refugee problems, disease, famine and the 
need for democratisation and human rights in many parts of the world.  Underlying 
forces have compelled the United States to move from traditional diplomacy with its lack 
of public transparency to public diplomacy, which focuses on the dissemination of in-
formation and two-way communications.133  The prime mover of change is information 
technology.  The network of communications technology will become the central 
nervous system of international relations, making public diplomacy more important than 
ever. 
Information Technology can provide effective tools for public diplomacy through 
understanding, informing and broadening dialogue.  More precisely, information tech-
nology can support diplomacy as a tool for planning, decision-making, prevention of 
conflict, mediation and management, networking, information sharing, communication 
and building understanding and political will on the part of leaders and the public. New 
technologies such as the Internet should be exploited more extensively to increase 
cross-cultural communication and preserve cultural diversity throughout the world.  The 
importance of tapping the vast potential of Internet-based information and resources in 
cultural activities cannot be overstated.  Modern technologies must be harnessed to re-
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cord, preserve and share the cultural histories and expressions of diverse cultures.134 
The internet can make diplomacy more transparent; new information technology is 
changing the world today as much as the invention of movable type revolutionised 
Europe.  In a world where instant communication takes place across oceans and state 
borders, governments cannot manipulate public policy and public opinion.  Mr. Joseph 
Nye in his book, “Soft Power, the means to success in world politics” proposed three 
dimensions of public diplomacy.  All three are important and they require different 
relative proportions of direct government information and long-term cultural relation-
ships.135 
The first is daily communication, which involves explaining the context of domestic 
and foreign policy decisions.  The second dimension is strategic communication, in 
which a set of simple themes is developed, similar to what occurs in a political or ad-
vertising campaign.  The third dimension of public diplomacy is the development of 
lasting relationship with key individuals over many years through scholarships, ex-
changes, training, seminars, conferences and access to media channels. Another powerful 
viewpoint is the article “Pillars of public diplomacy.” It was published in the Harvard 
Review, Summer 2003, by ambassador Christopher Ross. 
Modern diplomacy is now a multidimensional enterprise in which so called “non 
state” actors and foreign publics play an increasingly prominent role.  The increase of 
the influence of the non-state actor has been paralleled by two other equally important 
developments – globalization and information technologies.  This is the transformed 
international environment in which public diplomacy now operates.  In such a world, the 
public-diplomacy quotient of virtually every foreign policy issue today has risen dra-
matically, whether regarding a trade negotiation over genetically modified corn, the re-
construction of Iraq, or the threat of HIV/AIDS. Policies can still be forged in private 
confidential talks among professional diplomats, much as they were 200 years ago, but no 
policy initiative can succeed over the long term without the understanding and support of 
multiple foreign publics and other non-state actors. 
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The public diplomacy and international communications of the United States must 
reflect a basic set of principles and practices – the seven pillars of public diplomacy – to 
meet its mandate to inform, engage and influence foreign publics. The seven pillars are as 
follows: 
y All public diplomacy activities are designed to support US national interests and meet 
its international duties. 
y The US must rely on providing reasons and rationale for its policies. 
y US international messages must be consistent, truthful and credible. 
y The obverse of consistency is our ability to tailor messages for specific audiences. 
y The US must also find ways to repeat key messages for audiences of two million, or 20 
million, through national and trans-national media. 
y Alliances and partnerships recognise that as the number and importance of non-state 
actors have grown in international affairs, the official voice of the US has grown 
smaller. 
y The United States must build the foundations of trust and mutual understanding 
through a genuine commitment to dialogue. 
Indeed, for diplomacy to be effective, the tools of public diplomacy must be used 
throughout the process to explain what is going on, why it is being done and how it is 
proceeding.  Today, public diplomacy is neither an oxymoron nor an afterthought, but an 
integral component for successfully conducting US foreign policy.136 
Under the Clinton Administration, public diplomacy meant how to gain support for 
foreign engagement from the American people, whose interests were turning inwards 
after the end of the Cold War. In a report submitted by President Clinton to the congress 
on 30 December 1998, one can find: We place very high priority on public diplomacy 
with foreign audiences and are firmly committed to integrating public diplomacy more 
fully into foreign policy.  Our goal is to strengthen public diplomacy through its inte-
gration into the policy process.  Negotiations on such issues as NATO enlargement, Iraqi 
sanctions, and global climate change show the value of being proactive, informing and 
influencing foreign publics, NGOs and others.  These audiences are playing greater roles 
on international issues as communication improves and pluralism expands. 
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Public diplomacy promotes US national security and other interests by seeking to 
understand, inform and influence foreign publics and policy- makers, and by broadening 
the dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad.137 
Anti-Americanism seems to have become a new buzzword that spread around the world 
when the grave incidents on September 11, 2001 took place.  There are limits on what 
public diplomacy can achieve.138  Fully aware that the war on terrorism requires the 
co-operation of world leaders, Washington turned to the media to disseminate its message.  
And winning the hearts and minds of Arab and Muslim populations has quite under-
standably risen to the top of the Bush administration agenda. 
Thus, more than in the past, the United States will need to modify not simply the 
implementation of its foreign policies, but in certain cases, the foreign policies them-
selves.  The purpose is not to increase US popularity abroad for its own sake, but because 
it is in America’s national interest to do so.  This requires a deeper understanding of 
foreign attitudes and more effective communication of US policies.  It also means fully 
integrating public diplomacy needs into the very foundation of American foreign policies 
in the first place.  Particularly, in a period when the United States is fighting a war on 
terrorism, the country must come to understand and accept the basic notion that ‘image 
problems’ and ‘foreign policy’ are not things apart.  They are both part of an integrated 
whole.139 
Public diplomacy is important because foreign attitudes and understanding can af-
fect the success or failure of initiatives.  Thus, effective reform of public diplomacy must 
go beyond the provision of more resources to the development of a new paradigm.  This 
means redefining the role of public diplomacy as part of a comprehensive strategy, tying 
it to foreign policy objectives.  It means changing the recruitment and training of dip-
lomats and other public officials and redefining their missions.140 
Some key recommendations include the following: issue of a presidential directive 
on public diplomacy; create a public diplomacy coordinating structure and a dedicated 
secretariat led by the president’s personal designee; more public diplomacy from the 
margins to the centre of foreign policy-making, supporting voices of moderation, with 
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special attention over the long term on young people: empower them to engage in effec-
tive debate through means available or created in their societies; foster increasingly 
meaningful relationships between the US government and foreign journalists; deliver 
more bang for the government buck by creating a much expanded role for the private 
sector; send credible and independent messengers; capitalize on internet-age realties; 
bring funding in line with the role of public diplomacy as a vital component of foreign 
policy and national security; build a stronger public diplomacy through enhancements in 
key areas.141 
Public diplomacy helps the people to better understand foreign cultures and the 
people of the world.  Today, public diplomacy is neither an oxymoron nor an after-
thought, but an integral component of successfully conducting foreign policy.  Moreover, 
public diplomacy is being practiced overseas.  It is a set of skills and tools for any dip-
lomat who must communicate with the vast and varied foreign publics that are now role 
players in international affairs and governments, but also news media, academics, stu-
dents, youth groups, technologists, artists, cultural organizations, community and re-
gional entities, private enterprises and a vast array of special interests and 
non-governmental organizations.142 
Public diplomacy is effective only when it builds on long-term relationships that 
identify common interests between people and capitalize on them.  It must be strategic, 
consistent and flexible in its use of channels, and above all, must encourage two-way 
communication. In the US three principles – promoting the interests, investing in allies, 
and advancing a principled image should form the core of America’s redesigned public 
diplomacy.  Strong leadership and imaginative thinking, planning and co-ordination are 
critical.  Public diplomacy is a strategic instrument of foreign policy and US leaders 
must provide the sustained, co-ordinated, robust and effective public diplomacy that 
America requires.143 Public diplomacy helped win the Cold War, and it can help over-
come the philosophy of hate being spread overseas today. 
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Conclusion 
Diplomacy is a tool for using affordable resources to increase national interests. Personal 
diplomacy has been used throughout history; its basic premise is that the intervention of 
certain prominent and influential figures can be used to reach consensus or results be-
tween states. Foreign aid is another appealing tool of diplomacy, especially for those less 
developed states which are usually attracted by the political, humanitarian and economic 
gains that can be had on receiving foreign aid. Wherever interaction between states oc-
curs, economic diplomacy can found, and scholars have remarked that it is a very useful 
method for enhancing one nation’s relations with another. The use of conference diplo-
macy is also substantial and growing; it is yet another practical tool for achieving results 
and solving problems between states. Public diplomacy is effective in increasing cultural 
interactions and improving the perceived image of countries. These are the main com-
ponents of international diplomacy that enrich international relations through more fre-
quent and meaningful interaction as well as enhanced exchanges for the benefit of the 
sides involved. Diplomacy is political contact between governments of different nations. 
Diplomacy as an art of maintaining organized relations among the states is, obviously, 
the foundation of statecraft. International society is changing rapidly, and the changes 
affect the modalities of diplomacy, though not its basic nature. Interdependence and 
ease of communication are speeding up the diplomatic dialogue and extending its sub-
ject-matter, and bringing statesmen into more frequent direct contact. We have discussed 
the five methods of modern diplomacy which most countries use to some extent to 
reach their diplomatic goals. Each country will employ the most suitable methods to 
execute its foreign policy, which can be adjusted over time by decision- makers. In the 
next chapter, we will analyze the ROC’s Africa policy, especially with respect to its ori-
gins, evolution, confrontation with the PRC and possible future developments. It is 
without doubt that different approaches towards African states will meet with different 
outcomes. The ROC has no choice but to face the tough challenges in conducting its di-
plomacy in Africa, and the choices available need to be carefully examined. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE ROC’S POLICY TOWARDS AFRICA 
( 1949-2004 ) 
Africa’s position in the world 
The written history of Africa starting from 3400 B.C. in the Pyramid Dynasty of Egypt 
and the Nile River, gave extensive input to civilization.  The Arabs conquered Egypt in 
A.D.642 to develop the Arab culture in Northern Africa. During the 15th Century, the 
European countries wishing to develop business and open the market, moved into Africa 
one by one.  Portugal and Spain sought to do business in West Africa, while Britain, 
France, Holland and Belgium came later.  They moved into the African interior to build 
their colonies.  By the end of the 19th Century, most of Africa was colonized by Euro-
pean countries.  In this period, European powers held the Berlin conference in 1885 to 
determine a boundary as their sphere of influence. After the Second World War, owing to 
the upsurge of democratic ideologies and Nationalism, and through the assistance of the 
United Nations, more and more African colonies, gained independence.  During the 
1950s, only four sovereign nations emerged─Ethiopia, Liberia, The Union of South Af-
rica and Egypt─among the continent’s sixty-odd territorial units.  In September 1960, 
there were 19 members, an average of nearly two new nations a year. 
Most of the newly independent African countries mainly adopted the presidential 
system.  Hence the presidents had great power and a type of dictatorship.  In foreign 
affairs, African countries were against colonialism, claiming national self-determination.  
In addition they adopted the non-alignment policy, so that they remained neutral in the 
conflict between Western democratic and Communist countries and thus not to provoke 
either side.  This kind of attitude and policy proved to be quite successful, since on one 
hand it could gain profit in the political situation and on the other hand get financial and 
other aid from both sides.  Even though there were many problems related to politics, 
economic stagnation and social welfare in most African countries with their various 
cultures, tribes and languages that caused disunity in international society, there were still 
some advantages that need to be noted: 
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Africa with an area of 30,065,000 square kilometers, covering 20.2% of the Earth’s 
land, is the second largest continent in the world, second to Asia.  The population of 
Africa is 877,500,000.  Africa borders the Mediterranean Sea on the North, the Atlantic 
Ocean on the West and the Indian Ocean on the East.  It is opposite Europe to the North 
and Antarctica to the South.  Morocco in northwestern Africa holds a strategic position 
in the Straits of Gibraltar; Egypt in northeastern Africa has control over the Suez Canal.  
Somalia stretching along Africa’s “horn” controls the exit of the Red Sea to the Indian 
Ocean.  The Cape of Good Hope at the southern tip of Africa holds a strategic position in 
the Indian Ocean and the Atlantic Ocean, where large oil tankers from the Middle East 
countries pass all the year round, especially when the Suez Canal is closed.1  The Cape 
Route, an important sea route for transporting material and goods, is the lifeline for 
Europe and Asia.  The port of Darka in the Western African country, Senegal, in the es-
timation of NATO, is also playing an important role in controlling the South Atlantic 
Ocean. 
Economically, Africa’s traditional importance as a supplier of raw material (which in 
many African countries still generates up to 90 per cent of export earnings) has dimin-
ished with competition from synthetic substitutes and suppliers in Asia, Latin America 
and the former Soviet Union; between 1968/9 and 1986/7, Africa’s share in world pri-
mary product exports declined by half, from 8.3 percent to 4.2 percent.2  Furthermore, 
Africa has rich natural resources including some material of high strategic and economic 
value.  Africa’s uranium accounts for one-fifth of the world production.  South Africa, 
the largest uranium producer, has one-fourth of the world deposit.  Africa produces 85 
percent of the world’s supply of cobalt, 27 percent of copper; and 67 percent of gold.  
South Africa alone produces about 700 tons of gold a year.  There also are important 
deposits of chrome, iron, coal and petroleum.  The largest oil producers are Libya, Ni-
geria, Algeria and Gabon.  Africa also has plenty of cocoa, coffee, sisal, timber, vege-
table oil and cotton.  For this reason, Africa became a continent under European colonial 
rule and remains an arena of East-West rivalry.3 
Many strategic minerals were discovered in Africa, very useful both for military and 
economic use.  Uranium, gold, copper, diamonds, aluminum and platinum are some of 
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the main products, besides Libya, Nigeria, Algeria and Gabon having a great quantity of 
crude oil. Uranium in Gabon, diamonds in Angola, steel in Sierra Leone and Mauritania, 
chromite, steel, copper and tin in Zimbabwe are also in full production.4 
As far as agricultural products are concerned, coconuts and coffee have high pro-
duction, and timber, cotton and plant oil as well.  Most countries depend on these mate-
rials; for example, more than 60 percent of natural resources are imported from Africa. 
Independent Countries 
There were only three independent countries in Africa before World War I ─ Ethiopia, 
Liberia and South Africa.  In 1957, Ghana (Golden Coast) gained independent status, 
from Britain and is one of the foremost Black countries in Africa.  After the Second 
World War, with the rising tide of Nationalism and the support of the United Nations, an 
increasing number of African countries became independent. In 1960, 17 countries be-
came independent, among them Benin, Upper Volta, Cameroon, and Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Mauritania and Niger. This was the year of Africa. Between 1961 and 1968, another 17 
countries also became independent, including Burundi, Gambia, Malawi, Rwanda, and 
Swaziland. Such developments resulted in more influence.  It meant the bankruptcy of 
Imperialism and Colonialism, and since then every country, whether Western or African, 
was equal in international communities.  The newly independent African countries were 
the symbols of anti-hegemony and anti-super power politics as well as an important force 
to protect world peace. 
Seven causes of the rise of Africa in world politics have been outlined ─ the shift of 
world power stretches from Western Europe to the United States and the Soviet Union, 
African nationalism and anti-colonialism; the growing principle of international ac-
countability for colonial peoples; the Asian revolt against the West; the pressure of 
communism; the pressure of the United States; and the new colonial policies adopted in 
Western Europe.  Gaining strength through mutual support, this combination of nation-
alist pressures within Africa and external pressures from overseas proved so powerful 
that they bore fruit more quickly than anyone expected.  The Second World War further 
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stimulated all seven of these factors.  Although there were underlying causes predating 
the war, nonetheless the war served as their catalyst.5  
After 1960, more African countries participated in the United Nations, influencing 
the structural change of the international organization.  African countries were the 
dominant powers in the United Nations, instead of the United States, European Allies and 
Latin American countries, and at the same time anti-colonialists and human rights were 
the main topics, not the Cold War.6 Many African countries participated in the UN and 
formed a kind of Third Power, with the Soviets and the United States as separate groups.  
Owing to the “One Country, One Vote” and “The Majority Rules” principles, the influ-
ence after the newly independent African countries entered into the UN caused an im-
balance of power and confrontation within the UN.  For example, in 1960, during the 
Fifteenth General Assembly, when a resolution was raised by African and Asian countries, 
there were no obstacles to get past because those countries had the power of numbers to 
support them.  To some extent, the UN had become the diplomatic centre of those Af-
rican countries, and the Trusteeship Council played an important role in helping those 
trust territories to begin to attain self-government or independence. 
In the perspective of history, it would probably appear that the most powerful impact 
on Africa of the United Nations during its first 15 years was its stimulation of political 
agitation among colonial peoples.7  The UN also played a major part in the Congo crisis 
between 1960 and 1965.  When it ended, the UN had spent $392.8 million, while 20,000 
troops from 23 countries had served in the UN force.8 In fact, those African and Asian 
countries were very concerned about economic development and the colonies struggling 
for independence. Therefore they treated the UN as the tool of anti-colonialism, to help 
underprivileged nations to develop economically.  Furthermore, those countries, out-
numbered in voting, boycotted the superpowers, which could not reflect real power 
politics.  In such situations, the superpowers would rather not put discussions or resolu-
tions before the General Assembly, but rather put them before the Security Council.  The 
Security Council, instead of the General Assembly, became the real organ of power in the 
United Nations, after the influx of the African countries. 
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Undeniably, however, the first 25 years of African independence were focused on 
political questions involving decolonization and, to a lesser extent, on consolidation of 
statehood.9  For colonial Africa and for colonial peoples around the world, the promise 
of the United Nations outshone that of its predecessor, the League of Nations. African 
countries tried repeatedly to act together.  There were several organizations through 
which they could do this.  Problems of unity, however, often made such action difficult.  
Differing political attitudes, poor inter-African communications and varying states of 
economic development all contributed to disunity.  However, all African states faced the 
same problems.  This often enabled them to speak with one voice.10 
Actually, the anti-superpower attitude among African countries was very strong and 
only by eradicating this could Africa have peace and security.  African countries also 
took some useful actions, including a peaceful coexistence policy, non-alignment policy, 
anti-military competition, not allowing a foreign military power to be based in its own 
country, promising a peace zone and creating a non -nuclear zone, and so forth, decisions 
which have proved very useful in maintaining world peace. Moreover, the rise of Africa 
had a significant impact on the ideological rivalry of the Soviet Union and the United 
States.  It stimulated them to step up their efforts, both by increasing their propaganda 
and by refining their ideas and goals.  At the same time, both superpowers were con-
fronted by appeals from African leaders to settle their major Cold War disputes.11 
The achievements of the OAU, since its origin in 1963, have depended on the col-
lective will of its members.  The main objectives of the organization were to promote the 
unity and solidarity of African States, and to protect the sovereignty, territorial integrity 
and independence of African States.12  In fact, the goals of the organization, such as the 
eradication of colonialism (and Apartheid), have been realized.Actually, after the Second 
World War, more and more newly-born countries became part of the Third World which 
gave rise to many international organizations and led to a type of international law of 
development.   
The Right of Development strongly promoted by the Third World, was soon ac-
knowledged by the United Nations.  In November 1979, the General Assembly accepted 
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Resolution on the Right to Development. Furthermore, in December 1986 the General 
Assembly accepted Declaration on the Right to Development, once again confirming 
that the right of development is a human right of which countries and people cannot be 
deprived.  In theory, the right of development operates in two ways: to ask for devel-
opment and to help other countries develop. In other words, the Third World Group, 
many of which were African countries, could dominate or play a decisive role in inter-
national affairs, a fact which cannot be ignored. 
It is obvious that after the independence of African countries, each national econ-
omy had to be established with an African style of management. The states have full 
economic power, and citizens should get more money than before. Without doubt, the 
prosperous economies of developed countries related closely to the resources and cheap 
labor provided by Africa.  For them, African countries provided riches.13 In 1964, at the 
first Trade and Development Conference of the United Nations, the new African coun-
tries, with other Third World countries, with one voice established “The 77 Group”, and 
called for the establishment of a new international economic order.  This meant that they 
were not satisfied with the economic environment and wished to have a structural change. 
In May 1974, in the Sixth General Assembly of the United Nations’ Special Com-
mittee, accepted On the Creation of a New International Economic Order and Action 
Plan, which enabled African countries and other Third World countries to have a new 
international economic order to execute and operate.  Since then, more co-operation has 
taken place, from two-way co-operation to multilateral co-operation, from regional 
economic systems to different continental systems. The substance of co-operation in-
cludes among other things raw material, financial aid, food, energy production and in-
formation.14 
All these steps forced developed countries to take a constructive and positive atti-
tude to deal with African countries, to improve bilateral relations, with dialogue and 
negotiation to replace oppression and confrontation.  In practice, the former had to make 
some concessions to the latter in Generalizes System of Preference which stipulated that 
developed countries had to spend one percent of their Gross National Product in helping 
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new African countries and less developed countries. 
As a whole, Africa has vast natural resources and mineral deposits, and its markets 
are becoming bigger and bigger.  Although its history and background are full of strug-
gle, it is a continent of great potential and influence. In the international community, Af-
rican countries easily spoke with the same voice which meant they played an important 
role in international politics.  In the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the West wanted to 
influence African countries in the spheres of politics, economics, culture and ideology.  
After the Cold War, the West tried to set the model of democracy or democratic systems in 
Africa, causing huge political turmoil.  As time goes by, Africa remains an important 
area needing further attention to these matters. Every country needs an objective and 
comprehensive understanding of Africa as well as more contacts and interaction. 
The ROC and Africa 
Foreign Policy is the pursuit of national interest and therefore an integral part of overall 
national policy.  In the case of the ROC (Taiwan), a whole set of historical and economic 
determinants and their interplay with the changing external environment, increasing in a 
regional context, have shaped her foreign policy towards Africa. Even though a Chinese 
consulate was established by the Ching dynasty in 1911 in Johannesburg, the relations 
between China and Africa were never truly close because Africa is remote from China.  
The revolution led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen overthrew the Ching dynasty and founded the 
Republic of China in 1911.  There was no immediate improvement of relations between 
the Republic of China (ROC) and Africa.  In short, mutual neglect characterized the re-
lationship of the ROC and Africa before the Second World War. 
The Period 1949-1971 
The government of the ROC moved to Taiwan in 1949 as a result of its defeat in the civil 
war on the mainland.  During the 1950s, most African territories remained colonies of 
the European countries; the region was irrelevant to the ROC foreign policy in terms of 
voting on the China question in the United Nations.  Nominal relations with Egypt were 
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maintained, nevertheless, until 1956 when Nasser decided to recognize the PRC.  On the 
whole, the relations between the ROC and Africa in the early 1950s can be described as 
minimal, almost nonexistent.15 Without doubt, a nation exists in the world when recog-
nized by other countries and it is crucial to realize that the only way to recognition is 
through establishing diplomatic relations.  Hence, the ROC leaders were aware of the 
future importance of African states not only in gaining diplomatic relations but also in the 
voting on the China question in the United Nations. 
The ROC’s friendship with Africa began in early 1960.  A special delegation in-
cluding Yang Chi-tseng, Minister of Economic Affairs and Vice Foreign Minister H.K. 
Yang attended the celebration of Cameroon’s independence.  The delegation spent two 
months visiting Nigeria, Togo, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Guinea, Mali, Tunisia, Somalia and 
Ethiopia.  They were warmly received wherever they went.  The official visit heralded 
the era of the ROC’s close relations with these African countries.16 In 1960, 17 African 
countries attained independence.  The ROC’s government sent delegations to attend the 
independence celebrations of most of these countries and established diplomatic relations 
with them.  In 1964, at the peak of the ROC’s success in African diplomacy, the number 
of African countries having diplomatic relations with our country increased to 22.17 
In order to deal with the changing situation, the Department of African Affairs was 
established in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and actually came from the department of 
West Asian affairs.  Mr. H.K. Yang was the first Director, and also the Vice Foreign 
Minister.  In fact, Taipei had no wish to lead the Africans to a particular ideology or po-
litical system, but only to warn them away from communism for reasons that were es-
sentially altruistic.  This basic approach and some of the ROC ideas for achieving it were 
succinctly expressed on August 13, 1960, by H.K. Yang: “Politically, while nationalism is 
roaring over Africa and it (Africa) is very vulnerable to the penetration of Communists, 
we offer our most painful experience from the aggressions of international Communists 
and our most valuable experience in fighting them.  We want to tell (Africans) about our 
experience so that our African friends can escape what we have suffered.  Economically, 
Taiwan in the past decade has advanced from a backward agricultural economy to an 
industrial society.  Our achievements and experience provide a good example for the 
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new African nations in their economic development.  We would like to share this ex-
perience sincerely with African friends.”18 
When the ROC established full diplomatic relations with France, it was good for 
French-speaking countries in Africa to have diplomatic relations with ROC as well.  
After the establishment of diplomatic relations between France and the PRC in January 
1964, four African States shifted their diplomatic recognitions from the ROC to the PRC. 
In 1966, the ROC established diplomatic relations with Malawi, Lesotho, Botswana, and 
Gambia one after another, which increased the total in Africa to 22.  The Cultural 
Revolution, the ROC’s diplomatic efforts and the international situation as a whole made 
it possible for Taipei to keep its seat in the UN and maintain good relations with African 
states.  With their support the ROC was able to stay in the UN until 1971.  The United 
Nations’ decision in 1971 to seat Beijing and expel Taipei was a major blow to the ROC’s 
diplomatic efforts and consequently caused a host of nations to make moves towards the 
PRC. 
The Period 1971-1989 
From July 1970 through June 1971, 22 groups totaling 93 African guests visited the ROC.  
Ten groups from the ROC totaling 25 persons visited Africa.  Deputy Foreign Minister 
H.K. Yang made his twenty-third trip to the African continent as presidential special 
envoy from July to September 1970. His visit covered 25 countries. By July 1971 three 
African countries had established embassies in Taipei.  They were the Malagasy Re-
public (October 1964), Gabon (March 1967) and the Democratic Republic of Zaire (May 
1970).  In June 1971, the Government of Swaziland appointed an honorary consul in 
Taipei.  African countries that have accredited non-residential ambassadors to the ROC 
are Upper Volta, Ivory Coast, Liberia and the Central African Republic.19 In general, the 
ROC’s diplomacy toward Africa during the 1971 was rather successful.  As of July 1971, 
independent African countries totaled 42, of which 20 maintained diplomatic or consular 
relations with the ROC. 
US president Richard M. Nixon’s visit to China paved the way for an unfavorable 
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situation toward the ROC, which was forced to withdraw from the UN on October 25, 
1971.  The PRC pressure on the UN to remove the ROC from UN membership began on 
1 October 1949, when the Chinese Communist Party set up the PRC.  It was not easy for 
the ROC to stay in the UN for 21 years facing constant challenges and pressure, and the 
support of African countries to help the ROC remain in that organization was crucial and 
meaningful. The attitude of African countries in the UN voting was closely linked to 
diplomatic relations; and the change of attitude came about because of the different po-
litical thinking among the various nations.20  The ROC being forced to leave the UN had 
less to do with the position of the African countries than to the world situation where 
fundamental changes took place. 
In 1972, Japan cut diplomatic relations with the ROC, and more countries turned to 
recognize the PRC so that by 1975 only nine African countries maintained diplomatic 
relations with Taipei.  From October 1971 to January 1979, more than 40 countries 
turned to the PRC, a serious setback for the ROC.  In such a difficult situation, the 
Government of the ROC had the following foreign policy: to those countries which had 
diplomatic relations with the ROC, the ROC would try its utmost to maintain such rela-
tions, enhancing the traditional friendship; for other countries, whether the national 
power was big or small, no matter whether friendly or not, the ROC tried to enhance the 
basic nature of relations.21 Fortunately, the ROC survived this intensely difficult period. 
The Ivory Coast is one of the important countries in Africa not because of size, 
population, material or strategic position, but because of its political stability from the 
1960s to 1980s, and its prestigious President, Felix Houphouet-Boigny. After maintaining 
diplomatic relations for 13 years, the Ivory Coast cut relations with Taipei in March 1983, 
and was the last French-speaking country in Africa to recognize the PRC.  In 1988, only 
the Republic of South Africa, Malawi and Swaziland had diplomatic ties with the ROC.  
As the Director of Department of African Affairs in MOFA for 5 years, Mr. Du Ling said, 
the period between 1971 and 1989 was the bitterest and toughest for the ROC’s diplo-
macy in Africa,22 even though the ROC still maintained trade with many African coun-
tries as well as technical relations. 
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Lee Teng-hui said the following at the ruling party KMT’s Thirteenth National Party 
Congress, encouraging members “with more strong confidence, to take more pragmatic, 
more flexible and more forward looking actions, in order to upgrade and break the limit of 
only pragmatic diplomacy.” It is obvious that facing the setback in international relations, 
the ROC had to take more pragmatic steps and to adjust its foreign policy. In 1989, the 
massacre in Tiananmen Square was a turning point for the PRC as well as the ROC. 
The Period 1989-2000 
As a result of the June 1989 Tiananmen killing of students asking for better government, 
human rights, and democracy, the PRC was no longer in a favorable position in at-
tempting to isolate Taiwan diplomatically.  In fact it had, by its own actions, diplo-
matically isolated itself or caused itself to be regarded as a pariah.  A host of nations cut 
their embassy staffs.  Many important nations severed or reduced economic and trade 
relations.  Some spoke of breaking diplomatic relations.  International financial or-
ganizations stopped or put a hold on loans to China.  People throughout the world re-
acted negatively and stopped traveling to China.23 
This seemed like an ideal opportunity for Taipei to exploit the situation by asking 
some countries to recognize or re-recognize it diplomatically and/or allow Taipei into 
some important international organizations.  Thus Taipei increased its formal ties abroad 
in terms of the scoreboard.  Starting from 1989, Taipei increased its efforts aimed at 
gradually overcoming the diplomatic isolation that Beijing tried to bring about in Africa 
regarding Taiwan.  The African countries that successively established diplomatic rela-
tions with the ROC since 1989 were Liberia (October 1989), Lesotho (April 1990), 
Guinea-Bissau (May 1990), the Central African Republic (July 1991), Niger (June 1992), 
Burkina Faso (February 1994), Gambia (July 1995), Senegal (January 1996), Sao Tome 
and Principe (May 1997) and Chad (August 1997).  However, some of these countries 
later sided with Beijing: Lesotho in 1994, Niger in 1996, the Central African Republic 
and Guinea-Bissau in 1998. 
From 1989 to 2000, it was a favorable period for the ROC in gaining more diplo-
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matic recognition than it had achieved since the 1960s.  The ROC would consolidate 
and strengthen ties with diplomatic allies in Africa by enhancing technical co-operation 
and investment and providing funds.  As for African countries that did not maintain 
diplomatic ties with Taipei, ROC diplomatic initiatives would take three factors into 
account: abundance of resources, political stability and sincerity.24 In this period, the 
ROC Special Delegation was set up in Madagascar in June 1991; the ROC Trade Mission 
in Nigeria in April 1991; the ROC Delegation in Congo in September 1991; and the ROC 
Special Delegation in Angola in September 1992.  Even though these were not full 
diplomatic relations, the ROC had gained recognition by some African countries which 
proved useful to some extent. 
Since 1975, the number of countries with which Taiwan had diplomatic relations 
numbered 30 only three times (in 1993, 1995 and 1996), but this situation did not last for 
more than two years.  As for African countries, their number reached 10 only once in 
1997.25 
In fact, the Tiananmen Massacre in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet “Empire” in 
1991 had a great influence on the attitude of Africa in world affairs.  According to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the ROC: “Since the downfall of the Communist block and 
the process of democratization which is in progress on the continent, Africa is the most 
promising zone for expanding the ROC’s diplomatic horizon,”26 The end of the Cold 
War in 1988 co-incided with the start of Lee Teng-hui’s presidency and the pursuit of a 
“pragmatic foreign policy” (also referred to as a “flexible foreign policy”).  That is to say, 
if a country that had formed diplomatic ties with Beijing wanted to establish or resume 
formal relations with the ROC, then Taipei would not refuse to do so.  The implemen-
tation of pragmatic diplomacy enabled the ROC to launch an offensive on the diplomatic 
front.27  The climax was that there were 10 African countries with diplomatic relations 
with the ROC, and the ROC established eight official representative offices in seven Af-
rican countries that still maintained diplomatic relations with China. 
However, some African countries were either lured by China or had a change of 
government that switched the recognition to the PRC, which resembled a “tug-of-war”, 
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between the ROC and the PRC. Those countries were Lesotho, Niger, the Central African 
Republic and Guinea-Bissau. South Africa, accounting for nearly a quarter of Africa’s 
gross national product, also fell into this category even though Taipei continuously made 
every effort to maintain the diplomatic recognition. The joint communiqué on estab-
lishing Sino-South African diplomatic relations, signed by Qian Qichen and Alfred Nzo 
in Pretoria on December 30, 1997, was a huge blow to the ROC.  Besides, since 1998 
there were no major countries in the ROC’s diplomatic directory, and the ROC had to 
adopt a defensive strategy in her diplomatic attitude instead. 
The Period 2000-2004 
The Republic of China entered a new era of democratization in 2000 when it had its first 
change of governing party.  On March 18, 2000, Mr. Chen Shui-bian was elected the 
tenth term President of the ROC.  Since his inauguration on May 20, 2000, President 
Chen thoroughly understood that the future of the nation and the hope of people depended 
on him.  President Chen’s foreign policy is based on the concept that Taiwan should not 
only stand up, but also step out.  Emphasizing continuity and innovation in foreign re-
lations, the President made his first state visit, the “Trip of Democracy, Diplomacy, and 
Friendship,” to six diplomatic partners in Central America and Africa in August 2000, 
successfully solidifying relations with these allies and sharing the advantages of Taiwan’s 
democratic development. 
The stops in Gambia, Burkina Faso and Chad made Chen the first ROC President to 
visit those African countries.  In Gambia and Burkina Faso, the President toured the 
agricultural farms that Taiwan’s technical missions helped to develop.  The success of 
these farms won the admiration of humanitarian corps from other parts of the world.  
According to the ROC International Cooperation and Development Fund (ICDF), the 
Canadian government expressed a willingness to offer US$3 million to the Gambia 
government for the development of more vegetable farms under the guidance of Taiwan 
technical missions.28 Actually, this part of Africa has long been the site of a diplomatic 
tug of war between Taipei and Beijing.  All three countries forged ties with the ROC in 
the 1960s, broke off relations in the 1970s and re-established them in the 1990s. 
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The overseas trip was yet another goodwill gesture demonstrating Chen’s dedication 
to reinforcing diplomatic ties.  ROC Foreign Minister Tien Hung-mao described Chen’s 
diplomatic journey as a courtesy call and a gesture of reciprocal friendship to the ROC 
allies.  Tien’s words captured the meaningfulness of the trip.29  At the same time, Tai-
wan’s international standing would also be elevated as a result of Chen’s globetrotting 
diplomatic activities. After years of hard work, Taiwan finally joined the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) as its 144th member in January 2002, giving Taiwan the opportunity 
to participate equally with other nations and to contribute its experience to international 
trade and economics.  In these circumstances, from June 30 to July 10, 2002, President 
Chen Shui-bian led a delegation to Africa on a 10-day “Tour of Mutual Cooperation and 
Care”, making state visits to four of the ROC’s diplomatic allies ─ Senegal, São Tomé 
and Principe, Malawi and Swaziland. 
Since his inauguration, President Chen has been committed to promoting “diversi-
fied diplomacy” and the principle of “new internationalism” as part of his diplomatic 
strategy and thinking.  “New internationalism” should guide diplomatic thinking and 
“diversified diplomacy” serves as a strategic guideline.  Only then would Taiwan be able 
to participate as a member of the international community in such global activities as the 
safeguarding of peace, pursuit of security, sustaining prosperity, protection of human 
rights, conservation of the environment, and provision of humanitarian assistance.30 
President Chen received a warm welcome from the Presidents of the four countries he 
visited on this trip and he was the first ROC President to have visited Senegal, São Tomé 
and Principe, and Malawi.  Often, diplomacy relies on the sincerity of the leaders of two 
countries.  Malawi has been ROC’s diplomatic ally for 40 years, and Swaziland has 
maintained relations with the ROC for 38 years.  Leaders of these two countries have 
visited Taiwan many times.  This is the reason President Chen traveled so far to repay the 
visits; strong friendship is built on the basis of mutual co-operation and sincere care. 
It goes without saying that visibility of this sort is so important in the world of di-
plomacy that it has earned its own entry in the diplomat’s dictionary: it is the “acte de 
presence” – the act of being in attendance.  In foreign relations, symbolic acts carry real 
consequences.  Comparing President Chen’s African visits in 2000 and 2002, President 
  84
Chen spread the message of Taiwan’s democratic achievements in accomplishing the 
ROC’s first peaceful change of governing parties through his “democracy diplomacy” 
and “head-of-state diplomacy.” The second visit was a kind of “humanitarian diplomacy” 
which has sown seeds of humanitarian care and has already begun to achieve concrete 
results.  In short, the two visits not only bolstered the ROC’s diplomatic foothold in the 
region, but also brought Taiwan into the international limelight. 
In October 2003, since the situation in Liberia was deteriorating and the fighting 
between the Government force and the rebels continued, President Taylor was forced to 
leave Liberia by international pressure.  The UN peacekeeping force was the key point to 
control the situation. The new President of Liberia, Mrs. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, an-
nounced that she would establish diplomatic relations with China, a big setback to Tai-
wan.  Since then Taiwan has had only seven diplomatic allies in Africa. Since 2000, 
when President Chen assumed his post, he visited the seven allies in Africa twice.  Li-
beria was the only country that he did not visit and that ended in breaking diplomatic 
relations.  For practical reasons, the ROC closed the Representation Offices in Mada-
gascar and Angola in 2001, and offices in Egypt and Mauritius in 2002.  At the same 
time, the Government of the ROC also sent young people to work in these friendly 
countries as an alternative to doing military service, i.e. to support the Foreign Service. 
To face the reality and take the appropriate strategy, the ROC could not but adopt a de-
fensive policy to strengthen the relationship with the seven African allies in order to 
maintain her international character in the world. 
The PRC and Africa 
Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China on October 1, 1949, the PRC has 
had enormous influence in the Third World.  Since Taiwan and China are antagonistic to 
each other, various effects may be seen in foreign affairs and diplomacy.  Actually, 
China invented the term Third World in the 1970s.31  In this theory, China classified the 
USA and Soviet Union as First World; Australia, Canada, Germany, France and Italy as 
the Second World; all other countries are the Third World–and China wanted to be the 
leader of the Third World. 
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The ROC’s Africa Policy has had very close relations with the PRC’s, simply be-
cause most African countries gained independence after 1960s and needed time to es-
tablish a good environment for normal political and economic functioning, so the two 
sides used their influence to make friends.  The key point was which side could represent 
China.  The ROC in Taiwan was founded in 1912 and moved to the island because of the 
Civil War in 1949, which existed and is still recognized by some countries in the world.  
The PRC was founded in 1949 and most countries gave their recognition and established 
diplomatic relations.  Both sides proclaimed that they were the real China, which caused 
the international community to have contrasting views. 
From 1949 to 1979, the United States recognized that the ROC was the only Gov-
ernment that could represent China and maintained full diplomatic relations.   Newly 
independent countries in Africa had to make a decision whether to recognize the ROC or 
the PRC.  That was the reason since 1960s, the ROC and the PRC competed in Africa to 
win the friendship of its people.  For the last 50 years, the PRC’s policy towards Africa 
changed much, and is explaned further in the following pages: 
The Period 1949-1971 
When the Geneva Conference had a recess between June 21 and July 9, 1955, the chief 
delegate of the PRC returned home for consultation.  Zhou Enlai visited India on his way 
to Beijing and with Nehru concluded the well-known Five Principles of Peaceful Coex-
istence.  They were: (1) mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sover-
eignty, (2) non-aggression, (3) non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, (4) 
equality and mutual benefit, and (5) peaceful coexistence.32  These became a landmark 
of the era of peaceful coexistence and had a far-reaching impact on Chinese foreign 
policy. 
The Asian-African Conference (April 18 to 24, 1955) at Bandung, Indonesia, was 
another significant development during this era.  Zhou Enlai outlined seven principles 
that would govern China’s relations with other Afro-Asian countries.  These included 
respect for each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; abstention from aggression 
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and threats against each other; non-interference in the internal affairs of one another; 
recognition of the equality of races; recognition of the equality of all nations, large and 
small; respect for the rights of all people to choose their own political and economic 
system; and mutual benefit in economic and cultural relations.33  It represented an ef-
fective means of strengthening the Afro-Asian movement for national independence, and 
of cementing the bonds between the newly-independent states. On May 30, 1956, China 
established diplomatic relations with Egypt, the first African country to open the door to 
China.  In the 1960s, the African National Independence Movement witnessed un-
precedented progress; China staunchly supported the just struggle of the African coun-
tries for national independence and sovereignty against foreign interference, gaining the 
trust and praise of African countries. 
The most important diplomatic activity during that period was Premier Zhou’s 
goodwill visit to 10 African countries between late 1963 and early 1964, which was a 
milestone in the history of Sino-African friendship.  During his visit, Premier Zhou 
proclaimed the five principles of China in handling relations with African countries, 
namely, to support the struggle of all African nations against imperialism and old and new 
colonialism and for gaining and safeguarding their national independence; to support the 
governments of African countries in pursuance of a non-alignment policy of peace and 
neutrality; to support people of all African countries to realize unity and solidarity in their 
own way; to support the African countries to resolve their disputes through peaceful 
consultations; and advocated that the sovereignty of African countries be respected by all 
other countries, opposing infringement and interference from any party.34  For those 
newly independent African countries, this provided great encouragement and signaled 
friendship.  As he visited Mali, Premier Zhou put forward eight principles on China’s 
foreign economic and technological aid, stressing that the mutual economic aid between 
Asian and African countries was mutual assistance between poor friends.  The eight 
principles, the basic norms governing the Chinese government’s foreign economic aid, 
fully reflected China’s wishes for economic co-operation and cultural exchange with the 
newly-rising African countries at that time.  The Africans were impressed by this ap-
proach and Zhou’s tour promoted China’s image and influence there. 
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On January 27, 1964, France established diplomatic relations with China, and De 
Gaulle’s government even encouraged some West African French-speaking countries to 
do the same.  Hence, despite the Cultural Revolution and the Nuclear Test that occurred 
in China in the late 1960s, from 1963 to December 1971, China gained the recognition of 
15 nations and offered more than 300 million US dollars in economic aid. However, from 
the viewpoint of China, the appearance in 1960 of Taiwanese delegates on the continent 
was described in the People’s Daily as “an extremely dangerous conspiracy” which “we 
deem it necessary to explain further to our African friends,”35  It is evident that the 
concept of Sino-African unity was being exploited in a wholly premeditated way to 
achieve Beijing’s aims. 
The Period 1971-1989 
The presence of the PRC in the United Nations since 1971 has been of profound impor-
tance in promoting the emergence of the world’s most populous nation as a major player 
in international affairs.  Mao said it was our African brothers that took us into the UN. In 
the 1960s, China’s improper handling of some questions due to harassment by the ul-
tra-“Left” trend of thought and, among other things, the change of government and for-
eign policy in certain countries, led to the suspension of China’s diplomatic relations with 
Zaire, Burundi, the Republic of Central Africa, Benin and Ghana, the downgrading of 
such relations with Kenya from ambassadorial to chargé d’affaires level, and the closure 
of its embassy in Tunisia for a time.  China’s diplomatic relations with these seven Af-
rican countries returned to normal in the 1970s, with China taking the initiative to 
apologize to the countries concerned for those twists and turns in their bilateral relations 
and to admit the main responsibility.36  From 1972 to 1977, by establishing diplomatic 
relations with 16 more countries, China was finally recognized by 42 countries. 
Furthermore, Beijing was to grant Tanzania and Zambia an interest-free loan of 
2,886 million Kwacha (US$402 million), repayable over 30 years to build the Tanzam 
Railway.  Beijing formally committed itself, financially and technically, to the con-
struction of the 1860 km (about 976 km in Tanzania and 884 km in Zambia) Tanzam 
Railway, the largest single PRC aid project ever undertaken in Africa.  Western reaction 
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was a mixture of surprise and misgiving.  It is not surprising that the Tanzam Railway 
was described by Western powers and South Africa as “China’s Trojan Horse in Af-
rica”.37 Construction was completed in late 1975, at a total cost of well over US$500 
million, with 147 stations, 300 bridges, and 23 tunnels, and was described by a United 
Nations expert as “first-rate hardware”.  The PRC officially handed over the railway to 
Tanzania and Zambia on July 14, 1976. 
In addition to its vigorous support to the African people in their efforts to seek na-
tional independence and liberation, China extended continuous support to countries that 
had already won independence in their efforts to safeguard state sovereignty and territo-
rial integrity.  China opposed the invasion of Guinea in 1970, Zaire in 1977 and 1978 and 
Seychelles in 1981 by mercenary troops in the pay of colonialists, hegemonies and racists. 
In 1974, Mao expounded to President Kaunda of Zambia his theory of the three worlds.  
Vice-Premier Li Xiannian built on this idea by maintaining, during his tour of Africa in 
1979, that the Third World was the antithesis of the Soviet Union; and co-operation be-
tween the countries of the South was described as “strategic” in nature. 
In 1979, China normalised its diplomatic relationship with the United States and 
Deng Xiaoping put forth his modernisation programmes.  Those two things were very 
useful for China to gain more friends, but a blow to Taiwan, which lost some allies.  
Deng’s diplomacy aimed at preserving a peaceful and respectable international envi-
ronment that would be favourable to China’s modernisation programmes.38 From De-
cember 1982 to January 1983, Premier Zhao Ziyang toured 11 African countries: Egypt, 
Algeria, Morocco, Guinea, Gabon, Zaire, the Congo, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Tanzania and 
Kenya.  During his tour, Zhao had a wide exchange of views with African leaders on 
economic co-operation between China and African countries. Zhao said that in 
strengthening its economic relations with other Third World countries, China would try 
gradually to shift the focus to developing mutually beneficial economic and technological 
co-operation.  To this end, China put forward four principles: “equality and mutual 
benefit, stressing practical results, diversity in form, and attainment of common pro-
gress.”39 
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On June 6, 1985, Zhao delivered a speech to the Royal Institute of International 
Affairs in the UK, stressing that China was a developing country belonging to the Third 
World and China would forever stand with the Third World. … The steady strengthening 
of this friendly co-operation, and the active development of economic and technological 
exchanges and trade so as to promote peace and development, were important compo-
nents of China’s foreign policy.40 It could be said that China’s Africa policy had turned 
from the one-way donation to African countries to economic and technological 
co-operation based on mutual benefit.  China’s aid to Africa in the 1970s to early 1980s, 
was used in the building of several large construction projects such as stations, railways, 
parliament buildings, bridges, and Presidential palaces.  In addition, many African 
leaders visited China either to ask for financial assistance or to consolidate good relations.  
The relations and interaction between the Chinese Communist Party and the various 
ruling parties were very cordial and close. 
Beijing leaders routinely used aid offers as an inducement to African governments 
which had established ties with Taiwan to switch their diplomatic allegiance, undertaking 
for good measure to finish off any projects which Taiwanese technicians might have 
begun in the countries involved.41 From 1971 when China entered into the United Na-
tions until June 1989, China established relations with 48 of the 51 countries in Africa, 
excluding Malawi, Swaziland and South Africa.  For Taiwan, it was a bitter period of 
setback when many allies switched to China. 
The Period 1989-2000 
Sino-African relations were on the decline in the 1980s because of China’s policy of es-
tablishing closer relations with developed countries to attract investment and technology.  
The events of June 4, 1989, in Tiananmen Square in many respects revealed the place of 
Africa in China’s thinking and the utilitarian attitude of Beijing towards the developing 
world.  However, judging from the events in this turmoil, at a critical moment it was still 
those Third World countries and old friends who gave China the necessary sympathy and 
support. In July and August 1989, Qian Qichen, the Foreign Minister of China visited 
Botswana, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Angola, Zambia and Mozambique to express the PRC’s 
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support of justice for the people of Southern Africa.    In short, between June 1989 and 
June 1992, Qian visited 14 African countries, while 12 heads of state and 15 foreign 
ministers paid visits to China, highlighting the important position in which Beijing held 
Africa as a constituent for garnering potential political support. 
At government level Taiwan had made diplomatic progress for the first time in 20 
years.  African countries that successively established diplomatic relations with the ROC 
since 1989 were: Liberia (October 1989), Lesotho (April 1990), Guinea-Bissau (May 
1990), the Central African Republic (July 1991) and Niger (June 1992).  The diplomatic 
achievements were a great victory for Taiwan and of course a blow to PRC.  However, 
several African leaders voiced support for China’s crushing of the student movement, 
criticized Western interference in China’s affairs and stressed the right of Third World 
peoples to be governed according to systems they had chosen themselves.42  The Or-
ganization of African Unity’s Secretary General described China as the “pillar of 
strength” of the developing world.  China saw Africa as an integral part of its policy of 
opening to the outside world after Tiananmen and pledged to expand its trade with the 
continent. 
Beijing confirmed its new policy towards the continent during a visit by President 
Yang Shangkun to Africa in July 1992.  According to Yang, China believed in and would 
conduct its policies based on support for Africa to safeguard state sovereignty, national 
independence, opposition to foreign intervention and the development of their economies;  
respect for the different political systems and development paths chosen by African 
countries; support for Africa’s unity and co-operation; support for the OAU; belief that 
the active participation in the international system by African States as equal members 
was crucial and that the establishment of a new international economic and political order 
was paramount importance; support for economic co-operation with Africa.43  In short, 
China postured a highly attractive policy towards Africa that was aimed at boosting 
Chinese prestige on the continent at little actual cost, for much of China’s policy was 
rhetorical and needed little physical commitment. 
 Since then, Burkina Faso (February 1994), Gambia (July, 1995), Senegal (January 
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1996), Sao Tome and Principe (May 1997) and Chad (August 1997) established diplo-
matic relations with the ROC.  In 1997, there were 10 African countries, which recog-
nized the ROC, the highest since the ROC’s withdrawal from the United Nations in 1971. 
President Jiang Zemin, the leader of Central Committee of the Communist Party of China 
attached great importance to developing long-term stable and friendly relations with the 
African countries marked by all-round cooperation. He put forward three principles of 
China in handling the relations with the developing countries: All countries, big or small, 
are equal with each other; China supports the struggle of the developing countries for 
safeguarding their political and economic rights and interests; and China refrains from 
imposing its own ways on others.44 
The Period 2000-2004 
In October 1999, Jiang Zemin wrote a letter to the president of the Organization of Af-
rican Unity (OAU) and other African heads of state proposing the creation of a 
China-Africa cooperation forum. The first forum was held in Beijing from October 11-12, 
2000, with 44 African countries bringing 80 ministers. It produced two documents: the 
Beijing Declaration and the Program for China-Africa Cooperation in Economics and 
Social Development. The second China-Africa cooperation forum took place in Addis 
Ababa from December 15-17, 2003. The conference reviewed the implementation of the 
two documents adopted at the first meeting and explored new initiatives and measures 
with which to move forward.45 
Premier Zhu Rongji confirmed in Beijing that economic interaction with Africa has 
taken center stage and will define future relations while political collaboration in the form 
of South-South interaction is a secondary concern. The Chinese government has taken 
action in the field of debt relief, signing debt exemption protocols with 31 African states, 
cancelling 156 individual debts around Africa with a total value of US$1.27 billion. 
Sino-African bilateral trade exceeded US$10 billion in 2000 and reached US$18.55 bil-
lion in 2003.46 In addition, China has signed investment protection agreements with 26 
African countries, and 674 Chinese companies were operating in Africa as of June 2004. 
Mutually beneficial cooperative projects have mushroomed. 
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Chinese leaders like to highlight historical links to modern economic objectives and 
to promote Beijing as a reliable partner that has no interest in lecturing Africa on sensitive 
subjects such as human rights, governance and corruption. Actually, China’s Africa push 
is spurred in large part by its mounting hunger for raw materials, especially crude oil. 
China is the largest developing country in the world, while the African continent has the 
highest concentration of the world’s developing countries. Cementing Sino-African re-
lations is therefore of great significance for the common development of both China and 
Africa. Since 1989, it has become a tradition for the Chinese foreign minister to visit 
African countries at the beginning of every year. Exchanges of high-level visits have also 
strengthened the mutual understanding and trust between China and Africa. 
China is a member of the UN Security Council and has used its influence there to the 
detriment of Taiwan’s relations universally, particularly in Africa. For example, the PRC 
pressured Liberia into severing relations with Taiwan in October 2003. China has also 
played a more active role in the UN peacekeeping missions in Africa, and by the end of 
July 2004, China had sent about 1,404 peacekeeping troops to take part in nine UN mis-
sions in Africa.47 From October 2000 to November 2003, the Chinese government 
sponsored nearly 300 training courses for 6,000 African personnel in areas of diplomacy, 
economic management, national defense, agriculture, medical treatment, education, 
science, technology and culture, and dispatched 500 Chinese experts and teachers to Af-
rica to give short-term training courses. China’s deepening engagements in Africa, 
combined with its significant economic growth and rise to power, has allowed African 
states to see the reality of the changes in the global political and economic landscape. This 
has obviously sparked much interest, but perhaps of more concern for the ROC is that 
diplomats in Pretoria have commented that China’s growing activity in Africa has not yet 
caused any concern. 
The ROC’s Policy Towards Africa 
Fifty-three countries occupy the vast territory of Africa, the largest number for any con-
tinent. These African countries can be broadly put into three categories. The first includes 
northern Africa and a few countries in eastern and southern Africa which enjoy a com-
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paratively high GNP and per capita income. The second category includes the vast 
number of countries in sub-Saharan Africa. The overall development across each of the 
nations in this category, where the people live in communities based on race, clan, tribe 
and religious beliefs, is still slow. The third category dominates the inland countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa, sometimes referred to as Black Africa, which suffer from poor 
communications and transportation. This group endures the worst economic conditions. 
Despite these issues, the international status of Africa and African states is still very 
important. The reasons for this are first that Africa is vital to modern international politics. 
African states comprise more than one-fourth of the United Nations’ membership and half 
that of the non-aligned countries. African states therefore play an increasingly important 
role in safeguarding world peace. Secondly, the African continent is a large land mass 
directly south of the European continent. The two sea lines of communication either side 
of Africa, and the continent’s four corners, are therefore of great strategic importance. 
Thirdly, Africa has a great diversity of mineral deposits, being home to almost every kind 
of the world’s 50 major mineral products. These three factors contribute to Africa’s un-
deniably important status in the world.  
For over half a century, since 1949, China has been divided into two separate gov-
ernments, the PRC on the Chinese Mainland, and the ROC on Taiwan. Consequently, the 
two sides have different attitudes and goals and have developed divergent political and 
economic systems as well as different lifestyles. In order to expand the ROC’s presence 
on the international stage, and thus ensure its survival and continued development, the 
ROC’s foreign policy, as stated in the constitution, stipulates that the ROC shall “cultivate 
good neighborliness with other nations, in order to protect the rights and interests of 
Chinese citizens residing abroad, promote international cooperation, advance interna-
tional justice, and insure world peace.”48 
Both the ROC and the PRC maintain their claim to be the only legitimate govern-
ment of China. The diplomatic sparring started on October 1, 1949, and continues to this 
day with no sign of abating. Both sides of the Taiwan Strait maintain that there is but one 
China, of which Taiwan is a province. Beijing will not enter into full diplomatic relations 
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with any government that recognizes Taipei, and any form of dual recognition is not ac-
ceptable to either the ROC or the PRC. 
In September 1972, Premier Chiang King-kou stated that the firm and unshakeable 
principles to which the ROC shall always adhere are: 
y The system of the state of the ROC as established under Article 1 of the constitution. 
y The overall goals of anti-communism and national recovery of the ROC.  
y The ROC will always side with the democratic bloc and it will uphold righteousness 
and justice, and safeguard world peace.  
y The resolute position of the ROC is of never compromising with the Chinese Com-
munist rebel group.49 
This is the fundamental national policy of the ROC, and its diplomacy is carried out 
with care and discretion based on the principles of independence, self-determination, 
equality and mutual benefits. More precisely, the ROC is an independent sovereign state 
that has the right to establish normal diplomatic relations with any country in the world. 
Africa, with its high number of independent sovereign countries, has long been a prin-
cipal target of the ROC’s foreign policy. The success of this Africa policy, since the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs established the Department of African Affairs on April 12, 
1963, has varied greatly during the last five decades. The ROC had 22 diplomatic allies in 
Africa in 1969, 3 allies in 1988, 10 allies in 1997, and 7 allies in 2004. The ups and downs 
reflected the highs and lows in relations between the ROC and Africa.  
Over the course of the last half century, changing circumstances have necessitated 
different approaches, which in turn have returned different results. The ROC’s policy 
towards Africa during this time can be summarized as follows: 
1. Safeguarding the ROC’s international status and seat in the UN.  The ROC was 
one of the founding members of the UN and contributed enormously to world peace 
and sustainable development. After China was divided into the PRC and the ROC 
owing to civil war, the issue arose as to whether Taipei or Beijing should represent 
China in the UN. In order to justify the status of the ROC as a legitimate, independent 
sovereign state, diplomatic recognition of ROC is of paramount importance, a situa-
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tion unique to the ROC. Hence, the ROC needs diplomatic recognition to support her 
legal status in the UN. 
From 1949 to October 1971, securing African allies’ support for the ROC in the 
UN was very important if the ROC was to successfully block the PRC from partici-
pating. During this period, Taiwan brought into play different economic development 
strategies, including population policies, human resource policies and land reforms, 
which paved the road for an economic takeoff.50  US aid delivered from 1951 to 
1965, which comprised more than 30 percent of domestic investment each year in 
Taiwan, also played an important role. Rather than targeting certain narrow sectors of 
industry, US aid was focused on the overall improvement of infrastructure. This 
strategy proved to be effective in achieving balanced economic development in 
Taiwan.51 The ROC established diplomatic relations with between 58 and 62 coun-
tries, succeeded in preventing some major western nations from recognizing com-
munist China, and continued to maintain its status as a permanent member of the UN 
Security Council. The full support of the ROC’s African allies was critical and deci-
sive and cannot be dismissed. 
2. Battling for diplomatic recognition to justify the ROC’s international status.  
Since the United Nations’ diplomatic turnaround and decision in 1971 to switch offi-
cial recognition from Taiwan to China, the ROC was forced to watch helplessly as its 
international status and profile slipped to a new low, to the point that even the United 
States changed recognition to the PRC in 1979. Thereafter, the Vatican, Korea, South 
Africa and Saudi Arabia were the only states of major importance that officially rec-
ognized the ROC; the other states were small and impoverished countries. No coun-
try’s diplomatic status has been so out of step with its real power as that of the ROC. 
This has resulted in an intensely frustrating situation for Taiwan, for while it possesses 
a comparatively powerful economy and huge foreign reserves, it struggles to exist in 
official diplomatic circles and has largely become an isolated state.52 
It is clear that Taipei’s international status is lower that its power legitimately 
warrants, and the ROC must struggle continuously to obtain and then maintain what is 
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granted automatically to almost every other country.53  From the 1980s to 1990s, 
most allies switched recognition to the PRC. Only South Africa, Malawi and Swazi-
land still had official ties with the ROC. These were dark days for Taiwan, and Taiwan 
truly treasured her African friendships. 
3. Establishing diplomatic ties and competing with the PRC. The question of who, or 
what, represents the whole of China is largely irrelevant to most Africans, and astute 
politicians on the continent have become aware that the competition between the ROC 
and the PRC can be very profitable for economically depressed countries. By playing 
the two sides of against each other, this diplomatic competition has proved to be a vital 
source of economic assistance and aid to some African countries. From the 1990s 
onwards, the ROC has successfully established diplomatic relations with Burkina 
Faso, Chad, Gambia, São Tomé and Principe, and the Central Africa Republic, a 
triumph in the ROC’s diplomatic war.  
By isolating the ROC and actively trying to prevent the reemergence of Taiwan 
as an officially-recognized state, the PRC is attempting to force its own norms onto 
the international community. It aggressively claims the right to force other nations to 
accept its view on Taiwan’s status. Furthermore, China proclaims itself a third world 
country and provides funds and aid to African nations in the tug-of-war over Africa. 
Since the ROC has a broad international profile, forced integration by China is 
unlikely, as it would draw the global community into a military conflict. Hence, in 
order to avoid forced integration of the island into the PRC, Taiwan must use all 
means to compete with China in winning the recognition of African States.  
4. Interacting with African nations to safeguard the national interests of the ROC.  
Between May and July of 1992, the ROC set up representative offices in Nigeria, 
Zaire and Madagascar, and established full diplomatic ties with São Tomé and Prin-
cipe, and Guinea-Bissau. Even though some nations are too small or too pov-
erty-stricken to figure prominently on the international stage, by the same token these 
are the most likely to engage in relations with the ROC. Since the goal of diplomacy is 
the promotion of a country’s national interests overseas,54 the ROC provides sub-
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stantial assistance in the form of economic and technical aid in exchange for support 
of the ROC position in the diplomatic quarrel with the PRC. 
Liberia has accepted help from both Taiwan and China, switching sides in 1977 
and again in 1989. The Central Africa Republic had established diplomatic relations 
with Taiwan twice, in 1962 and 1968, but then switched recognition from Taipei to 
Beijing in 1964 and 1976.55  With diplomatic ties in place, Taiwan promised and 
provided substantial aid to those African countries as compensation for loss of PRC 
aid and as a gesture of good will. Taiwan’s strong economic performance has also 
attracted increasing attention, thus giving the ROC more opportunities to pursue its 
pragmatic foreign policy. African countries that have serious economic problems 
have to choose between international politics and national development, which pro-
vides the ROC with opportunities for diplomatic maneuvering. 
5. Taiwan investment spurs growth in Africa.  Economically, Africa’s overall GNP 
is still less than 2.5 percent of the global total, even though its population of 756 mil-
lion represents 12 percent of the world total. Africa’s long term prospects for eco-
nomic development are not promising unless some major obstacles and fundamental 
issues can be resolved. 
Since 1990, despite a concerted effort by the PRC to obstruct the ROC from 
establishing and maintaining foreign relations in the region, most of the countries 
with which the ROC established new diplomatic relations were in Africa. The ROC 
can combine the strength of its private sector with its development experience of the 
past few decades to actively promote its diplomacy in Africa. Trade between the ROC 
and Africa, although small, is growing. Its main trading partners in the region are 
South Africa, Egypt, Nigeria, Morocco, Mauritius, Congo, Angola, Cameroon and 
the Ivory Coast.56  The Taiwan External Trade Development Council (TAITRA) 
maintains offices in Egypt and Morocco to promote bilateral economic and trade re-
lations. 
As the most powerful country in Africa, trade relations between South Africa 
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and the ROC are the strongest among African states. South African exports to Taiwan 
amounted to R3.69 billion in 2000, with imports amounting to R4.22 billion in the 
same period.57 The pursuit of profit has always been the main concern for Taiwanese 
business interests in the region. Taiwanese investment in South Africa, Swaziland and 
Lesotho amounted to roughly US$2.15 billion. 
6. Urging African states to voice support for Taiwan in the United Nations and the 
World Health Organization (WHO). Taiwan is willing and able to actively coop-
erate in international issues. Nevertheless, Taiwan’s lack of proper representation in 
the UN prevents Taiwan from participating in the WHO, the International Civil Avia-
tion Organization (ICAO) and many other international organizations, as well as 
multinational treaties. Since the ROC wants to keep the issue of Taiwan’s exclusion 
from the UN and its specialized agencies alive and in the open, it encourages its Af-
rican allies such as Swaziland, Malawi and Burkina Faso to speak out in favor of its 
bid for participation in the UN and WHO. An example of this is President Mauritika, 
who posed the questions, “How can the United Nations stand for equity and justice 
when it is denying membership to over 23 million people who contribute significantly 
to global trade and development? How can the UN justify its denial of membership to 
Taiwan when the countries listed above were admitted? Why is Taiwan being dis-
criminated against by the UN? Unless the questions are honestly answered, observers 
will conclude that the UN is applying double standards. The government of Malawi 
believes that the UN should use the same standards to grant membership to the 
ROC.”58 
For the last 10 years, at the request of the ROC, African allies have spoken in 
favor of Taiwan’s participation in the UN and WHO to remind the world that the 
ROC’s exclusion is unfair and needs to be re-examined, and that Taiwan can be a 
positive contributor. Letting Taiwan’s voice be heard in the international community 
is one of the chief policy aims that the ROC has adopted in recent years. By so doing, 
it is more likely that the international community will understand that China and 
Taiwan are two different states and should be dealt with as such.  
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In a nutshell, the goal of the ROC’s diplomatic strategy towards Africa is to ensure 
that the ROC’s situation is internationalized through the establishment of diplomatic ties 
with as many African states as possible. This also promotes and safeguards the ROC’s 
national interests in Africa and allows the ROC to assist its African allies through a 
positive international role and an effective aid strategy. Since 2000, Taiwan’s NGOs have 
assisted local organizations in taking part in international organizations, conferences and 
exchange projects which, to some extent, are useful for enhancing Taiwan’s interaction 
with Africa. These kinds of NGOs are growing in number and their contributions are 
becoming more substantial. Naturally, such a development is welcomed by Africa, par-
ticularly as the government specifically encourages NGOs to focus on Africa. Yet it is 
clear that when comparing their respective international roles for influence and aid, China 
has the upper hand on Taiwan. Taiwan is in a defensive situation, so it needs suitable and 
reasonable means to approach, safeguard, and enhance relations, both diplomatic and 
substantive, with its allies and important countries in Africa.  
The spirit of ROC foreign policy is one of mutual respect, cooperation for mutual 
benefit and progress for all, not only to Taiwan’s African friends. The conduct of the 
ROC’s diplomatic strategies and tactics towards Africa for the last 50 years can be clas-
sified as follows:  
1. High level exchanges and visits by heads of states.  Foreign Minister Shen 
Chang-huan was the first Minister of Foreign Affairs to visit Africa, in 1961. Since 
then, almost every Minister of Foreign Affairs has done so. Before 1971, Mr. H.K. 
Yang stayed in Africa for three months of every year to keep interactions active, to 
inspect cooperative agricultural projects and persuade the allies to vote for the ROC in 
the UN. Since then, frequent exchanges between Taiwan and Africa consolidate re-
lations, increase understanding of the scope and results of cooperation and promote 
Taiwan’s successful achievements. After his inauguration, President Chen visited 
Gambia, Burkina Faso and Chad in July 2000, and visited Senegal, Sao Tome and 
Principe, Malawi and Swaziland in July 2002.  
In May 2004, all of Taiwan’s African allies sent high-ranking delegations to 
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Taiwan to attend the inauguration of the 11th-term President and Vice President of the 
ROC. These were led by President Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso, President Dr. 
Alhaji Yahya A.J.J. Jammeh of the Republic of Gambia, President Fradigue Ban-
deeira Melo de Menzes of the Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Principe, King 
Mswati III of the Kingdom of Swaziland, Premier Moussa Faki Mahamat of the 
Republic of Chad, and President Envoy S.D. Kaliyoma Phumisa of the Republic of 
Malawi.59 In May 2004, Weng Yue-sheng, President of the Judicial Yuan, led a 
delegation to attend the inauguration ceremony of President Mutharika in Malawi. In 
January, 2005, President Mutharika paid a state visit to the ROC. These visits en-
hanced substantial bilateral relations between the ROC and its African allies, pro-
moted the ROC’s economic achievements and increased Taiwan’s visibility in the 
international community. High-level exchanges are a form of personal diplomacy that 
can sometimes be combined with conference and/or summit diplomacy.  
2. Promoting international cooperation through foreign aid.  Agriculture is very 
important in Africa. In the 1960s, Taiwan sent agricultural missions to its allies to 
help the African people. Over the years, these overseas technical missions have 
helped those of Taiwan’s allies that are developing countries build up their domestic 
agriculture, fisheries, handicraft industry, health care, economy and trade, and learned 
from Taiwan’s successful experience in national development. For the last 45 years, 
more than 2,000 African technicians have participated in training programs in Taipei. 
Without such training programs, the ROC could not possibly have reached such a 
large number of African elites. By bringing them to Taiwan to observe the positive 
results of the ROC’s development, they have benefited substantially.  
The basic idea of the aid program was to emphasize the role of agricultural de-
velopment in the economic process of developing states. Again, the dispatch of ag-
ricultural missions served the ROC politically.60 In recent years, the ROC built 
Muzuzu Hospital in northern Malawi, cultivated and enlarged the Kou area in 
Burkina Faso, where it also constructed a bridge, and a road in Chad. In short, tech-
nical and medical cooperation is one of the most important elements of bilateral re-
lations between the ROC and its allies in Africa. The sum of Taiwan’s technical mis-
  101
sions more than excels its component day-to-day exertions; they have often achieved 
miraculous results with projects whose fruits continue to be reaped indefinitely. To 
reiterate, foreign aid has been the vital component of the ROC’s Africa policy over the 
last 45 years. 
3. Increasing economic cooperation with Africa.  Economic cooperation at the in-
ternational level can be divided into commercial and noncommercial, or conces-
sionary, categories. In commercial transactions, the ROC encourages private sectors 
to invest in its allies in Africa. This has not been so successful, and trade between the 
ROC and Africa accounts for roughly one percent of the ROC’s total export trade, or 
US$3.5 billion in 1999. 
Concessionary programs are undertaken in the form of grants and loans which 
the ROC provides to the recipient countries in Africa.  Although recipients view 
these as real and timely assistance, critics argue that most recipients are less devel-
oped countries that are hardly serious players in the world arena, so spending hun-
dreds of millions of dollars in exchange for merely symbolic recognition cannot be 
considered prudent. After all, they argue, Taiwan has been isolated for so long, adding 
a few more countries to the list of allies that provide diplomatic recognition is devoid 
of further political meaning. However, some less developed countries have accepted 
this aid and improved their relations with Taiwan. 
The International Cooperation and Development Fund (ICDF) is the only or-
ganization in Taiwan that deals with international cooperation. In recent years, the 
ICDF has actively collaborated with international partners to develop regional banks 
drawing on international resources and engaging the work of international organiza-
tions. Taiwan’s economic cooperation helps convince industrial countries of its 
genuine contributions to the international community and its willingness to cooperate 
with others in international affairs.61 
4. Promoting understanding through cultural and media activities.  In the 1960s 
and 1970s, the ROC actively sent pictorials and magazines introducing its recon-
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struction achievements and reporting on Chinese communist infiltration to officials, 
libraries, schools, press and advertising organizations and educational organizations 
in Africa for their reference. Nowadays, well-known African personalities, journalists 
and scholars are invited to visit Taiwan, and propaganda and cultural activities are 
actively performed by ROC diplomats in African countries.  
In addition, the ROC sends sports teams, sports delegations and performing artist 
troops to visit African countries to promote cultural exchange with the African people. 
They also hold various cultural and historical exhibitions to enhance knowledge of 
Taiwan. Two other useful channels for increasing contact and interaction between 
Africans and Taiwanese is through providing scholarships for prominent students to 
study in Taiwan and offering short courses for officials that show potential. In recent 
years, Taipei has held Africa Day celebrations with President Chen in attendance, 
which has proved to be a popular and well-known event that shortens the distance 
between the ROC and Africa, thus promoting unity. While cultural exchanges and 
cooperation is not a decisive factor in ROC-Africa relations, it is helpful in at least 
warming relations. In 2002, the ROC issued the ROC-Burkina Faso and the 
ROC-Chad postage stamps, which had both political and cultural meaning. Through 
their circulation, more people could understand and feel the friendships and coop-
eration.  
5. Providing humanitarian aid to African people in need.  Providing humanitarian 
aid to other countries has become ever more necessary. Under the current system, 
humanitarian grants (coming out of the International Relief and Humanitarian Fund) 
are under the direct control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the fund is appro-
priated from the government budget. In 1988 and 1989, emergency assistance was 
offered by the ROC to help Malawi purchase corn during a food shortage. In 1994, the 
ROC donated two million dollars to Rwanda to help it through extraordinarily diffi-
cult times. Being a donor country reflects Taiwan’s national pride and national image.   
In 2002, millions of people in southern African nations such as Malawi, Zim-
babwe, Lesotho and Swaziland suffered from famine. President Chen donated 
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US$300,000 to Malawi and US$150,000 to Swaziland during his visit to four of 
Taiwan’s allies between June and July, highlighting Taiwan’s humanitarian concern 
for Africa. Due to its limited diplomatic channels, it is important for Taiwan to con-
solidate its diplomatic relations and to enhance its international participation through 
all means, including non-political means. Thus Overseas Development Assistance 
(ODA) became a critical tool for Taiwan to broaden its international breathing space 
and to pursue engagements internationally.62 
6. Launching the Taiwan Youth Overseas Service. In March 2000, Chen Shui-bian 
was elected President of the ROC. In order to increase the visibility of Taiwan on the 
international stage and to honor the dedication and hard work of overseas technical 
personnel, President Chen paid visits to countries that remained diplomatic partners 
with Taiwan. In these countries, President Chen found the time to visit Taiwan’s 
technical missions and to witness the sweat and labor of the personnel, the nameless 
heroes who work daily on behalf of Taiwan, upholding its name for the world to see. 
President Chen also actively promoted the Taiwan Youth Overseas Service, thus in-
troducing fresh blood into Taiwan’s international cooperative efforts.63 
In 2000, 35 young men were selected to participate in the Taiwan Youth Over-
seas Service in lieu of the mandatory army service. Before being sent abroad as 
members of technical missions, they received training in such specialized areas as 
medicine, information technology and agricultural techniques. Recently, some Tai-
wan overseas volunteers, religious groups and NGOs have joined with the Taiwan 
Youth Overseas Service to demonstrate that Taiwan is not just the symbol of an 
economic miracle, but is keen to devote itself to sharing its experiences, resources and 
knowledge with the rest of the world.64 The ROC also promotes substantive relations 
with other nations that do not have formal ties with the ROC, such as South Africa, 
Nigeria and Libya. In essence, international cooperation is the core value of the 
ROC’s foreign policy strategy in Africa. In order to combat competition from China, 
the ROC will not give up this effective practice, nor will it change this strategy in the 
future.  
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Diplomacy is the instrument by which one conducts foreign policy. The ROC has 
rightly chosen to conduct its foreign policy using appropriate strategies. And the ROC 
really has made an enormous contribution to Africa’s agricultural development. Making 
use of Taiwan’s numerous strengths, the ROC will continue to help developing nations 
learn from the “Taiwan Experience” so that they can move towards prosperity and af-
fluence.  
Evaluation 
Africa is comprised of 53 countries, many of which are characterized by low gross na-
tional income, racial conflicts and unstable governments. Hence, given that fighting 
poverty is the most important issue for many African states, particularly for sub-Saharan 
states, the search for aid is often at the forefront of African nations’ foreign policy. Geo-
graphically distant and economically weak, though potentially significant through their 
possession of voting rights in bodies such as the UN, African states remain at the center of 
the two Chinas’ diplomatic competition. 
Since 1949, the ROC and the PRC have competed with each other for international 
legitimacy and recognition from the world community. Before 1971, the ROC enjoyed 
the diplomatic recognition of a majority of independent states. After 1971, when the PRC 
replaced the ROC in the UN as the legitimate representative of China, the number of 
countries that recognize the ROC dropped from approximately 70 to about 22 by the early 
1980s. Gaining diplomatic recognition, therefore, has become the most important task for 
the ROC’s foreign diplomacy.  
Premier Zhou Enlai made a tour of 10 African states between December 1963 and 
February 1964 and asserted that “revolutionary prospects are excellent throughout the 
African continent”.65  Chinese President Jiang Zemin visited Kenya, Ethiopia, Egypt, 
Mali, Namibia and Zimbabwe in May 1996 and referred to China and Africa as 
“all-weather friends.” Jiang Zemin traveled to South Africa in April 2000, where he 
signed the Pretoria Declaration with his counterpart, President Thabo Mbeki. 
  105
The PRC has long promoted itself as the leader of the Third World and as a major 
power in the post-Cold War multi-polar world, and it seeks out alliances with African 
countries in order to target the ROC’s remaining friends there. As a member of the UN 
Security Council since 1971, with fast economic growth as well as growing international 
influence, China continues to consolidate and deepen its friendly relations and cooperate 
more substantially. In 2004, during his visit to Gabon, President Hu Jintao delivered a 
speech in which he made a three-point proposal for closer China-Africa relations in the 
new era. The three points were building on traditional friendships and pushing for new 
progress therein; persisting in mutual assistance and mutual benefit and promoting 
common prosperity; and working in close cooperation to safeguard the rights and inter-
ests of the developing countries.66  These statements proved that China wants closer 
relations with Africa.  
Frankly speaking, China’s ability to provide huge amounts of foreign aid to Africa 
and its veto power in the UN are two powerful instruments with which to woo African 
states. Owing to the zero-sum nature of the so-called “One China” policy, African coun-
tries have to decide between Taiwan and China. This has created a tug-of-war that has 
lasted for over five decades. Compared with other states in other regions, it is relatively 
easy for African states to establish and disestablish diplomatic relations with both the 
ROC and the PRC.67 
The main direction of the ROC’s foreign policy towards Africa is consolidating re-
lations with its diplomatic allies, promoting substantive relations with nations having no 
diplomatic ties with the ROC, and requesting African allies’ assistance in participating in 
international organizations and related activities.  
1. Consolidating relations with diplomatic allies.  In order to strengthen the ROC’s 
relations with its African diplomatic allies, the ROC government has held commercial 
exhibitions, provided business information services, improved investment regulations 
and encouraged ROC business investments in friendly countries. To help economic 
development in the region, the ROC government also combines the use of private 
charities and medical personnel to assist in improving the public health and medical 
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services of these countries. The ROC further provides them with agricultural tech-
nology and skills training in the hope of both solidifying its relationships and reviving 
the local economies.68 
2. Promoting substantive relations with nations having no diplomatic ties with the 
ROC.  The ROC actively promotes the Taiwan Experience to assist in the economic 
development of these nations, based on the ROC’s sincere desire to contribute to the 
international community. The ROC hopes to take further steps to develop friendly 
relations with these countries on the basis of reciprocity and mutual benefit. 
3. Requesting African allies’ assistance in participating in international organiza-
tions and related activities. Taiwan’s African allies have long supported Taiwan’s 
participation in international organizations. Burkina Faso, Gambia, Senegal and Chad 
jointly submitted a proposal to support the ROC’s bid to join the United Nations 
during the UN General Assembly in September 2001. Malawi and Swaziland signed 
the proposal and spoke in Taiwan’s favor along with Liberia, and São Tomé and 
Principe in the UN General Assembly and in General Committee. Regarding Taiwan’s 
bid to join the WHO, representatives of Taiwan’s allies continue to praise Taiwan’s 
medical achievements at international health conferences and express appreciation for 
the medical assistance from Taiwan. For instance, Senegal and Chad submitted a 
proposal to the WHO in November 2001 to support Taiwan’s bid to join the organi-
zation as an observer. The proposal was discussed by the Executive Board of the 
WHO in January 2002, as well as at the World Health Assembly in May of the same 
year.69 
The ROC’s emergence as a developed country, especially with its successful ex-
perience in developing small and medium enterprises, appeals to African states. Besides, 
Taiwan’s successful political and economic development serves as a role model for 
friendly countries in Africa. 
The whole picture of the ROC’s Africa policy can be best demonstrated by the 
sub-themes of Strength, Weakness, Opportunity and Threat. 
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Strength – The ROC’s strategy towards Africa for the last four decades is simple and 
clear; to win the friendship of African nations through foreign aid, grants, soft loans and 
international cooperation. The ROC has no intention of competing with the PRC or 
challenging its sphere of influence. The ROC’s strengths include inviting the political 
figures of African allies to visit Taiwan, promoting summit diplomacy between African 
heads of states and the president of the ROC, and most importantly, enhancing interna-
tional cooperation through foreign aid. Up to now, the ROC has dispatched technical 
missions to six allies in Africa with the expectation that those countries will voice their 
support in the UN and WHO for Taiwan’s plight, and to draw attention to her unfair 
treatment. 
Weakness – Economic relations and trade should be the main components of the relations 
between Africa and the ROC. Yet since the ROC’s investment in Africa is just one percent 
of its total foreign investment, the two sides do not have much in common in economic 
relations. Also, the two sides do not share similar political or cultural characteristics, a 
fact which is not easily altered. Furthermore, the ROC is not a member of the UN and 
WHO, which makes participation in international society very difficult. The challenges 
that the ROC faces in this context are much more difficult than those faced by any other 
country in the world. 
Opportunity – In essence, the ROC’s main interest in Africa is to win the diplomatic 
recognition and political support which has been needed for decades. The African allies’ 
interest in Taiwan is to receive the economic benefits, financial assistance and technical 
cooperation. Only when the tense relations across the Taiwan Strait improve will the 
ROC have the opportunity of winning more friends in Africa, for the ROC doesn’t want 
to irritate the PRC and those pro-Taiwan African leaders currently in power. With the 
situation on the world stage being distinctly in the PRC’s favor, the ROC must conduct its 
Africa policy prudently, with the pre-condition of not irritating the PRC. 
Threat – Since 1949, both sides of the Taiwan Strait have proclaimed that they are the 
only legitimate government of China. The ROC’s only real threat has always been the 
PRC. With accepting the so-called “One China” policy as a precondition to relations with 
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the PRC, and with the PRC as a member of the UN, every country has had to make a 
choice between the two, thus putting the ROC in an unfavorable position. Another threat 
is that African states are unstable, prone to coup d’etats, civil wars and famine, which 
makes the political situation hard to manage or predict. The fact that more and more Af-
rican allies want increased aid, financial support, loans, etc, has also put the ROC in a 
difficult position in its response to these requests. Africa’s appetite is getting larger, cre-
ating new challenges for the ROC. 
The ROC has a unique international status which has forced Taipei to seek political 
recognition from states in Africa. The number of states to recognize Taiwan in 1969 was 
22; three in 1988; 10 in 1997; and at the end of 2005, there were six states which had 
diplomatic ties with the ROC. Taiwan’s economic performance and successful devel-
opment is a powerful tool to be used in foreign diplomacy. Yet there are still many chal-
lenges arising from the outside world, especially from the PRC. It is much easier to 
safeguard the current diplomatic ties that the ROC currently has than to establish dip-
lomatic relations with new allies in Africa. After all, the PRC has already become an 
important player on world stage, which has seriously curbed the ROC’s already limited 
international space. 
In March 2004, Taiwan donated funds to assist Chad resettle refugees from the 
Darfur region. In July that year, Taiwan donated 40 metric tons of rice to the people of 
Tanzania. In August, Taiwan joined other donors of the international community and 
offered emergency relief funds to help Burkina Faso, Chad and the Gambia battle swarms 
of desert locusts devouring crops in that region.70  These examples highlight the close 
cooperative relations between Taiwan and its African allies as well as Taiwan’s humani-
tarian concern for Africa. Regarding Taiwan’s bid to join the UN, Burkina Faso, São 
Tomé and Principe and Swaziland submitted a proposal to the WHO Assembly in April 
2004 supporting Taiwan’s efforts to join the organization as an observer. The proposal 
was discussed and voted on with full support from Taiwan’s six African allies at the 
World Health Assembly in May 2004.71 
A quick glance at the ROC’s six allies in Africa will reveal that São Tomé and 
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Principe is the only country that can be considered a democratic nation by world stan-
dards. While not ideal, the ROC needs diplomatic recognition and the African allies need 
financial assistance or foreign aid, which facilitates the two sides coming together. The 
ROC has to then pay close attention and provide more financial support to fit their needs, 
and relations revolve around this kind of assistance. Yet regular elections in Africa mean 
that different political parties can come to power and decide on a new foreign policy, 
which is a potential threat for friendly relations. Diplomatic relations between the ROC 
and its African allies are fraught with challenges and need to be handled very carefully if 
they are to be sustained. 
After the first Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, held in Beijing from October 
10-12, 2000, representatives from over 40 African states gathered in Beijing to discuss 
South-South cooperation, North-South dialogue, debt relief and Chinese economic co-
operation with African states.72  China attempted to consolidate its role as a major player, 
second to the US and France, in the African continent, and at the same time to contain 
Taiwan involvement. With the official document “China’s Africa Policy” published in 
January, 2006, China seemed to be announcing that China-Africa cooperation is in the 
PRC’s best national interests and is as important as the China-Russia relationship of the 
1960s. At the same time, since international cooperation is one of the major parts of its 
foreign policy, the aims of Chinese technical missions have shifted from purely agricul-
tural to agribusiness and on further to science and technology.73 
Taiwan’s then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tien Hong-mao, said, “Using democracy 
and the ROC’s economic achievements as an axis, the ROC will create a mechanism for 
all people to participate in diplomatic work.” MOFA wants to integrate the resources of 
both the government and the civilian sector to strengthen cooperation with the ROC’s 
diplomatic allies and enhance substantive relations with countries having no diplomatic 
ties with the ROC. This once again stressed the ROC’s willingness to actively participate 
in international community. Taiwan’s outstanding techniques have allowed it to share its 
achievements with the world, and collaboration with other international organizations 
and NGOs has enhanced the depth and breadth of its work in technical assistance, and 
expanded the outlets through which Taiwan gives back to international society. 
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Although the ROC is a successful, economically developed, free and peace-loving 
sovereign state, and its democratic government is the sole legitimate government that can 
represent the interests and wishes of the people of Taiwan, it has been politically dis-
criminated against and remains adrift from the UN, like South Africa during the apartheid 
years. The ROC relationship with its African diplomatic partners is based not on mutual 
economic benefit, but rather on a pattern of friendship founded on the ROC’s mutual 
assistance programs and on the historical nature of its ties. Despite enjoying very little 
political return on its engagement with Africa, the ROC has continued to remain com-
mitted to its Africa program.74 
Even though international cooperation is the main tool for conducting the ROC’s 
strategy towards Africa, the PRC also uses similar methods to woo African states. The 
ROC needs diplomatic recognition and uses every means to sustain the ties. However, 
faced with such a strong opponent, the challenge is enormous and unpredictable. At the 
end of the day, it is relations between the ROC and the PRC that have the biggest impact 
on Africa relations. The two sides have competed for over five decades, and this compe-
tition, especially in Africa, will continue for the foreseeable future. Either way, it is the 
African states that will benefit from either the ROC or the PRC.  
Conclusion 
The main goals of diplomatic relations between the ROC and African states, which have 
seen distinct highs and lows, have been to safeguard the ROC’s international status and 
seat in the UN; to win diplomatic recognition in order to justify the ROC’s international 
status; to compete with the PRC; to interact with African nations to safeguard national 
interests; to spur growth in Africa through Taiwanese investments; and to urge African 
states to voice their support for Taiwan in the UN and WHO. The strategies and tactics 
used in conducting the ROC’s policy towards Africa can be classified as follows: 
high-level visits including those by heads of states; promoting international cooperation 
through foreign aid; enhancing economic cooperation with Africa; promoting under-
standing through cultural and media activities; providing humanitarian aid to people in 
need; and launching the Taiwan Youth Overseas Service. During the diplomatic battles 
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between China and Taiwan of the last half century, both sides have provided many funds, 
resources and personnel in their efforts to win the friendship of African countries. This 
tug-of-war will continue for the foreseeable future, yet with China becoming evermore 
powerful at an alarming rate, Taiwan is set to face an even bigger challenge. Indeed, when 
Liberia, Senegal and Chad switched to China’s side after 2000, it became clear that China 
is intent on claiming the whole Africa pie. In the light of China’s aggressive push into 
Africa, the ROC should work to consolidate diplomatic ties with its African allies by 
helping to develop their economies. Instead of merely providing financial assistance, the 
ROC should improve their business environments and lure Taiwanese companies to in-
vest there. To strengthen the ROC’s ties with Africa, the government and the African na-
tions formed the Africa Taiwan Economic Forum (ATEF). The forum is held jointly by 
the five embassies and two trade offices of the African countries represented in Taiwan, 
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. To better encourage investment in Africa and so 
consolidate diplomatic relations, the government should help build infrastructure such 
as highways and ports to facilitate trade. In short, the ROC needs a new plan for Africa. 
Since the rise of China in the African arena has caused concern for both the EU and the 
US, the ROC can consider engaging in informal strategic dialogue with those powers on 
ways to collaborate in pursuing common interests in Africa. The following chapter will 
explore further the ROC’s most significant foreign aid contribution in Africa during the 
1960s and early 1970s--Operation Vanguard-- to paint the overall picture and its effects.  
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CHAPTER FOUR  
OPERATION VANGUARD 
(1960-1974) 
More than 40 years have passed since the Republic of China on Taiwan launched Op-
eration Vanguard and dispatched technical missions to various nations in an attempt to 
share technologies that would enhance the quality of life of the people. After the Second 
World War the winds of independence were blowing around the African continent: Libya 
became independent in 1951; Tunisia, Sudan and Morocco in 1956; Ghana in 1957; 
Guinea in 1958. The year 1960 was known as the African year. There were 17 African 
countries which achieved independence from colonialist oppression. In 1959, President 
Chiang Kai-shek decided to dispatch his Economic Affairs Minister, Chi-tseng Yang, to 
participate in the independence ceremony of Cameroon. The group served as the bridge to 
Africa, visiting Togo, Nigeria, Gabon, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Mali, Tunisia, Somalia and 
Ethiopia. From the group’s detailed report, President Chiang was further convinced that 
these countries had achieved their independence and the most urgent and primary de-
velopment should be that of agriculture. Agriculture has been the mainstay of China’s 
economy for centuries. In addition, the emphasis on agricultural growth and land reform 
in the early 1950s had crucial effects on Taiwan’s development.  Thus, President Chiang 
decided to single out agriculture as the cornerstone of Operation Vanguard.1 
Origin and Operation Safari  
In 1960, 17 African countries received independent status, and all joined the United Na-
tions. Therefore their influence began to play an important role in international affairs. 
Thus 1960 was the United Nations’ African Year. In September 1960, Mr. Sékon Touré, 
the President of Guinea went to China and signed the so-called Friendship Co-operation 
Treaty. China promised to provide a loan of US$2.5 million without interest. This was an 
obvious signal that China wanted to use Guinea as a foothold in Africa.2 Another crucial 
decision was made at the Fifteenth General Assembly of the United Nations in 1960. 
During the voting for a Chinese Representative, only two out of eight African countries 
that had diplomatic relations with the ROC, supported the ROC’s position. Another five 
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countries abstained from voting and Senegal even voted against it. 
Based on the fact that more and more African countries would participate in the 
United Nations, Communist China had already contacted some countries and influenced 
them and the ROC could but try its best to win the friendship of the newly independent 
African countries. Most importantly, the traditional way of diplomacy was not enough to 
deal with the new situation, and formal diplomatic recognition could not guarantee that 
African countries would support the ROC in a crucial situation.  
Foreign Minister George Yeh, Permanent Representative of China to the UN 
Tsiang Tingfu and Vice Foreign Minister Yu-chi Hsueh all agreed that the newly inde-
pendent African countries were very poor and needed foreign aid urgently. It was a very 
good opportunity if the ROC could provide some technical co-operation proposals, which 
could enhance the relations between the ROC and its African allies. The US Department 
of State also had this viewpoint. Hence the MOFA drafted the “actions plan towards Af-
rican countries”, while the Chinese Embassy also drafted the “Operation Safari” on Oc-
tober 24, 1960. It was very clear that the purpose was to improve and strengthen relations 
with newly-independent African states, through the rendering of technical assistance and 
other means, with a view to securing their positive support or at least preventing their 
abstention from turning into unfavourable votes at the Sixteenth and the subsequent ses-
sions of the General Assembly of the United Nations.3  At the same time, two delega-
tions visited Africa, and the ROC invited some business and agricultural leaders to visit 
Taiwan. 
In January 1961, MOFA finalised the proposals from the Joint Commission on Ru-
ral Reconstruction, Council for U.S. Aid, and GIO. MOFA established the project, under 
the name of Operation Vanguard. Its aim was to promote, within the next nine months, a 
better understanding and close ties between the ROC and some of the African countries. 
The project consisted of two parts, one relating to technical co-operation and the other 
dealing with publicity.4 The methods involved inviting Africans to visit Taiwan, training 
classes for prospective African technicians, providing scholarships for African students, 
sending specialists and experts to African countries to render technical assistance in ag-
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ricultural and industrial fields. With reference to publicity, it included the establishment 
of information services, the provision of publications and audio-visual materials, dis-
patching a theatre troupe on a visit to 12 African countries, inviting political leaders, 
parliamentarians, newspapermen and civic leaders to visit Taiwan, and organising 
friendly association between China and African countries.5  
From February to September 1961, the ROC negotiated with the USA and hoped the 
latter could provide financial aid for this project. The American government thought the 
project was too large and wanted to reduce the scale in expenditure. Furthermore, many 
African Ministers visited Taiwan to discuss how to start the agricultural co-operation, 
which caused the ROC to make concessions. According to the agreement, the American 
Government would provide NT$16,500,000, about two thirds of the project, and the rest, 
about one-third of the total, would be borne by the ROC. On November 1961, the first 
agricultural mission started in Liberia, with 11 people working in Gdedin, about 200 
kilometres west of Monrovia. The expense of this mission was supported by the Ameri-
can government. To some extent, it meant that an important new phase in the ROC dip-
lomatic offensive against the PRC in Africa began formally. A summary of the reasons 
for the ROC to choose agricultural co-operation as the way to help its African allies are as 
follows: (1) it was beneath its capacity to have this kind of ability; (2) the ROC had good 
agricultural techniques; (3) it was for the need of African people; (4) African people 
would also participate in the project; (5) it was only technical assistance and would not 
cause misunderstanding. 
In the early stages, there was a series of meetings involving officials of the ROC 
MOFA, MOE, and Council for UD Aid, Sino-American Joint Commission on Rural 
Reconstruction (JCRR), and the Taiwan Provincial Government’s Department of Agri-
cultural and Forestry. The ROC Government dealt with the African countries and nego-
tiated the form of support with the American Government. That Operation Vanguard was 
able to function within a year was largely due to the foresight and leadership of President 
Chiang. Although the original reason for Operation Vanguard was to meet political and 
diplomatic purposes, the ROC also wanted to help African countries by way of humani-
tarian aid. Furthermore, because of the implementation of the less costly Operation 
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Vanguard, friendship between Chinese and African peoples could prosper and flourish. 
Action and Execution 
MOFA, MOE, Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction and Council for U.S. Aid to-
gether established “Operation Vanguard Task Unit”, and H.K. Yang was the leader of the 
group of six people, who first met in October 26, 1961. “Operation Vanguard” proceeded 
rather rapidly and soon grew beyond the administrative capacity of its initial executive 
committee. To cope with the rapid development and to facilitate co-operation between its 
components, the Executive Committee was expanded and renamed the Sino-African 
Technical Co-operation Committee on April 18, 1962. 
Objectives of the cooperation at its early stage included: 
y To introduce the ROC’s agricultural technical know-how and experiences to African 
countries; 
y To help African countries train their farmers and agricultural workers; 
y To help African countries carry out agricultural extension programs; 
y To help African countries produce enough food crops to attain self-sufficiency; 
y To create Sino-African friendship through technical cooperation. 
With a view to attaining the aforementioned objectives, it was common to carry out 
the Sino-African agricultural technical cooperation program in the following four ways: 
y To send survey teams of agricultural specialists to survey and study the local agri-
cultural situation in order to recommend the most effective and practicable 
co-operative measures that could be taken to further agricultural development. 
y To invite African agricultural officials and technicians to understand agricultural 
practices and economic development in the ROC. 
y To dispatch farming teams and other relevant technical teams to African countries. 
y To conduct training courses for African agricultural technicians who were also offered 
scholarships.6 
The Sino-African Technical Cooperation Committee (SATCC), a logistic support 
and coordination agency, was in charge of the operation of the Sino-African agricultural 
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technical cooperation program. The Department of African Affairs of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, especially the Third Section of the Department, handled matters con-
cerning policy. The SATCC’s regular work covered selecting and training of members of 
the farming demonstration teams, organizing and conducting courses, and establishing 
and dispatching farming demonstration and other technical teams to Africa.7 The com-
mittee carried out a total of 18 training programmes from 1961 to 1975, in which 1,229 
people took part and were dispatched thereafter to Africa. At the beginning, the gov-
ernment decided that the guidance of Sino-African cooperation was “diplomacy goes to 
the countryside, agriculture goes abroad.” The committee therefore selected its techni-
cians on the basis of technical expertise as well as commitment to the outreach.  
Another important arm of “Operation Vanguard” was a series of 15 “Seminars for 
African Agriculturalists” held between 1962 and 1974. Since Africa was handicapped 
most by an acute shortage of experienced and well-trained technicians in all fields, the 
ROC in 1962 established these seminars to train agricultural technicians for friendly Af-
rican countries. Trainees attended a four-to-eight month agricultural seminar in Taiwan to 
learn cultivation techniques and to receive on-the-job training. The first such seminar was 
held from March 31 to October 15, 1962 with 25 participants from 11 African countries.8 
The training programme of each seminar consisted of three main phases: (1) Ori-
entation: to help trainees acquire a general understanding of the ROC’s political organi-
sations, economy, culture and customs; (2) Training courses, the longest and most im-
portant phase of the project: Trainees were taught in classrooms and in the field on all rice 
and upland crop cultivation techniques: the curriculum included the selection of seeds, 
land preparation, rotational irrigation, pest control, cultivation of upland rice, vegetables, 
and sugar cane, use and maintenance of power tillers, water and soil conservation, seed 
grading and improvement, irrigation installation, farm demonstrations and extensions; (3) 
Observation tours: when the major training courses were over, participants were given an 
opportunity to undertake “ a study tour to various rural districts to observe farm opera-
tions and the work of peasant organizations.”9 In short, training offered to foreign tech-
nicians was aimed at advancing agricultural development and, eventually, economic 
prosperity in their countries. 
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Several African countries that sent participants to these agricultural seminars when 
they were not then independent or had no diplomatic relations with the ROC have since 
become Taiwan’s close allies in the United Nations.10 From 1962 to 1974, 15 technical 
seminars were held involving 715 participants from 31 countries. Among these partici-
pants, 64 were from seven African countries that had no diplomatic relations with Taipei: 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Rhodesia, Somalia, Tanzania and Zambia. All but Ethiopia and 
Rhodesia of this group actually had diplomatic relations with Beijing. All these seminars 
laid special emphasis on field operation and observation. Participants were required not 
only to attend lectures in the classroom but also to do every kind of work with their own 
hands to put their learning into practice. It was hoped that with their understanding of the 
ROC, they would become cadres in their respective professional fields. By the 1970s 
most African countries recognised Beijing rather than Taipei. The ROC seminar pro-
gramme for African agricultural technicians was therefore terminated in 1974 after the 
fifteenth session, ending one of ROC’s most impressive and successful aid projects. 
After receiving a request for technical assistance from a country, the ROC first sent a 
survey team of experts to assess feasibility. The mission worked with officials of the host 
country to study various subjects, including agricultural policy, environmental and cli-
matic conditions, and status of agricultural production, limitations, and possible solutions. 
A preliminary recommendation for possible areas and the scope of co-operation would 
then be drafted by the study mission. The officials of the host country carefully studied 
the recommendation. If both parties agreed, the draft proposal would be written in the 
form of an “Agreement” or “Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)” which would be 
signed by representative officials of both parties. After signing the “Agreement” or 
“MOU”, the ICDF would dispatch a team of experts to that country to set up a technical 
mission.11 
One such agreement was expressed in a diplomatic note from Belletten 
Gabre-Tzadik, Deputy Minister of Agriculture, Imperial Ethiopian Government to 
Shih-ying Woo, ambassador of the ROC on special mission. The message acknowledged 
the recommendations of the Chinese Agricultural Survey Mission and stated: “That the 
Imperial Ethiopian Government concur in the proposals transcribed above and that this 
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note in reply and Your Excellency’s Note shall be considered as constituting an agree-
ment between our two Governments effective as on June 3, 1963.”12  
Each team usually started with 10 to 20 members, depending on the size of the 
project undertaken in each country. In most cases, the team was later enlarged. The largest 
team was the one sent to the Ivory Coast, which at one time included 160 people.13 The 
agreement of technical co-operation between the ROC and the United Kingdom of Libya, 
signed by Ambassador Chen Chih-ping and Minister of Agriculture Hawid al-Obeidi on 
February 26, 1962, stated: “The Chinese Government shall send to Libya a Farming 
Demonstration Team to carry out rice growing for two years in the areas in Wadi Chati, 
Fezzan on an experimental and demonstration basis. The team is composed of one rice 
expert, one soil and fertilizer expert and six farmers.”14 
Dispatching agricultural missions to African countries to give demonstrations, 
education and extension to recommend the most effective and practicable measures for 
food self-sufficiency was the main task of Sino-African co-operation.   
a) Major work at demonstration stage: 
․Establishment of demonstration farms at carefully selected sites: Suitable location 
with good accessibility and favorable agricultural conditions were the major con-
cerns in selecting the sites. In the early stages the agricultural mission concentrated 
on one experimental and demonstration plot. In this way the mission was able to 
observe and study local conditions. It was advised that demonstration plots should 
avoid using either fertile or barren land. Barren soil would bear no fruit, while fertile 
land could produce good fruits but would be difficult to promote. To achieve their 
main task of promotion, agricultural missions were obliged to expand demonstration 
farms in various parts of a country for full scale cultivation. 
․Introduction of good varieties for local trial planting: Working in an unfamiliar en-
vironment, the agricultural team set about introducing new varieties of grains, crops, 
vegetables, melons and fruits and appropriate methods of cultivating them. A major 
project was to select and improve local crops for planting and promotion. 
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․To improve farming techniques and establishment of suitable systems: Some Afri-
can countries grow paddy rice. They depend upon rainfall with no irrigation facili-
ties, not to mention weeding, fertilization, insect and pest control. It was clear that 
new ways of promoting development of agriculture were essential. Because of the 
lack of irrigation facilities, a rotating crop-planting system ensured high productiv-
ity, i.e. rice in the wet season and a dry crop in the dry season. 
․To develop water resources and install simple irrigation and drainage facilities: Most 
African countries could not afford large-scale irrigation schemes. Therefore, the 
agricultural mission had to explore and exploit local water resources to initiate 
projects of water conservation and irrigation works. Among them, irrigation works 
of the Kou River in Upper Volta, Saga in Niger and Dowasi in Malawi were less 
costly yet most successful to the growth of the country’s agricultural sector. 
․To train local farmers in the use of modern farm machines and implements: 
“Learning from working” was one way that the agricultural team taught local 
farmers. By working shoulder-to-shoulder with ROC specialists, local farmers 
gradually acquired and accepted new technology and know-how. Simple and eco-
nomical farm machinery was also introduced to increase farm production. 
․Emphasis on economic impact: One of the purposes of the demonstration work of 
the teams was to enhance Africans’ interest in farming so as to promote the living 
standard of the people.15 
b) Major work at extension stage: 
․To increase demonstration acreage on a regional basis. 
․To encourage local farmers to join their work to receive practical training on the 
farm. 
․To help trained farmers take over the demonstration farms to operate by themselves. 
․To introduce new and superior varieties of crops and the application of scientific 
cultivation methods through field experiments and demonstrations in order to in-
crease crop production and establish appropriate crop systems. 
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․To set up irrigation systems gradually in consideration of local environments and 
actual requirements. 
․To assist in establishing farmers’ organizations and also to maintain, repair or 
manufacture farm machinery and implements.16 
To avhieve major objectives of host countries, many handicraft, animal husbandry 
and veterinary medicine and fishery missions were sent to Africa to assist the Govern-
ment and the people and hence won friendship in those countries. The most important 
objective was extension, since it could improve the standard of living and provide re-
markable assistance. Technical co-operation followed the same module as agricultural 
assistance. At the request of certain countries the ROC first dispatched technicians and 
specialists to survey and study local conditions and then recommended the most effective 
and practicable measures. By the same token, there would have to be a suitable animal 
husbandry environment before dispatching an animal husbandry team. Local materials 
and markets were studied before dispatching a handicraft team. A reliable source of sugar 
and oil seed had to be assured before dispatching a sugar refining and oil extraction team. 
Such feasibility studies were conducive to the success of technical co-operation with 
African countries. 
In an open letter, dated May 24, 1969 to all members of agricultural teams, H.K. 
Yang said, “With limited resources and manpower, we can win the friendship and support 
of the African people. It is such a great honor to have the opportunity to work in Africa.” 
“ there are 24 African countries that supported us in the United Nations; 20 African 
countries supported our legal status, moreover, about the two Chinas’ case, our African 
allies’ full support is much appreciated”17  Mr. Yang also encouraged people to deem 
Sino-African cooperation as their own business, to put in every effort possible to meet the 
needs of African allies. 
The performance also drew Europe’s attention. Ms. Kathleen Baker published an 
article, “The Chinese Agricultural Model in West Africa,” in Pacific Viewpoint saying 
that “The Taiwanese devoted considerable effort to integrating themselves into village 
life and gained the confidence and trust of the villagers by bringing them gifts of new 
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seeds, fertilizer, insecticide and pesticide and, in some cases, such as at Deni Biram 
N’Dao, donating a hand pump for applying the plant protection chemicals.” Both Taiwan 
and China had agricultural teams in Africa at the same time, but the perception of the 
Senegalese interviewed was that the Chinese lacked the warmth, friendliness and gen-
erosity of the Taiwanese.18 
Another key factor that must be noted is that the funding from America was very 
crucial. In April 1964, Washington was favourable in principle to Operation Vanguard but 
considered it to be too ambitious. Furthermore, with regard to Sino-Liberian technical 
cooperation, Washington thought the Chinese government seemed to be throwing too 
much of its limited resources into one African country. All in all, America advocated the 
idea of starting pilot farms in Liberia whereby to demonstrate Free China’s farming 
techniques to the Liberian people, and indeed to other African people in the neighbouring 
countries, and to prove to the African people what the Free World could do for them. 
The ROC contacted the US in October 1964 to provide funds for Sino-African 
technical cooperation, by means of many consultations. On December 31, 1964, the two 
countries signed the “PL 480 program”. According to this agreement, the US provided 
US$12 million to the ROC, and the ROC had to find the rest, around US$5 million by 
themselves. By the late 1960s, it cost Taipei US$7 million a year, and in 1969 alone, Af-
rican missions and training programmes cost Taipei US$10 million dollars. However, 
beginning in 1968, the US, impressed by the Nationalist Chinese accomplishments in 
Africa, provided most of the necessary money through the scale of US agricultural sur-
plus in Taiwan under the PL 480 program.19 
In January 1970, U.S. Ambassador Walter P. McConaughy informed the ROC that 
the recently signed agreement concerning Operation Vanguard would be the last financial 
donation from the US Government. Since then, the ROC took a new strategy and formed 
the “Committee of International Technical Cooperation” in November, 1972. In 1973, 
American Foreign Aid ended, but the ROC still kept the policy of helping African coun-
tries and funded all expenses on her own. The new strategy was called “Funds for In-
ternational Technical Cooperation.” 
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H.K. Yang played an important role in enhancing the good relations between Africa 
and Taiwan. For example, in November 1964 and January 1965, he led delegations to 
visit Africa, to discuss the economic and technical co-operation and made commitments 
to those countries. In July 1969, Mr. Yang, on his twenty-second African visit, had five 
main goals: maintaining contact with ROC’s African allies and some other countries; 
inspecting the agricultural missions as a gesture of concern from the President; thanking 
African countries for their support in the General Assembly of the UN; on behalf of the 
President, congratulating the re-elected President of Chad; and accepting the invitation to 
attend the anniversary celebration of Swaziland’s independence.20 To some extent, this 
was an example of perfect personal diplomacy in the history of Chinese diplomacy. 
At the cultural level, in August 1964 a cultural delegation led by Ambassador Ber-
nard T.K. Joei, consisting of 40 members, visited 15 African countries. During the 
three-month tour, they introduced traditional Chinese culture and handicrafts, as well as 
the economic accomplishments of Taiwan to Africa. Besides, they held many perform-
ances with Chinese music, folksongs, national dance and Chinese opera for African 
people. This tour opened the gate of Sino-African cultural exchange and also led to Af-
rican people having a better understanding of Taiwan, the ROC. 
Achievements of Agricultural Cooperation 
In 1960, the invitation for agricultural co-operation with African countries was launched. 
From then up to the death of President Chiang in 1975, among 47 African countries there 
were 25 that signed the Agreement of Technical Co-operation with the ROC, and 32 that 
sent their farmers and technicians to agricultural and technical seminars in Taiwan. 
During this 16-year period, 1,168 agricultural officials and technicians from 37 African 
countries were invited to visit the ROC; 718 agricultural technicians from 31 countries 
participated in 15 agricultural seminars and seven African countries participated in 
training courses such as electrical skills, handicrafts, hog raising, youth activities, sug-
arcane refining, pineapple and rice cultivation. 
During this 15-year period, the ROC had organised a total of 40 technical missions 
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for assignments in African countries. Among them, 23 agricultural missions to Liberia, 
Libya, Dohomey (now Benin), Ivory Coast, Gabon, Rwanda, Cameroon, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Niger, Central African Republic, Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), Chad, Togo, 
Malawi, Gambia, Zaire, Malagasy Republic, Botswana, Ghana, Lesotho, Swaziland and 
Mauritius; three veterinarian teams to Ethiopia, Chad and Liberia; five handicraft teams 
to the Central African Republic, Rwanda, Swaziland, Malagasy Republic and Ivory Coast; 
furthermore, a sugar refinery, seed multiplication, wine brewing, peanut oil extracting, 
fishery, farm machinery manufacture and high construction teams to Ivory Coast, 
Rwanda, Liberia, Chad, Cameroon, Niger and Central Africa Republic respectively. The 
above missions had a total of 1,220 technicians posted in almost every corner of the Af-
rican continent. Over the period of 15 years, 11 technicians in both agricultural and 
technical missions dedicated their lives for the cause of the green revolution.  Nine of 
them were mission chiefs, team leaders, deputies or specialists. All of them were bona 
fide technicians and Chinese agricultural elites. Their blood, tears and sweat were sacri-
ficed for the well being of their African brothers.21 
The above-mentioned 1,168 agricultural officials and technicians attained profes-
sional skills and also acquired an understanding of the progress made in the ROC’s 
economic development. After returning to their home countries, many become cadres in 
their respective professional fields. They contributed significantly to the agricultural and 
economic development of their own countries and to the promotion of friendly rela-
tionships with the ROC. 
The Operation Vanguard Program was generally guided by the following lines of 
basic approach: 
Grassroots Contact: It is the ROC’s conviction that the most effective way to dis-
seminate know-how is to get into close contact with the people who will actually be doing 
the work and show them how to do it. The rate of illiteracy may be high among the people 
of some under-developed countries, but they are intelligent and full of enthusiasm. The 
ROC’s specialists and technicians work shoulder-to-shoulder with the workers of host 
countries. They are never asked to do anything that the Chinese personnel would not do 
themselves. The trainers and trainees mix happily together as friends. They live in the 
same environment and do the same type of work as members of the same team. 
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Spirit of Cooperation: ROC’s economic and technical cooperation is offered in a 
genuine spirit of co-operation. ROC’s primary consideration is whether its participation 
in a certain project will be helpful to the economic welfare of the host country and to the 
promotion of international understanding. For instance, some of the projects are designed 
to increase the local output of certain products, even though they may be competitive with 
the ROC. The ROC also works with countries where no diplomatic relations have been 
established.  For example, an ROC veterinary team has been stationed in Ethiopia since 
August 1963. In Senegal, the technical mission continued its services after the disruption 
of diplomatic relations between the two countries in November 1964. In fact, it has since 
been extended at the request of the Senegal Government.22 
The Operation Vanguard Program has had far-reaching effects: 
y African nations have confidence in and welcome ROC’s technical assistance. 
y ROC assistance had proved that rice and other crops could be grown successfully in 
African countries. 
y Technical assistance rendered by ROC specialists has developed the natural resources 
and manpower of co-operating countries, resulting in a sense of self-confidence and 
self-reliance. 
y ROC technical assistance to African countries has changed the image of the people of 
Africa, has attracted people of other countries to visit the areas where ROC technical 
teams operate, and has led international financial agencies, such as the World Bank, to 
consult with ROC specialists with regard to aid programmes to African countries. 
ROC technicians stationed abroad have helped the farms of co-operating countries 
to solve their technical difficulties and improve their livelihood. The personal contacts 
and friendships thus established have cemented the ROC’s close relationship with these 
countries. It has also enhanced the status of overseas Chinese who take pride in their 
motherland and its international ventures.23 In 1971 alone, rice output was 34,000 metric 
tons in the Ivory Coast. President Félix Houphouët-Boigny said with ample evidence, “In 
the past, people considered Africa too barren for cultivation. After ROC agri-farming 
teams helped us grow three crops of rice per year, we have begun to realize that beneath 
us lies a land of wealth.” President Banda of Malawi once said, “The friendship of ROC 
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has been fully manifested by its agricultural assistance.” 
The most important effect is the support in the United Nations from the African al-
lies. In the worldwide diplomatic war with Beijing, particularly in Africa since 1960, 
Taipei had only one short-term goal: to protect its seat in the United Nations and thus 
promote the survival of the ROC as a political entity.24  Foreign Minister Shen said: “In 
order to keep our seat in the United Nations, we cannot but fight with the enemy. With 
some newly independent countries that are far away from Taipei, and have very little 
connection in economic, cultural and overseas Chinese affairs, we have to establish of-
ficial relations for gaining their understanding and support and countering their support to 
Mainland.”25 
When the UN General Assembly voted against ROC’s membership in 1960, only 
two out of eight African countries having diplomatic relations with ROC voted in ROC’s 
favour. After the ROC began their technical co-operation programme in Africa in 1961, 
the ROC had the support of nine out of 12 African countries having diplomatic relations 
with the ROC. In 1962, the ROC had the vote of 17 African countries, two of which had 
no diplomatic relations with ROC. When the French gave their recognition to the Beijing 
regime in 1964, the policy of “appeasement” influenced a number of African countries. In 
1965 when the China representation issue came up for a vote, the result was 47 to 47; 
African countries cast 10 votes in the ROC’s favour. Thanks to Gambia’s support, the 
ROC could keep its seat in the UN. From 1966 through 1970, those African countries 
receiving the ROC’s technical assistance, but having no diplomatic relations, also sup-
ported the ROC. The technical assistance undoubtedly has yielded great influence. 
Most importantly, from 1966 to 1968, as Italy raised the issue of “two Chinas” in the 
UN, African countries helped the ROC to veto the proposal.26 Even though, in the   
Twenty-seventh General Assembly of the UN in 1971, the ROC was forced to withdraw 
as one of the founding members of the UN, 15 African countries were against accepting 
the PRC instead of the ROC. Foreign Minister Shen said: “In foreign affairs, we provided 
economic and technical co-operation that has already upgraded our international status; 
especially the Operation Vanguard program made a great effect. With limited manpower 
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and funding, in confrontation with Communist China’s huge manpower and vast funding 
in Africa, we defeated Communist China. This is to prove that those agricultural experts 
should take the credit.”27 
The attitude of African countries in the voting on the China Representative Issue in 
the UN was influenced by the diplomatic relations. There is no doubt that the agricultural 
co-operation provided by the ROC was quite useful in establishing of diplomatic relations. 
With regard to the failure in voting in the United Nations in 1971, the main reason was not 
that African countries changed their attitude, but that the world situation had changed 
fundamentally. 
H.K. Yang also indicated that after the ROC Government moved to Taiwan in 1949 
until the ROC withdrew from the United Nations in 1971, the ROC survived in the UN 
for 22 years. During those years, the agricultural teams in Africa were the main factors of 
success because of their hard work.  The ROC’s Africa Policy was brought about by 
Taiwan’s own endeavours and strategy. The ROC’s participation in the UN for 22 years is 
very critical for the future development of Taiwan, and the last 10 years with the agri-
cultural missions to win the support of African countries is the most crucial factor in 
ROC’s foreign policy. It is obvious that H.K.Yang was the generator and executor of the 
Operation Vanguard Program and is the key figure in this successful strategy. 
The issue of October 18, 1968, of TIME magazine described the ROC foreign aid 
programme as “Taiwan’s small but surprisingly successful technical assistance pro-
gramme to under-developed nations.” Der Spiegel of West Germany in its issue of April 
17, 1967, carried an article entitled “Rice and Revolutionist”, reporting that the ROC 
farming demonstration teams in Africa were highly praised by the governments and 
people of the countries they served because of their superior expertise and industrious-
ness. Furthermore, Jeune Afrique of France, Est et Ouest of France, Afrique Nouvelle of 
Senegal, Fraternité Matin of Ivory Coast, and the Readers’ Digest of USA all had highly 
favourable comments about the performance of ROC’s agricultural cooperation and the 
government of ROC. The Representative of Liberia delivered a speech in the 
Twenty-Fourth General Assembly of the UN in 1969, with a copy of Readers’ Digest in 
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his hand, saying that Liberia was proud of being the first African country that received the 
ROC’s agricultural team. 
In fact, many countries and agencies have entered into economic cooperation with 
African countries, such as the United States, Britain, France, Canada, Japan, Israel, 
Denmark, and some communist countries as well. The World Bank and the European 
Common Market have also helped them. In terms of funds involved, the ROC’s budget 
was far below those of other countries and agencies, but the impact has turned out to be 
strikingly outstanding.28 President Chiang received thousands of African visitors from 
1960 to 1975. Many dignitaries told him that “If you give me a fish, it will be finished in 
one meal. Now by teaching us how to catch fish, we shall always have fish to eat.” This 
was the best remark about the ROC’s Africa Policy in the 1960s and early 1970s. 
Kou River Reclamation District 
Upper Volta achieved its independence on August 5, 1960, but did not establish diplo-
matic relations with the ROC until December 14, 1961. On May 25, 1964, during his 
second visit to Africa, Yang Chi-tseng, ROC Minister of Economic Affairs, signed an 
agricultural technical co-operation pact with Upper Volta, under which Taipei sent a 
12-member agricultural team in April, 1965. The initial activities included the surveying 
of project sites, the planning of irrigation facilities that would improve water use effi-
ciency, land reclamation, experimental planting of rice, field demonstrations, the training 
of local extension workers and farmers, and extension of farming techniques to new set-
tlers. 
Upper Volta sees only about a third of the rain that Taiwan receives in a year. As a 
result, much of the country is desert. While the raising of livestock is the main economic 
activity, Upper Volta did not produce enough food to feed itself. Extremes of climate 
make irrigation essential to the success of any agricultural programme in Upper Volta. 
Situated at the southern edge of the Sahara desert (known as the Sahel), its six-month 
season brings torrential downpours and damaging floods. Afterwards, the hot six-month 
dry season parches the green fields and makes water once again a precious commodity. 
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Hence, finding a suitable source of water to irrigate the desert and support productive 
fields was a daunting task. 
About 600 km west of the capital city of Ouagadougou is the Kou River Reclama-
tion District. The site was selected to make best use of the abundant water flow of the Kou 
River. A diversion dam with a water inlet was built below the Diordougon village. Water 
channels consist of 11 kilometres of canals, ten of laterals, 11 of sub-laterals and 73 of 
branched sub-laterals. Farm roads measuring 15 kilometres with 84 kilometres of side 
roads were constructed. The facilities served 1,260 hectares of reclaimed land. Of the 
Boulbi, Louda and Kou project areas, this is the largest reclamation operation, serving 
913 families and 5,480 people. Rice yields of above 5 t/hectares were obtained on the 
1,260 hectare of reclaimed land.29  
Through the above efforts, rice yields were raised to 12 t/ha on a double cropping 
system, raising production level by nearly 20 times. Six rice crops were grown during 
1970-73 with water resources fully utilized. As a result of extension work done by the 
Taiwanese mission, a total of 1,205,821 tons of rice was produced from the Kou area 
covering 2,078 ha of land. The total income earned from the selling of rice amounted to 
278,707,641 CFA, which brought 134,123 CFA for each rice farmer.30 At that time, some 
58 people, the third-largest group in the history of the Agricultural Missions, worked at 
the Kou River Site, digging out over 10 kilometers of irrigation channels. By turning the 
barren wilds into fertile fields in only three years, they made it possible for over a thou-
sand farming families to settle down and earn their livelihood from the land. And the 
scene, with its golden waves of rice, looks like something straight out of a southern 
Taiwanese farming village. 
 Among the three projects, the Kou River Reclamation District has the only irriga-
tion channels that were designed and built by the ATM (Agricultural Technical Mission). 
After the farmers moved in, villages formed. The government built schools and infra-
structure and the area gradually prospered. Most important, all these developments were 
effected by means of manpower only.31 The unexpected returns from this project not 
only impressed the top officials of the country, but also the foreign staff of other inter-
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national organisations stationed there. The U.S. Embassy donated a school and an in-
firmary, and the Food and Agricultural Organisation of the UN (FAO) provided food and 
crop production subsidies at the beginning of the first planting season. The World Bank 
also indicated willingness to provide soft loans to the country if technical assistance from 
the Taiwanese Mission could be made available.32 
President Sangoule Lamizala, who replaced Yameogo after a coup, was also “very 
much satisfied” with the work of the Taiwanese technicians. Many French officials 
congratulated President Lamizala on the great achievements and success of the Kou River 
Site. After visiting the site in March 1972, Robert Strange McNamara, the President of 
World Bank said, owing to the agricultural development the livelihood of the Kou River 
residents had been greatly improved. Compared with other areas, the Kou River Site had 
many more positive results. The Kou River Reclamation has become widely known as 
one of Africa’s largest specialised rice-producing zones. This project also became a 
model of successful agricultural cooperation between an African country and other 
countries.  
A report published at the time by a Dutch agricultural journal noted that the Kou 
River Valley, opened up in the 1970s by aid works from Taiwan, is an exceptional ex-
ample of successful agricultural development in Africa.33 In November 1972, in terms of 
another agreement, the ROC granted Upper Volta 50 million CFA francs for construction 
of a rice mill. However, just before the project was to begin, Upper Volta established 
diplomatic relations with Beijing on September 15, 1973. There had been five 
co-operative agreements between the ROC-Upper Volta from August 1964 until Sep-
tember 1973, to enhance relations and enact projects. Upper Volta’s change in alliance 
caused Taipei to break off relations with Ouagadougou on October 23, 1973 and with-
draw its 42 agricultural technicians. However, the Taiwanese Mission turned over the 
management of the irrigation facilities to the local authorities before they left the country. 
Bagre Reclamation 
After the name of Upper Volta changed to Burkina Faso in the 1980s, BF re-established 
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diplomatic relations with the ROC on February 2, 1994. Burkina Faso’s Minister of Ex-
ternal Affairs, Tomas Sanon and ROC Vice Foreign Minister Fang Chin-yen signed a 
communiqué in Taipei, agreeing to open embassies in each other’s territories. Sanon said 
that the BF was willing to maintain ties with both the ROC and Mainland China. He said, 
“I don’t believe ties with one side should necessarily influence relations with the other.” 
Burkina Faso became the twenty-ninth country to recognise the ROC.34 Since Burkina 
Faso had a population of 9.5 million and nearly 90 percent of its economy relied on the 
agricultural sector, Taiwan promised that technology, medical and agricultural assistance 
would be offered to BF as soon as possible. The exchange of diplomatic recognition 
provided evidence that there was room for the ROC to build diplomatic relations despite 
Beijing’s persistent efforts to isolate Taiwan internationally. 
In his greeting to the ATM, Foreign Minister Sanon said, “Our country still does not 
produce enough to feed itself; we look forward to the Agricultural Technical Mission for 
guidance to help increase our rice harvest. My hope is that you will help us expand yields 
by another 40 thousand tons.” In such a situation, finding a convenient source of water for 
irrigation was the ATM’s primary concern. After days of analysing and discussing in-
formation, the ATM decided on Bagré as the centre for the mission’s irrigation project. A 
reservoir on the upper reaches of the Nakambé River, Burkina Faso’s largest, and the land 
downstream, spanning the Nakambé, was suitable for developing an irrigation network. 
The first task was to excavate the main irrigation channel that could link the area to 
the Nakambé. However, the channel needed to flow alongside the river, which meant 
digging mostly into the solid bedrock. The only solution would be to use dynamite to 
create a path along the riverbank. There were explosions everywhere, and the air was 
filled with the smell of smoke. Since the ATM arrived, they created a river bank fringed in 
terraced rice fields. The mission brought a total of 1,000 hectares on the right bank of the 
river under irrigation. A consortium of 11 international organisations developed 2,165 
hectares on the left bank in cooperation with the Taiwan Mission.35 A rural development 
plan was made for the local government to develop the Bagre area into a community 
centre. The project included the establishment of new villages, schools, health centers, 
and so forth. Thirteen members of the mission were concentrating their efforts not only on 
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the lowland paddy rice, but also on the extension of upland rice in the water deficient 
areas. Taiwanese technicians also trained 29 local cadres and 2,989 farmers to adopt 
improved varieties and cultural practices. 
The successful greening in such unfavourable terrain was greeted with high praise 
from BF officials, foreign assistance agencies, and even the ambassadors and heads of 
state of other countries. When noted Japanese scholar Toshiyuki Wakatsuki visited the 
Kou Valley in 1998, he was amazed to see farmers still using farming techniques taught 
by the Taiwan Agricultural Technical Missions nearly 30 years before. He remarked that 
if the experience could somehow be replicated throughout Africa, it may indeed result in 
a “green revolution” for the continent, delivering sorely needed sustenance to the people 
and coaxing fertility and previously unimagined prosperity from difficult West African 
soils.36 
All in all, using water from the nearby Bagre Dam, the Bagre Rice Plantation, also 
known as the Bagre Project, covers over 1,000 hectare. Developed using funds and 
technology from Taiwan between 1995 and 2000, it is now the major granary of this 
land-locked African country. To facilitate the rice plantation there, Taiwan helped de-
velope a 580-metre canal system along the River Nakambe. The canal system was the 
largest in all of West Africa. On the heels of the Bagre Project, Taiwan also helped BF 
develop another 200 hectares of rice paddies near the River Nakambe (White Volta) and 
was helping the locals to develop their fishing industry in the Bagre area.37 The President 
of Burkina Faso personally visited the Bagre Reclamation, and followed the progress of 
agricultural land reclamation very closely. What undergirded their efforts was seeing 
barren land turn into rice-growing villages, seeing the fruits of the farmers’ labours, and 
helping solve the problem of food supply. 
New Development 
For the last three decades, Taiwan has made tremendous progress in economic devel-
opment, and the “Taiwan Experience” is known to the world. The standard of living is 
recognisable as that of a developed country. In order to do something for the international 
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community, the ROC established the ICDF on July 1, 1995, as an important department to 
deal with foreign affairs.  
Six strategies for foreign aid were identified: 
(1) To comply with the foreign policy, to open more space for Taiwan’s international role, 
which meant that ICDF was definitely a foreign instrument. 
(2) Comparatively favourable subjects were key goals, such as the management of macro 
economics, small and medium enterprises, promoting foreign trade, the developing of 
human resources and the upgrading of agricultural techniques, technical transfer and 
assistance, and so forth. 
(3) Co-operation with international organisations was the best way to learn from the 
experience of others and could guarantee both the success of the project and interna-
tional publicity as well. 
(4) To co-operate with Non-Governmental Organizations as an international trend. 
(5) According to the different conditions of separate foreign aid recipient countries, the 
ICDF stipulated different strategies for assistance. For example, the aim in Africa was 
to focus on increasing food production and initiatives related to basic technical in-
dustry.  
(6) Providing the small loan project, and at the same time using technical co-operation, 
plus education training to solve the vicious cycle of poor farming.38 
More specifically foreign aid that Taiwan provided for the African allies could be 
classified as follows: 
(1) Technical co-operation: related to agriculture, fisheries, grading, medical and irriga-
tion projects, with SME specialists and volunteers to provide consulting services as 
well as inviting mid-ranking officials to Taiwan to attend courses, seminars and 
educational training, and so forth. 
(2) Loans: Allies sometimes required loans. All the loans were to be examined carefully 
beforehand, and through the channel of ROC’s Business Bank to sign the agreement 
with the recipient country’s bank. 
(3) Encouraging enterprises to invest in allies; to help allies to develop their economy, 
creating job opportunities and increasing foreign income, the MOFA encouraged 
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business sectors to invest in allies and do this by means of subsidies. Furthermore, 
ICDF stipulated the way to facilitate the business sectors applications for the neces-
sary funding.  
(4) Donations: Providing food, equipment, daily necessities, or helping allies to build 
infrastructure such as Muzuzu Central Hospital in northern Malawi. 
(5) International Humanitarian Aid: the fundamental concept of international 
co-operation is “The world is one”, “Your misery is my misery too”. Sharing inter-
national obligation, the Government and people of Taiwan have always provided as-
sistance to war zones and natural disaster areas as well as poverty-stricken coun-
tries.39 
For Taiwan, to help the African allies to develop was the basic substance for dip-
lomatic action. For more than four decades Taiwan had already proved a reliable partner. 
Reasons for the success of the ROC’s technical co-operation efforts may be summarised 
as follows: 
(1) Basic needs orientation: In every country, economic well-being and equal opportu-
nities for all are prerequisites for social and political stability. Basic human needs, 
including access to adequate amounts of food, clothing, shelter and essential services, 
should be met. The most basic of needs is food production; accordingly, the ROC’s 
efforts have focused heavily on the production of staple food crops (rice, sweet po-
tatoes, maize, and so forth) horticultural crops (vegetables, fruits and, in some cases, 
flowers), fishing and aquaculture, animal husbandry and handicrafts. In the process, 
employment opportunities in small farming have been developed. 
(2) Hands-on Approach: Even the best assistance programme can fail if it is designed or 
implemented by officials who are not in touch with local circumstances. ROC mission 
members live and work side –by- side with local workers, bringing about greater 
mutual respect and leading to lifelong friendships. The exchange of technical 
know-how and the training of local farmers, workers, entrepreneurs and officials 
require the continuing presence of mission members in the field. 
(3) Use of Appropriate Technology: In many parts of the world, inappropriate and overly 
sophisticated technologies are applied to tasks that require simple solutions and the 
productive employment of local labour. Picks and shovels can get the work done more 
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quickly and efficiently than bulldozers that lie idle as a result of lack of spare parts or 
inadequate repair capabilities. In most developing countries, some farm mechanisa-
tion is appropriate, but the objective is to offer employment opportunities to local 
people.  The semitropical climate in Taiwan has fostered the development and ad-
aptation of farming machinery that is consistent with climatic and soil conditions. 
This knowledge is valuable in many of the overseas technical assistance projects, 
since many countries share similar conditions with the island. 
(4) Local Participation: Many worthwhile development projects have been completed 
successfully but have foundered following the departure of the field mission. In many 
cases that was because local personnel have not been integrated into the process and 
are thus unable to maintain the project or to adapt it to changes in conditions. In most 
cases, the ROC’s projects place a high premium on the participation of local farmers, 
workers and village leaders; all of these are important to the continuation and exten-
sion of gains accomplished. 
(5) Self-help Approach: In the long run, few development projects will succeed if they 
depend on inflows of capital or technical resources which dry up once the donor 
mission leaves the scene. The technical assistance efforts of the CITC have from the 
outset been oriented to self-help, with a major emphasis on training for continued 
operation after field missions return home. 
(6) Co-operation, Not Aid: The ROC approach is one of co-operation, not foreign aid. 
Programmes are designed as bilateral co-operation efforts, in which the ROC shares 
its techniques and experience with other nations while learning from them at the same 
time.40 
In the foreseeable future, Taiwan will still use this kind of approach to provide as-
sistance to its African allies, to enhance the close friendly relations, and at the same time 
to improve the livelihood of the African people.  
Conclusion  
Foreign aid has been instrumental for conducting relations between Taiwan and Africa. 
Operation Vanguard, a creation of Ambassador Yang that was undertaken from 1960 to 
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1974, successfully helped the ROC to keep its seat in the UN until 1971. It also cemented 
the image of the ROC as an important and beneficial world player through reports in the 
world media. In 1969, 22 African states had diplomatic ties with the ROC. Foreign aid 
that Taiwan had received from the US was channeled into these countries. Taiwan’s 
marvelous achievements and contributions will be recorded in history. At the present time, 
there are ROC agricultural and medical missions in Africa providing assistance to the 
local people. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE ROC  
AND AFRICAN STATES 
With all the trade and other contacts, full diplomatic relations are generally a prerequisite 
to systematic contacts and therefore set limits for a government’s foreign undertakings. 
By this criterion, the ROC’s opportunity for influence in Africa has always been limited. 
The lack of diplomatic relations closed large sections of Africa to most ROC activities. 
During the last four decades, some African countries switched their recognitions between 
the ROC and the PRC; some still keep diplomatic relations with the ROC since achieving 
independence, but the alliances need to be examined. This chapter surveys relations 
between the ROC and individual countries in Africa, grouped regionally in the sequence: 
North Africa, East Africa, West Africa, Central Africa and Southern Africa. 
North Africa 
Egypt 
The ROC established the Consulate in Cairo in 1934 and upgraded it to a Legation in June 
1942. The ROC embassy existed from September1948 to May 1956. Relations between 
Chiang Kai-shek and Africa began in 1942 when he was in Cairo attending a summit 
meeting. Witnessing the way the British police treated the Egyptians with great cruelty, 
Chiang Kai-shek felt deep sympathy for the oppressed people. During Chiang’s short stay 
in Cairo, the king of Egypt sent his personal envoy to him seeking his help. Then and 
there, Chiang Kai-shek reaffirmed his determination to help African countries obtain 
independence.  
In April 1986, six business specialists visited Egypt to start the economic interaction. 
Taiwan External Trade Development Council (TETDC) office in Egypt was established 
in April 1989. MOFA established its official office in Cairo in 2000; however, under  
pressure on Egypt by the PRC, the office was forced to close in July, 2000. Currently, 
only Taiwan Trade Center Cairo, under the umbrella of the Taiwan External Trade De-
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velopment Council, functions in Egypt. 
Libya  
The ROC established diplomatic relations with Libya in May 1959. Since then, the two 
countries signed the Agricultural Co-operation Agreement and agricultural and medical 
teams were sent to Tripoli. The Libyan people were satisfied with the performance of the 
ROC specialists, and more medical personnel were sent to Libya upon the request of the 
Libyan government. However, in September 1978, Libya recognised the PRC, bringingt 
good relations to a full stop.1 From March 1980 to September 1997, the ROC commer-
cial office in Libya was a de facto government office in Tripoli.  
Mauritania 
Mauritania became independent on November 28, 1960, and established diplomatic re-
lations with the ROC on the same day. At the Sixteenth UN General Assembly meeting in 
1961, the Soviet Union again sponsored Outer Mongolia’s membership and indicated that 
it would not vote for the admission of Mauritania if Taipei again blocked Mongolia. Fi-
nally, Taipei was forced to compromise; both Mauritania and Outer Mongolia joined the 
United Nations in 1961. Despite this sacrifice made by the ROC, no ROC ambassador 
was sent to Mauritania, and relations between the two countries were never close. Mau-
ritania, nevertheless, was the first country visited by ROC’s Foreign Minister Shen 
Chang-huan during his 1963 trip to 16 African countries, and in February 1965, Mauri-
tania accepted an offer of assistance made by ROC Vice Foreign Minister H. K. Yang on a 
visit to Nouakchott. In June, Taipei sent a technical co-operation mission to Mauritania 
and at last appointed an ambassador. However, less than a month later, Mauritania sud-
denly changed its attitude and established relations with Beijing in July. Taipei conse-
quently broke diplomatic ties with Nouakchott on September 11, 1965.2 
Morocco 
There is little business contact with Morocco and currently the Taiwan Trade Center, 
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Casablanca Sarl, an overseas office of the Taiwan External Trade Development Council, 
is the only office there. 
Algeria 
According to a reliable source, the Chinese Council was established in Algeria in October 
1943 and closed in January 1945.3 
Tunisia 
The deputy director of MOFA led a commercial delegation to visit Tunisia in April 1966. 
The two countries then signed an agricultural co-operation agreement on February 7, 
1967. Owing to the announcement by Foreign Minister Habie Bourguiba Jr. that there are 
two Chinas in the world, Communist China reprimanded the Tunisia government for 
interfering in the internal affairs of China and protested against the visit of Taiwan’s 
commercial delegation. Relations between the two countries were never cordial. 
Sudan 
According to the memories of Dr. Fong-san Ho, the Chinese ambassador to Egypt until 
1956, Dr. Ho was busy with secret contacts with the Sudan government under instruction 
by the ROC government to establish formal relations.4 Generally speaking, since none 
of the countries there recognise Taipei now, the ROC has little interaction with North 
African countries; even commercial relations are not very robust. 
East Africa  
Malawi 
Malawi achieved its independence on July 6, 1964. In July 1966, Malawi became a re-
public, and PM Hasting K. Banda became the first president. Banda received Vice For-
eign Minister Yang on July 11 and informed him that Malawi had decided to establish 
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diplomatic relations with Taipei. On the same day, Banda and Yang, expanding Taipei’s 
agricultural assistance by 20 additional agricultural technicians, signed the first 
Sino-Malawi technical co-operation agreement. The Chinese team achieved great success 
in increasing Malawi’s average rice yield from 500 pounds to 6,000 pounds per hectare.5 
Malawi under Banda consistently supported Taipei in the UN between 1965 and 1967. 
President Banda arrived in Taipei on August 4, 1967, for an eight-day visit, and signed a 
joint communiqué with President Chiang to enhance the good relations. Premier Sun paid 
an official visit to Malawi in March 1980, which highlighted the close ties that existed 
between the two countries. The Premier described the Chinese Agricultural Mission 
Projects in Malawi as the best of all those established by the ROC under its programme of 
providing technical aid to developing countries. During the Premier’s visit, a technical 
agreement was signed providing for increased assistance in the future. Part of this assis-
tance was to cover the provision of more power tillers, a key factor in increased rice 
production.6 
The government of Malawi set up an embassy in the ROC in December 1994. 
High-ranking officials on both sides maintain frequent interactions. Since President 
Bakili Muluzi took office in 1994, he has visited the ROC four times----1995, 1996, 1999 
and 2003. In the joint communiqué signed by President Chen and President Muluzi, the 
latter reaffirmed his support for the ROC’s bid to participate in the UN and other inter-
national organisations. He also expressed his sincere appreciation for the assistance that 
the ROC has extended to the ROM in its economic development. Both presidents ex-
pressed their satisfaction with the cordial ties of friendship and co-operation that exist 
between the two countries. President Chen visited Malawi in July 2002. At a state ban-
quet, President Chen said: “we understand the needs of most developing countries be-
cause Taiwan experienced a similar development process, and we are eager to share the 
‘Taiwan experience’ of development with such allies as Malawi.”7 With the cordial re-
lations between Malawi and the ROC for spanning 40 years, this friendly tie is the one of 
longest standing among the ROC’s African allies. 
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Kenya 
Kenya is a powerful country in the East African region. Before it gained independence in 
December 1963, the ROC donated 20,000 pounds of rice to help the victims of famine. 
What is more, the two sides signed a common communiqué to enhance friendship and 
co-operation with the intention on the part of the ROC to send an agricultural team to 
Kenya. Madam Chiang also received the women’s leader of Kenya, Ms. Ruth Kariuki 
Njieri. The interaction among people of both countries is quite good and even nowadays 
the ROC would like to establish government level contact with Kenya. An explosion 
occurred at the US embassy in Nairobi on August 7, 1998 that killed hundreds of people. 
The MOFA condemned this vicious and brutal action and also paid condolences to the 
Kenyan government and the families of victims. 
Ethiopia 
Ethiopia is one of the world’s old kingdoms. In 1960, the king of Ethiopia received the 
ROC delegation led by Mr. Yang. There was are an exchange of notes between the ROC 
and the Empire of Ethiopia on Agricultural Technical Co-operation on June 3, 1963, and 
an Agreement on Handicraft Technical Co-operation on April 19,1966.8 Based on this, 
the ROC sent agricultural, veterinary and handicraft technical missions to assist the Im-
perial Ethiopian Government. In 1967, the Ethiopian King Haile Selassie I received the 
ROC special envoy Mr. Yang for the celebration of the Kenya’s seventy-fifth birthday 
and discussions on agricultural co-operation. Since Addis Ababa was the headquarters 
for the African Union, the Central News Agency stationed a journalist there to report on 
African affairs during the 1980s. On November 24, 1970, Ethiopia established diplomatic 
relations with the PRC. After serving in Ethiopia for more than seven years, all veterinary 
missions withdrew and returned back to Taiwan. 
Uganda 
Before Uganda achieved independence, some delegations led by the Prime Minister vis-
ited the ROC and expressed the intention of establishing diplomatic relations after in-
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dependence. On October 9, 1962, the ROC sent a congratulatory telegraph on the inde-
pendence of Uganda, and Dr. Simpson Shen was the special envoy visiting Kampela. 
Furthermore, on October 15, 1962, the Chinese Representative to the UN strongly urged 
that Uganda should be allowed to be a full member of the United Nations. After 1990, the 
political situation of Uganda became stable again and the Minister of Tourism and Fi-
nance visited the ROC to discuss cooperation between two countries. It was clear that 
Uganda was interested in the economic performance of the ROC and would like to have 
some non-political contact. 
Rwanda 
Rwanda became independent on July 1, 1962 and established diplomatic relations with 
the ROC on the same day. A four-member Rwandan government delegation led by the 
Minister of Agricultural and Economic Affairs P. D. Nkezabera visited Taipei from Oc-
tober 9 to 16, 1963, and signed an agricultural technical co-operation agreement that 
resulted in the dispatch of a 10-man agricultural team in late January 1964 to work for two 
years in Rwanda. A handicraft technical co-operation pact was signed between the two 
countries at Kigali on May 26, 1965. The 1963 agreement was renewed in 1966 by Li 
Kou-ting, the Minister of Economic Affairs of the ROC and Thad Dee Bagaragaza, the 
Minister of International Cooperation of Rwanda. In terms of the new agreement Taipei 
was to provide US$1.5 million in technical aid over a five- year period to help 
Rwanda .Rwanda pledged to fully support Taipei in the UN. Rwanda had abstained on the 
“Chinese representation” issue in November 1965, but in the next five years, kept the 
promise.9 
However, pressed by its strongly pro-Beijing neighbour Tanzania and lured by a 
PRC promise of aid, Rwanda began to change its policy in early 1971, and for the first 
time voted for Beijing’s admission to the United Nations on October 26, 1971. On No-
vember 12, 1971, Rwanda officially established diplomatic relations with Peking. Taipei 
therefore closed its embassy on May 13, 1972 and withdrew its 47 agricultural techni-
cians.10 On July 25, 1994, the ROC donated 2 million dollars through the UN Children’s 
Foundation-American Branch to help the victims of slaughter during the bloody genocide 
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in Rwanda. 
Burundi 
Burundi gained independence on July 1, 1962. The ROC sent a congratulatory message to 
the Burundi government and instructed the Chinese ambassador in the Congo (Kinshasa) 
to attend the independence ceremony as special envoy. The Burundi government once 
showed interest in the ROC’s Agricultural Missions in Africa, expecting that the ROC 
could send some agricultural specialists to Burundi. Burundi established diplomatic re-
lations with the PRC on December 21 1963, but broke off the relations on January 29, 
1965 and forced the staff in the embassy to leave the country within two days. Mr. Yang 
had high praise for this decision of the Burundi government and encouraged African 
leaders to take the same action against the PRC’s psychological attack and subversion in 
Africa.11 
In East Africa, the ROC had diplomatic relations with Malawi, Rwanda and Burundi. 
Right now the ROC still has friendly relations with Malawi, maintaining these relations 
for 40 years and setting a record in the ROC’s diplomatic history. The ROC also main-
tains contact with Kenya, a country of influence in the region, attempting to promote 
co-operation at the governmental level. 
West Africa  
Burkina Faso 
Upper Volta achieved its independence on August 5, 1960, but did not establish diplo-
matic relations with the ROC until December14, 1961. From July 17 to 20, 1963, ROC 
FM Shen Chang-huan visited Ouagadougou to confer ROC decorations on President 
Maurice Yameogo and FM Lompolo Kone, and to receive the Upper Volta’s second 
highest decoration from President Yameo. A joint communiqué on July 20 indicated plans 
for co-operation, particularly in agriculture. On May 25, 1964, during his second visit to 
Africa, Yang Chi-tseng, the ROC’s Minister of Economic Affairs, signed an agricultural 
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technical cooperation pact with Upper Volta, by terms of which Taipei sent a 12-member 
agricultural team in April 1965. This pact was subsequently renewed and expanded sev-
eral times. As in many other African countries, the Chinese team achieved great success 
in Upper Volta, with an average yield of 6,600 kilograms of rice per hectare.12 During 
HK Yang’s visit on September13, 1971, Taipei signed a most favored trade agreement 
with Ouagadougou to increase commerce between the two countries. Upper Volta 
switched recognition to the PRC on September 15, 1973; Taipei then withdrew its 42 
agricultural technicians. 
On February 2, 1994, Burkina Faso’s Minister of External Affairs Tomas Banon, 
and the ROC’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Fang Chin-yen signed a communiqué in Taipei, 
agreeing to open embassies in each other’s territories. The exchange of diplomatic rec-
ognition provided evidence that there was room for the ROC to build diplomatic relations 
despite Beijing’s persistent efforts to isolate Taiwan internationally. Since July 18, 1994, 
President Blaise Compaore has visited Taiwan four times (1994, 1996, 1998, 2001) and 
actively supports the ROC returning to the international community by speaking in fa-
vour of the ROC at the UN General Assembly. This fully reflects Burkina Faso’s firm 
friendship with the ROC. President Chen visited Burkina Faso from August 21 to 23, 
2000, and was the first president from Asia to visit the country. 
The Mixed Commission of Co-operation between the ROC and BF was established 
and signed in July 1994. The ROC and BF rotate every two years to host the meeting, 
whose purpose is to gather major officials and experts from the two countries to study and 
implement bilateral co-operation projects. It has so far been held in Ogadugadu in June 
1995, Taipei in June 1997, Ouagadougou in June 1999, Taipei 2001 and in November 
2003 Ouagadougou. Both countries carry out various co-operation projects according to 
the meetings minutes, and both governments recognise the success of these projects.13 
Taipei also sent an Agricultural Mission and Medical Mission to Ouagadougou, which 
was not only warmly welcomed by the people of BF, but also won the praise of other 
foreign missions based in Burkina Faso. 
In order to witness the friendly relations between BF and the ROC, the issue of two 
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sets of one million commemorative stamps is of historical significance for Burkina Faso. 
The themes of these stamps are the Kou River rice-growing area, built with the assistance 
of Taiwan in the 1960s, and the Bagre Reclamation Project, which is under construction. 
Both of them are the result of efforts of Taiwan’s early and current technical agricultural 
missions and of the people of Burkina Faso. The Kou River rice-growing area was started 
by Taiwan’s Technical Mission in 1968 and completed in 1973. It includes 1,260 acres of 
rice paddies and agricultural irrigation facilities and can be called the first grain barn of 
Burkina Faso. The Bagre Reclamation Project area was once regarded by Western ex-
perts as unlikely to grow rice, but the first phase of this difficult reclamation project was 
completed in 2000. It was praised by the French TV5 as “a model of sustainable devel-
opment” and was broadcast to the whole world during the 2002 World Summit in South 
Africa.14 
Gambia   
The Republic of The Gambia, the smallest country on the continent of Africa, became 
independent on February18, 1965, but did not establish relations with either China until 
late 1968. A technical cooperation agreement between Gambia and the ROC was signed 
at Bathurst on August 12, 1966. Because the Chinese team made ‘great contributions to 
the increase of rice production’ in Gambia, at Gambia’s request, the Sino-Gambia Tech-
nical co-operation agreement was extended for two years on May 14, 1986 and the team 
was expanded from 16 to 24 men. Gambia’s Prime Minister Jawara paid a state visit to 
the ROC from November 8 to 12, 1968, and a joint communiqué at the end of this visit 
announced the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Jawara 
paid another state visit to Taipei as President of The Gambia on October 16, 1972.15 
Nevertheless, pressed by the pro-Beijing trend prevailing in Africa, Gambia established 
diplomatic relations with the PRC on December14, 1974. The ROC therefore broke re-
lations with Gambia on December 28 and withdrew its farm technicians.   
On July 13, 1995, Gambia re-established diplomatic relations with the ROC. Since 
then, Yahya Jammeh, President of The Gambia has visited the ROC six times---1996, 
1998, 2001, 2003, May 2004 and October 2005, reflecting the excellent relations be-
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tween the two countries. Several co-operation programmes have been developed, and 
government officials of all levels have exchanged frequent visits. The Republic of The 
Gambia has been a strong supporter of the ROC in the international arena, speaking in 
favour of the ROC repeatedly at meetings of the UN, the WHO and other international 
organisations. Furthermore, President Jammeh voiced Gambia’s support for the ROC at 
the UN Millennium Summit.16 
 President Chen Shui-bian visited Gambia in 2000 during his Journey of Democracy, 
Diplomacy and Friendship and was warmly received by President Jammeh and the 
Gambian people. There are agricultural and medical missions from the ROC working in 
Gambia, together with some other assistance that the ROC extended in various fields of 
national development. President Chen and President Jammeh expressed their satisfaction 
with the cordial ties of friendship and co-operation that exist between the two countries. 
Chad 
Chad achieved independence on August 11, 1960 but did not establish diplomatic rela-
tions with the ROC until January 13, 1962. Under an agricultural co-operation agreement 
signed in Taipei on April 7, 1964, the ROC sent a 17-person agricultural team to Chad to 
help with the cultivation of rice and sugar cane.17 In a joint communiqué on June 26 1969, 
Taipei promised US$3 million in aid to Chad over five years, the first credit assistance 
granted by the ROC to a foreign country. Furthermore, a new technical co-operation 
agreement was signed in Fort Lawy on January 15, 1966, providing for the expansion of 
the ROC agricultural assistance, scholarships for training young Chad farmers in Taiwan, 
and construction of an oil refinery and a factory to produce 150,000 tons of soap per year. 
The 1964 agricultural pact and the 1966 technical co-operation agreement were incor-
porated into a new Sino-Chad economic and technical co-operation agreement signed on 
July 10, 1972, in Taipei.18 Despite the considerable aid it had received Chad deserted 
Taipei on November 28, 1972. Even though Chad had voted against the expulsion of 
Taipei from the UN, it nevertheless recognised Beijing, a year after Taipei lost its UN seat 
in late 1971. 
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On August 12, 1997, Chad’s Foreign Minister Mahamat Annadif and John Chang 
signed the agreement to re-establish diplomatic relations. Since then, President Idriss 
Deby of Chad has visited the ROC twice---October 1997 and March 2002. President 
Chen visited Chad on August 23, 2000, signing joint communiqués with President Deby, 
successfully promoting the ROC’s democratic achievements and elevating visibility in 
the international community. Cooperation between the two countries extends to many 
fields such as medical care, agricultural technology, drinking water treatment, education 
and road construction. The ROC medical and agricultural missions stationed in Chad 
gave great assistance and were welcomed by the people. 
Foreign Minister Eugene Chien led a delegation to visit Chad from November 29 to 
December 4, 2002, and co-hosted with President Deby the ceremony for the unveiling of 
Taiwan Avenue and the Solidarity Bridge, both made possible through assistance from 
the ROC. The two great projects are the fruits of co-operation between the ROC and Chad 
over the years. On December 1, 2003, the ROC issued four stamps commemorating 
co-operation, each depicting a different field of bilateral co-operation: road construction, 
agricultural techniques, health and medical care, and symbols of bilateral friendship.19 
These stamps fully illustrate the productive results yielded by various co-operation pro-
jects during the seven years in which diplomatic ties had been resumed.  
However, Chad established diplomatic relations with the PRC on August 5, 2006.  
President Deby sent a letter to President Chen expressing that “For Chad’s survival, I had 
to make such bitter decision,” which ended the relations of nearly 10 years. Chad is an 
important country full of crude oil, and this move was is a big setback for the ROC. After 
recovery the unwelcome news, the ROC withdrew its missions from Chad. 
Senegal 
Taipei established relations with Senegal on September 23, 1960. Foreign Minister Shen 
visited Senegal on July 15, 1963, and on behalf of the ROC government, conferred a 
decoration on the President of Senegal, Leopold Sedar Senghor. The ROC signed a 
technical co-operation agreement with Senegal on September 13, 1963, and sent a 
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12-person agricultural demonstration team in April 1964. On November 8, 1964, the 
ROC severed relations with Senegal after the country established relations with Beijing 
and closed its embassy in Dakar. Diplomatic relations between the ROC and Senegal 
were not resumed until July 16, 1969, and lasted only two-and-a-half years after that. At 
the request of the Senegalese government, the ROC set up an Economic and Technical 
co-operation Office in Dakar in April 1972 that only lasted for four-and-a-half years. The 
office closed in November 1976. 
In December 1995, President Abdou Diouf sent his special advisor, Mansour Cama, 
to Taiwan to discuss the resumption of relations On January 3, 1996, Foreign Minister 
Moustapha Niasse signed the agreement with Foreign Minister Fredrick Chien to resume 
diplomatic relations.20 Another four agreements ranging from agricultural and medical 
to technical co-operation were signed. President Abdou Diouf led a delegation to visit the 
ROC in July 1996. Mr. Ahmed Kane was ambassador to the ROC and came to Taiwan in 
October 1998. In the year 2000, the countries signed five-year co-operation programmes 
to execute projects. In October 2001, Senegal hosted an international seminar on Af-
rica’s stance regarding Taiwan’s participation in the United Nations. The event, organ-
ized by the Dakar regional center of the Center for Diplomatic and Strategic Studies 
(CEDS), gathered participants not only from countries that had diplomatic relations 
with the ROC but also from the rest of the region. 
President Abdoulaye Wade led a delegation to visit the ROC in 2001, and President 
Chen visited Senegal in July 2002. In order to strengthen relations with Senegal, the ROC 
organised different kinds of official visits to Dakar. In return, high-ranking officials such 
as the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Economic Affairs Minister, Health Minister, 
Speaker of the Parliament and others, also visited the ROC. Taiwan even sent officials to 
participate in the NEPAD meeting held from April 15 to16, 2002, in Dakar in order to 
share their small and medium enterprise experience with African countries, and to prove 
that the ROC fully supports NEPAD.21 
However, Senegal established diplomatic relations with the PRC on October 25, 
2005.  President Wade sent a letter to President Chen expressing that “Between countries 
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there is no forever friend (sic), only forever interests,” which ended the relations of nearly 
10 years. Senegal is an important regional country in western Africa, and this movement 
was another setback for the ROC, which then withdrew its missions. Diplomatic history 
shows that the ROC and Senegal established official and friendly ties three times, the 
third time being the longest.  
Liberia 
A treaty of amity between the ROC and Liberia was signed in Paris on December 11, 
1937 by Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo, then Chinese Ambassador to France and Baren de 
Bogaerde, Liberian Minister to France. This was China’s first treaty with an African 
country, and the two countries set up formal relations August 19, 1957.22 A two-year 
technical co-operation agreement was signed between the ROC and Liberia in Monrovia 
on October 13, 1961. Then the ROC began its African aid programme by sending a 
14-member team led by Tsou Mei to help Liberia improve its cultivation of rice and 
vegetables. The agreement was renewed in 1963, 1965, and 1967 and in June 1970, ex-
tended to four years. The impressive results achieved by the ROC agricultural team led 
other African countries to ask Taipei for aid. Officials of the two countries exchanged 
frequent visits. Between 1954 and 1971 Liberia continuously supported Taipei in the UN. 
After Liberia established diplomatic relations with Beijing on February 22, 1977, Taipei 
broke relations with Monrovia the next day, ending a cordial relationship of two decades. 
Liberia and the ROC resumed diplomatic relations on October 9, 1989. In February 
1997, Charles Taylor, then Vice Chairman of the Liberia Council of State, paid an official 
visit to the ROC. In July 1997, he was elected the President of Liberia under the obser-
vation of UN and international observers. At the invitation of President Lee Teng-hui, 
President Taylor visited the ROC again in November of the same year.23 Relations be-
tween the two countries have been growing steadily. However, the lack of security, the 
collapse of public infrastructure, and the absence of the rule of law in Liberia have re-
sulted in a paucity of foreign investments and donations.24 Taylor sought to court Tai-
wanese investors, holding the first session of the Joint Commission between the Republic 
of Liberia and the ROC in Monrovia from April 28 to 30, 1998. The Chinese delegation 
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agreed to provide assistance in rehabilitation of air and seaports and in other reconstruc-
tion programs as well as to encourage the ROC private sector to invest in Liberia. 
President Taylor visited the ROC in February 2000 and March 2001. During the 
visits, Taylor expressed sincere appreciation to the ROC for the assistance rendered to the 
Republic of Liberia in the form of economic development and humanitarian assistance. In 
December 2002 and again in May 2003, the ROC donated 5,000 metric tons of rice to the 
people of Liberia suffering from civil war. However, the PRC influenced politicians from 
Liberia by threatening to obstruct the passage of the US$250 million budget in the UN 
Security Council for the dispatch of troops from the United Nations Mission in Liberia 
(UNMIL). Hence the interim government of the Republic of Liberia bowed to threats and 
enticements from the PRC, so the ROC decided to suspend diplomatic relations and to 
cease all assistance projects that it initiated in Liberia.25 
Guinea-Bissau 
Guinea-Bissau gained independence on September 24, 1973 and in 1974 Portugal rec-
ognised its independence. It is the first Portuguese colony to have this status. GB estab-
lished diplomatic relations with the PRC on March 15, 1974. In September 1987, the 
Minister of Trade of Guinea-Bissau came to Taiwan to discuss co-operation, and Foreign 
Minister Julio Semedo also came in May 1990. The ROC and the Republic of 
Guinea-Bissau established diplomatic relations on May 26, 1990.26 In October that year, 
President Joao Bernardo Vieira headed a delegation to the ROC and signed a joint 
communiqué with President Lee Teng-hui, affirming their willingness to strengthen the 
friendly relations and co-operation between two countries. 
From April 7 to 13, 1995, President Vieira led an important delegation on a state 
visit, during which the first session of the ROC and Guinea-Bissau Mixed Commission 
was held in Taipei to review mutual co-operation projects and discuss the direction and 
framework of future co-operation. There were three co-operation agreements between the 
ROC and Guinea-Bissau. The ROC dispatched an Agricultural Mission and a Medical 
Mission in June and November 1990 respectively to GB to provide assistance to the 
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people. Foreign Minister Jason Hu paid a visit to GB in February 1998. The Prime Min-
ister, Carlos Augosto Correia, and the Minister of Agriculture, Avito Jose Da Silva, vis-
ited the ROC in February and April 1998.27 However, on April 23, 1998, Guinea-Bissau 
signed a resumed communiqué with the PRC, and the ROC ended relations the next day, 
putting the friendship of nearly eight years to an end. 
Niger 
The Republic of Niger became independent on August 3, 1960. Only the Foreign Minister, 
Shen Chang-huan visited Niamey, the capital of Niger, and a joint communiqué was is-
sued on July 22, 1963, announcing the establishment of diplomatic relations between 
Taipei and Niamey. In 1966, Taipei promised Niger US$3 million in technical and ma-
terial assistance over the next five years.28 Niger President and Madame Diori arrived in 
Taipei on October 23, 1969 for a five-day state visit. Speaking at a banquet given in his 
honour by President Chiang, Diori thanked Chinese leaders for their assistance in agri-
cultural development. During the 1960s, Niger was one of Taipei’s strongest supporters in 
Africa, consistently voting for Taipei in the UN, and was among the 15 African countries 
which voted against Beijing’s admission in 1971. But Niger recognised Beijing on July 
20, 1974. As a result, Taipei closed its embassy in Niamey nine days later and withdrew 
its 15 agricultural technicians. 
The Republic of Niger and the ROC re-established diplomatic relations on June 19, 
1992. Two months later Prime Minister Amadou Cheiffou led a delegation to visit the 
ROC. President Mahamane Ousmane paid a state visit to Taiwan from June 2 to 7, 1994. 
Foreign Ministers of both countries signed the trade agreement and established the mixed 
commission to further enhance the interaction, promoting friendly relations. The ROC set 
up an agricultural mission in Niger in November 1994. The President of National As-
sembly, Mr. Mahamadou Issoufou; Minister of State in charge of Industrial Development, 
Trade, Craft and Tourism, Mr. Sidikou Oumarou; and the Minister of Foreign Affairs and 
Co-operation, Mohamed Bazoum, visited Taiwan in July, November and December re-
spectively.29 After Niger signed the reassumed agreement with the PRC on August 19, 
1996, the ROC cut off relations the same day, ending the friendship of only four years. 
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Ivory Coast 
When the Ivory Coast achieved independence on August 7, 1960, the ROC sent Chen 
Hsiung-fei, its Minister to Paris, as special envoy to the independence ceremony at 
Abidjan, capital of the new republic. In September 22, 1962, Young Chin-tseng, Minister 
of Economic Affairs of the ROC, and Minister of Agriculture of the Ivory Coast, Charleo 
Donwahi, signed the Technical Co-operation Agreement. On July 20, 1963, during For-
eign Minister Shen Chang-huan’s visit to Abidjan, Shen and Acting President P A Denise 
signed the official diplomatic relations agreement. In 1967, the number of people in the 
ROC agricultural demonstration and cadre-training mission to the Ivory Coast totalled 
160, the largest ever sent by Taipei to an African country.30 In addition, Taipei established 
a ‘Seed Multiplication and Supply Center’ in the Ivory Coast in April 1968.   
The Ivory Coast was one of Taipei’s closest allies in Africa and the relations were to 
be among the most enduring and most fruitful with any African country. President 
Houphouët-Boigny, acclaimed by the ROC as the “leader of leaders” in Africa, was one 
of the very few senior African statesman who persistently warned Africans of the danger 
presented to Africa by Communism, especially the Beijing variety. Under his leadership, 
the Ivory Coast continuously supported Taipei in the United Nations from 1961 to 1971. 
In 1978, the Ivory Coast was the only West African country that still recognised Taipei 
rather than Beijing.31 After the official relations ended on March 2, 1983, the Economic 
and Trade Services Center was still in Abidjan. The Foreign Minister of the Ivory Coast 
even supported the ROC to rejoin the UN in the General Assembly of September 1993. 
Nigeria 
Nigeria gained independence in 1960. Mr. Sun Yun-suan was the General Manager of 
Taiwan Power Electricity Company in 1960s. At the invitation of the World Bank, Mr. 
Sun worked as CEO & General Manager of the Electricity Corporation of Nigeria from 
1964 to 1967. He was appointed Minister of Economic Affairs from 1969 to 1978, and 
Premier of the ROC from 1978 to 1984. During the years he worked in Nigeria, people 
paid high respect to him for his enormous contribution and achievements. 
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In February 1971, Nigeria and the PRC established diplomatic relations. However, 
after signing the Memorandum in November 1990, Nigeria and the ROC agreed to set up 
an official office in Taipei and Lagos respectively. The Trade Mission of the ROC (Tai-
wan) was set up in April 1991 and the Nigeria Trade Office in Taiwan in November 1992. 
In order to help Nigeria develop the Calabar Export Processing Zone, the ROC opened 
the Chinese Consulate General in Calabar on August 17, 1993. Furthermore, in April 
1994 the Minister of Commerce and Tourism, Chief Metford Okilo and the ROC Minister 
of Economic Affairs, P. K. Chiang, signed an Agreement for Promotion and Protection of 
Investments and an Agreement on Economic Cooperation on Export Processing Zones. 
32 However, because no investors from Taiwan came to Calabar, the ROC closed the 
Consulate General in September 1997. 
Cameroon 
When Cameroon became independent on January 1, 1960, Taiwan sent a government 
delegation led by Yang Chi-tseng, Minister of Economic Affairs, to attend the inde-
pendence ceremony at Yaounde, and the countries officially established diplomatic rela-
tions on February 19, 1960. From 1962 to 1967, the ROC and Cameroon signed four 
agreements regarding agricultural, economic and technical co-operation. Foreign Min-
ister Jean Faustin Betayene visited the ROC in August 1963 to enhance friendly relations. 
In spite of receiving continuous agricultural aid from Taipei from 1964 onwards, Cam-
eroon only half-heartedly supported the ROC in the UN. Although never voting against 
Taipei, Cameroon abstained in many votes on the China issue. Cameroon announced on 
April 2, 1971, that it had decided to recognise Beijing, Taipei severed relations the next 
day and withdrew its agricultural teams. Cameroon was among the 26 African countries 
that voted for Beijing’s admission to the UN in October 1971.33  
Togo 
When Togo became independent on April 27, 1960, the ROC was invited to the inde-
pendence celebrations, and diplomatic relations were established on the same day. In 
December 1963 the ROC sent four specialists to study the potential for rice cultivation in 
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Togo: Prof. Chin Cheng, Dr. Tseng Chun-fu, Tsou Mei and Yu Yin-piao. Tsou and Yu 
were then the heads of the ROC agricultural teams in Liberia and Benin, respectively. On 
December 7, 1978 a car accident claimed the lives of Professor Chin and Dr. Tseng and 
permanently paralyzed Tsou Mei. This was the most tragic cost to the ROC’s African aid 
programme. On August 12, 1964, the ROC and Togo signed a technical co-operation 
agreement on agriculture at Lome. The Sino-Togolese Agricultural Co-operation Pro-
gramme was renewed twice, in 1968 and 1970. Lome and Taipei established the sister 
cities on October 12, 1966. By late 1969, there were 38 Chinese agricultural experts 
working in Togo. However, Togo established diplomatic relations with Beijing on Sep-
tember 26, 1972. In response, Taipei closed its embassy on October 4, 1972 and withdrew 
its agricultural mission.34 
Benin 
When Benin became independent on August 1, 1960, under the name of Dahomey, Taipei 
appointed Chen Hsiung-fei, its charge d’affaires in Paris, as special envoy to the inde-
pendence celebrations. Benin established diplomatic relations with the ROC on January 
18, 1962. From October 7 to 12, 1963, President and Madam Hubert Maga paid a state 
visit to Taiwan and received a warm welcome from President and Madam Chiang 
Kai-shek. A joint communiqué promised further co-operation between the two countries. 
On November 12, 1964, a year after the first coup in Benin, the new government allowed 
Beijing to establish an Embassy in Cotonou, which opened in December while Taipei also 
still had one there. This curious situation continued until April 6, 1965, when Taipei broke 
relations with Benin. After two coups in quick session brought a pro-Taipei government 
back to power in Benin, and the China policy was again reversed, Benin resumed rela-
tions with Taipei on April 21, 1966.35 Because of Benin’s extreme political instability, a 
Marxist government reverted to pro-Beijing policy, and Taipei severed relations with 
Benin on January 14, 1973. Benin had diplomatic relations twice both with the ROC and 
the PRC at different times. 
  160
Mali 
On June 20, 1960, Mali gained independence, which Taipei recognised and sent Chen 
Shiung-fei to attend the independence ceremonies. On September 27, 1960, Mali divided 
into the Republic of Senegal and the Republic of Mali. Three weeks later, Mali recog-
nised the PRC; the ROC severed diplomatic relations with Mali, closed the Embassy and 
withdrew its embassy staff.36 Diplomatic relations had lasted only four months, when 
Mali became the first African country with which the ROC ended diplomatic relations. 
In April 1994, the Sino-Mali Friendship Association was established to encourage more 
people in Mali to understand the country and the people of the ROC.  
Sierra Leone 
Sierra Leone became independent on April 27, 1961, and established diplomatic relations 
with the ROC on September 28, 1963. After the Foreign Minister John Karefa-Smart 
visited Taiwan in March 1964, the two countries signed the first Technical Co-operation 
Agreement in Free Town, the capital of Sierra Leone. A new technical co-operation 
agreement was signed in Taipei on July 26, 1965, providing for US$2 million in agri-
cultural aid from Taipei over the next five years.37 After Prime Minister Siaka Stevens 
visited Taiwan in May 1969, SL took a definite pro-Taipei stand in the UN. It later voted 
in favor of Taipei on the “representation issue” in both 1969 and 1970. Influenced by 
Guinea, one of Beijing’s closet allies in West Africa, and attracted by Beijing’s promise of 
economic and technical aid, Stevens, by then President of SL, established diplomatic 
relations with the PRC on July 29, 1971. The ROC subsequently broke relations with SL 
on August 20, 1971, and withdrew its agricultural mission. 
Ghana 
On March 6, 1957, Ghana became independent and by July 1, 1960, was a full republic. 
Five days later, Ghana and the PRC established diplomatic relations. However, from 
October 20, 1966 to February 29, 1972 the two countries did not have official relations. In 
November 1966, the spokesman of MOFA, ROC said: “Since African countries have 
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already understood the real intention of the PRC, Ghana cut off the relations with the 
PRC.” Furthermore, in August 1967 when the new representative of Ghana to the UN 
Richard M Akwei presented his credentials, he said: “Ghana supported the ROC to stay in 
the UN.” Ghana has only business interests in Taiwan and wants to have commercial 
interaction with Taiwan. 
Central Africa  
Sao Tome and Principe 
SP gained independence on July 12, 1975, and had full official relations with the PRC. 
Then in May 6, 1997, at the request of SP’s Foreign Minister, Homero Salvaterra, Foreign 
Minister, John Chang signed the agreement with him to establish diplomatic relations.38 
Thereafter, the ROC dispatched a medical mission and an agricultural technical mission 
to assist SP in improving hygiene conditions in medical facilities and developing agri-
cultural pisciculture and livestock. The ROC also helped SP to promote several pro-
grammes such as national housing, road repairs and paving, sports facilities renovation, 
and national education as well as public health. 
President Miguel Trovoada visited the ROC in June 1998, and Prime Minister 
Guillaume Posser da Costa led a delegation to Taiwan on January 9, 2000. During the 
Prime Minister’s visit, a memorandum on the second phase of Bilateral Co-operation was 
signed to continue strengthening the cordial relations. President Fradigue Bandeira Melo 
de Menezes visited the ROC on December 10, 2001, and President Chen reciprocated on 
his “Tour of Mutual Co-operation and Care” in 2002. At a state banquet in SP, he said: “I 
admire President Menezes for his work and believe that SP will progress and develop 
quickly under his leadership, I am confident that these co-operative projects will improve 
the lives of your people and enhance friendship between our two countries.”39 
In fact, co-operation projects between the two countries have produced great results 
and made outstanding contributions to the development of local institutions, quality of 
medical care and agricultural production. These admirable achievements have won praise 
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and appreciation by the ruling and opposition parties as well as the people of SP. With 
regard to the coup d’etat on July 16, 2003, the MOFA, ROC made the following state-
ment: “The Government of the ROC expresses its deep regret and concern over the coup 
d’etat that occurred in SP. Based on the universal values of democracy, the Government 
of the ROC urges the international community to assist SP to restore its democrati-
cally-elected government and constitutional system.”40 President Fradique de Menezes 
visited the ROC again on January 5, 2004 to seek opportunities through which Tai-
wan-based enterprises could invest in SP. It has been eight years since the two countries 
established diplomatic relations; the cordial and constructive atmosphere between the 
two countries is excellent. 
Central African Republic  
The CAR established diplomatic relations with Taipei on April 13, 1962. During his 1963 
tour of Africa, ROC FM Shen Chang-huan visited Bangui and met with President Dacko. 
However, after Bangui recognised Beijing, Taipei closed its embassy on November 5, 
1964. After a military coup led by Colonel Jean-Bedel Bokossa, diplomatic relations 
between Bangui and Taipei were restored on May 6, 1968. Bokossa paid a state visit to 
Taiwan in October 1970, which was very successful for him, because he met a Taiwanese 
lady whom he married. Six years later, Bokossa decided to established diplomatic ties 
with the PRC in August 1976; Taipei then broke relations with Bangui on August 23, 
1976.41 Based on the political and economic interests of both countries, the CAR and the 
ROC resumed diplomatic relations on July 8, 1991. The CAR was the first 
French-speaking country in Africa that resumed diplomatic ties with the ROC.42 
From 1992 to 1996, President Andre Kolingba, Foreign Minister Simon 
Beoaya-Ngaro, President of National Assembly Hugues Dobozendi, President 
Ange-Felix Patasse, and Prime Minister Jean-Luc Mandaba visited the ROC to promote 
friendly relations between the two countries. Beginning in April 1996, the military and 
civil servants were not paid their salaries, causing increases instability in CAR. The 
PRC’s representative to the UN, as the rotating chair of the Security Council, came to 
CAR from October 21 to 23, 1997, causing the CAR to switch its recognition to the PRC 
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on January 27, 1998. Taipei severed relations the same day. In brief, Bangui and Taipei 
had a record of establishing and severing relations three times, an indication that the PRC 
and the ROC were still competing with each other in Africa. 
Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire) 
The former Belgian Congo achieved its independence on June 30, 1960, and diplomatic 
relations with Taipei were subsequently established on August 10, 1960. On October 13, 
1964, Zaire’s Minister of Agriculture, Albert Kalonji-Ditunga and Yang Ching-Tseng, 
Minister of Economics of the ROC, signed the technical co-operation agreement in Taipei. 
General Sese Seko Mobutu, Zaire’s President since November 1965, later praised the 
Chinese contribution, saying, “The Dutch reclaim land from the sea; the Chinese produce 
rice and vegetables in sandy soil. The Chinese agricultural team is made up of people who 
know only hard work instead of filing reports.”43 
At the invitation of the ROC President Chiang, President and Madam Mobutu made 
a state visit to Taiwan from April 15 to 21, 1971. In a joint communiqué, the two leaders 
agreed “to strengthen co-operation with special emphasis on the cultivation of rice, maize, 
cotton, sugarcane and the establishment of sugar mills” in Zaire, and “to establish a joint 
committee that would meet once a year in Taipei and Kinshasa alternatively to discuss 
co-operation between the two countries.” Zaire was one of the 15 African countries that 
voted against Beijing’s admission to the UN in October 1971. After that, however, 
Mobutu’s pro-Taipei attitude changed. Zaire established diplomatic relations with Beijing 
on November 24, 1972. Taipei broke off relations with Zaire on January 30, 1973. Zaire 
was the first central African country to establish relations with Beijing, and the loss of 
Zaire’s support was the most serious setback suffered by the ROC in Africa in the early 
1970s.44   
On June 10, 1991, the ROC and Zaire signed the “Special Agreement for Estab-
lishing Mission” by which the ROC delegation in Kinshasa could have diplomatic 
privileges and have the authority to do consular affairs. On May 1997, the rebels took 
over Kinshasa and changed the name to DRC. Because of the civil war in the DRC that 
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has raged for many years, relations between two countries could not improve and the 
ROC closed its mission in mid-November 1998. 
Republic of Congo  
After the former French colony achieved independence, Taipei established diplomatic 
relations with the Republic of Congo on September 10, 1960. After a bloody demon-
stration instigated by left-wing trade unions, conservative and anti-Beijing Congolese 
President You Lou was forced to resign on August 15, 1963. Two months later, on Oc-
tober 4, 1963, ROC Ambassador Dr. Sampson C. Shen met with Prime Minister 
Alphonse Massamba-Debat and expressed the intention of keeping diplomatic relations 
with the new government.45 When France recognised Beijing on January 27, 1964, the 
new Congo regime followed suit in February. Taipei severed relations with Brazzaville on 
April 17, 1964. In July 1995, the Republic of Congo and the ROC signed special 
agreement that both countries could have an official delegation set up in each other’s 
capital with the full official name of the country. For various reasons, Taipei closed this 
mission on September 12, 1997. 
Gabon 
Gabon became independent on August 17, 1960, and established diplomatic relations 
with Taipei on December 9, 1960. Relations were raised to ambassadorial level in May 
1965. An Agricultural Co-operation Agreement was signed by the Minister of Agricul-
ture, Rene Paul Sousatte and Foreign Minister Shen Chang-huan in Taipei on January 19, 
1963. The agreement was renewed in 1966, 1969 and 1972, and the agricultural demon-
stration team was also expanded. Besides cultivating rice and vegetables, the Chinese 
team also helped the Gabonese to improve their fishing catch. Jean Remy Ayoune, Ga-
bonese Minister for External Affairs, who visited Taiwan in April 1969, praised the 
Chinese Team for its training of Gabonese fishermen. On November 8, 1973, Taiwan also 
signed an agreement to help Gabon build a sugar plant and train Gabonese technicians to 
manage it. However, the agreement was never implemented, since diplomatic relations 
between the two countries were soon terminated. Libreville granted Beijing de jure 
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recognition on March 5, 1974; Taipei then closed its embassy on March 30, 1974.46 
Angola 
Angola’s independence achieved on November 11, 1975, was followed by a 16-year civil 
war. On January 12, 1983, Launda and Beijing established diplomatic ties. The Angola 
Government sent the Deputy Minister of Oil, Desiderio da Costa, to Taiwan to sign the 
Special Agreement with the ROC on March 14, 1992.47 Based on this fact, the ROC set 
up a Special Delegation in Launda in September 1992. However, civil war plagued the 
country, causing relations to come to a standstill. Taipei therefore closed its mission in 
Launda in September 2000, ending eight years function. 
Southern Africa 
Swaziland 
Swaziland, a former British Protectorate, became an independent kingdom on September 
6, 1968, and established diplomatic relations with the ROC on the same day. The ROC 
signed a technical co-operation agreement with Swaziland on August 9, 1969, at Mba-
bane and a handicraft technical co-operation agreement on February 12, 1973. 
His Majesty King Mswati, who ascended to the throne in 1986, has visited the ROC 
many times. The cordial relationship between the two countries has been highlighted by 
many mutual visits of high-ranking officials of the two nations. President Lee Teng-hui 
led a delegation to Swaziland in May 1994 and visited an agricultural and handicraft 
centre, promising economic aid for Swaziland’s development as well as continuation of 
the close co-operation between the two nations.48 During President Chen’s visit to 
Swaziland in July 2002, Chen said, “I wish to reiterate that my government will continue 
to promote various exchanges and co-operation projects with the Kingdom of Swaziland 
and develop a partnership based on mutual benefit and prosperity.”49 President Chen 
donated US$150,000 to Swaziland during this visit, highlighting Taiwan’s humanitarian 
concern for Africa. From 1995 onwards, there were economic and technical meetings 
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between the two nations each year in Taipei and Mbabane in rotation to discuss continued 
co-operation. For the last 10 years, the ROC signed “investment guarantee” and “tax free” 
agreements with Swaziland, even an extradition treaty. Swaziland opened an embassy in 
Taiwan in February 2000 to prove the close and sincere relations between the two nations. 
On February 23, 1998, Swaziland announced that visas for citizens of ROC can be ob-
tained free of charge at the point of entry. 
Swaziland spoke in support of the ROC’s bid to join the UN and other international 
organisations, a needed voice for the ROC. Since the ROC withdrew from the UN, many 
African allies have turned to recognise the PRC, but Swaziland still maintains friendly 
relations with the ROC and does not have confidence in Communists. 
South Africa 
A Chinese consulate general was opened in JHB as early as 1905, while China was still 
under the Manchu Empire and SA still a British colony. After the division of China in 
1949, South Africa continued to recognise the ROC government in Taiwan and consis-
tently voted against Beijing’s admission to the UN. After South Africa set up a consulate 
general in Taipei in 1967 and an ROC consulate in Cape Town was finally opened in 
January 1973, relations between the two countries upgraded. Taipei and Pretoria an-
nounced on April 26, 1976, that diplomatic relations between the two countries would be 
raised to ambassadorial level. 
Because the international community took sanctions against South Africa’s apart-
heid policy since 1980s, interactions between Taipei and Pretoria kept a low profile, in 
order to avoid condemnation. After 1990 when President de Klerk announced that the 
ANC was no longer a subversive party and abolished the apartheid policy, the ROC then 
contacted the ANC from central level to local level to build cooperative relations. Under 
ambassador I-cheng Loh’s endeavour, Mr. Nelson Mandela, President of ANC led a 
delegation to visit the ROC. President Lee Teng-hui visited SA to attend the inauguration 
of Nelson Mandela on May 1994. Lee’s visit aimed at solidifying Taiwan’s official rela-
tions with the new South African government. President Mandela gave his assurance to 
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the ROC’s Vice-Premier Hsu Li-teh, during his visit to South Africa in August 1995, that 
relations between SA and the ROC would be maintained. However, Mandela announced 
that SA would cut formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan, recognising the PRC instead on 
November 27, 1996. The surprise decision, following Mandela’s statement, brought SA 
into line with the international trend of recognising China.  
Ending diplomatic ties with South Africa until December 31, 1997, the ROC used 
the Taipei Liaison Office in Pretoria, Johannesburg and Cape Town respectively from 
January 1, 1998, instead of formal Embassy and Consul-Generals functioning in SA. 
South Africa is an important country in Africa, and an important partner for the ROC. It is 
because South Africa is playing an influential and useful role in African affairs, as well as 
in world affairs, that the ROC will continue to keep up relations in business, trade, cul-
tural and other fields of mutual concern. 
Lesotho 
Lesotho became independent on October 4, 1966, and established diplomatic relations 
with the ROC on October 31. Lesotho Prime Minister, Chief Leabua Jonathan visited 
Taiwan from November 21 to 28, 1966. At the end of his visit, Jonathan signed a joint 
communiqué agreeing that “International Communism’s attempt and ambition to conquer 
the world is the most serious threat to world peace.” In August 1969, Prime Minister 
Jonathan paid a second visit to Taiwan, reporting that the Chinese Farm Team in Lesotho 
“had done an excellent job and won the respect” of the people of Lesotho.50 He returned 
a third time to the ROC in September 1977. Prime Minister Sun paid his visit to Lesotho 
in March 1980 to enhance the friendly relations between the two countries. These good 
relations lasted for 17 years and ended on May 14, 1983. 
On April 5, 1990, the special envoy of the ROC Mr. Du Ling, Deputy Director of the 
Department of African affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, signed a joint commu-
niqué of the re-establishment of diplomatic relations with Major General Justin Metsing, 
Chairman of the Military Council of the Kingdom of Lesotho, in Maseru. In this com-
muniqué, the two sides decided to re-establish full diplomatic relations for the purpose of 
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strengthening ties of friendship and co-operation conforming with the principles of in-
ternational law, in particular, those relating to the equality of states, and mutual respect 
for sovereignty. 51  On June 27, 1990, the two countries signed an agricultural 
co-operation agreement, and several members of the military council Brig B. Lerotholi 
and Colonel Jacob Mahlabe Jane visited the ROC. With the agricultural mission of the 
ROC based in Maseru to help the people to cultivate the land, the ROC government do-
nated US$1 million to buy 5,000 tons of maize for the needy people of Lesotho.52 
When Dr. Liu Ta-jen was the ROC ambassador to Lesotho, from 1972 to 1980, he 
had encouraged the Taiwanese citizens from Pozih to immigrate to Lesotho. For the last 
20 years, more than 500 Taiwanese worked in Maseru and most of them stayed in La-
dybrand, a border town in South Africa.53 The opposition won the election held in March 
1993 and formed a new government. Owing to the government’s pro-Beijing attitude, 
Taipei therefore broke off diplomatic relations with Lesotho on January 12, 1994 and 
withdrew the agricultural mission. Nowadays, the biggest blue-jeans factory, Nien Hsing 
Textile, owned by Taiwanese businessmen, and 19 other textile factories in Maseru, have 
created 20 thousand jobs for the people of Lesotho, an economic benefit welcomed by the 
people and government of Lesotho. 
Botswana 
Bechuanaland, a former British protectorate, became the independent Republic of Bot-
swana on September 30, 1966 and established diplomatic relations with the ROC on 
December 30 of the same year. On July 15, 1968, Botswana Vice-President Q. K. J. 
Masire arrived in Taipei for a nine-day official visit, and said Botswana was “grateful to 
the Chinese government for sending an agricultural team to Botswana--a significant 
demonstration of genuine friendship.” Two months later, H. K. Yang, during his 
twenty-second trip to Africa, signed a technical co-operation agreement with Botswana at 
Gaborone. The rice cultivation carried out by the Chinese teams in Botswana achieved  
tremendous success and prompted Botswana to request extension of the 1968 agreement, 
which was granted by Mr. Yang on April 28,1972, during his twenty-eighth trip to Af-
rica.54 
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However, relations between the ROC and Botswana gradually deteriorated after the 
1970 UN vote on “ Chinese representation”, when Botswana joined Chad, Togo, Cam-
eroon, the CAR and Senegal---- all then receiving ROC agricultural aid---in saying they 
would no longer try to block Beijing from the UN. Even Botswana voted for the Beijing 
to participate in the UN in October 1971, yet diplomatic relations lingered for 
two-and-a-half more years until Botswana granted recognition to Beijing on March 25, 
1974. Taipei then closed its embassy at Gaborone on April 5, 1974, and withdrew its ag-
ricultural mission and medical personnel from Botswana.55 
Namibia  
On May 5, 1967, Permanent Representative of China to the UN Liu Chieh spoke for 
supporting SWA’s independence. In early March 1976, H. K. Yang visited Pretoria and 
met with both Dr. H. Diederichs and Prime Minister Balthazar Johannes Vorster. With 
Pretoria’s approval, Yang visited South-West Africa for the first time, met with 
South-Wwest African tribal delegations then attending a constitutional meeting at 
Windhoek, and told them that the ROC “always supports any nation to achieve their le-
gitimate political goals through peaceful means.56 The ROC sent an “observer delega-
tion” to Windhoek on August 21, 1989, to observe the process of rewarding independent 
and constitutional activities, but the PRC protested this action to SWA Authority. With-
out a doubt, the ROC also tried to take this opportunity to find a possibility of establishing 
formal relations after SWA became an independent country. On March 21, 1990, SWA 
became a new country named the Republic of Namibia. Two days later, Namibia and the 
PRC established diplomatic relations. 
Madagascar 
The ROC set up a consulate in Antananarivo on May 9, 1945 and upgraded to consu-
late-general on April 2, 1949. When Madagascar became independent on June 26, 1960, 
Taipei established diplomatic relations with the new republic on the same day and raised 
its consulate –general to embassy rank. Because of his earlier close relations with the 
French Socialist Party, President Philibert Tsiranana became one of the most 
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anti-communist leaders in Africa. On April 3, 1962, he became the first African Head of 
State to visit Taiwan. A Sino-Madagascar Treaty of Amity was signed on April 4, 1962. 
President Tsiranana later called his visit to Taiwan “very rewarding” and indicated that 
Madagascar had “much to learn from Nationalist China in economic development, land 
reform and the modernisation of armed forces.” From November 12 to 15, 1965, Presi-
dent and Madame Philibert Tsiranana paid a second state visit to Taiwan. 57  A 
Sino-Madagascar agricultural technical co-operation agreement was signed on January 9, 
1967 and this pact was extended on September 22, 1969. 
Madagascar under the leadership of Tsiranana was one of the ROC’s strongest Af-
rican supporters in the UN between 1961 and 1971. After Tsiranana was forced by 
left-wing labour unions and students to resign in mid-May 1972, the new regime under 
Major General Gabrid Ramanantsoa established diplomatic relations with Beijing on 
November 6, 1972. Taipei then closed its embassy at Antananarivo on December 15 and 
withdrew all its technicians. 
In February 1990 Foreign Minister Jean Bemananjara visited the ROC twice, to 
discuss establishing official relations. On October 31, 1990, a memorandum was signed 
in Antananarivo that the two sides could set up their special delegation with the country’s 
full name in Taipei and Antananarivo. On January 10, 1991, President Ridier Ratsiraka 
announced in his new-year message that the ROC was going to establish a special dele-
gation to promote economic and trade interaction. Six months later, “the ROC Special 
Delegation” started its consular function in Antananarivo, with its staff at diplomatic 
status.58 Deputy Speaker J. E. Voninahitsy visited the ROC in May 1995, and Deputy 
Prime Minister Mohajy Ackram visited Taiwan in January 1997, to discuss matters of 
mutual concern. However, the cabinet of Madagascar abolished the “Special Agreement” 
on its own on September 9, 1998, but the President did not approve it. For various reasons, 
Taipei closed this special delegation office on August 30, 2000. 
Mauritius 
Before Mauritius gained independence on March 12, 1968, the French colony’s Prime 
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Minister, S. Kamgoolam, visited Taiwan on January 5, 1965. On April 15, 1972, Mauri-
tius established diplomatic relations with the PRC. On September 21, 1984, the ROC set 
up a Trade Mission in Port Louis to promote two-way commercial, cultural and 
co-operative interaction. Deputy Prime Minister, Gaetan Duval visited Taiwan in August 
1986 and January 1988 to discuss promoting two-way trade. Two months later, Mauritius 
Export Development and Investment Authority opened in Taipei, but this office was 
closed in December 1992. Since relations between Mauritius and the ROC could not 
upgrade as expected, Taipei closed the commercial delegation office on July 31, 2000. 
Seychelles 
In March 1976, H. K. Yang and Dr. Liu Ta-jen visited the small country of Seychelles, 
consisting of 92 small islands, and met Prime Minister Wen-jen Chen, a poet and a 
Chinese descendant. Three months later, the Republic of Seychelles became independent. 
With a total number of 600 descendants in this island country in 1976, to be a President of 
Chinese origin is very rare and difficult. However, Seychelles established diplomatic 
relations with the PRC the next day. Right now, the Trade commission of the Republic of 
Seychelles at Taipei is the only channel of contact between the two countries. 
Conclusion  
ROC relations with Malawi and Swaziland, which have lasted for 40 years and 38 years 
respectively, are cordial and valued. However, some countries, including the Central Af-
rican Republic, Senegal, Lesotho and Liberia, opted for relations with China over Taiwan. 
North Africa was, and remains, the weakest link in Taiwan’s foreign relations with Africa. 
The ROC and South Africa have had interactions for more than 100 years. Some Central 
and West African countries switch their positions back and forth between the two Chinas. 
Since the Democratic Progressive Party took power in Taiwan in 2000, Liberia, Senegal 
and Chad have switched their recognition to the PRC which is a worrying development. 
To-date, Malawi, Swaziland, Sao Tome and Principe, The Gambia, and Burkina Faso still 
maintain diplomatic relations with the ROC. Africa is a continent where the most de-
veloping countries are situated. The ROC’s remaining allies are vital to prevent the 
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country from becoming isolated diplomatically, and it is no surprise that Beijing wants 
to reduce the ROC’s influence on the continent even further. Seven states in six years 
have switched allegiance to Beijing. It is likely that in the future the ROC’s diplomatic 
position in Africa will be put under even more intense pressure from the active cam-
paign by the PRC to secure access to Africa’s natural resources and squeeze the ROC’s 
diplomatic space in Africa. There is, subsequently, little room for optimism in facing 
what is proving to be an intense diplomatic war. In the next two chapters, we will fur-
ther examine relations between the ROC and the RSA, with emphasis given to the pe-
riod from 1976 to 1998. Both countries were once isolated states. However, the RSA has 
been welcomed into international community since 1994 while the ROC is still strug-
gling to break out of the diplomatic deadlock and is devoting enormous effort to gain 
diplomatic allies around the world. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
SOUTH AFRICA’S LINKS WITH THE ROC 
( 1905-1990 ) 
The Challenges to Both Countries 
Since the communist take-over of Mainland China in 1949, the Kuomintang (Nationalist) 
government was forced to relocate itself on the tiny island province of Taiwan.  The of-
ficial position all along has been that the ROC–established in 1912 with its seat in 
Nanking–has only temporarily moved its government to Taiwan following the commu-
nists’ illegal seizure of power; the Kuomintang considers itself the only legitimate gov-
ernment of all China and its stated policy is to recover the mainland from the control of 
the Communist “rebels”. 
A majority of states initially supported the ROC’s claim to international legitimacy 
and they accordingly refused to recognise the PRC.  The ROC’s non-recognition, by 
scores of states acting unilaterally and then collectively in the UN in 1971, meant that the 
world community no longer formally recognised the ROC as the sole Chinese state.1  
Nor does the outside world recognise the ROC as a separate, second Chinese state, but as 
part of China.  On the latter point, the PRC, ROC and the international community all 
agree: there is but one China, and that includes both the Mainland and Taiwan. 
The 1950s and 1960s saw a steady erosion of the ROC’s international status as a 
growing number of states switched their recognition to the PRC.  The ROC’s interna-
tional decline was an inverse image of the PRC’s diplomatic assent. This trend was cul-
tivated in the UN’s decision of 1971 to admit the PRC to membership at the expense of 
the ROC, severely undermining her claim to be the only legitimate government of China. 
Both the ROC and PRC have long insisted that foreign states make a clear choice: 
they may recognise and enjoy diplomatic ties with only one of them.  Although the 
World community has chosen overwhelmingly against it, the ROC will not opt for “in-
dependence” from the rest of China and seek recognition of a sovereign state located 
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solely on Taiwan.  Beijing has made it plain that it will not tolerate independence for 
Taiwan – a warning that not only deters Taiwanese from considering this option but 
would also prevent many foreign states from recognising an independent Taiwan.2 
Owing to the gold rush in the Transvaal, a final agreement was the Anglo-Chinese 
Labour Convention, signed in London on May 13, 1904, by Chang The-Yih and Lord 
Lansdowne, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.  The terms of reference for the 
appointment of the first Chinese diplomatic representative to the Transvaal were con-
tained in Article VI of the Convention. 
The first Chinese Consul-General in Johannesburg, Lew Yuk Lin arrived in JHB on 
May 14, 1905, to look after the interests of Chinese labourers and solve their problems.  
Transvaal authorities wanted the consul to be an official of high rank, paid by the Chinese 
government, and to take up the Chinese point of view in matters of principle that might 
arise, but not to occupy himself with the conditions of the labourers in the mines.3 This 
was the first official contact between South Africa and China. 
After the National party won the election in 1948, the radical Afrikaner Nationalists 
created a vast legal superstructure to enforce separation.  From then on, “apartheid” 
governed every aspect of national life: it assigned every baby from birth to a rigid 
“population group”, which determined where he or she could live and go to school, what 
lavatory he or she could use, and whom he or she could marry.  On August 5, 1963, the 
Chinese Permanent Representative Liu Chieh said: “Towards the situation aroused by the 
Apartheid in South Africa, the UN should put some pressure to the Government.”4 Two 
months later, on October 24, 1963, the Chinese delegation leader delivered a speech, 
during the UN discussion of South Africa’s apartheid, that the ROC’s sincere wish was 
that this issue could be solved in a peaceful manner.5  In fact, the ROC and SA did not 
have much interaction in the 1960s.  Only Foreign Minister Shen invited the Foreign 
Affairs Minister, Eric H Louw and South Africa’s Permanent Representative Botha to 
have dinner in UN Headquarters on December 9, 1964. 
It is noteworthy that the use of the High Commissioner as a channel of diplomatic 
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communication became so controversial that KEGJ Pakendorf, Second Secretary, ap-
pealed from London in 1955, pointing out that the UK didn’t recognise the ROC, but 
rather the PRC.  South Africa’s diplomatic approaches to the ROC, which it recognised, 
of necessity therefore went through Washington, even though the British consular office 
in Taipei handled South African passport and visa issues.  The Department was hesitant 
to use the Consul-General of the ROC in Johannesburg as a channel because Norway, 
Israel, Denmark and Japan also had only Consul-Generals in South Africa, and those 
governments were perceived to be trying to raise their de facto status by insisting on their 
being used for non-consular issues.6 
There matters rested until 1962, when the Consul-General of the ROC approached 
the Department of Community Affairs directly on behalf of Chinese living in SA.  He 
implied that his country had until then taken a moderate stance in the UN on the issue of 
sanctions and condemnation of SA’s polices.  This demarche amounted to indirect in-
terference in SA’s domestic affairs and Eric Louw again reminded the Department that he 
needed to be kept abreast of developments and to have key documents always available.  
His successor, Dr H Muller retained this procedure.7  It was only on January 14, 1967, 
that South Africa opened its Consul-General office in Taipei, Taiwan, and Mr. K.E. 
Pakendorf was the first Consul-General.  And for the first time, in celebration of South 
Africa’s National Day, a large banquet reception was held in Taipei by the Con-
sul-General’s office, and many ministers and dignitaries as well as members of the dip-
lomatic corps attended. 
Before 1945 the Union of South Africa was a respected member of the British 
Commonwealth as well as of the League of Nations, and seldom if ever were her internal 
policies challenged.  Many observers assume that the drastic changes after the war were 
due to the coming into office of the National Party and its particular handling of the in-
ternal race situation.  The National Party’s determination to legislate its race relations 
policy was a factor that contributed to South Africa’s weakened position in international 
politics after the Second World War.8 
The post-war expansion of the Commonwealth to include a substantial number of 
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Afro-Asian countries resulted in yet another controversy about South Africa’s position.  
On January 30, 1961, Dr. Verwoerd declared unequivocally that membership of the 
Commonwealth would not be sought at the cost of sacrificing policy principles on which 
only South Africa could decide.  That meant that South Africa withdrew from the 
Commonwealth.  An intimation of things to come was South Africa’s temporary with-
drawal from the UN in 1951, the decision to recall its mission from the tenth session of 
the General Assembly in 1955, and its maintaining only token representation at the UN in 
1957 and 1958.  These were all protest actions against what Pretoria considered the 
world body’s unwarranted and unconstitutional interference in South Africa’s domestic 
affairs.9  Considering the part played by General J.C. Smuts in the founding of the UN, it 
is ironic that the relationship between South Africa and the world body had deteriorated 
so drastically.   
Because the Afro-Asian states were vociferously opposed to South Africa’s apart-
heid policies, the ROC was not in a position to develop full diplomatic relations with 
South Africa before the 1970s.  Its priority at this stage was to avoid offending the 
Afro-Asian states and to safeguard its position in the UN.  The ROC obviously took 
cognisance of the inevitability that its growing links with South Africa would surely 
alienate its friendly relations with Black Africa and jeopardise its UN seat.  Moreover, to 
establish alignment with South Africa might also endanger the ROC’s relations with 
Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries in the Middle East, which supplied vital oil to the 
ROC.10  It was with these considerations that the ROC was against SA’s racial policies 
and repeatedly voted at the UN in favour of sanctions against South Africa during the 
period 1948-1971.  For more than 20 years, the ROC was unwilling to be associated with 
South Africa.  In the 1950s and 1960s, the representative of the ROC in the UN Security 
Council, expressed the hope that the South African government could find a satisfactory 
settlement.  The ROC delegates routinely voted in favour of the dismantling of apartheid 
and sided with the Afro-Asian states.  Besides, because the NP government was per-
ceived as one of the most oppressive in the world, even some Chinese scholars were 
opposed to the establishment of diplomatic links between the ROC and the RSA.  Hence, 
during the period 1948-1975, the ROC merely maintained a low-level consular rela-
tionship with SA.  The RSA then also had many of its own reasons to keep its distance 
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from the ROC.  Although the NP Government had been in power for more than two 
decades by the end of 1960s, as a Eurocentric society, South Africa was still closely tied 
to the West through economic links, cultural heritage, security needs, family contact and 
other common interests.  The white population was inclined to identify themselves with 
Western interests and share Western values.  Even in the realm of international relations, 
the NP government found it necessary to rely on Western support.  Therefore, the links 
with the West were far more important than the relations with the Far East.   
Fear that large numbers of Chinese would migrate to South Africa to complicate the 
issue of Asians in the country was another reason for the South African government to be 
hesitant to forge diplomatic links with the ROC.11 The RSA entered an era of rapid 
economic progress and continued prosperity from the end of the Second World War to 
1974, which gave confidence to the SA government and diminished the need to diversify 
its economy and to develop closer links with the ROC.  Discrimination against cheap 
products from the Far East made it even more difficult for the SA government to venture 
into expanding relations with the East Asian countries, including the ROC. 
In fact from 1948 to 1971, both the ROC and the RSA were reluctant to develop full 
diplomatic ties.  Therefore relations between the ROC and the RSA were merely main-
tained at the relatively low level of consular links for more than two decades.  During 
this period, both countries were preoccupied with their respective internal and external 
priorities.  The great cultural divide, geographical distance and South Africa’s apartheid 
policy, as well as its colonial connections with the West, further contributed to the mutual 
lack of interest in expanding relations.12 
There is some common ground between the two countries warranting further re-
search. 
y Both the Chinese Nationalist Party and the SA National Party were fervently 
anti-Communist in their ideological make-up and adopted a common hard-line ap-
proach towards Communism. 
y Both the Chinese majority (in Taiwan) and the European minority (in SA) in their 
respective new settings, each had their “native” problems. 
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y Both were minority-rule countries: in SA, the white minority ruled over the black 
majority, but in the ROC, a minority of Chinese mainlanders dominated the na-
tive-born Taiwanese majority – albeit that these two ethnic groups are of Chinese 
origin and they have no colour distinction. 
y Both the Chinese republic and the Afrikaner republic fought and opposed imperialism 
and colonialism even as both were imposing hegemony and colonialism on their native 
populations. 
y The ROC experience with Communism was long, bitter and historico-empirically 
grounded; while that of SA was essentially metaphysical, ideological and theoretic-
cal.13 
However, it is interesting to note that after the division of China in 1949, the RSA 
continued to recognise the ROC on Taiwan in line with USA’s policy.  While the ROC 
was still a member of the UN before 1971, SA consistently voted for the ROC to keep its 
seat each time the issue was put to a vote.  The support granted by SA to the ROC was 
due to the common anti-Communist stance of the two governments. We may say that 
relations between the ROC and the RSA from 1948 to 1971 were quite tentative, with 
only consular relations existing.   
Establishing full diplomatic relations 
Reasons for the formation of close links between the ROC and the RSA were manifold.  
From the ROC side, the foremost factor was removal from the UN in 1971.  In fact, the 
ROC former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chien-jen Chen, gave the following 
explanation: After the ROC was ousted from the UN, the political consideration was 
removed that by associating with the RSA, its apartheid policies might lead the ROC to 
offend other black African countries, and the ROC’s foreign policy towards the RSA was 
less influenced by factors of political stance.14 
The second factor was the change of American policy towards the ROC.  In 1971, 
the RSA effected a complete change in its China policy.  Nixon was determined to 
normalise relations with the PRC and to phase out USA-ROC diplomatic relations.  On 
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July 15, 1971, an announcement was made by the White House that Henry Kissinger, 
then the Assistant for National Security Affairs and later the Secretary of State of the 
USA, had made a secret trip to Beijing from July 9 to 11, 1971, to have talks with Zhou 
Enlai, then Prime Minister of the PRC.  Thereafter, Nixon decided to pay a state visit to 
the PRC in February, 1972.15 The decision of the Nixon administration to play the “China 
card,” had enormous repercussions on the international relations of the ROC and the re-
taining of its seat in the UN. 
The third factor was economic need. Despite its racial problems, SA was the leading 
industrial country in the whole of Africa.  South Africa was rich in natural resources, but 
its manufacturing sector was not as competitive as that of the ROC.  The ROC needed 
access to SA’s markets as well as its maize, wood pulp, coal, gold, basic metals and 
minerals, including uranium, to develop the ROC’s economy. 
The importance of SA’s strategic location, its relatively long coastline with an 
abundance of fishing opportunities, together with its fairly advanced agriculture and the 
nuclear co-operation were also some advantages causing the ROC to want to upgrade 
relations.16 To put this into action, the ROC established its Consulate (office) in Cape 
Town in 1973 to look after its fishing interests in the Atlantic Ocean and to liaise with 
Parliament.  This office was upgraded to Consulate-General in March 1980.  Further-
more, to cope with the growing economic relations, the office of the ROC commercial 
attaché was opened by the ROC government in Johannesburg in May 1974 to handle 
matters related to trade and commerce. 
From the South Africa side: The first factor was that SA was a member of the UN, 
but since the rejection of its credentials by the General Assembly in 1974, it had been 
unable to participate in Assembly proceedings.17  The second factor was the sudden 
collapse of Portuguese control in Mozambique and Angola set in motion a chain of events 
that considerably altered Pretoria’s foreign policy options, forcing a policy retreat to 
within the boundaries of Southern Africa.18  The third factor was that apartheid caused 
the whole country to become locked in turmoil, with the economic performance going 
from bad to worse. 
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During the 1960s, the phase of separate development came into common use.  The 
idea behind this phase was to set up black homelands for the different ethnic groups.  
Only in these homelands would black people have any political power.  They were no 
longer to be regarded as citizens of SA but as citizens of one of the black homelands.  
The 1970s saw the turning of the tide for apartheid.  The economy was in a bad state 
because of the international oil crisis, which led to massive increases in the price of oil.  
New forms of resistance emerged, such as Black Trade Unionism and the Black Con-
sciousness Movement. The Soweto Uprising helped turn more overseas countries against 
the South African government.   
Yet, at the same time, Taiwan made a great economic achievement by focusing 
growth efforts on manufacturing and exports.  Indeed, economists identified a number of 
factors common to the phenomenal performance of that period: the elements of labour, 
capital, human resources and the ability to combine them effectively.19  
To increase bilateral trade, the SA Government decided to remove trade barriers. To 
this end, the Consul-General of the RSA in Taipei, Mr. John Kincaid, announced at the 
beginning of 1975 that in view of the tremendous increase in the volume of trade, the 
RSA would remove tariff discrimination against imports from the ROC, while the ROC 
would import more maize and iron ore from South Africa. Soon after the announcement, 
a trade agreement was concluded in Taipei by the two countries.20  
Following the steadily expanding economic ties, the exchange of visits of 
high-ranking officials and cabinet ministers between the two countries also began to 
occur more frequently.  In 1975-alone, there were three delegations of South African 
parliamentarians, Cabinet ministers, and high-ranking officials in charge of trade and 
commerce such as A.L. Schlebusch, Speaker of the House of Assembly, C.P. Mulder,  
Minister of the Interior and Information and G.J.J.F. Steyn, Secretary of Commerce.  
While the ROC-RSA economic relations were deepening and each country’s diplomatic 
views had been prepared for the forthcoming closer association with the other isolated 
state, the two governments considered that the time was ripe to establish full diplomatic 
ties.21 During Deputy Foreign Minister Yang’s visit to South Africa, the RSA State 
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President N. Diederichs, and Prime Minister B.J. Vorster received Yang.  The common 
ground of a strong anti-Communist ideology and aspiration for freedom had gradually led 
the two sides to have an appreciation for one another.   
Eventually, as both the ROC and the RSA found themselves cast out of the wider 
international community, albeit for different reasons, the two countries exchanged full 
diplomatic relations, shifting to the status of ambassadorial level in April 1976.  The 
ROC was the only Asian country that had an embassy in Pretoria, which proved to be a 
reliable ally.  The South African policy-makers recognised the anti-Communist gov-
ernment of the ROC as the true representative of China. 
In the wake of establishing diplomatic ties between the ROC and the RSA in 1976, 
the second stage of bilateral relations was unfolding.  The 1975 Trade Agreement signed 
on February 26, 1975, indicated both countries were desirous of further developing, ex-
tending and strengthening the commercial relations on a mutually advantageous basis.  
For example, the Maize Trade agreement between the Board of Foreign Trade, Ministry 
of Economic Affairs, ROC and the Maize Board, RSA, signed on October 7, 1975 once 
again enlarged the trade volume between the two countries, stipulating that annually for 
three years, the ROC would import 450,000 metric tons of maize with the total amount of 
1 million 350,000 metric tons from the RSA.22  Furthermore, several other agreements in 
various fields were concluded during the period of 1977 to 1979.  Among these agree-
ments was one concerning the exchange of postal parcels between the Postal Admini-
strations of the ROC and the RSA, concluded on January 11, 1977; another agreement 
between the ROC and the RSA on Mutual Fishery Relations was signed on February 26, 
1978; and the Agreement for Technical Cooperation between the South African Bureau of 
Standards became effective on November 10, 1979.23  In 1979, the two countries signed 
another Maize Agreement.  In doing so, the Office of Commercial Attache upgraded 
into Economic Counsellor Office of the Chinese Embassy on February 20, 1979, to en-
hance the close trade interactions between the two countries. P.K.Chiang the Economic 
Counsellor, said: “On October 1979, the Economic Minister Chang visited South Africa 
to attend the Economics Ministers’ Conference, which promoted the economic relations 
to a climax; trade and investment (sic) was the main substance for co-operation.”24 
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In South Africa, the Soweto Uprising in 1976 and the death in police custody of 
Steve Biko in 1977, together with the imposition of a mandatory UN Arms Embargo in 
1977 and increasing antipathy of the Carter Administration towards South Africa’s race 
policies, heightened Pretoria’s perceptions of vulnerability and “set the stage for a fun-
damental policy reappraisal.”25 Hence, even though Prime Minister B.J. Vorster and 
Foreign Affairs Minister Dr. H Muller made the decision to upgrade diplomatic relations 
with the ROC and Vorster did accept the invitation of the ROC government intending to 
pay an official visit during the period October 14 to 18, 1978, none of South Africa’s 
Prime Ministers visited the ROC before 1980. 
Following Pik Botha’s assumption of office as Foreign Minister of the RSA on June 
7, 1977, and P.W. Botha as Prime Minister in 1978, the ROC-RSA bilateral links were 
visibly strengthened.  The New Chinese Ambassador, H.K. Yang presented his creden-
tials to Prime Minister Botha, starting a new page in the diplomatic ties between the two 
countries. Yang sent a citation to Pik Botha in September 1979 while he paid a courtesy 
call shortly after his assumption of duties as the ROC Ambassador to the RSA.  On the 
first occasion, Pik Botha frankly indicated that as the current development of a Rhodesian 
settlement was of critical importance to SA, he had to postpone his visit until 1980.  Both 
sides agreed that in the face of common, increasing international adversity, the two 
countries should strengthen their bilateral ties and deepen co-operation in various aspects, 
including the development of technology and military self-sufficiency, at a low profile.26 
On the second occasion, Pik Botha and his wife accompanied by Brand Fourie and his 
wife, attended a dinner hosted by Ambassador Yang on October 6, 1979 at his residence. 
Pik Botha spoke graciously about the close relationship existing between the two coun-
tries. He referred to the efforts of the ROC government to overcome difficulties resulting 
from world politics and Ambassador Yang’s role as an instrument of the ROC national 
policy.27 
The main indicator of the forging of closer ROC-RSA ties was the exchange of visits 
of high-ranking executives of the foreign ministers of the two countries that began in 
1979.  The first significant visit of the head of the RSA’s Department of Foreign Affairs 
was made by Brand Fourie, the Director General of the MFA, in October 1979.  At the 
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time of his visit, Fourie as head of this Department was a key figure in the formulation of 
South African foreign policy. 
Fourie’s visit served as a precursor of a series of more important visits to be made by 
the Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of the two nations from 1980 onwards.  In 
fact, the visit paid by Fourie and his wife during October 1979 was in lieu of a visit by Pik 
Botha, the Minister of Foreign Affairs.  During their stay in the ROC, they met the  
ROC Premier Sun Yun-suan and held discussions with Y.S.Tsiang, the Minister of For-
eign affairs, Chen hsing Yen, who was Acting Chairman of the Atomic Energy Council 
(AEC); Shien-sin Shu, Chairman of the National Science Council (NSC) and other high 
ranking officials.  Fourie and the ROC leadership exchanged views on the world situa-
tion and also discussed issues of mutual concern, including co-operation in the fields of 
science, trade, economics, military and nuclear energy.28  Fourie was deeply impressed 
with the ROC’s remarkable achievements in various fields, and he was “heartened by the 
extremely positive approach adopted by the Government of the ROC regarding the rela-
tions between our two countries and the expressed intention of even closer co-operation 
between us.” At the end of his visit, Fourie was awarded a medal by the ROC government 
for his contribution to cementing closer bonds between the ROC and the RSA.   
Fourie was an important figure in conducting South Africa’s Foreign Policy from 
1966 to 1980, and he made very positive remarks about Ambassador Yang’s contribution 
in consolidating the friendly relations between the two countries.29 According to a reli-
able source, there were some informal talks that SA wanted to form a new type of “Fourth 
World” by the pariah states in addition to the First, Second and Third Worlds.30  This 
idea was raised for both sides to think about whether it would be possible to organise this 
kind of alliance.  In fact, both countries still considered their long-standing relationship 
with the traditional major powers as crucial. 
In short, it was the Vorster administration that nurtured and formalised the 
ROC-RSA relations; with the same position in international affairs, anti-Communist, and 
with complementary forms in economic and trade interaction, the friendly relations grew 
stronger from 1976 to 1980.  However, in order not to be a diplomatic nuisance, the two 
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countries worked together discreetly, keeping a low-profile.  The former Foreign Min-
ister said that the achievement of the ROC’s alliance with the RSA is that it deterred 
Communism from coming to Africa for 10 years, indeed a candid comment.31  They also 
said: My enemy’s enemy is my friend, which indicated that the ROC was SA’s friend and 
the PRC was SA’s enemy. 
Premier Sun’s Visit and Prime Minister P W Botha’s Visit 
Premier Sun Yun-suan who was Minister of Communications in 1969, then became 
Minister of Economic Affairs before becoming Premier in May 1978.  The Twelve 
Construction Projects were launched as he entered the premiership.  He won the trust of 
both industrialists and businessmen. 
At the invitation of Prime Minister P.W. Botha, Premier Sun and Mrs. Sun, ac-
companied by an entourage of 31 delegates and 24 journalists from Taipei, paid an offi-
cial visit to South Africa during March 1980.  Among Premier Sun’s entourage were the 
Minister of State Kuo-ting Li; Minister of Communications, Lin Chin-sheng; Chief of the 
General Staff in the Ministry of National Defence, Admiral Soong Chang-chi; Political 
Deputy Minister of Economic Affairs, Edward Y Kuan; the Director-General of the 
Government Information Office, Dr James Soong, and other high-ranking officials.  
Premier Sun and his entourage held discussions with their South African counterparts on 
matters of mutual interest.  The first issue concerned the status of Chinese in South Af-
rica.  The South African government agreed that it would try to eliminate the chronic 
discrimination against the Chinese through amendment of legislation, but cautioned the 
ROC delegation that this matter might have complex implications regarding the treatment 
of the RSA’s Asian population (implied, Indian descendants), which numbered nearly one 
million.  It was feared that if the Chinese were granted full constitutional rights as white 
South Africans, other racial groups, particularly the Asians, would make similar demands.  
Therefore, there was a tacit understanding that since the Chinese population in SA was 
relatively small, the SA government was willing to improve its treatment of the Chinese 
by granting them “honorary white” status, so long as the Chinese understood the com-
plexity of the racial situation and the political sensitivity without openly publicising this 
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tacit understanding.32 
The two Prime Ministers also discussed the formation of a “Fourth World”.  The 
concept of forming a “Fourth World” by the pariah states such as the RSA, the ROC, 
Israel, Paraguay, and Chile was first brought up by P.W. Botha during the second round of 
summit meetings held on March 11, 1980 in Cape Town.  P.W. Botha expressed his view 
that because the RSA was deeply disillusioned with Western vacillation and unjustified 
hostility to SA, his government was in favour of the formation of the “Fourth World” by 
the medium-sized powers to strengthen mutual cooperation, to break out of isolation and 
to solicit the recognition and support for these states.33 Despite the desire to break out of 
international isolation, each pariah state had its own agenda and different constraints.  
During the summit meeting, Premier Sun was of the opinion that the formation of a 
“Fourth World” by these pariah states was unrealistic and was not feasible.  Finally, the 
two Prime Ministers agreed that the two countries should start to strengthen bilateral 
co-operation as the first step and then gradually expand the scope of co-operation to other 
pariah states.34 
Premier Sun’s visit also offered an opportunity for the two governments to exchange 
views on mutual diplomatic support.  A proposal was made by Foreign Minister Pik 
Botha for each country to render necessary support to the other by lobbying its close 
diplomatic allies to improve their relations with the ROC or the RSA.  The ROC would 
attempt to convince Malawi, Lesotho, Swaziland, Paraguay, Costa Rica, South Korea, 
Saudi Arabia, and Panama to improve their relations with the RSA; while the RSA would 
approach Botswana, the U.K., France and West Germany, seeking to enhance relations 
with the ROC.35  As a result of this official visit, the following six important agreements 
and one procurement contract for uranium were entered into and signed between the two 
governments: 
y Agreement on the Co-operation of ROC-RSA Defence Industries (Confidential). 
y Agreement on the Reciprocity of granting Most Favoured Nation (MFA) status in 
respect of navigation and shipping. 
y Aviation Agreement. 
y Agreement of the Reciprocal Exemption of the Income Tax on Aviation & Navigation. 
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y Agreement on the Co-operation of Science and Technology. 
y Exchange of Personnel between the National Science Council of the Executive Yuan 
of the ROC and the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research of the RSA.36 
Mr. Botha said that the agreements were precursors of others which would benefit 
commerce, communications and future co-operation, “Visits of representatives of both 
the public and private sector covering all fields of cooperation between us will be im-
portant to maintain the momentum which your visit and conclusion of the agreements 
between us have generated.” The Grand Cross of the Order of Good Hope was conferred 
on Premier Sun when he paid a courtesy call on the State President at his official resi-
dence, Tuinhuys. Before the order was conferred, Foreign Minister Pik Botha explained 
that it honoured those who had promoted South Africa’s international relations.37 
At the state banquet held in Cape Town on March 12, 1980, Premier Sun stated: Four 
years ago the level of our respective representation was elevated from consular to that of 
diplomatic, the foundation of our friendship further consolidated, and the co-operation 
further strengthened. …And I am also pleased to announce that a purchase contract of 
approximately 400 tons of uranium from South Africa between the period of 1984 and 
1990 amounting to US$400 million will be signed this coming Friday, March 14.38 P.W. 
Botha echoed the viewpoint of Premier Sun by emphasing that “We both know the 
meaning of integrity in politics and integrity in friendship.  Both our countries can point 
to phenomenal post-war economic growth despite international problems we have had to 
face. Your visit has placed us on the threshold of significant development in our rela-
tions.”39 
In summary, the visit to SA by the PM of the ROC Mr. Sun, underline the cordial 
relations that existed between the two countries and presage a further strengthening of the 
bonds.  It provided the ground work for further bilateral co-operation in ROC-RSA re-
lations by nurturing mutual understanding and a value system between the leaders of the 
two friendly countries. Subsequent to Premier Sun’s visit, a SA official delegation led by 
P.W. Botha and his wife visited Taipei during October 13-17, 1980.  The delegation was 
comprised of 66 officials, including the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Information, Pik 
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Botha; Minister of Transport Affairs, H.S. Schoeman; Minister of Industries, Commerce 
and Tourism, D.J. de Villiers; the Director General of the Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Information, Brand Fourie, as well as the wives of the officials and 19 journalists 
representing the major media of SA.40  The media group included The South African 
Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), the South African Press Association (SAPA), The 
Star, Pretoria News, Beeld, The Cape Times, Die Burger, The Daily Dispatch, The Mirror, 
The Sunday Times, Rapport and the Rand Daily Mail. 
During his visit, P.W. Botha met with President Chiang Ching-Kon on October 15, 
1980, and held two rounds of talks with his counterpart, Premier Sun.  The two sides 
reached a consensus that because both countries were strategically important and their 
common enemy was Communist expansion, the ROC and the RSA should augment both 
their national strength and mutual co-operation to further contribute to the cause of the 
free world.  They agreed that while the ROC could be viewed as the cornerstone of se-
curity in the west Pacific, holding the key to Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia, the RSA 
held the strategic position of a gateway to the Indian and Atlantic oceans.41 After two 
rounds of thorough discussion on the implementation of relevant mutual co-operation 
agreements, P.W. Botha invited Taiwan to become involved in development projects in 
the Homelands; a major co-operation project was to be in the field of exploring energy 
sources and developing heavy industries.42 Botha also suggested that the two countries 
could co-operate in the use of nuclear power “for peaceful purposes”. 
Having served as Minister of Defence for 14 years, P.W. Botha toured military in-
stallations was impressed by the ROC’s well-organised and well-trained military forces.  
He and his delegation were also in favor of the ROC’s social, economic, cultural and 
technological developments.  Two days after the conclusion of the visit, the two coun-
tries signed an agreement to boost trade and technical co-operation.  A joint statement 
was issued committing both countries to opposing Communism.43   Prime Minister 
Botha’s visit was the first official foreign trip in his capacity as Prime Minister–heading a 
20-strong delegation.  As this was the first time that a South African Prime Minister had 
set foot on the soil of Taiwan, the visit was covered with massive publicity in both the 
ROC and the RSA.  Before the visit, the government and people of RSA did not know 
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much about the ROC because of the differences in cultural background and geographical 
distance.  Due to prominent media coverage, Botha’s visit helped to change the percep-
tion of the two countries towards each other.  The visit had also highlighted an awareness 
of the real situation of what each country could offer to each other.  Many journalists 
were surprised to witness the remarkable progress and achievements of the ROC.  Many 
of them did not expect to see that the ROC was so progressive in some fields of its de-
velopments, which were worth emulation by the RSA. 
P.W. Botha proclaimed “SA is proud to have the Republic of China as a trusted 
friend.” He further declared that “We have every reason to co-operate, not only because 
we have a common enemy, but more positively, because we have a great deal to learn 
from each other and a great deal to gain.” Botha’s declaration was a clear reflection of the 
growing partnership between the two countries.44 Premier Sun’s visit to the RSA in 
March 1980 and Prime Minister Botha’s return visit to the ROC in October 1980, culti-
vated the close relationship between the two countries.  With the exchange of visits of 
the two Prime Ministers, good will and trust developed, and the significant events held 
profound practical consequences.  These enhanced the mutual understanding and the 
foundation of a long-term partnership between the ROC and the RSA had been laid.   
The cordial partnership lasted for almost one decade until P.W.  Botha’s stepping 
down as party leader after suffering a stroke in February 1989.  In the ROC’s view, the 
ruling years of P.W. Botha, from 1978 to 1989, were a period of cordial partnership in the 
history of the ROC-RSA relations. The close diplomatic and political links supported 
various economic and strategic co-operation projects, and new economic frontiers were 
unfolding for ROC entrepreneurs and businessmen in terms of investments and trade with 
the RSA.45 
After accepting the invitation from Pik Botha, Foreign Minister Fu-sung Chu, ac-
companied by his wife and three officials, made his first official visit to the RSA from 
May 28 to June 4, 1981.  The main purpose was to participate in the celebrations of the 
Twentieth Anniversary of South Africa as a Republic and to discuss mutual relations with 
his counterpart, Pik Botha.  He was the first ROC foreign minister to pay an official visit 
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to South Africa, and his visit symbolised the cordial ties existing between the two coun-
tries.46 
During the one-week visit, Chu paid a courtesy call on Marais Viljoen, the State 
President, and a courtesy call on P.W. Botha, the Prime Minister, to deliver a letter from 
the President of the ROC and another from the Premier of the ROC respectively.  Chu 
and his delegation met Pik Botha and Brand Fourie and exchanged views on the world 
situation with special emphasis on Asia and Africa.  Chu urged the SA Government to 
stand with the ROC to fight international Communism.  He also toured SA military in-
stallations.  As the request of the SA Government, Foreign Minister Chu was decorated 
with the Grand Cross of the Order of Good Hope to honour his distinguished contribution 
in the promotion of ROC-RSA cordial relations.47 
Prime Minister Botha addressed a large crowd of celebrants on the Republic Day 
20th anniversary in Outeniqua Park, paying special tribute to the hard-working and de-
voted people of Taiwan, who shared with the people of South Africa a role as guardians.48  
He said, “They are fighting for freedom in the South China Sea – and we are guarding the 
Cape Sea route.” At a banquet given in his honour by R.F. Botha on June 3, 1981, Foreign 
Minister Chu said, “I wish to point out that the close co-operation between our two 
countries in various fields during the last couple of years and the efforts that have been 
made to promote such co-operation are signs of will-power and determination in their 
fight for survival.  And it is gratifying to note that in order to ward off threats to national 
existence, our two countries have been doing all they can to build and strengthen their 
sinews, without fanfare but with conviction and confidence to win.”49 
When Foreign Minister Chu was in SA, the ROC Naval Goodwill Squadron was 
invited by the South African Navy to visit South Africa’s ports for the first time.  The 
squadron consisted of two destroyers, one supply vessel and about 1,400 officers and 
cadets.  Members of the Marine Corps were overwhelmed by the warm reception and 
generous hospitality accorded them in all the 10 cities and towns where their perform-
ances became part of South Africa’s overall celebration programmes.  In addition, 55 
pieces of reproductions of objects of art from the National Palace Museum Collection 
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were exhibited in SA for the general public during the festival.  This exhibition served as 
the beginning of systematic and periodic cultural exchanges between two countries.   
Prior to his departure, Foreign Minister Chu held a press conference at Jan Smuts 
Airport on June 4, 1981.  He first spoke warmly of the ties of friendship between the 
ROC and the RSA and declared that “we want to share our experiences with our friends 
and we also want to exchange information… to work out programs against such Com-
munist infiltration and subversion”.  When asked about the ROC’s Africa ties, he simply 
made it clear that the ROC government was not concerned about ties with other black 
African states, and he did not believe that the ROC’s links with the RSA would really 
harm the ROC’s ties with other countries in Africa.50  It was evident that the ROC gov-
ernment considered the ROC-RSA bilateral relations as important as diplomatic ties with 
other African countries, and it had no fear that its growing links with SA might jeopardise 
its friendly relations with those countries.  Foreign Minister Chu was gratified to see 
how South Africans treated the ROC nationals as brothers and sisters during the Republic 
Day Twentieth Anniversary. His official visit was of great political signifince.   
Official Mutual Visits 
After the diplomatic setback in the 1970s, especially the severing of diplomatic relations 
with the USA in 1979, the ROC treated the RSA as one of the top four diplomatic allies in 
its 28 friendly countries.  Having isolation in the international community, the two 
countries supported each other.  An important aspect was their efforts to promote mutual 
understanding through visits by prominent personalities from both countries.  Various 
delegations from different governmental departments visited the other country every year 
to chart the course of bilateral co-operation projects.  Each country backed the other’s 
diplomatic stance.  High-level exchange of visits was further continued.  On the ROC 
side, following the visit of Foreign Minister Fu-sung Chu, Minister of Finance Hsu Li-teh 
visited South Africa in September 1982.  Two months later, the Minister of Economic 
Affairs, Chao Yao-tung and the chairman of the Vocational Assistance Commission for 
Retired Servicemen of the Executive Yuan, General Cheng Wei-yuan, visited SA sepa-
rately.  In April 1983, the Chief of the ROC Defence Force, General Hau Pei-tsun visited 
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the RSA and SWA to strengthen military co-operation.  In May 1983, Vice Premier Chiu 
Chung-huan and Minister of Transport Lien Chan paid a visit to the RSA.  After Premier 
Sun suffered a stroke and resigned from the government, Premier Yu Kuo-hwa, his suc-
cessor, paid an official visit to the RSA in July 1984.  ROC Vice- President Lee Teng-hui 
visited SA for the third time in September 1984 to attend the ceremonies involving the 
inauguration of the new Tricameral Constitution and the new State President of the RSA.  
The Deputy Premier of the ROC, Lin Yang-kang, also visited SA in 1985.  Inauguration 
ceremonies of SA’s seventh State President De Klerk on September 20, 1989, at Pretoria, 
was attened by Dr. K Huang, Minister without Portfolio on behalf of the ROC.51 
From the RSA side, distinguished visitors to the ROC included Dr. Hilgard Muller, 
Foreign Minister in 1979; R.F. Botha, Foreign Minister in 1980; Dr. P.G..J. Koornhof, 
Minister of Co-operation and Development in 1982; J.W. Greeff, Speaker of the House of 
Assembly in 1983; Barend du Plessis, Minister of Finance in 1984; P.W. Steyn, Minister 
of Mineral and Energy Affairs in July 1984; D.J. de Villiers, Minister of Trade and In-
dustry in 1985; F.W. de Klerk, Minister of National Education in 1985; General M.A. 
Malan, Minister of Defence in 1986; A.L. Manley, permanent representative to UN in 
1987; Danie Steyn, Minister of Economic Affair and Technology; Eli Louw, Minister of 
Transport; and Greyling Wentzel, Minister of Agriculture.52 
In the 1980s with Western countries using sanctions and embargos, and experienc-
ing confrontation and riots internally, South Africa faced a difficult period.  In such an 
environment, the frequent visits by high-ranking officials from the ROC were a strong 
symbol of support to the RSA.   Although the ROC was still one of SA’s reliable allies, 
the ROC government urged the fractions to engage in negotiation and end the violence. 
In the eyes of the ROC, the RSA was getting better and better.  Ambassador H.K. 
Yang in his Seventy-fourth National Day Anniversary speech said: “In SA in 1985, we 
were pleased to see significant changes taking place.  Among other things we saw the 
new constitution brought into effect.  As has been contemplated or planned, apartheid in 
all its ramifications is in the process of phasing out.  For legislature, there is now a tri-
lateral parliament, with the Coloured and Indians each having its own House: House of 
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Delegates for the Indians and House of Representatives for the Coloureds.  The Blacks 
too have been promised citizenship and decision-making power at high level.  Not only 
will they be brought into the new system, but also they are to have an equitable role to 
play in the new dispensation.  Who can say that these are not significant changes? As all 
these changes are brought to pass, we as friends of South Africa can do no less than to 
wish both its Government and its people well.”53 
Homelands 
There are various tribes in South Africa who constitute the bulk of the people in this 
country.  Under the name of so-called separate development, four out of the 10 tribes got 
“independent status” during the 1980s.  They were Venda, Bophuthatswana, Ciskei and 
Trankei.  Owing to this special political development inside SA, no country in the world 
recognised those areas as being fully independent countries.  Actually they were 
homelands, and only SA recognised them as countries with an exchange of ambassadors.  
On December 6, 1986, when Bophuthatswana obtained “independence”, Ambassador 
Yang upon the instruction of the ROC government wrote a letter of congratulation as a 
friendly gesture to the “President” Chief Lucas M. Mangope.54 
SA wanted the ROC to recognise those countries and establish official relations to 
demonstrate to the world that SA was not the only country sending ambassadors to the 
“homelands”.  Foreign Minister Chu said positively that the ROC wanted to make 
friends with all democratic and peace-loving countries of the world but would not have 
any official relations with those homeland countries whether they were independent or 
not.55  SA accepted the position of the ROC towards the homelands.   
However, the ROC did invite the leaders and some high-ranking political figures to 
visit Taiwan.  For example, the President of the Republic of Venda, Frank N. Ravele, led 
a delegation to visit the ROC on September 26, 198956 to promote mutual understanding 
and encourage non-political co-operation.  Hence all these visits were underway main-
taining a very low profile not to cause unnecessary speculation or have further implica-
tions. The government and the embassy of the ROC also encouraged Taiwanese busi-
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nessmen, entrepreneurs, and small and medium enterprises to invest in the homelands, to 
expand their businesses and to create job opportunities, a move which proved very suc-
cessful for both countries.   
Since the ROC was a close friend of the RSA, the ROC’s attitude towards apartheid 
was very sensitive and was handled appropriately.  Ambassador Yang explained: “We 
do not interfere in the domestic affairs of other countries.  All this is consistent with the 
UN Charter on non-interference in other countries’ domestic affairs.  Let the South Af-
ricans find their own solution.  The country (SA) has its problems, but these are inherited 
from the past.  The government of P.W. Botha wanted to bring about changes, but cir-
cumstances have made this difficult.” 57 Foreign Minister Chu answering the apartheid 
issue also said that the ROC was always in favour of harmony and equity among racial 
groups and that it would never interfere in any countries’ domestic affairs.   
P.W. Botha was in power as Prime Minister from 1978 and stepped down on Feb-
ruary 1989 as President of the RSA, after suffering a stroke.  Ambassador Yang came to 
South Africa in 1979 and left in May 1989, the most difficult years in the history of South 
Africa.  The relations between the two countries were indeed very cordial and at their 
best.  On behalf the South Africa, Foreign Minister R.F. Botha conferred the Grand 
Cross of the Order of Good Hope to ambassador Yang for his enormous contribution and 
great achievement in promoting the friendly relations between the two countries. During 
that period, both countries were very satisfied about the close relations with regard to 
trade and in matters of a more political nature.  Numerous inter-governmental visits at all 
levels took place, including attendance at a variety of educational and training estab-
lishments.58 
Economic Cooperation and Investment 
Economic and trade relations were one of the most decisive aspects of the bilateral rela-
tions.  After 1971, the ROC-RSA interaction included investment, trade, air links, tour-
ism, fishing, loans and technical co-operation.  In the 1960s, many African countries had 
become independent and joined the UN.  The ROC established diplomatic ties with 
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friendly nations and sent agricultural missions to Africa with a view to winning their 
support in the UN.  Because of all the political considerations, the ROC did not give 
much attention to economic and trade relations with SA, but the political and economic 
relations between the two countries were equally important.  In other words, because the 
political and diplomatic ties were very close, the economic and trade relations would 
become very fruitful.  Through the two governments’ joint efforts in creating an envi-
ronment conducive to sound and orderly economic development, the ROC-RSA bilateral 
economic and trade ties expanded achieving some positive results.  In the 1970s, the two 
countries signed four agreements; in the 1980s, the two countries signed 15 agreements.59  
More precisely, those agreements covered the area of air services, trade, tariffs, agricul-
ture, culture, technical cooperation, mineral and energy affairs and medical co-operation.  
With these agreements in place, the legal foundation and framework of the economic 
co-operation between the two countries was solidified.   
Taiwan is an island country which lacks natural resources, but from the late 1960s, 
Taiwan laid the foundation for its outstanding economic growth.  On June 20, 1978, 
Taiwan was listed as the twenty-fifth largest trading country in the world by the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund.60  Agriculture, the main productive sector of Taiwan at the be-
ginning of its development, was hindered by the problems of high farmland rentals, in-
secure tenure, and small tracts of arable land.  The land reform was aimed at turning 
tenants into land owners, giving incentives to increase production, and improving agri-
cultural productivity.  Since the 1980s, Taiwan has vigorously pursued massive privati-
sation as an irrevocable trend.  Besides, in the terms of numbers, Small and Medium 
Enterprises (SMEs) have dominated Taiwan’s manufacturing sector.  For most of the 
time in Taiwan’s economic transition, SMEs have maintained the lion’s share (more than 
98%) of all manufacturing firms.61 
There are a few hundred thousand small businesses dotting the landscape of the 
small island.  It is these that have powered the economic and industrial growth of Taiwan 
after the agricultural take-off.  For this reason, the “Made in Taiwan” label of the coun-
try’s high quality products is recognisable around the world. Another obvious example is 
the Export Processing Zone (EPZ) that earned much foreign capital for Taiwan.  The 
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ROC government also built the EPZ in Subic Bay in the Philippines.   
It was the 1980s, however, which were critical for Taiwan’s industrial period.  This 
era was spurred by vigorous government promotion of strategic, technology-intensive 
industries such as electronics, precision machinery, industrial automation, and 
semi-conductors.  In 1981, for instance, the first Science-Based Industrial Park for 
Taiwan was set up in Hsinchu.  This was modelled extensively on the famous Silicon 
Valley in California.  A decade after the Science Park was established, top earners in 
Taiwan were machinery electronic products, textiles, basic metals and articles manu-
factured from them, information and communication products, transport equipment and 
electrical machinery products.62 For almost 40 years, the Taiwanese economy was one 
of the fastest growing in the world, posting an annual growth rate of 8.9 per cent over the 
period 1953 to 1989, approximately double the average of the developing nations over 
the same period (4.71 percent).  In short, the major lessons from the Taiwanese experi-
ence were agricultural reform, import substitution, export-led economic growth guided 
by the comparative advantages of international trade and a concrete commitment to free 
trade.63  
No single factor explained Taiwan’s extraordinarily successful development.  
Rather, Taiwan’s economic miracle was initiated and maintained by a number of key 
factors that remained relevant to all developing countries.  These factors include a fa-
vourable international environment, domestic stability, frugality and hard work, foreign 
direct investment, market economy, manufacturing, high productivity, export-led growth, 
government guidance, the super-technocrats, export processing zones and science in-
dustrial parks, and especially the vocational training system and small and medium en-
terprises.64 As time passed, Taiwan experienced phenomenal growth and transformed 
itself in less than 40 years from an agrarian rice-and-sugar economy to the world’s fif-
teenth biggest trading power with the largest gold and foreign reserves, amounting to 
more than US$100 billion. 
South Africa has a well-developed formal sector based on mining and manufactur-
ing and a smaller, but important, sector based on agriculture and services.  SA is an in-
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dustrializing country with most of the characteristics associated with developing 
economies – a division between formal and the informal sector, uneven distribution of 
wealth and income, a dependence on commodity exports, and a legacy of government 
intervention. South Africa is the world’s biggest producer of gold and platinum and one 
of the leading producers of base metals and coal.  South Africa’s mineral wealth is found 
in diverse geological formations, some of which are unique and very extensive by world 
standards.65 
According to the US Department of State, it is the world’s leading producer of gold, 
gem diamonds, vanadium, and ferro-chromium, and a major producer of platinum-group 
metals, titanium, antimony, asbestos, and manganese.  South African reserves of man-
ganese, platinum-group metals, and chrome ore are each greater than half of the world’s 
known supplies; reserves of gold are almost half of total known reserves.  Gold mining is 
the most critical sector in the South African economy, accounting for about 40% of all 
export proceeds, and other minerals account for a further 20%.  The price of gold went 
from $35 an ounce in the 1960s to an average of $130 in the 1970s to $450 in 
1980-1985.66  The only problem is inadequate petroleum resources, but South Africa’s 
SASOL corporation provides a coal gasification/liquefaction process to produce petro-
leum products and is capable of providing an estimated 50% of South Africa’s petroleum 
requirements.   
During the apartheid years, economic goals came second to political objectives in 
SA.  The SA government protected and deliberately encouraged large-scale investment 
in projects that would enhance the country’s strategic self-sufficiency.  This included 
state initiatives such as Armscor, Sasol, Atlantis and Mossgas.  The outcome of these 
policies was that SA displayed its best performance in export products such as minerals, 
basic manufactured goods, chemicals, and transport equipment.67 In a purely economic 
context, the ROC’s and the RSA’s national interests coincided during the 1980s, and the 
mutual attraction of the two economies was important for the gradual deepening of the 
ROC-RSA economic and trade relations in the 1970s and the 1980s.  As the two 
economies were basically complementary, each country pursued common economic and 
strategic interests, in particular when SA’s major trading partners imposed international 
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sanctions.68  Under the threat of economic isolation, the RSA naturally looked to the 
ROC for assistance in countering the economic sanctions imposed by Western countries. 
With a view to handling the various issues arising from bilateral economic relations, 
the two countries founded three kinds of institutional structures.     
y The two governments initiated the ROC-RSA Ministerial Conference on Economic 
and Technical Cooperation in 1977.  This conference took place once a year alterna-
tively in the respective capitals.  Initially, the Ministerial Conference was co-chaired 
by the Deputy-Minister of Economic Affairs of the ROC and the Deputy Minister of 
Commerce and Industries and Consumer Affairs of the RSA during 1977-1978.  From 
1979 onwards, based on the recommendation made by the SA Government, the Con-
ference was upgraded to the level of full Ministerial Level.   
y The RSA/ROC Chamber of Economic Relations (also known as SAROC) in Pretoria 
and its counterpart, the ROC/RSA Economic Council (also known as ROCSA) in 
Taipei, were established simultaneously in 1982.  The main purpose of SAROC and 
ROCSA was to facilitate the exchange of visits between the private sectors of the two 
countries and closer co-operation of the organisations that had been established to 
promote trade and the enhancement of the ROC-RSA economic and trade relations.69 
y The contact between the China External Trade Development Council (CETRA) and 
the South African Foreign Trade Organisation (SAFTO) was another channel of in-
teraction at a private business level.  The principal function of CETRA was, and still 
is, to advance close co-operation between the ROC government and industries to de-
velop foreign trade relations with its trading partners. Association of ROC Industrial-
ists in Southern Africa also played an important role in this regard. 
The first Economic and Technical Cooperation Conference was held on March 7, 
1977 in Taipei.  The ROC Vice Economics Minister S.C. Liu and the RSA Deputy 
Minister G.J.J.F. Steyn co-chaired the conference.  The Second Conference was held on 
August 21, 1978, in Pretoria, with the ROC Vice Economics Minister Wang I-ting and 
Deputy Minister T.F. Van der Walter co-chairing.  The Third Conference was upgraded 
to Ministerial Level and was held on December 12, 1979, in Pretoria. The ROC Minister 
of Economic Affairs Kwang-shih Chang and Minister of Trade and Industries of South 
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Africa, Dr. Schalk co-chaired this conference.70 According to the minutes of the first 
conference, the conclusions were summarized as follows: 
y Removal or modification of area restriction applied by the government of the ROC on 
imports from the RSA. 
y Removal of Tariff and Non-tariff barriers against ROC’s products 
y Exchange of experience in respect of customs administration 
y Co-operation between the television manufacturers of both countries in the manu-
facture of 16-inch and smaller television sets in SA 
y Exchange of information on industrial technology and trade 
y Exchange of visits of business for the improvement of trade relationships between the 
two countries.   
y Agricultural, scientific and technical co-operation.71 
Furthermore, the ROC Minister of State and Governor of the Central Bank, Yu 
Kou-hwa paid a visit to SA in September 1981 to contact the authorities and private 
sectors concerned in economic and financial fields to discuss matters of bilateral 
co-operation.  The Minister of Finance, Li-teh Hsu, visited SA in December 1983.  On 
the SA side, F.W. de Klerk, Minister of Energy and Mineral Affairs, visited the ROC in 
1981.  O.P.F. Horwood, Minister of Finance, paid a visit to the ROC from September 13 
to 15, 1982.  Dr. P.G.J. Koornhof, Minister of Co-operation and Development visited 
Taiwan from July 15 to 23, 1983.  Barend du Plessis, Minister of Finance, and G.P.C. de 
Kock, Governor of the South African Reserve Bank, both visited the ROC in 1985.  All 
these decision-makers were just names of a few delegations that came to the ROC to 
discuss matters of mutual concern, especially in the fields of energy, finance and trade.  
In the 1980s, the two countries signed 15 agreements, which covers reciprocal treatment 
of Navigation, Scientific and Technological Co-operation, Meteorological Co-operation, 
Mineral and Energy Affairs, and so forth.  These agreements proved that economic and 
trade interactions were close and that both sides were satisfied with the results and 
achievements.  In short, the annual Minister’s Economic and Technological 
Co-operation Conference, together with visits by high-ranking officials from both coun-
tries, and the signing of agreements (altogether 15 in the 1980s), are the main substance 
of the close economic co-operation which cemented the two countries and  was the core 
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value of all the co-operation.   
Dr. Hilgard Muller emphasised: “We prefer schemes which help others in the long 
run to help themselves.  In this field South Africa has proved her reliability as a partner.  
There are no hidden strings attached to such co-operation.  The Republic of China is an 
example of productive co-operation based on common interests with a resultant expan-
sion of fruitful relations.”72  Minister of Economics of the ROC, Mr. Kwang-shih Chang 
said the ROC believed both countries were at a similar stage of development and had to 
depend greatly on developed countries.  They should depend more on their own efforts 
to develop their own economies.  That’s the underlying reason for our wanting close 
cooperation and permanent relations with South Africa.” 
Foreign trade was the major impetus behind Taiwan’s economic development.  
South Africa was Taiwan’s main trading partner in Africa and during the close economic 
interaction cultivated in the 1980s.  The bilateral trade between the ROC and the RSA in 
the 1950s was rather insignificant, even before 1971, the trade volume were very limited.  
It was only with the maize agreement in 1973 and the trade agreement in 1975 that both 
countries had the most favoured status, opening the door to further trade relations.  The 
quality of the South African maize was very good and the agreement was extended many 
times. For a time maize was the biggest import to Taiwan.  Without doubt, the 1973 
Maize Agreement was the watershed of the economic relations between the ROC and the 
RSA.73 
The trade volume was increasing after 1973, and the two-way trade reached R8.3 
million in 1977.74  The establishment of diplomatic ties provided further momentum to 
the expansion of bilateral trade.  The Minister of Mining and Energy, F.W. de Klerk, 
visited Taiwan in January 1981, and agreement was reached for cooperation in mining 
and the refining of coal, zinc, copper and aluminium.  SA undertook to supply Taiwan 
with 10,000 ton of magnesium and 5,000 ton of nickel p.a.75  Hence, trade with Taiwan 
increased rapidly – from US$27.6 million in 1980 to US$400 million in 1981.  Over 
those years, there were five SA trade missions to Taiwan and 15 reciprocal missions.76 
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SA and the ROC were developed closer economic ties quickly after the visit of 
Prime Minister P.W. Botha to the ROC.  F.W. de Klerk told the annual meeting of the 
SA-ROC chamber of Economic Relations in Johannesburg on June 25, 1984, “The 1983 
bilateral trade agreement between SA and the ROC had resulted in strong commercial 
relations that were mutually advantageous to the two countries.  This growing interac-
tion had an impact beyond commerce and trade, and most important, the two countries 
shared a common goal – to promote trade and sound relations.”77 After the fruitful visit 
to SA in September 1984, Mr. Loh Jen-kong, the Minister of Finance, told the Sunday 
Star that for the first time since the two countries concluded trade agreements, the balance 
of trade was now in favour of the ROC.  Loh replied: “The fact is that we are not looking 
for a trade balance with you; we would rather have a balance in favour of SA because we 
want to buy more South African goods in future, especially maize and iron ore.”78 
The two-way trade between SA and the ROC continued to grow, just as the cordial 
friendship and co-operation between the two countries flourished.  In 1986, the trade 
between the RSA and the ROC totalled US$550 million with a balance of US$102 million 
in favour of South Africa.  Although the trade between the RSA and the ROC increased 
significantly in 1986, the trade volume in terms of percentage of the total external trade of 
the two countries was small; i.e., the trade in 1986, which amounted to US$550 million, 
represented only 0.8% of the total external trade of the ROC, and 1.6% of that of the RSA 
in that year.   
There were some concerns about the increase of trade between the two countries 
being mainly due to the sanctions imposed by other countries on SA.  Ambassador Yang 
explained: “The major products the ROC bought from SA were base metals, maize and 
coal.  In 1986, the ROC bought about two million tons of coal from SA, accounting for 
20% of its total coal imports.  We should realise that in 1986, SA exports to the ROC 
represented only 4.5% of its total export.  The remainder went to Europe and other 
countries.  The ROC major export items to the RSA were electronics, textiles and plastic 
products.  We would also find that the trade growth had nothing to do with economic 
sanctions imposed by other countries.”79 Ambassador Yang said the real reason for im-
proved trade was because of better understanding between the people and attributed the 
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remarkable growth of trade to the revaluation of European currencies and the Japanese 
Yen against the US dollar, which made the price of ROC exported goods more competi-
tive on the international market.   
In brief, trade and technical co-operation were the main links between the ROC and 
the RSA, but in the realm of technical co-operation, significant progress was registered.  
This had been extended in many fields with tangible results beneficial to the people of 
both countries.  Over the years, South Africa had established a special trade relationship 
with the ROC.  The SAROC chamber of Economic Relations made a valuable contri-
bution in the development of this relationship, and the chamber may have an even greater 
role to play in the future.  The chairman of SAROC, Mr. Allen Sealey, said in an address: 
“SA was one of Taiwan’s smallest trading partners.  If SA is to repay its foreign debt and 
re-establish its credit worthiness so as to once again attract the foreign capital it needs for 
development, we will have to emulate the ROC’s trade performance.  Given the required 
time and the right climate, we could go a long way towards achieving the levels reached 
by Taiwan.”80 
On the South Africa side, despite all the political obstacles, SA managed to engage 
in considerable trade promotion activities.  In 1988, South Africa’s permanent exhibi-
tion – the largest in floor space – was opened at the Taipei World Trade Center.  
Two-way trade between SA and Taiwan soared by 120% to over US$ 900 million in the 
first half of 1988, compared with the same period in 1987.81  SA was estimated to be 
Taiwan’s twelfth largest import source in 1988.  The primary items exported to Taiwan 
by SA included platinum, gold, silver and other precious metals; coal, iron and steel; 
aluminum and aluminum products; wool and textile products; copper and copperware; 
pulp; petrochemicals and basic industrial chemicals; paper and paper board; rice; silicate 
minerals; canned food and juice; veneer and plywood and reconstituted woods.  Tai-
wan’s trade liberalisation policy had been a boon to SA exporters, with price-competitive 
SA products being well received.  The two-way trade between the two countries reached 
US$1,539 million in 1990,82 which was also a harvest year for SA’s economic diplo-
macy.   
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Taiwanese investment in South Africa 
Taiwan’s political leaders have regularly called for Taiwanese citizens to assist in the 
development of African economies and for business to expand investments in Africa.  
Taiwan’s investments in Africa were extremely limited except in South Africa.83  After 
P.W. Botha visited the ROC, Premier Sun made it very clear that the ultimate goal of the 
ROC –RSA ties was to take advantage of South Africa’s minerals, energy resources and 
metal products to promote the ROC’s economic development.  In accordance with the 
spirit of this guideline, the domestic policies of the RSA such as apartheid, the homelands, 
democracy and human rights were not the concern of the ROC government.84 
The beginning of Taiwanese investment occurred during the 1980s and stemmed 
from two major factors.  First, in the early 1980s, Taiwan began to enjoy high economic 
growth of more than 10 percent and relaxed exchange controls.  This encouraged Tai-
wanese companies to invest abroad. Secondly, South Africa under apartheid had intro-
duced many incentives to attract foreign capital, including tax breaks, allowances and the 
financial rand.  Taiwan’s government also played a major role in promoting investment 
in SA when the two maintained diplomatic ties.85  The number of factories relocated 
from Taiwan increased in 1985 to 36, reached over 100 in 1987, and 300 in 1990.86  
Many of these investors poured in their capital investment without doing sound prior 
market research.  Many actually were encouraged to relocate in SA by friends or family 
members, since most of their businesses were small-to medium-sized family- owned 
factories.  Prime Minister Mpephu of Venda and Phatudi of Lebowa both visited Taiwan 
in 1983, and President Sebe of Ciskei traveled there in 1984.  The purpose of their visits 
was to lure foreign investors. 
Taiwanese industrialists had invested US$60 million by early 1987 to establish 68 
factories in the Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei.  Such labour-intensive 
investment is significant primarily for the homeland concerned by creating employment.  
In economic terms, the investments created jobs in areas of extremely high unemploy-
ment, and politically they gave an element of recognition to homeland governments 
shunned by most of the world.87  Many products manufactured by Taiwanese investors 
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in South Africa were computers, knitted sweaters, socks, electronics, surgical gloves, 
shoes, yarn and packing tapes.  However, Taiwanese investment in the homelands was 
small compared to investments there of South African origin.  “Many investors in the 
ROC were afraid of unrest in SA.  They only saw that affairs were stable and calm when 
they came here,” ROC’s economic counsellor in Johannesburg, C.C. Kan, said.88 
Two successful factories are worthwhile to understand: Union Drug (Pty) Ltd. and 
Mustek Electronics (Pty) Ltd.  The former is the largest latex glove manufacturer in SA, 
rated among the top five in the world.  With five modern automatic latex glove manu-
facturing machines, each line can produce 70,000 pieces of surgical or examination 
gloves per day.  The latter is the RSA Mustek Group.  Mustek SA was founded in 1986 
as a supplier of computer and associated equipment to local dealers and corporations.  
Mustek produces locally the well-known Mercer computer brand in Midrand and has 
grown significantly. ROC industrialists who started to invest in SA from the early 1980s 
have made a meaningful contribution to the economic development of SA, creating 
needed jobs in the former homelands areas and the economically peripheral parts of the 
country.89 
Based on the agreement between the ROC and the RSA for the Reciprocal Treatment 
of Navigation, South African Airways began a weekly round-trip flight between Johan-
nesburg and Taipei in November 1980 and increased its direct flights to twice a week 
from November 1987.  This flight proved that more tourists, businessmen and visitors 
would visit Taiwan and South Africa, and this route which connected Johannesburg 
Mauritius, Hong Kong and Taipei, carried mail, freight and business goods, promoting 
the  economic activities of both sides.  Even though the two countries were geo-
graphically far apart, the ROC-RSA direct service by SAA brought the two states much 
closer together.  It was obvious that the air-links not only facilitated the development of 
air transportation and the exchange of visits and tourism, but also further strengthened 
economic, cultural and other relations.  The state-funded South African Tourist Bureau 
(SATOUR) also set up a branch office in Taipei, after SAA’s direct feight to Taipei twice a 
week. SATOUR’s Business Section encouraged more tourists from Taiwan to visit South 
Africa,  
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South Africa’s commercial shipping company, the South African Marine Corpora-
tion Limited (Safmarine) started its regular service to the Far East including Taiwan in 
1967.90  But it was only when the two countries signed the Reciprocal Treatment of 
Navigation in March, 1980, that the real co-operation in shipping swung into action.  
During the 1980s, in addition to Safmarine, Nantai Shipping Lines, Uniglory Marine 
Corporation and Kien Hung Shipping SA (Pty) Ltd. entered the shipping business and 
trade between the two countries was well served.  Many vessels were busy at the sea-
ports in Keelung and Kaohsiung as well as in Durban and Cape Town.  The shipping 
business once again promoted two-way trade and transported the goods, machinery, 
equipment and investments from Taiwan to SA. 
The bilateral cooperation agreement on fisheries dates back to 1978 when the ROC 
government concluded a Bilateral Agreement on Mutual Fishery Relations.  In particular, 
the two countries agreed that they would promote future bilateral co-operation on such 
matters as exchanges of technical information and personnel and the improvement of 
utilisation and processing of catches.  Based on this agreement, the annual bilateral 
consultation meeting was held in Cape Town to discuss such matters as the issue of 
permits to tuna vessels, total tuna catches within the South African fishery zone, levies, 
and quotas and security.  The South African Government allowed fishing vessels of the 
ROC to catch the following species of fish and quantity of each species: Horse Mackerel 
3,500 tons; Squid 1,700 tons; Hake 2,000 tons; other species, 15% by-catch on 7,200 
tons.91  Every year about 450 Chinese fishing vessels carried out their overhaul main-
tenance and purchased their supplies in Cape Town, contributing one hundred million 
rand to the revenue of that city.   
The bilateral cooperation on fishing was an important facet of the ROC-RSA eco-
nomic relations.  While mutually beneficial to both countries, yet the co-operation 
worked more in the ROC’s favour economically. Every year, approximately 450 ROC 
fishing vessels docked at Cape Town harbour for provisions such as fuel, food and water 
as well as for repairs or to sell their catches.  To enable the seamen to have a secure place 
to rest, the ROC government, through the ROC consulate-General in Cape Town, spent 
R2.5 million on December 1, 1989, to rent a double story building as the Fishermen’s 
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Club.  The 24-year lease expires on November 30, 2013.  The ROC government un-
dertook to pay annual rentals, repairs and renovations of the premises to the South Afri-
can authorities.92 
South African agricultural exports include animal and vegetable products, processed 
foods and beverages.  In 1987, farmers who settled in Ka Ngwane were growing rice that 
compared favourably with that produced in the ROC.  The selected project area was 
situated in the Tonga Irrigation Scheme and there was about 350 ha of land under gravity 
irrigation.  The first crop of rice was planted in October 1985, with rice experts from 
Taiwan watching the area closely.93  The black farmers cultivated rice, yielding a harvest 
of almost three tons per hectare more than the yield achieved in the ROC.  Similar rice 
projects were envisaged for the self-governing territory of Lebowa.  The Direc-
tor-General of the Department of Development Aid said this success story was a good 
example of what could be achieved through effective co-operation.94 
During the 1980s, with co-operation taking place between forestry, mineral and 
energy sectors, especially the training programme of the Chinese steel company and 
ISCOR, and the encouragement of two-way investment activities, the two countries had 
already established a full-scale and comprehensive interchange and co-operation in 
economic, energy, investment and medical fields.  The ROC even proposed to establish a 
Sino-South Africa Investment Corporation.  With the Standard Bank of South Africa 
establishing a branch office in Taipei to promote business investments in 1989, together 
with the request to relax South African visa restrictions against ROC businessmen, the 
overall cordial ties between the two countries were greatly cultivated. 
Military and Nuclear Cooperation 
Military links between the ROC and the RSA were established in 1977 when the two 
countries exchanged military attachés.  Both countries were isolated in the military 
domain and faced severe security threats.  The ROC was under constant threat from the 
PRC for many decades and sought to develop its own strong national defence capabilities.  
The USA switching their recognition to the PRC in 1979 was a serious blow to the ROC’s 
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national security, nullifying the USA-ROC Mutual Defence Treaty. Thus an urgent need 
existed to seek other sources of military technology to safeguard its national security.  
Even though in November 1977, the UN Security Council imposed a mandatory 
arms embargo on SA, that UN member states had to implement the resolution, the 
country had continued to make remarkable progress in the production of the armaments 
necessary to defend itself and so increased the level of preparedness of the South African 
Defence Force. These developments resulted in far-reaching improvements in technology 
throughout the economy.95 
Based on the belief that two countries were also anti-Communist, because Prime 
Minister P.W. Botha had been the Minister of Defence for 12 years, he had a keen interest 
in national defence.  Thus official military co-operation between Taipei and Pretoria 
began on March 13, 1980 when Prime Minister Sun visited the RSA and signed a secret 
agreement on the Co-operation of the Defence Industries with Prime Minister Botha in 
Cape Town.96 In accordance with Article II of this agreement, the ROC-RSA military 
cooperation encompassed the following fields: 
y Research, development and exchange of know-how in respect of mili-
tary/para-military equipment or armaments; 
y Exchange of information in other related fields as may be determined from 
time-to-time; 
y Bilateral training and reciprocal visits of personnel; and 
y Reciprocal sale of military/para-military equipment, materials or armaments.97 
The first ROC-RSA Defence Industry Co-operation Conference was held in Taipei 
on May 15, 1980, and the second in Pretoria on October 30 of the same year.  From the 
third conference held in Taipei on April 18, 1981, the conference was held alternatively in 
Taipei and Pretoria once or twice each year. 
Exchange visits by top-ranking military personnel of both countries were frequent.  
The Chief of General Staff of the ROC, Pei-tsun Hau visited SA from April 24 to May 3, 
1983.  General Hau was invested with the medal of Grand Cross of the Order by General 
Magnus Malan.  General Malan, in presenting the decoration, said the close and friendly 
  209
relations enjoyed by the RSA and ROC Defence Forces were largely responsible for the 
high standard of co-operation that had existed between the two countries over the years, 
co-operation covering a broad spectrum of matters of mutual interest.98  “The common 
ground of being obliged to look after ourselves and to fight the same enemy is constantly 
drawing us closer together.” Most of the ROC Chiefs of General Staff and Command-
ers-in-Chief of the ROC Army, Navy and Air Force visited SA in the 1980s. 
Most of the top South African generals and military commanding officers visited the 
ROC and were decorated with various medals in recognition of their contributions to-
wards promoting the close military exchange and co-operation between the ROC and the 
RSA.  The South African Minister of Defence paid official visits to the ROC many times, 
and General Malan said: Taiwan is almost my second hometown.99  In 1984, General 
Johann Coetzee was awarded the ROC Medal of Yun Hai for promoting traditional 
friendship and military co-operation between the two countries.100 The ROC also offered 
to set up a political warfare class to train South African military officers.  The pro-
gramme was set up for the purpose of helping  friendly countries see clearly the nature 
and intrigue of international Communism, introducing them the theory and practice of 
“political warfare” so as to head off Communist infiltration and expansion, maintain so-
cial order, further people’s welfare and safeguard national security.   
To counter Communist expansion, the ROC assisted the RSA in setting up a moni-
toring station in a Pretoria suburb 1980 to decipher the Chinese Communist broadcasts, 
radio announcements, electronic transmissions and intelligence communications, and to 
gather information on the broadcasts from Moscow in the Chinese language as well.  
The exchange of intelligence and the monitoring of Communist activities in South Africa 
were important facets of the military co-operation between the ROC and the RSA.101 
The ROC Naval Goodwill Squadron visited South Africa in May 1981, in celebra-
tion of the twentieth anniversary of the Republic.  Afterward, the ROC sent the Goodwill 
Squadron to South Africa many times, mainly docking in Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and 
Durban harbours.  The Squadron consisted of two destroyers, one supply vessel and 
approximately 1,300 naval officers and cadets.  In July 1985, the ROC dispatched a 
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Naval Task Group of three ships with 1,400 officers and midshipmen to visit SA for 15 
days.  The visit coincided with the South African Navy Week, July 8 to July 13, and the 
Durban Tattoo.  Even though the value of Armscor’s arms export to the ROC was limited, 
and the main item in the 1980s was ammunition, there were some exchange military 
medical co-operation and training programmes beneficial to both sides. Since South Af-
rica was in the forefront of the struggle against Communism in Africa, while the ROC 
was playing a similar role in Asia and Indo-China, the two countries had much in com-
mon.  Military co-operation had to maintain a low profile, with sensitivity and confi-
dentiality. Both the RSA and the ROC were satisfied in general in the interactions in the 
military domain in the 1980s. 
Nuclear Cooperation 
There was a widespread belief in the 1980s that Israel, South Africa and the ROC, all 
isolated states, had nuclear weapons.  South Africa had developed the capability to 
produce nuclear warheads.102  This was to deter enemies that could invade the Republic, 
notably Ccommunists forces joined by African armies and exiled South African political 
movements.  There was also co-operation in the development of a nuclear industry be-
tween the RSA and Israel.103 The first nuclear power station in Chinshan, Taiwan had 
two nuclear reactors.  The first reactor began to operate in 1977 and the second func-
tioned as of December 1978.  In the wake of the first world oil crisis of 1973, the ROC 
government hastened to build two more nuclear power stations.  Construction of the 
ROC’s second nuclear power plant commenced in November 1974 and the third nuclear 
power station was under construction as of May 1978.104  In short, it was the ROC’s 
seeking of an alternative supply of energy and its strategy of diversification that led to the 
development of its nuclear industry.   
The ROC Prime Minister Chiang Ching-kuo declared, during an interview with 
journalists of the United Press International on September 17, 1975, that “The ROC does 
have the technical ability to make its own nuclear weapons, but it will never proceed to 
develop atomic bombs or nuclear weapons.” South Africa had sufficient uranium re-
serves.  Increasing international restrictions on the supply of conventional arms to South 
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Africa supported the argument that the country had virtually no alternative but to develop 
its own nuclear deterrents to counter an external threat.105  In August 1977, the prepara-
tions of the Kalahari site for an underground test came to the notice of the super powers, 
by their surveillance satellites, and intense diplomatic pressure was brought to bear on the 
South African government.106  Upon direct instruction of the head of government, the 
site was abandoned in August 1977. 
During the 1970s and 1980s, South Africa had some serious doubts about the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty, but clearly the central reason for not accepting the treaty was to 
maintain the secrecy of a nuclear weapons programme.107 The ROC’s nuclear collabo-
ration with the RSA had its origins from the contact made between the Atomic Energy 
Council of the ROC and Atomic Energy Board of the RSA in November 1979.  The 
President of the AEB, J.W.L de Villiers visited Taiwan to evaluate the progress of the 
ROC in the nuclear field and the prospect of future nuclear energy co-operation, paving 
the way for further exchange of visits by high-ranking officials and nuclear scientists.   
During Premier Sun’s historical visit to South Africa in March 1980, arranged by the 
SA Government, Mr. Sun was accompanied by the Chairman of the Board of Directors of 
Taiwan Power, Chen Lan-kao Vice Economics Minister Wang Yi-ting; and the Minister 
of State K.T. Li to the uranium enrichment pilot plant at Pelindaba.  They were warmly 
received by A.J.A Roux, Chairman of UCOR, and briefed on the uranium enrichment 
process used by the UCOR pilot plant and the constraints of meeting SA’s needs and 
exports in the course of time.108  One of the achievements of this visit was that, a R400 
million contract for SA to supply the ROC with 4,000 tons of uranium oxide concentrates 
from 1984 to 1990 was signed on March 14, 1980 by the chairman of Taiwan Power 
company and the President Chamber of Mines and Chairman of the Nuclear Fuels Cor-
poration of SA (Nufcor).109  Besides, the Minister of State, K.T. Li and A.J.A Roux, 
Chairman of UCOR (SA) signed the “Memorandum on Possible Collaboration between 
the ROC and the RSA in the fields of Conversion and Enrichment of Uranium.”  This 
memorandum thus can be considered as the first working document that ushered in the 
new era of ROC-RSA nuclear co-operation. 
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In 1981, two important visits from the SA government heightened the close nuclear 
co-operation.  F.W. de Klerk, Minister of Mineral and Energy, in his first trip to Taiwan 
from January 5 to 10, 1981, visited the ROC’s two nuclear power plants and discussed 
matters of mutual interest with the Minister of Economic Affairs, K.S. Chang.  The bi-
lateral discussions were mainly focused on energy co-operation and the RSA’s export of 
minerals to the ROC.  As a result of the visit, the two governments not only agreed to 
strengthen nuclear energy collaboration, but also to explore and expand cooperation in 
the field of minerals and energy resources.  A.J.A Roux, Chairman of UCOR, paid a visit 
to Taipei from April 8 to 15, 1981.  He was well received by S.L. Chien, Chairman of the 
ROC Atomic Energy Council.  He was deeply impressed by the progress made by the 
ROC’s nuclear industry and its advanced manufacturing industry as well.110  Most of the 
joint venture in nuclear cooperation was largely due to his recommendation and propos-
als. 
The main concern for the ROC-RSA joint operations was economic in nature, rather 
than military.  In practice, the ROC-RSA nuclear relations also included the exchange of 
the latest nuclear technology, and equipment and to acquire the ROC’s financing, which 
would help the RSA’s nuclear enrichment production to expand. In terms of military 
co-operation, this kind of interaction between the two countries was conducted covertly, 
so as not to draw the attention of the West and the US. 
However, things changed radically.  On April 26, 1986, one of the nuclear reactors 
at Chernobyl in the Ukraine exploded, which drew world attention to the safely and se-
curity of the use of nuclear energy.  The government in Taiwan faced tremendous pres-
sure from the media, opposition and conservation groups.  In December 1987, Colonel 
Chang Hsien-yi, a CIA spy infiltrated the CIST, got hold of the confidential nuclear re-
search files and escaped to the US.  The secret of the ROC’s nuclear development pro-
gramme and the country’s nuclear links with the RSA were exposed.111  After 1988, 
American intervention led the ROC government to gradually disengage itself from nu-
clear co-operation with the RSA. 
One SAA plane flying from Taiwan to Johannesburg on November 28, 1987, ex-
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ploded near Mauritius killing all passengers and crew.  The media speculated that the 
reason for the explosion was that the airplane was loaded with nuclear material.  This 
was never confirmed or clarified by either the RSA or the ROC governments. Being a 
nuclear threat did not enhance South Africa’s international status and may have contrib-
uted to strengthening the perception of being a “rogue” state.  It is therefore not sur-
prising that within eight weeks of President P W Botha’s fall from power, F.W. de Klerk 
ordered the complete cancellation of the nuclear weapons programme.  In effect, De 
Klerk acknowledged that nuclear weapons were extremely expensive, unusable and an 
impediment to South Africa’s full participation in the international system.112  It also 
meant the termination of the two countries’ nuclear ties. 
Cultural Exchange and Cooperation 
As the inheritor of an historical tradition stretching back thousands of years, the ROC 
offered decent, traditional oriental cultural fare.  Cultural cooperation promotes mutual 
understanding and creates a friendly atmosphere between countries. But since the edu-
cational systems in the ROC and the RSA were different and there was no agreement to 
link the two sides, educational and cultural exchange was very limited before 1976.   
Most people in Taiwan knew about South Africa only through television and 
newspapers, which largely covered negative aspects such as sanctions, embargos, 
shooting, riots, the state of emergency and so forth.  However, most people did not know 
that South Africa was 33 times bigger than Taiwan with beautiful scenery, a good edu-
cation system, diverse cultures and an advanced infrastructure in modern cities.  For SA, 
the ROC was the only Asian country with which it had diplomatic relations.  Most 
people did not have a correct picture of Taiwan.  Some were even confused about Taiwan 
and Thailand.   
After the upgrading of diplomatic relations in 1976, the cultural and academic ex-
change started, and to some extent, was vitalised.  Vice Premier Ching-Chung Hsu, 
Deputy Foreign Minister H.K. Yang, and the Director of the Institute of International 
Relations of the ROC, W.P. Tsai, visited the RSA.113  There were numerous exchange 
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visits by education ministers, high-ranking educational officials, chancellors, 
vice-chancellors, professors, scholars and teachers.  During the 1970s and 1980s,  
Professor Daniel M Joubert, Principal of the University of Pretoria; Professor P.T. Pienaar, 
University of Durban-Westville; Dr. S J Baynham, University of Cape Town; and Pro-
fessor Deon Geldenhuys, Rand Afrikaans University were among a total of more than 
200 people who visited the ROC.  All these visits by top academics were very useful 
since they could present the real picture of Taiwan to the South African people, and 
through their eyes and pens, people would know more about the current situation in 
Taiwan’s politics, economics, social life, culture and customs.   
The South African Institute of International Affairs had closer contact with the In-
stitute of International Relations of the ROC, exchanging publications and visits.  The 
Director of the Africa Institute, Dr. G.M.E. Leistner, visited the ROC twice, not just 
giving speeches at the University, but also attending academic seminars. The Human 
Sciences Research Council’s Sino-South Africa Conference was held once a year in the 
mid-1980s, alternatively in Taipei and Pretoria.  In 1988, Dr. Chang King-yuh led a 
visiting group to attend this conference and meet top South African experts and aca-
demics versed in the same or similar fields.114  This visit contributed greatly to the future 
strengthening of the ties of friendship and co-operation, not only between the HSRC and 
IIR, but also between the two countries. Because Taiwan put much emphasis on educa-
tion, people respected academics and intellectual leaders.  Prominent South African 
scholars and professors that visited Taiwan could stimulate progress, and that was the 
reason the ROC government invited so many from various disciplines to Taiwan.  
At the same time, artists, actors, journalists, writers, performers, musicians, various 
kinds of performing groups were also encouraged by the two governments to engage in 
exchange visits, tours, competitions, and social association.  For example, the Roode-
poort International Eisteddfod of song and dance, a famous event, drew a Chinese 
Folklore Troupe in 1985, the only group from Asia to participate in this event.  The Na-
tional Contract Bridge League sent a national team to participate in the 1987 National 
Congress in SA.  The Youth String Orchestra from SA, Harmonia Juventia, visited 
Taiwan and had seven performances during the tour.  The ROC also invited young 
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people from SA to attend the International Youth Culture Recreation Tour to Taiwan.  It 
offered an opportunity for the youth of all anti-Communist parts of the world to get to-
gether, to exchange ideas, strengthen mutual understanding and promote friendship. 
Painter Christo Coetzee and the world-famous heart specialist, Dr. Christiaan Barnard, 
visited the ROC in the 1980s.  At government level, the ministers of education of the two 
countries also exchanged visits.  The Minister of National Education, F.W. de Klerk 
visited Taipei in October 1985, his second official.  Minister of Education Lee Huan 
visited SA in May 1987 and afterwards strongly proposed to establish the office of Cul-
tural Counsellor within the Chinese Embassy to deal with mutual cultural affairs.115 
In order to promote Taiwan’s image, the Office of the Press Counsellor provided 
various books, pamphlets, video tapes, magazines and periodicals to university libraries, 
government departments and institutions.  The Free China Review, Free China Journal 
and the Republic of China Yearbook were quite commonly available in public libraries.  
The embassy also sponsored a Chinese Film Festival in Johannesburg, Cape Town and 
other cities, which was part of the cultural exchange programmes being promoted be-
tween the two countries.  Every year before October 10, the National Day of the ROC, 
the embassy contacted The Star, The Citizen, Die Burger, Cape Times, Sunday Times, 
Business Day and Pretoria News to publish a supplement  about the National Day 
Celebrations of the ROC, to give readers a vivid update and correct impression of the 
ROC of the present. 
The Head of Bureau for Information D.W. Steward led a delegation that visited the 
ROC in June 1987.  Before that, an educational tour by 14 journalists from Taiwan came 
to SA for a 19-day working visit; the Embassy also invited journalists, editors and re-
porters from the news agencies and the media to promote mutual understanding.  After 
M A Johnson, editor-in-chief of The Citizen came back from Taiwan, he wrote: “The 
point is that we need not have been so badly off, even with our own peculiar problems, if 
we had the same dedication, the same common purpose, the same discipline and capacity 
for hard work of the Taiwanese, as well as the same will to succeed despite all odds.”116 
After 1976, the ROC’s Central New Agency stationed a special correspondent in Jo-
hannesburg to gather and report news on South Africa and sub-Saharan Africa for the 
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mass media in Taipei. 
In 1979, the Speaker of the House of Assembly J.J. Loots was invited to pay an of-
ficial visit to the ROC from November 6 to 18, 1979.  In return, the President of the 
ROC’s Legislative Yuan, Wend-ya Nieh, visited SA from June 10 to 19, 1981.  The 
mutual visits of the two speakers enabled the two Parliaments to have some under-
standing of the real situation of each country.  Many mayors and city councillors of local 
SA governments accepted the invitation to Taiwan in the 1980s.  Among them were P.R. 
Smith, Mayor of Pretoria; Danie van Zyl, Mayor of Johannesburg; D.E.W. Schumann, 
Mayor of Stellenbosch; G. J. Coetzer, Mayor of Queenstown; J.M. Pretorius, Mayor of 
Bloemfontein; Dirk Liebenberg, Mayor of Kimberley. In the 1980s, more than 10 cities, 
including Port Elizabeth, Pietermaritzburg, East London, Oudtshoorn and Mossel Bay, 
had established sisterhood ties with their counterparts in the ROC.  A sister-city rela-
tionship was formed between Pretoria and Taipei on October 8, 1983, in an effort to im-
prove relations between the cities and the countries involved.  Mayors of the two cities 
agreed to undertake visits to promote the activities of the other city and country and boost 
tourism as well as cultural and sports ties. 
To some extent, the sister-city relationships could promote educational and scientific 
exchange, accelerate the modernisation of the two cities, or even provide support in times 
of adversity or natural disasters.117 From the ROC, prominent visits included those of the 
Governor of Taiwan province, Lee Teng-hui in November 1982; the Speaker of Taipei 
City Council C.P. Chang at Johannesburg’s Centennial Celebration, August 30 to Sep-
tember 6, 1986; the Goodwill Mission from I-Lan County, Taiwan to the City of Cape 
Town from August 29 to September 1, 1987; and Deputy Speaker of Taipei City Coun-
cillor James C C Chen to Pretoria from February 18 to February 24, 1989.  Exchange 
visits between members of the two Parliaments were also quite frequent during the 1980s.   
Since the UN imposed sports boycotts on South Africa, sports lovers who wanted to 
participate in the international-national activities had to be either professional or junior 
players to observe the regulations of the International Olympic Committee.  With the 
mutual understanding of South Africa, the ROC’s sports exchanges with the RSA were 
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mainly conducted by university and college students, as well as professional and junior 
players.  In other words, the ROC refrained from engaging South African teams at the 
national level. Since real substance is more important than formalities, there were some 
exchanges of sports teams, including golf, baseball, basketball, cricket, netball, softball, 
and swimming.  After the South African police wrestling team paid a visit to Taiwan 
from April 21 to May 6, 1987, the Acting Commissioner, Lt.-General H.G. de Witt, said 
this visit had strengthened the friendship ties between the two countries.118 
While food nourishes the body, culture nourishes the soul.  At a time when two 
countries were jointly exerting themselves to promote co-operation in the economic, 
scientific and technical fields, similar efforts were also made to promote cultural, edu-
cational, academic and press co-operation.  On June 19, 1989, Minister of National 
Education F W de Klerk and Minister of Education Mao Kao-wen signed a cultural 
agreement to promote artistic, scientific, sporting and educational links between the two 
countries.119  In order to facilitate bilateral educational and cultural co-operation, the 
ROC government established the Office of the Cultural Counsellor in Pretoria in July 
1990, the only one on the African continent.  In the same year, Mandarin Chinese was 
offered by the Centre for Contemporary Asian studies as a UNISA distance-teaching 
course. 
Because of ambassador H K Yang’s unfailing efforts to strengthen every existing tie 
between the ROC and the RSA from 1979 to 1989, and his service as Doyenne of the 
diplomatic corps in Pretoria for many years, the University of Pretoria conferred on him 
an Honorary Doctorate on July 17, 1989.  He also received the honorary citizenship of 
Pretoria at a special meeting of the Pretoria City Council and a civic banquet120 in rec-
ognition of his contribution and achievement.   
South African Chinese 
It would appear that some of the first Chinese to enter SA in the early years of the nine-
teenth century came at a time when there was a shortage of skilled carpenters. Subsequent 
arrivals from China were mainly skilled artisans and merchants from Canton and Moi 
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Yean.  The Chinese community in the 1980s in SA appears to have developed from the 
sporadic immigration that began in 1891, of Chinese traders who made their way from 
Canton to SA via Madagascar and Mauritius.121  In South Africa, the prevailing racism 
was worsened by apartheid legislation, to the extent that Chinese South Africans were 
discriminated against by legislation such as the Group Areas Act of 1950, the Population 
Registration Act of 1950, the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act of 1953 and the 
Extension of University Education Act of 1959.122  According to the law of SA in the 
1950s, South Africans were classified into White, Asian, Coloured and Black, and Chi-
nese and Indians belonged to the Asians.  From 1950s, South African Chinese were 
confronted with many problems in living, studying, working, sports and recreation.  The 
Chinese, like other non-Whites, suffered political, social and economic discrimination. 
Not only could they not live in certain areas and could not attend certain schools, but also 
could not hold certain jobs or own property.  The main work of the Chinese Consulate in 
Johannesburg was to deal with and resolve different kinds of issues related to these as-
pects on a daily basis. 
A careful and comprehensive survey of the Chinese community revealed an esti-
mated 8,500 Chinese in SA, possibly one of the smallest minorities of all.  There was 
only one Chinese Group Area in SA, in Port Elizabeth.  The Chinese were too few, their 
numbers so insignificant, that they posed no threat to any group in SA. Apart from 
boosting trade, both Prime Ministers’ visits also gave rise to press speculation that the 
position of the South African Chinese would be reviewed.  Prime Minister Botha said 
the government was “already working on a better deal for the local Chinese.” Constitu-
tional commission chairman, Alwyn Schlebusch, said he would investigate the question 
of their political rights.123 
During Foreign Minister Chu’s visit on June 3, 1981, he said that while the existence 
in SA of a Chinese community of some 10 thousand people whose contribution to the 
growth and development of the nation should not be overemphasized, the many simi-
larities in terms of family tradition, outlook and sense of values should not be over-
looked.124  Through the friendly attitude of the SA government of the time towards the 
Chinese and the endeavours of the Chinese Embassy Consulate-General in Johannesburg, 
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Mr. Kenneth Winchiu, a South African Chinese, was nominated as a member of Presi-
dent’s Council, which had been established in September 1981 but lasted only until 
September 1984.125  The fact that Mr. Winchiu was taken into the President’s Council 
brought cautious optimism in the community that their constitutional position – the same 
as the Asian and Coloureds – would be normalised.126 
After the Group Areas Act was amended allowing South African Chinese the same 
rights as Whites in early 1985, the Chinese finally could no longer be treated as second 
class citizens.  Since then the Chinese have had equal rights in living, studying, working 
and even in using public facilities as Whites.   
The steady influx of Taiwanese industrialists into SA in the 1980s was one of the 
significant effects of the warm relationship between the two countries.  South Africa’s 
long-standing prohibition on non-White immigration had to be waived to accommodate 
them. Investors from Taiwan were initially permitted entry only on temporary permits.  
By 1988, it was estimated that nearly 2,500 immigrants from Taiwan had arrived.  They 
settled in remote parts of SA, in the TVBS states, Lebowa, GazanKulu, KwaZulu and 
QwaQwa, with several establishing themselves in Newcastle.127  Mr. Chung-nan Aou 
who established the first of several factories in 1977 in the Ciskei and Trankei, donated 
money and clothing worth R32,400 to the Flood Relief Fund in Ciskei on March 18, 1988.  
The donation was received by the South African Ambassador to Ciskei, Mr. Christiaan 
van Aardt, who thanked the Chinese community for its kindness and consideration at a 
moment of great need for the victims of the flood.128 
One of the main tasks of the ROC Embassy was to assist the Chinese schools and 
develop Chinese education.  There were three main Chinese schools in South Africa:  
Port Elizabeth Chinese School, established in 1918; Pretoria Chinese School, founded in 
1934; and the Kou Ting Chinese School in Johannesburg, opened in 1950.129  All these 
schools have played an important role in the Chinese community by helping residents 
maintain their language and culture. The famous Overseas Chinese Gazette has been 
published since 1931; it has one of the longest histories of all Chinese newspapers all 
over the world.  It was the spiritual food for all the Chinese in Southern Africa and 
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through this newspaper most Chinese stayed in touch with Chinese culture, current affairs 
in Taiwan and the progress of the ROC. Another thing to note was the Johannesburg 
Chinese Cultural Centre, constructed in 1982 to provide a space for the use of the Chi-
nese community.  More than two thousand people attended the opening ceremony.  The 
Cultural Centre was an ideal venue for the Chinese community to hold their various 
functions. 
Conclusion 
China established a consular office in Johannesburg in 1905. It wasn’t until 1976 that the 
ROC and South Africa upgraded to full diplomatic relations, a necessary move since the 
both countries both faced international isolation and wished to enhance cooperation. 
Since the upgrade to diplomatic relations, many mutual visits and investments from the 
ROC strengthened trade as well as scientific and technological ties and concluded 
agreements in various fields.  Even in the 1980s, South Africa was unstable and carried 
out many changes in political affairs.  Co-operation, official or otherwise, was extended 
to almost all fields and began to yield results beneficial to all concerned.   
South Africa was the ROC’s biggest diplomatic ally in terms of size and population. 
From 1976 to 1990, mutual visits of political figures, economic cooperation and cultural 
exchanges deepened the cordial relations. Taiwan encouraged immigration to South Af-
rica in the second half of the 1980s, and both sides had agreements on direct air flights. 
Both countries were proud of the ties of friendship and co-operation and had the intention 
to further strengthen them. At the end of 1980s, the relations between the RSA and the 
ROC were at their best.   
Without a doubt, the State President P.W. Botha and Foreign Minister Pik Botha 
played important roles in promoting cordial relations.  Ambassador Yang, who was the 
key figure in cementing the friendly ties for 10 years, humbly said he is very happy to 
witness that South African Chinese could have equal rights as Whites.  The Ambassador 
admitted that this was his only accomplishment to look after the vital interests of the 
Chinese Community.  Owing to Ambassador Yang’s commitment, the SA Government 
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decorated him with the Order of Good Hope, the greatest honour that SA can bestow upon 
a foreign citizen, for his endeavours and contribution. Since the US switched their rec-
ognition to the PRC in 1979, the RSA was one of the top four diplomatic allies among its 
29 friendly countries.  The RSA was the ROC’s most important partner in Africa, and the 
ROC intended to maintain these relations.  
The Tianamen Square incident in 1989 led to the ROC’s establishment of full dip-
lomatic relations with Liberia in October that year. Soon afterward, in April 1990 and 
May 1990, Lesotho and Guiena-Bissau signed agreements on the resumption of full 
diplomatic relations status with the ROC. Hence, the number of allies the ROC had in 
Africa doubled from three to six. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia cut its diplomatic ties 
with the ROC in July 1990. 
After 40 years of this diplomatic tug of war, the ROC adopted a resolution in that 
those nations seeking diplomatic ties with the ROC would not have to sever their dip-
lomatic ties with the PRC. In other words, the ROC would accept “dual recognition” in 
an effort to win more diplomatic allies. This was a great pragmatic and significant step. 
In February 1990, Mandela was released from jail. In the second half of that year, the 
cabinet of South Africa discussed its relations with the ROC twice, but no decision was 
reached. Moreover, gill net use, seal hunting and the frostbite event damaged the cordial 
relations between the ROC and South Africa, dragging the ROC’s expectations down to 
an all-time low. The ROC dispatched Mr. I-cheng Loh to South Africa to assume the 
post of ambassador on October 19, 1990. That very same day, Mr. Neil van Heerden, 
Director General of the MFA, visited Beijing to enter talks with China’s foreign monis-
ter Mr. Qian Qichen. 
As South Africa was the ROC’s most important diplomatic ally in Africa, its 
pro-China move was a blow to the confidence of the ROC’s allies. In short, China’s de-
sire to clean up its negative image and China’s sending its foreign minister to visit Af-
rica, presented big challenges to the ROC. Making matters worse, certain unpleasant in-
cidents occurred in South Africa, thereby damaging the ROC’s images. As a result, the 
friendly relations between the two nations became full of uncertainty. 
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Even though the ROC obtained a few new allies and announced its willingness to 
accept dual recognition, the ROC faced constant challenges. Despite the PRC’s efforts 
to maintain its allies in Africa, the ROC did manage to win some new friends in Africa. 
Subsequently, the two sides started paying closer attention to the continent. For the 
ROC, 1990 was a crucial year full of challenges, a year of full of doubt. It also marked a 
turning point in the ROC’s Africa policy.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN  
The ROC-RSA Relations After 1991  
( 1991-2004 ) 
Challenge from the PRC 
At the end of the 1980s, the world situation changed significantly including improved 
relations between the USA and Russia as well as the independence of countries of  
Eastern Europe, Cuban troops’ withdrawal from Angola, and SWA was about to become  
an independent country, Namibia.  President de Klerk inherited an environment similar 
to that of his predecessor 11 years earlier.  Recognising that South Africa’s international 
position could not be improved without internal political accommodation, de Klerk set 
about to achieve necessary changes. Avoiding the frequent displays of hubris and the 
need to placate the conservative elements in his white constituency that characterised his 
predecessor’s term of office, the new president embarked on the most radical period of 
political reform yet seen in SA.1  His actions were followed by the dramatic unbanning 
of the liberation movements, the release ultimately of all political prisoners and, most 
importantly, the freeing of Nelson Mandela from Verster prison on February 11, 1990. 
Mainland China’s image was seriously damaged by the Tianamen Square incident of 
June 4, 1989.  The collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and reactions to the in-
cident made Beijing eager to reconstruct its tie with the Third World.  It paid special 
attention to Africa, which it considered to be an important force on the international 
stage,2  believing that the countries and people of the Third World regarded Beijing as a 
reliable friend and were genuinely sympathetic to Mainland China. 
In 1990, the PRC established diplomatic relations with Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and 
Singapore. With a changed atmosphere in SA, more countries desired to befriend SA, 
including the PRC.  It was obvious that the cordial relations between the ROC and the 
RSA faced a new era with many challenges. Because of the tremendous business poten-
tial, people in South Africa did have the expectation to have contact with the PRC to do 
business, export goods and make investments.  This put pressure on the SA government 
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while the Department of Foreign Affairs was also aware of the PRC’s military power and 
that it was one of five members of the UN Security Council whose influence could not be 
ignored. 
Facing the new situation, the ROC immediately took two important steps.  First, on 
February 13, 1990, because the ANC was a legal political party in SA, the MOFA of the 
ROC made a statement that the new political situation would promote stability in 
Southern Africa and that the Chinese Government hoped that all groups could solve their 
domestic disputes in a peaceful, rational way through negotiation.3  This was a hint of 
goodwill to the ANC, since the ROC had no contact with the ANC before 1990.  Sec-
ondly, the ROC dispatched Ambassador I-cheng Loh to replace Ambassador Steven 
Wang, who had been in SA for only one year. 
Before the Ambassador assumed his post, he testified in the Legislative Yuan (Par-
liament) that the future diplomatic relations between the two countries would be decided 
by (1) The interaction between the SA government and the ANC, and (2) the ROC’s ef-
forts to maintain ties.  With regard to the first, the SA government started the Constitu-
tional negotiation with the ANC in January 1991 but it would be three years before both 
the term of the white parliament and De Klerk’s term of office would end.  The new 
situation at that time would be a key point.  Ambassador Loh, with 30 years of foreign 
service overseas, expressed very confidently that diplomatic ties would not change be-
fore 1994. 
With reference to the second point, the ambassador suggested that  
y The ROC should contact the ANC at once to establish friendly interaction, since the 
ANC would play an important role in SA.   
y Invite political figures from government and party and leaders in different fields, to 
promote mutual understanding. 
y Keep close contacts with the media, provide positive information, and encourage the 
media to take a fair position towards the ROC.   
y Increase investments: the volume was less than US$1.5 billion.  The ROC would 
have to expand investments, especially in the field of trade and investment. 
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y All ministries in the Government of the ROC should co-operate and get things done.4 
Ambassador Loh arrived in SA on November 19, 1990, to assume his post as the 
fourth ROC Ambassador.  It was the same day that the Director General, N P Van 
Heerden; DDG, J H A Beukes and Chief Director, D W Auret of the Department of For-
eign Affairs were visiting in the PRC.  Neil van Heerden, the Director General, was in 
favor of establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC in accordance with the world 
mainstream.  Mr. Van Heerden had discussions with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
the PRC with no concrete result; he then flew to Taiwan via Tokyo to have discussions 
with Foreign Minister Qian.  The first secret telefax from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of the ROC to the Ambassador was the exchange of views between Van Heerden and 
Foreign Minister Qian.5 At that time, SA had only 27 diplomatic allies.  This excluded 
the four TVBS state embassies. Actually there were only 23 diplomatic allies, and the 
ROC was the only country from Asia. 
There were several events that damaged ROC-RSA relations: resolution of the 
frostbite incident and the seal culling incident was a top priority.  The “unfortunate” in-
cident led to much embarrassment for the ROC, and the government had decided on 
compensation scales considerably higher that those of the South African Workman’s 
Compensation Act.  Taiwan paid out more than R1.3 million in compensation to 32 
South African seamen whose fingers had to be amputated after they got frostbite while 
working on Chinese fishing trawlers in 1989 and 1990.6 The frostbite incident caused a 
lot of damage both to the Chinese fishing industry and South Africa.  Furthermore, be-
cause of the incident a large number of Chinese boats no longer docked at South African 
ports and those that did, no longer hired local fishermen.7   
The seal-culling incident also resulted in considerable pressure on the ROC and 
aroused fear that it could discourage Chinese businessmen from investing in SA. Mr. Loh 
said that the businessman involved had made a large investment in SA to set up the 
seal-processing factory in the Cape and that he was now “left holding the bag” after the 
protests by environmentalists.  “He broke no laws in either SA or the ROC and there is 
no legal way we can stop him from continuing his venture.  We are, however, putting 
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moral pressure on him to stop it, but there is still the question of compensation,” he said.8 
After dealing with these unpleasant incidents, FM Chien paid a visit to SA in Janu-
ary 1991. During this visit, he and Finance Minister Barend du Plessis signed a Loan 
Agreement worth US$60 million to the Industrial Development Corporation, for im-
porting Taiwanese machinery to South Africa.  On February 20, 1991, Taiwan’s national 
airlines, China Airlines (CAL) announced that it was to open air links with South Africa.  
The CAL flights would commence on September 1 and would service the 
Taipei-Johannesburg route via Singapore.9 
The South African Ambassador told FM Chien: South Africa wants to develop trade 
and tourism relations with the PRC, but not to develop political relations.10  At the 
celebration of the National Day of the RSA on May 31, 1991, Ambassador Harvey said: 
“During the past 15 years relations between our two countries have grown from strength 
to strength, and it would not be an exaggeration to say that there are hardly any fields of 
human endeavour in which we do not maintain contact, to the great and on-going benefit 
of all our peoples.”11 
At the invitation of SA Government, a visiting professor from the Rand Afrikaans 
University, Dr. John K.J. Chao, gave a lecture on June 20, 1991, with the title “ROC’s 
Foreign Policy and Recognition Problem.”  He summarized the current ROC-RSA 
commercial relations as follows: 
y The ROC-RSA Ministerial Conference on Economic and Technical Co-operation has 
been held each year since 1979.   
y The ROC is not only the thirteenth largest trading nation of the world but also the sixth 
biggest trading partner with the RSA after Germany, Britain, the USA, Japan and Italy.  
Two-way trade volume between ROC and RSA in 1990 totalled some R5.4 billion 
while SA exports are triple the amount of ROC imports. 
y The ROC had deposited US$0.5 billion in the South African Reserve Bank and US$60 
million in the form of a long-term low interest loan to SA. 
y There were 250 factories from Taiwan, which employed more than 40,000 workers in 
SA.  Many large-scale private enterprises and investors were waiting for a closer 
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co-operation between the RSA and the ROC. 
y The Bank of Taiwan would soon set up a branch in Johannesburg . 
y The ROC was in the process of establishing a Fruit and Vegetable Centre, which would 
introduce advanced agricultural techniques to SA. 
y China Airline of the ROC would fly to Johannesburg via Singapore once a week from  
September 1, 1991.12 
As for ROC-RSA Political Relations: 
y The ROC and SA had more than 22 agreements encompassing trade, industry, fishery, 
navigation, agricultural and technical co-operation, mineral and energy co-operation, 
medical co-operation and some other areas. 
y The reason for the major industrial states to recognise the Beijing regime was either to 
protect their existing interests in mainland China or to take into consideration global 
strategy. 
y Newly-independent countries recognised the Beijing regime partly because of their 
application for membership to the United Nations, which needed the PRC’s affirma-
tive vote.  However, the RSA revived its membership in the UN on the approval of the 
General Assembly and did not need the PRC’s support in the Security Council. 
y If SA established diplomatic relations with the PRC, it would undoubtedly encourage 
the Maoist faction of the ANC, which was headed by Harry Gwala, who aggressively 
championed the nationalisation of white farmlands without compensation, to continue 
its military struggle to gain power by the barrels of guns. 
y Both State President F.W. de Klerk and Foreign Minister Pik Botha repeatedly prom-
ised that SA was the ROC’s all-weather friend, not just a fair-weather friend since 
ROC had stood firm with SA during its difficult time.  If SA severed its formal rela-
tions with the ROC, it would be extremely difficult for the ROC to maintain substan-
tive relations with the RSA.13 
The ROC observed that the RSA was more welcome in the international community, 
not a good sign for the maintenance of relations.  The PRC would definitely get involved 
in gaining South Africa’s friendship. In 1991, the RSA abolished the Group Areas Act, 
Land Act and Population Registration Act, which meant that apartheid had totally died.  
This was one of two obstacles in the way for the PRC to establish formal relations with 
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the RSA.  Since this one was solved, only the second one-- the Taiwan Issue--needed to 
be discussed. In July 1991, The Forty-Eighth National Congress of the ANC was held in 
Durban.  One high-ranking official of the Chinese delegation from Beijing congratulated 
the ANC on behalf of the 50 million Chinese Communist party members.  The number 
50 million is more than the population of SA and greatly impressed participants and au-
dience.14 Two months later, the China News Agency opened a branch office in Johan-
nesburg.  Furthermore, unconfirmed news sources reported that the PRC had imported 
G-5, cannon artillery from the RSA.  All these were warning signals that proved the 
relations between the RSA and the PRC were getting closer and closer. 
The most important step for the ROC was to invite State President F W de Klerk to 
pay a state visit to Taipei to symbolise the cordial relations existing between the two 
countries.  De Klerk accepted the invitation and instructed Foreign Minister Botha to 
visit Taipei in October 1991. Foreign Minister Botha arrived in Taipei on October 4 and 
departed on October 6, 1991. On his way back to SA, he stopped at Hong Kong and flew 
to Beijing with P.J. Botha, South African Consul General in Hong Kong, to meet the 
PRC’s Foreign Minister, Chien Chi-Shen at the airport for two hours.  After that, Botha 
flew to Johannesburg via Hong Kong again.  The Star reported the news next day that 
Foreign Minister Botha had paid a visit to Beijing, which was a diplomatic breakthrough.  
In writing a letter to Chien, Botha expressed that this meeting was an historic contact 
between the RSA and PRC governments.15 
State President de Klerk visited the ROC from November 14 to 16, 1991.  During 
this period, de Klerk said SA would strive to follow the ROC’s good example of hard 
work, economic achievement and stability.  SA was looking forward to further decades 
of mutual co-operation and friendship.16  He said at a news conference “South Africa has 
full diplomatic relations with Taiwan and so long as I have any influence in the decision 
taking process, this will remain the position.”17 In the joint communiqué, the two gov-
ernments agreed to establish projects to promote agricultural and technical co-operation 
for the benefit of the Southern African region as a whole.  It was further agreed that other 
feasible programmes would be explored and undertaken jointly by the two Governments 
in the near future.  The two Presidents were convinced that the signing of the Agreement 
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of Cooperation on the Promotion of Investment and the Bilateral Air Services Agreement 
would further cement the ties of cooperation between the two countries.18 
In diplomatic practice the fact that Foreign Minister Botha went to the PRC was a 
strong implication that there were interactions between them, especially about improving 
relations.  For this reason, Ambassador Loh paid a visit to ANC headquarters at Shell 
House, Johannesburg on November 22, 1991, to meet Mandela, Alfred Nzo and Thabo 
Mbeki.  On December 19, 1991, the RSA and the PRC announced that both States were 
represented by “interest offices” in Beijing and Pretoria respectively.  Without a doubt, 
when Foreign Minister Botha went to Beijing in October, they had already reached this 
consensus.  One month later, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen landed at Johan-
nesburg international Airport to meet Foreign Minister Botha, and once again stressed 
that the conditions for having diplomatic ties with the PRC were that the RSA’s diplo-
matic ties with the ROC should first be broken. 
The two meetings between Foreign Minister Botha and Chien at airports were sig-
nificant in the evolution of RSA-PRC relations.  Before establishing official ties, airport 
diplomacy may be used as an effective channel for negotiation and exchange between two 
governments.19  On February 1, 1992, the South African Research Centre was opened in 
Pretoria as a liaison office, but actually it was a semi-official institution which issued 
visas for South Africans wanting to visit the PRC.  The same day, the South African 
ambassador to the ROC, Alan Harvey was summoned by the Deputy Minister of Foreign 
Affairs.  Mr. Fang Chin-Jen, to express the ROC’s disapproval of the contact between 
Foreign Minister Pik Botha and Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen.20 
After 1990, trade and other relations between SA and the PRC improved signifi-
cantly.  For SA, the PRC, with a population of 1.2 billion people and a rapidly growing 
economy, offered vast trade opportunities.  Nor was the PRC without political clout; 
since 1971, the PRC had been one of the five permanent members of the Security 
Council.21  Besides, there were 39 Chinese embassies on the African continent, so the 
PRC’s influence therefore had to be taken seriously. From December 1991 to May 1992, 
the whole country was busy with the Convention for a Democratic South Africa 
  236
(CODESA).  If there were positive and satisfactory results from CODESA, the RSA 
would definitely not be isolated any longer and more countries would welcome SA to the 
international community.  At that time, domestic affairs in SA were far more urgent than 
foreign affairs.  Even in foreign policy, South Africa put Southern Africa countries first, 
whether friends or enemies.  After that came Western European Countries and finally the 
US.  The China issue was never a priority in the Department of Foreign Affair’s agenda.  
For the ROC, the RSA was its top diplomatic ally.  They helped each other during the 
difficult years and Taiwan’s investment and creation of more than 40,000 jobs in SA gave 
the ROC the right to expect fair treatment.   
It was evident, under such circumstances, that the PRC tried to take this opportunity 
to establish relations with the RSA, urging the country to sever ties with the ROC first.  
The RSA also wanted to improve its relations with the PRC, encouraging its private 
sector to establish commercial links with China,22 but also hoping to keep Taiwan’s in-
vestment and other interests.  Hence, in moral value and in substantive profit, SA would 
hesitate to take the radical decision.  The SA promised the ROC that since the RSA-PRC 
relations were booming, SA would inform the ROC about actions toward the PRC and 
hoped that her actions would be beneficial to both the RSA and the ROC as well. 
In a meeting between South African Chinese Community leaders on February 19, 
1991 in Cape Town, Foreign Minister Botha talked to more than 50 people and confirmed 
that the relations between the RSA and the PRC was restricted only to economic and 
business purposes. In diplomatic status, SA would never betray her good friend, the 
ROC.23  This statement was very clear and precise, leaving no space for ambiguity or 
vagueness. In order to prove Taiwan’s support, the Bank of Taiwan opened its branch 
office in Johannesburg in May, 1992 to facilitate Taiwan’s investment in the RSA. 
Foreign Minister Botha outlined the foreign policy in August 1992: “The Depart-
ment of Foreign Affairs will continue to bring forth innovative and creative ideas for new 
diplomatic initiatives, regional co-operation, economic opportunities and other efforts to 
improve the welfare of our people.”24 This implied that facing the new world situation, 
SA had to adjust foreign policy to gain the most national interest. There was no doubt 
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after February 1990, when both the ROC and the PRC sought to come closer to the ANC, 
especially its leading figure, Mr. Nelson Mandela.  In October 1992, two years after 
Mandela was freed from 27 years of incarceration, he visited Beijing at the invitation of 
the PRC.  On October 31, 1992, Finance Minister Derek Keys left for Taiwan in a bid to 
take advantage of the country’s $303 billion capital expansion projects and Direc-
tor-General of the Department of Trade and Industry Stef Naudé accompanied the dele-
gation.25 
In brief, in the early 1990s, the world situation had changed very rapidly.  Inside SA, 
ANC was a legal political party, a fact which caused SA to win friends from all over the 
world.  Even in the UN, the South African Mission was more socially acceptable to other 
delegations.  The UN was increasingly acting as a forum for governments that wanted to 
establish ties with Pretoria.26  The PRC also showed a willingness to formalise relations 
with the RSA, with some conditions.  The ROC immediately sent ambassador Loh to SA 
to strengthen the diplomatic ties, not only in arranging for State President F.W. de Klerk 
to visit the country in November 1991, but also to inaugurate the direct flight from Taipei 
to Johannesburg.  Foreign Minister Botha and Foreign Minister Qian met twice at Bei-
jing and Johannesburg airports.  The so-called “airport diplomacy” means taking an 
important step in historical contact.  The RSA government dealt with the ROC and at the 
same time contacted the PRC with economic purposes in mind.  For diplomatic reasons, 
the ROC tried its best to win the friendship of the ANC – the soon-to-be ruling party of 
South Africa. 
Contact and Co-ooperation with the ANC 
From 1993 to the end of 1994, there was turmoil and a period of major political change in 
SA.  Mr. Chris Hani, member of the ANC National Executive Committee, was murdered 
in April 1993.27  Two months later, different political parties agreed that the first De-
mocratic Election should be held on April 27, 1994.  The most special development in 
1993 was that Mr. Mandela paid a visit to the ROC from July 30 to August 27, 1993, 
despite objections from Beijing.  Earlier before this significant visit, the ANC sent 
Thabo Mbeki and Joe Modisie to Beijing to explain why Mandela accepted this invitation 
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and tried to gain the PRC’s understanding.   
Mandela led a 10-member delegation that arrived in Taiwan on July 30, 1993.  This 
was the tenth visiting group from ANC.  For Mandela the purpose of this visit was to 
understand current relations between the RSA and the ROC and to seek financial support 
for the MK (Umkhonto we Sizwe).  However, this visit also sparked fears among local 
legislators and the public that the ANC might sever official ties with the ROC once it 
headed the government.  Mandela noted that South Africa’s foreign policy would be 
bound by the decisions of the UN and international organisations, and said that a decision 
would be made on the matter after the April 1994 election.28  Mandela was received by 
President Lee Teng-hui and was awarded the Brilliant Star with Grand Cordon and an 
Honorary Doctorate of Law by Soo-Chow University in Taipei.  Mandela’s ANC dele-
gation had asked the ROC Government for financial support.  At the end of the visit, 
Mandela said the New SA would carefully examine its foreign relations but would base 
its decisions on national interests.  To some extent, Mandela’s attitude had softened after 
this successful visit. 
On September 7, 1993, Parliament passed the four bills to establish the Transitional 
Executive Council and the various commissions that would oversee the election sched-
uled for April 1994.  The MOFA of the ROC expressed its positive response and support 
for this constitutional development.29 Owing to the ROC embassy’s efforts, Mr. Walter 
Sisulu paid a visit to the ROC to attend the National Day Celebrations from October 7 to 
14, 1993.  Addressing a luncheon honouring Mr. Sisulu, Premier Lien Chan said “Be-
cause our hearts are with you, we committed ourselves to a specific amount of devel-
opment loans at government level once the new South Africa is born.  We also promised 
to establish a vocational training center, comparable in scale to the one you visited, and to 
help train the staff to operate it professionally.  When Mr. Mandela brought up the sub-
ject of those members of Umkhonto We Sizwe who have returned from exile and who are 
now facing extremely difficult conditions at home, we immediately dispatched emer-
gency aid, while agreeing to include assistance on a long-range basis as a part of the 
development loan projects.” 30 In fact, the ROC’s policy towards South Africa at that 
time involved providing loans and encouraging investment.   
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South African Ambassador Johan Viljoen said 1993 was a fruitful year for both 
countries, with total trade projected to grow by 10 per cent that year.  South Africa en-
joyed a trade surplus of US$500 million.31  He said there were numerous investment 
opportunities that SA could offer Taiwan, such as the commercial and residential complex 
being developed in Bronkhorstspruit, where the biggest Buddhist temple in the world 
outside of China was being built.  The project had attracted over US$300 million in in-
vestments.  The uncertainty and unpredictability of South Africa’s political future as 
well as the recurring violence seriously hampered Taiwanese investment confidence.   
As for the PRC’s approach to SA, there were three ways to damage the friendly re-
lations between the ROC and the RSA: sending high-ranking officials to SA; forging 
close economic links; and dividing the Chinese community in SA.32  The former Chinese 
ambassador to the US, former foreign minister, Han Xu paid a visit to South Africa in 
1993.  The PRC imported 12,500 Jetta VW cars from SA in 1992 and 17,000 cars from 
SA in 1993.  The two way trade between the PRC and SA was R1.6 billion in 1993.  The 
PRC even incited contradiction and confrontation among members of the Chinese 
community.  In February 1994, the Chinese Communist Vice Foreign Minister, Tian 
Zengpei, visited South Africa.  He wanted the ANC to sign a document committing itself 
to breaking relations with the ROC, but the ANC declined.33 
In order to support the first democratic election in SA, the ROC embassy in Pretoria 
co-operated with the local Chinese community in organising two fund-raising dinners for 
the ANC and NP respectively.  Mr. Nelson Mandela, Jay Naidoo and Gill Marcus at-
tended the ANC voters’ education fund-raising dinner on March 9, 1994, in Braamfontein 
Recreation Centre, Johannesburg.  More than 700 guests attended this gala and raised 
R580,000.  Mr. Pik Botha, on behalf of the NP, participated in a similar fund-raising 
dinner on March 31, 1994 and collected R100,000.34 The next day, six election obser-
vation group members from Taiwan arrived in SA and the ROC announced that President 
Lee Teng-hui accepted the invitation to attend the new President’s inaugural ceremony to 
be held in May 10 in Pretoria. 
The first non-racial general election on a one-man, one-vote basis was held 
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throughout South Africa on April 27, 1994.  As predicted, the ANC won 62.65% of the 
popular vote and gained for itself 252 seats in the National Assembly.  The National 
party scored 20% with 82 seats, the Inkatha Freedom Party 10.5% with 43 seats, the 
Freedom Front 2.17% with 9 seats, the Democratic Party 1.73% with 7 seats and the Pan 
African Congress 1.25% with 5 seats.35  The ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs praised 
this free, fair and peaceful election and congratulated the leader of ANC, Mr. Nelson 
Mandela. According to the interim Constitution, Mandela would be the President; Thabo 
Mbeki, the First Deputy President; and F W de Klerk, the Second Deputy President.  In 
the Cabinet, there were 18 ANC Ministers, 6 NP Ministers and 3 IFP Ministers.  This 
formed the Government of National Unity, since all ANC Ministers were the majority and 
held the important posts; hence all important decisions and policies were under ANC 
control.   
President Lee Teng-hui led a large delegation to SA to attend the inauguration of 
President Mandela from May 9 to May 15, 1994.  In the afternoon of May 11, the two 
presidents had a fruitful and constructive private talk for 50 minutes.  President Lee told 
a group of ROC investors, “I met and have talked with President Mandela.  I am willing 
to solemnly declare that relations between the ROC and SA are very solid.  You can keep 
your minds on doing business here.”36  Since after the election, ANC ran short of money, 
at the suggestion of Ambassador Loh, the ROC government approved the provision of 
US$10 million to the ANC. Ambassador Loh reported this to President Mandela on June 
20, 1994.37 
In the New South Africa, Mr. Alfred Nzo succeeded Mr. Pik Botha as Foreign 
Minister, and the country’s foreign relations underwent a dramatic change.  In starting a 
new era, South Africa was no longer isolated, changing from being destitute to popular, 
and South Africa wanted to play an active role in regional, continental and even interna-
tional affairs.  Nzo emphasised that in the age of rapid global communication, SA should 
expand its role and integration to become a global village.  Furthermore, SA would es-
tablish and normalise her relations with the rest of the world.  On May 23, 1994, SA was 
officially admitted as a full member of the OAU; on May 31, SA joined the Common-
wealth.38  The restoration of South Africa’s seat in the UN General Assembly was the 
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climax, not only ending its isolation of many decades but also developing a partnership 
with the whole world.   
A leading article pointed out the new situation regarding foreign policy, stating that 
“the adjustment to a world of open doors would not be easy, but the guidelines were clear: 
identify our interests and pursue them.  If we are to become strong enough to play the 
role we are capable of, we must have economic growth – and that depends heavily on 
trade.”39 To run a country with different groups of people and different political parties at 
a time when the new government structure had not been established, the SA government’s 
first priority was to assist national reconciliation and develop economically, especially 
the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP).  The government appointed 
Jay Naidoo as Minister of the Department of RDP.   
After the visit to SA, President Lee instructed the Executive Yuan to organise a 
mission to promote trade, investment and technical co-operation with the new SA.  
Headed by Vincent Sien, Minister of State and Chairman of the Council for Economic 
Planning and Development, the mission consisted of 48 government officials and busi-
ness leaders from both the public and private sectors and was accompanied by 18 jour-
nalists.  It arrived in SA on August 29, 1994, for a nine-day visit.  During its stay, the 
Mission was divided into eight groups that visited and discussed numerous co-operation 
projects with their counterparts.  SA was very impressed with this Mission’s visit. 
In fact, since the new Government was formed on April 27, 1994, there had been 
much speculation that the RSA would soon recognise the PRC and that the PRC was al-
ready looking for an embassy.  On May 23, 1994, the Minister of Housing, Joe Slovo, 
also the leader of the SA Communist Party, proposed that the RSA should establish dip-
lomatic relations with the PRC and cut diplomatic ties with the ROC.  Other parties in 
the GNU did not support this proposal.  The most important step was to provide sound 
economics, trade, job opportunities, education, housing, water and electricity, health 
services and for other domestic issues.  For the New South Africa to solve its domestic 
problems was a concern 10 times more urgent than foreign affairs.  That was the main 
reason the GNU did not want to deal with the China issue at that time. 
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The Deputy Foreign Minister told The Star: our viewpoint has been that the decision 
must be taken on the basis of national interest and international precedent.40  Subse-
quently, in October 1994, President Mandela contended that South Africa “doesn’t break 
relations with countries unless a country does something wrong which causes us to break 
relations.  We are prepared to enter into diplomatic relations with China but we are not 
going to break our relations with Taiwan.” 41  Of course, this was the final deci-
sion-maker’s position about the China issue so that no one could challenge it.  Both the 
ROC and the PRC had mixed feelings about this statement.  The “two Chinas” dilemma, 
as it came to be called in SA, was the first substantive foreign policy issue to face the 
post-apartheid government.  It preoccupied the foreign policy-making establishment, the 
free press, and the business community and, for the first time a number of emergent in-
terest groups.  Furthermore, because it dealt with a region of the world in which South 
Africans had relatively little concrete experience, the latitude for influence, obfuscation, 
and outright confusion was particularly pronounced.42  The solidarity movements sug-
gested that continued relations with the ROC made it difficult to distinguish Alfred Nzo’s 
foreign policy from Pik Botha’s.   
In 1993, the ROC was South Africa’s sixth largest trading partner; their total trade 
amounted to R 6.1 billion, with a surplus of R2.3 billion in South Africa’s favour.  The 
ROC has already invested some R1.4 billion in SA, creating more than 40,000 jobs in 
over 280 factories.  The ROC Trade and Investment Mission that came to SA in Sep-
tember 1994 concluded agreements for trade, investment, technical co-operation and fi-
nancial assistance totaling R1.1 billion.  A good deal of this money was likely to flow to 
the Government’s Reconstruction and Development Programme.  Taipei had offered to 
establish a vocational Training Centre in Gauteng Province as another major contribution 
to the RDP.43 
Mainland China is the world’s most populous country with nearly 60 times the 
20-million people in Taiwan and it would soon be the world’s largest economy.  Ac-
cording to the PRC’s viewpoint, SA’s official ties with the ROC would curb any further 
investment in RSA. Trade was already up to US$1.3 billion in 1993. The establishment of 
formal links was only a matter of time, even under the present government.  Some South 
  243
Africans even argued the ROC and the PRC traded more with each other than with SA.   
In dealing with the two Chinas dilemma, one of the solutions for the ANC-led GNU 
would be the “dual recognition of the ROC and the PRC at the same time, as the two 
Koreas, two Vietnams and two Germanys before 1990, when each enjoyed international 
recognition through the concept of dual recognition.”  The case for dual recognition, 
made elsewhere by Willie Breytenbach (1994) and Deon Geldenhuys (1995), rested on 
three sets of criteria: 
y A case in international law; 
y A de facto but publicly unacknowledged recognition by both the PRC and ROC gov-
ernments that in their mutual interactions, they were dealing with autonomous, if not 
sovereign, entities with distinct – and not overlapping – areas of jurisdiction;  
y A changing international reality involving a growing recognition worldwide that the 
ROC government was a force to be reckoned with in international relations and that it 
was wishful thinking, and self-defeating, to pretend it did not exist.44  
In principle, the ROC was willing to accept dual recognition.  Taipei had declared 
that it would not sever ties with SA if Pretoria established diplomatic relations with Bei-
jing.  It would accept dual recognition and coexist with the mainland.45 However, the 
PRC would not accept the notion.  For the PRC, there was only one China in the world 
and the one China position was a non-negotiable issue.  The PRC regarded this stance as 
a most important question of national sovereignty and territorial integrity and allowed no 
room for compromise on this issue. Previously, there were at least four attempts at dual 
recognition – by Grenada in 1989, Nicaragua in 1990, South Korea in 1992 and Burkina 
Faso in 1994.  None of these succeeded. 
In the UN, Foreign Minister Nzo met the PRC’s representative Lee Choshin in June 
1994 and Foreign Minister Qian in September 1994, who asserted that the PRC wanted to 
normalize relations with the new SA and encourage the country to take the same position 
as more than 150 other countries; to have diplomatic ties with the PRC.46  Foreign 
Minister Nzo agreed that the PRC was an important player in the world, and SA needed 
time to solve this issue.  He also said that the new SA had inherited its diplomatic reality 
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from the previous government.  There were many co-operation treaties and projects in 
between and certainly the changing of the ties could not be done in one day.  On De-
cember 4, 1994, Foreign Minister Nzo paid an official visit to the ROC.  In February 
1995 the Foreign Minister gave his assurance that ties would not be cut with Taiwan, 
noting, “This is a matter which should be resolved by the Chinese themselves.”47 
In essence, there is little need for Pretoria to rush this issue, simply SA would stick 
with diplomatic relations with Taipei until either SA swaps to Beijing or something 
happened between the ROC and the PRC that prevented a decision from having to be 
made.  In this situation, South Africa should bide its time until 1997 when Chinese 
politics would take a decisive turn with the incorporation of Hong Kong into China.  
This may be the catalyst for more parity between the ROC and the PRC. 
In short, after State President de Klerk, Mr. Nelson Mandela and Mr. Walter Sisulu 
visited the ROC in the early 1990s, before the first democratic election in the RSA, the 
ROC tried to solidify the bonds between the two countries.  The ROC’s President Lee 
visited SA to attend the inaugural ceremony of President Mandela and promised to 
co-operate in building urgent projects, especially the RDP.  The PRC urged SA to cut 
diplomatic ties with the ROC first and normalise relations with Beijing. South Africa 
attempted to take the position of dual recognition with both Chinas, but in vain.  In the 
GNU, there was no consensus in handling the China issue, and foreign affairs were not 
the first priority among all the important issues.  For SA, it took time to handle this 
sensitive problem prudently, which meant keeping the status quo, hoping the Chinese 
themselves could solve the problem.   
Various Kinds of Cooperation 
To invite the decision makers, the Ministers of the GNU, to the ROC was the first step for 
understanding and for future co-operation.  From July 1994 to June 1995, Foreign 
Minister Alfred Nzo; Defence Minister Joe Modise; Minister of Public Enterprise Stella 
Sigcau; Minister of Correctional Services Sipho Nzimela; Minister of Arts, Culture, 
Science & Technology Ben Ngubane; Minister of Public Works Jeff Radebe and other 
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members of Parliament were part of the delegation that visited the ROC.48 
 
In supporting the RDP, which covered economic development, land distribution, 
housing, supply of water and electricity, compulsory health education, and the social 
welfare system among others, the ROC took four main steps: 
y In September 1993, Mr. Mandela visited a vocational training centre in Taiwan and 
was very impressed.  Consequently, Dr. Lee, President of the ROC, promised two 
years later to assist SA in setting-up a similar centre at an estimated cost of US$40 
million. President Mandela and Ambassador Loh signed a Technical Assistance 
Agreement for the Establishment of a Vocational Training Centre.  In the initial stage, 
the VTC would only train retired military personnel and help them to learn the nec-
essary skills for other jobs. 
y The ROC donated more than R320,000 to the Department of Agriculture for the 
training of small-scale farmers.  This amount represented half of the estimated costs 
for the first phase of the project.  The joint venture was aimed at the training of small 
farmers and would stretch over a period of three-and-a-half years.  In fact, the ROC’s 
contribution towards the project would mainly consist of financial aid, but the ROC 
experts would also help with the training of the South African trainers.49  In addition, 
22 South Africans attended the food processing, agricultural management training 
courses, sponsored by the Committee of International Technical Co-operation in the 
ROC.  On November 29, 1994, an agreement was signed with the Development Bank 
of Southern Africa for US$15,482,000 for assistance to small farmers. 
y Under its technical co-operation programme with the RSA, the ROC offered training 
courses for RSA citizens in a variety of fields, ranging from land reform to SMME 
development, from taxation to foreign investment, and from plant tissue culture to 
precision scientific instrumentation.  The length of courses varied from two weeks to 
four months, depending on the subject content.  During 1994, training awards were 
granted to 44 persons, and the number of trainees selected during the first half of 1995 
was 53. 
y Obviously, economic relations between the countries were the key factor in deciding 
SA’s continued ties with the ROC.  On February 14, 1994, the two countries signed a 
no-double-taxation agreement.  It was the second no-double-taxation accord the ROC 
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had signed with another country, the other being Singapore.  The South African 
Agreement would help reduce the tax burden on Taiwan investors and promote more 
Taiwan investment there.50  The ROC and SA also agreed to exchange information to 
crack down on tax evasion.   
Most commentators have cited trade figures to justify their support in debating the 
China issue.  According to a monthly abstract of foreign trade statistics released by the 
Commissioner of Customs and Excise, trade with Taiwan in 1993 was at the value of R 
4.2 billion while that with China was R1.6 billion.  More significantly, the balance of 
trade with Taiwan was consistently in South Africa’s favour.  Coal, iron, aluminium and 
other metal alloys were the mainstays of South African exports to Taiwan. ROC exports 
to SA were mainly electronic and textile products.  Taiwan’s importance to SA lay in the 
sphere of investments – crucial for the successful implementation of the Reconstruction 
and Development Programme. 
After Taiwan’s largest trade and investment mission visited SA on August 29, 1994, 
and committed R1,105 billion in trade, investment, loans finance and technical 
co-operation, a further agreement included setting up a Taiwan Trade Centre in JHB by 
July 1955.  This involved the signing of a government procurement contract, promoting 
co-operation in the food, telecommunications and tourism industries.51 
At the end of the Thirteenth Economic and Technical Co-operation Conference 
between the ROC and the RSA, Economic Affairs Minister Pin-kung Chiang said a task 
force would probe the multibillion-dollar Taiwanese investment in South Africa’s pet-
rochemical industry.  Both governments agreed on a two-stage approach to the envi-
sioned project.  Officials from the industrial conglomerate that supplied most of Tai-
wan’s fuel and petrochemical needs, the Chinese Petroleum Company, attended the 
conference and visited the Sasol plant at Secunda. 
Ambassador Loh said up to 3,000 ha of coastal industrial land would be needed at 
Saldanha Bay, Cape Town, Mossel Bay, East London, Port Elizabeth, Durban and Rich-
ards Bay for in integrated chemical complex of Chemsystems.  The findings were posi-
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tive.  “We strongly support the initiative, not only because we are impressed by SA’s 
political reforms but also as it could involve lucrative investments for all parties, with 
export products targeted at the SA, African, South American and even European mar-
kets.” 52 The governments also expressed the intention to take steps to establish ex-
change programmes to train black entrepreneurs for two years in Taipei in running small 
and medium-sized enterprises.   
The ROC set up a special mechanism called the “fixed rate relending facility” 
(FRRF) to encourage small South African entrepreneurs to start their own businesses.  
FRRF would help would-be entrepreneurs who had the ambition, but lacked the 
know-how and sufficient capital to start their own business.  The embassy said FRRF 
would enable local entrepreneurs to buy capital goods and non-consumer strategic 
products made in Taiwan.53 
In support of RSA’s Reconstruction and Development Programme, the ROC pro-
vided financial assistance amounting to R556 million in the forms of grants and loans in 
the first year of the Government of National Unity.  Under the sponsorship of the ROC, 
many South Africans received technical training in a variety of fields, such as land reform, 
SMME (small, medium and micro enterprise) development, taxation, foreign investment, 
and precision scientific instruments.  To underline its attitude towards the new govern-
ment, Taiwan donated R35 million to the ANC’s election coffers. SA Embassy Minister 
in Taiwan, Pieter Snyman, noted that SA remained the big prize for the two Chinas; 
should SA opt for diplomatic ties with Beijing, it would have a negative effect on the trade 
relationship with Taiwan.54 
In other areas, Nobel Laureate Desmond Tutu paid a visit to Taiwan on June 10, 
1995 as a gesture of goodwill.  From July 1995 to November 1996, the chairman of the 
Foreign Affairs Committee of the Parliament, Raymond Schutter; the chairman of the 
RDP committee, Max Sisulu; Matthews Phosa, Premier of Mpumalanga; Ngoako 
Ramathlodi, Premier of Northern Province; and Popo Molefe, Premier of North West 
were among well-known political figures that visited Taiwan.  Having cordial relations 
with the National Party for many decades, the ROC also won the friendship of the Inkatha 
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Freedom Party by inviting the leader, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, Premier of KwaZulu-Natal, 
to Taiwan to solidify the ties.  The ROC opened a Consulate in Durban in 1994 to en-
hance the relations.  In October 1995, according to the KwaZulu-Natal Marketing Ini-
tiative, the ROC was the largest foreign investor in KwaZulu-Natal, with approximately 
42 per cent of all foreign investments in the region.  In Ladysmith alone, there were 24 
factories set up by businessmen from Taiwan, 10 of which were newly-established.  
These factories created approximately 4,000 job opportunities for the local residents.55 
The Taiwan Experience: Implications for South Africa was a conference held at the 
Senate Hall, University of South Africa, Pretoria, on August 26, 1995.  The purpose of 
the Conference was to demonstrate to South African policy makers, government officials, 
the academic community, the business sector and the South African public in general, the 
deeper character of Chinese economy, politics, government and culture in the island of 
Taiwan. In educational co-operation, the ROC offered scholarships for prominent and 
potential university students; many mutual visits between principals of universities were 
conducted with positive results.  In 1994, approximately 30,000 tourists from Taiwan 
visited SA while 6,698 South Africans visited Taiwan. 
Taiwan was loyal to SA, not only during the apartheid era but after Mandela took 
office.  All agreed that President Mandela was the key figure in deciding SA’s diplomatic 
recognition in the China issue.  Therefore, both the ROC and the PRC exerted their in-
fluence to gain his acceptance.  After Mandela’s stance in favour of dual recognition was 
turned down by the PRC, Mandela listened to public debate to determine South Africa’s 
national interest. Some of the Cabinet ministers, including Minister of Defence Joe 
Modise and Director-General of the Department of Foreign Affairs Rusty Evans, fa-
voured maintaining the status quo.  The three partners of the ruling alliance, the ANC, 
the SACP and COSATU, as well as the Department of Trade and Industry and most of the 
senior officials of the Department of Foreign Affairs were in favour of establishing dip-
lomatic relations with the PRC.56 
Many times in Cabinet meetings there was discussion of diplomatic recognition of 
the PRC, with no complete consensus owing to RDP having top priority among various 
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difficult topics.  The National Assembly’s Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs be-
came the debating forum.  Raymond Suttner, the Chairperson of the Committee, strongly 
advocated that SA should break with the past and reprioritise its relations.  Suttner urged 
the Government that it was necessary for the RSA to urgently establish diplomatic rela-
tions with the PRC and reduce the level of its relationship with the ROC.  However, he 
was pragmatic enough to point out that “there are many areas of friendship and relations 
other than at the official diplomatic level.”57 On May 23, 1995, Deputy Foreign Minister 
Aziz Pahad chaired an interdepartmental meeting to assess South Africa’s real long-term 
interests with regard to the two Chinas and to what extent a shift in South Africa’s policy 
position was necessary  Twenty-one departments participated in this meeting, where 
concluded that the PRC was a major power and therefore, in the RSA’s long-term eco-
nomic and political interest, SA should seek to normalise its relations with the PRC and 
downgrade its relations with the ROC.58 
Because of this, South African businesses were even more eager to do business with 
the PRC, which encouraged or put pressure on the South African government to nor-
malise its relations as soon as possible.  SAB, Armscor, Eskom, Investec Bank and 
Denel all had a keen interest in exploring and establishing a foothold in the enormous and 
fast growing market of China.  The business sector’s needs could not be ignored by the 
SA government.  In the academic sector, foreign policy institutions such as the South 
African Institute of International Affairs and the Foundation of Global Dialogue were in 
favour of recognising the PRC and advocated that improving relations with the PRC was 
in South Africa’s national interest.  Greg Mills, the Director of SAIIA pointed out that 
Taiwan needed South Africa more than the other way around and a diplomatic choice 
between Beijing and Taipei was inevitable.59  Among all prominent members in the 
academic sector, only Professor Deon Geldenhnys, Professor Willie Breytenbach, Pro-
fessor Themba Sona and Professor John Daniel were in favor of keeping the status quo or 
suggested opting for dual recognition.  It was a very difficult situation that the ROC had 
to face and deal with everyday.   
The PRC was impatient that after two years since the ANC-led Government was in 
office, there were still no formal relations between the PRC and the RSA.  The Director 
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of the Chinese Centre for South African Studies, Ji Peiding, said, “South Africa has to 
solve this question”; “We want South Africa to follow international practice and recog-
nise China as the legitimate government, and accept that Taiwan is a province.” 60 He 
also said it would be in South Africa’s international political interest to recognise China 
because of the PRC’s position in the UN and relationship with the Non-Aligned Move-
ment and the Organization of African Unity. 
In South Africa’s view, the consular office in Hong Kong, SAA’s landing rights in 
Hong Kong, and a possible seat in the UN Security Council were all important consid-
erations when making a choice.  Furthermore, China’s huge market and the fact that 160 
countries around the world recognised China, compared with the 28 which had ties with 
Taiwan, had to be taken into account. Jiang Zemin also wrote a letter to Mandela “In 
order to establish diplomatic ties, the Taiwan issue should be solved first… We do have 
confidence that Your Excellency will conduct the bilateral relations into a right direc-
tion.”61 The PRC’s precondition for diplomatic ties was the termination of links with 
Taiwan.  Whenever a head of government which already had diplomatic ties with the 
PRC visited SA, the PRC requested that pressure be put on the SA government to nor-
malise relations with the PRC and downgrade with the ROC.  During Deputy President 
Mbeki and Foreign Minister Nzo’s tour to New York to attend the UN Assembly, the PRC 
Foreign Minister Qian once again advocated the importance of the PRC.62 
The sensitive and complex matter caused such a dilemma for SA from May 1994 
until early 1996, that the RSA instructed Foreign Minister Alfred Nzo to visit the PRC 
and the ROC separately to clarify the situation and find a solution.  During Nzo’s visit to 
the PRC, he said it was abnormal that SA did not have ties with the PRC and hoped that 
SA would solve the problem soon.  ANC MP and chairman of the parliamentary com-
mittee on foreign relations Raymond Suttner, who was part of Nzo’s delegation to Beijing, 
said: “There is a definite desire to form diplomatic relations with China, but Beijing’s 
condition is that SA break off diplomatic relations with Taiwan.  This would mean no 
relations with Taiwan, but we would have to work hard to ensure that economic benefits 
of relations with Taiwan are retained.”63 Foreign Minister Alfred Nzo led a fact-finding 
delegation to the ROC from June 30 to July 2, 1996. 
  251
In the joint statement issued in Taipei by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the ROC 
and the Embassy of the RSA, Minister Nzo explained that South Africa would like to 
maintain and expand its cordial relations on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.  How to 
achieve this was currently the subject of debate in South Africa.  His current visit to 
Taipei and an earlier one to Beijing were meant to exchange views and information on the 
subject with leaders on both sides and to report on these exchanges to President Nelson 
Mandela.”64 
During Nzo’s visit, the ROC leaders reiterated that they did not question SA’s desire 
to promote relations with Beijing but stressed that this should not occur at the cost of 
existing relations between the ROC and the RSA.  The ROC reconfirmed the full support 
of its Government for South Africa’s RDP. In the scope of South Africa’s overall as-
sessment of relations with the Greater China region, all countries were waiting to see 
what Pretoria would do next.  The ROC pointed out the scale of its investments to the 
RSA and with one simple goal, the maintaining of diplomatic ties, even proclaimed to 
accept so-called dual recognition. With the PRC’s powerful status in the UN, a popula-
tion of 1.2 billion people, enormous market opportunities, the recognition of 160 coun-
tries and holding the landing rights of SAA in Hong Kong, SA’s consulate in Hong Kong  
stressed that SA should take international practice to make the right decision. Frankly 
speaking, foreign policy could only be determined by what was in the country’s best in-
terests.  Neither sympathies nor ideology, moral and emotional arguments could deter-
mine foreign policy.  Despite Taiwan’s R35 million donation to the ANC’s election chest 
in 1994 and subsequent technical assistance worth R146 million for retraining demobi-
lized soldiers, the ROC faced a tough challenge for formal recognition of the PRC rather 
than the ROC.   
The Cutting of Diplomatic Ties 
The Ninth United Nations Conference on Trade and Development held in Johannesburg 
at the end of April 1996, involved participation by nine heads of state and 3,000 gov-
ernment officials from nearly 188 countries. The PRC Minister of Foreign Trade and 
Economic Co-operation, Madame Wu Yi, met President Mandela and Foreign Minister 
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Alfred Nzo.  She insisted that after establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC, both 
countries would get huge profits from economic development, bilateral trade and in-
vestments.  She envisioned that within the next 15 years, valuable opportunities for the 
development of trade and joint ventures between the two countries would arise.  She 
succeeded in signing of the Exchange of Notes for the granting of Most Favoured Na-
tional Trade Status with the Minister of Trade and Industry, Alec Erwin.  A growing 
consensus on the need for the normalisation of relations was thus aroused the South Af-
rican media by Madam Wu’s visit.65 
In answering a journalist’s questions, Madame Wu said the RSA would establish 
diplomatic relations with the PRC soon.  President Mandela phoned ambassador Loh to 
clarify that the statement was not quite correct.  Even in July 1996, Mandela reaffirmed 
his position that nothing had changed towards the China issue. As the storm was ap-
proaching, the ROC sent Vice-Premier Hsu Li-teh to SA from August 26 to September 3, 
1996, pledging to offer more trade, investment, economic aid programmes and various 
co-operation projects.  Mandela received Hsu and repeated his assurance that he would 
not break off diplomatic ties with the ROC. 
The ROC’s intention was very clear, that it was using economic bonds to sustain the 
weak ties the only possible way.  Vice Premier Hsu’s visit in August did not receive 
much news coverage.  Most political analysts said that SA’s normalization of relations 
with the PRC was not a topic for debate, but only a matter of timing.  When would the 
shift take place? Dr. Greg Mills said the obvious time frame was sometime between the 
March Taiwanese Presidential election and the July 1997 handing over of Hong Kong to 
the PRC.66 
On November 27, 1996, Mandela, with Foreign Minister Alfred Nzo and Deputy 
Foreign Minister Aziz Pahad, announced at a press conference that SA had decided to 
recognise the PRC and enter into diplomatic ties with Beijing at the expense of formal 
relations with the ROC. In his four-paragraph statement, Mandela offered only one reason 
for switching recognition, “A permanent continuation of diplomatic recognition of the 
Republic of China on Taiwan is inconsistent with South Africa’s role in international 
  253
affairs.”67 
The President explained that formal ties with the ROC were harming South Africa’s 
active participation in multilateral forums such as the UN, the Organisation of African 
Unity, and the Non-aligned Movement, all of which recognised the PRC.  Mandela also 
decided that the changes would take effect on January 1, 1998, leaving the ROC with 12 
months to conclude its diplomatic mission in SA.  Mandela also tried to sever the rela-
tionship on good terms.  He recorded his and his government’s “enormous appreciation” 
for the ROC government’s contribution to the RDP and for encouraging Taiwanese in-
vestment in SA.  Furthermore, Mandela insisted that SA would continue to maintain 
strong economic and cultural ties with Taiwan.68 
In Taiwan Mandela’s surprise announcement caused a great shock since Mandela 
had given his assurance to the ROC’s Vice Premier Hsu Li-teh in August that South Af-
rica would not cut diplomatic relations with the ROC in favour of relations with the PRC. 
On the same day, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs lodged a strong protest against the de-
cision, saying the move would seriously hurt existing friendly relations between the two 
countries.  The ROC government expressed regret at what it termed “a very unfriendly” 
decision and called on Pretoria to reconsider.69  The next day Foreign Minister John 
Chang protested to the South African Ambassador Johannes Viljoen about his country’s 
intention to establish full diplomatic ties with Beijing and the chairman of the Council for 
Economic Planning and Development, Chiang Ping-kun, announced that the government 
would not continue to encourage Taiwanese investment in SA. 
As a famous statesman in the world, Mandela voiced his appreciation for Taiwan’s 
help to the ANC making it possible to win the 1994 election, “something we will never 
forget”: As for his decision, Mandela perhaps did not want to saddle his crown prince, 
Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, with the burden of having to break the Taipei connection 
after Mandela’s planned retirement in 1999.  It was suggested that the twelve-month 
period of transition was in part designed to place Beijing under pressure to indicate what 
it would offer to compensate SA for any loss of assistance from Taiwan.70  Mandela 
presented the diplomatic switch as a painful decision that he wished he did not have to 
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make.  According to his words, “But there comes a time when a man, in the interest of 
his own country, has to take a decision which hurts a very close friend.” 
Mandela’s announcement prompted divergent reactions among the various political 
parties.  It was welcomed in ANC ranks, but condemned by the National Party, the 
Inkatha Freedom Party and the Freedom Front.  At a news conference, NP leader, F W de 
Klerk said the severing of diplomatic ties with Taiwan was a disturbing and serious 
situation.  He said it was difficult to understand how South Africa could break ties with a 
country from which it had benefited considerably in the past.  He blamed the decision on 
the SACP’s influence on government policy.  Mr. De Klerk added he would have ex-
pected President Mandela to discus the issue with him as a leader of the opposition before 
making the announcement.  The IFP said it was shocked and dismayed at the decision.  
IFP Secretary-General, Dr. Ziba Jiyane, said although the IFP supported the establishing 
of formal links with a fast-emerging world power like mainland China, it was regrettable 
that President Mandela had alienated one of South Africa’s foremost trading powers in 
the process.71 Freedom Front foreign affairs spokesman, Dr. Pieter Mulder, said the de-
cision had followed in the face of all efforts by the parliamentary committee on foreign 
affairs to find an amicable solution to the matter.  He said the committee, which had 
visited both countries last year on fact-finding missions, had not completed its work.72 
Press commentaries were mostly favourable to SA’s decision.  Business Day wrote 
“South Africa’s switch is primarily to do with international diplomacy and our govern-
ment’s desire to become increasingly a world player – for example, winning a permanent 
seat for Africa on the UN Security Council, which China could veto.” The Daily News 
described the situation as follows:” Taiwan has for long treasured and nurtured its 
friendship with South Africa.  The diplomatic ties may soon be coming to an end, but 
that’s no reason why the two cannot remain good friends.” The Sunday Independent was 
of the opinion that from a practical standpoint, South Africa’s recognition of the People’s 
Republic of China did not come a day too soon.  The Citizen described the handling of 
the China issue as “a classic example of bungling” and insisted “It’s time our Foreign 
Minister Alfred Nzo quit.73 
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For Ambassador Loh, who had assiduously cultivated links with the Mandela gov-
ernment and earned much of the credit for the continuation of diplomatic ties after May 
1994, declared that “I personally should take responsibility for Pretoria’s change.” 
However, the PRC’s economic and political weight and the Hong Kong factor were 
reasons for South Africa’s change of policy. The Taiwanese community in SA, most of 
which was involved in the business sector, was outraged at Pretoria’s decision.  Some 
members openly declared that they were nervous and worried about the future of their 
investments in South Africa.    
A week after Mandela dropped his diplomatic bombshell, the two countries held 
high-level meetings on their future relationship.  From December 3 to 6, 1996, ROC 
Foreign Minister John Chang visited Pretoria for talks with Mandela and Foreign Min-
ister Alfred Nzo.  Taipei saw this visit as an opportunity to persuade Pretoria to recon-
sider the severance of ties.  The Mandela government, by contrast, intended using the 
talks to explain the decision to terminate diplomatic links and also to begin working out a 
new formula for future relations.74 Mandela described Taiwan as a very close friend and 
was confident the countries would maintain relations on the highest possible short of full 
diplomatic recognition.  Chang was very disappointed not only that diplomatic ties with 
SA could not be saved, retaining the three Consulates-General in Johannesburg, Cape 
Town and Durban, but also because the use of the name Republic of China in the desig-
nations of future missions and the use of the ROC national flag and national emblems 
would be discontinued.   
Having failed to persuade Pretoria to reconsider its diplomatic switch to the PRC, 
Chang announced three retaliatory measures: (1) the recall of Ambassador Loh to Taipei 
for an indefinite period “to express our displeasure and our concern caused by the action 
of the South African government”; (2) the immediate suspension of programmes of 
co-operation between the two countries; (3) many of the 39 bilateral treaties would also 
be suspended, one of which was an aviation agreement. The Johannesburg-Taipei route, 
served by South African Airways, would be terminated on February 15, 1997.75 Asked 
about Taiwanese investments in SA, Chang said the total volume of investments in SA 
was US $1.5 billion.  More than 43,000 jobs had been created by these investments.  In 
  256
the past, the PRC government advised and encouraged businessmen to work in SA. Now, 
businessmen would have to make their own decisions whether or not to stay.   
The Department of Foreign Affairs said the suspension of the Taiwanese projects 
was regrettable.  “The reaction will influence our sincere desire that the friendly rela-
tions that have been built up over the years should continue to the mutual benefit of SA 
and the ROC.” Although businessmen and economists say that trade and economic rela-
tions between the two countries are bound to continue, the big question is whether they 
will be on the same scale.  The ROC is South Africa’s seventh biggest trading partner, 
with two-way trade totaling R5.7 billion in 1995. 
In December, Foreign Minister Chang indicated that his government had not ruled 
out the possibility of taking the initiative to break diplomatic links with SA if deemed 
necessary.  It could indeed be argued that it would be a humiliating experience for the 
ROC to maintain a full diplomatic mission in SA while the clock ticked away.76 The 
highest possible recognition other than official relations needed to be negotiated in the 
interest of both SA and Taiwan. On returning to South Africa in January 1997, Foreign 
Minister Chang and Foreign Minister Nzo held the second round of negotiations to dis-
cuss the future arrangements after January 1998.  He indicated that the ROC government 
would not discourage Taiwanese from investing in SA provided that the ROC was given 
adequate representation in SA to provide sufficient protection for Taiwanese doing 
business there.  Chang told Nzo that Taipei wanted future relations based on the princi-
ples of reality, continuity, governmentality, legality and morality,77  but the talks did not 
produce concrete results.  In June 1997, Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz Pahad led a 
delegation to Taiwan for the third round of negotiations with Deputy Minister Chen 
Chien-jen. 
With the three high-level rounds of negotiation, there were 12 bilateral work-
ing-level discussions between Ambassador Loh’s ROC delegation and the appointed 
special committee of the DFA of the RSA. The final goal was to work out a mutually 
acceptable framework for future relations. During the negotiations, the two sides had a 
different perception about “the highest possible level short of full diplomatic recognition”, 
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but all agreed to sustain economic, investment, cultural, scientific and technological, 
agricultural and fishery relations for the purpose of promoting mutual interests.78 In May 
1997, RSA Ambassador Johan Viljoen finished his term and was succeeded by Ambas-
sador Cornelius Scholtz.  Mandela asked Ambassador Loh to stay in SA after 1998, but 
the ambassador neither agreed to this goodwill proposal nor did he report it to the gov-
ernment. The PRC also had several rounds of negotiations with the SA government, 
trying to establish diplomatic ties six months earlier to coincide with the transfer of Hong 
Kong to the PRC.  Owing to South Africa’s firm stand, this idea did not bear fruit.  The 
ROC also kept their office building and the Heads of Mission’s residence was not trans-
ferred to the PRC. 
The twelfth round of negotiations ended December 23, 1997, when the two sides 
agreed that from January 1, 1998 the new framework for interaction would be as follows: 
y Taiwan’s interests in SA would be handled by the Taipei Liaison Offices in Pretoria, 
Johannesburg and Cape Town.  South African interests in Taiwan were to be repre-
sented by the Liaison Office of the Republic of SA in Taipei. 
y The representative would be the head of mission.  Mr. Du Ling would be the first 
Representative from Taiwan.  Former Ambassador Scholtz would be the first repre-
sentative from Pretoria.  Representatives would be appointed according to interna-
tional practice and conduct their duties from January 1998. 
y The function of the offices was to promote two-way economic, educational, cultural, 
financial, scientific exchange and co-operation, in order to sustain mutually beneficial 
and substantial relations. 
y In order to realise these functions of the offices effectively, the two sides agreed, based 
on the equal and mutual beneficial foundation, to provide their staff with what was 
necessary so as to conduct duties.79 
One week later, the RSA and the PRC signed the joint communiqué on the estab-
lishment of diplomatic relations.  Among the four clauses, it stipulated that the Gov-
ernment of the RSA recognised there was but one China in the world, the Government of 
the PRC was its sole legal government and Taiwan was an inalienable part of China.80  
By accepting the “One China” position, the RSA formally ended official relations with 
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the ROC which had been established since 1905. 
The year 1997 was a difficult one for the ROC Embassy staffs in Pretoria, who were 
busy with the negotiations yet aware that their days were numbered.  Only the Minister 
of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology, Lionel Mtshali and the Mayor of Greater 
Pretoria, Mrs. Nombuyiselo Joyce Ngele visited Taiwan in 1997.  Another obvious 
consequence of these events was that programmes of co-operation, including conces-
sionary loans, grants, technical assistance and arms purchases were suspended.  With 
regard to the existing 36 bilateral treaties, Taipei indicated that 50 to 60 percent would be 
suspended.  The ROC closed the Consulate-General in Durban and reduced the number 
of diplomats in another three offices. 
With the demise of apartheid and the ANC assuming power in 1994, South Africa’s 
international fortunes were transformed into the paragon of the 1990s.  Prior to 1994, the 
ROC government had envisaged the fundamental changes and sent Ambassador Loh to 
attempt to solidify ROC-RSA relations.  Taipei acknowledged that the ROC had a po-
litical motivation to encourage investment in SA.  There were three options for SA: keep 
the status quo, dual recognition or switching diplomatic ties.  SA decided to cut ties with 
the ROC and downgraded the close relationship it had enjoyed from 1976 to 1997.  SA 
made a most unusual decision: to allow one year for the ROC Embassy and Consulates 
to remain before the official change of recognition to the PRC would occur.   
Ambassador Loh was captain of the ship, steering into a tremendous storm.  With a 
formidable opponent, the ROC government prevented the worst event for more than 
three-and-a-half years.  Without doubt, Ambassador Loh’s diplomatic techniques were 
one of the key factors in sustaining relations. President Mandela wrote a letter to Presi-
dent Lee (appendix XIX) to explain why SA had to face the reality in changing the rec-
ognition and mentioned Ambassador Loh “I would like to extend my appreciation to 
Ambassador Loh I-cheng for his personal sacrifices and endeavours in this regard.  
During our private discussions, he has become a close personal acquaintance of mine and 
it is my sincere belief that no government can wish for a better representative.  The for-
eign diplomatic community in South Africa of which Ambassador Loh is the doyen holds 
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both Ambassador Loh and his wife in the highest regard.  They are sensitive and loyal 
ambassadors of your country.”81 Mandela decorated Ambassador Loh with the Order of 
Good Hope in the Grand Cross Class which was the highest honour possible from South 
Africa.  Ambassador Loh pointed out that the ROC did not do anything inappropriate in 
SA. On the contrary, the ROC tried its utmost to enhance diplomatic ties, owing to the 
international reality, but each country had its own national interests to consider, resulting 
in the conclusion of an important chapter in relations between the countries.   
Substantive Relations after 1998 
In international politics, SA was an important role-player, not just in sending 
peace-keeping forces to African countries, but also in organising different kinds of 
summits and international conferences.  In 1998 South Africa was the leading and most 
powerful country in Africa with 39 embassies through the continent.  Most countries 
sent influential figures to SA as ambassadors or representatives.  Even though there were 
no diplomatic relations, Taiwan still had three Liaison Offices which started functioning 
January 1, 1998, to encourage substantive relations. 
On January 28, 1998, Foreign Minister Nzo at the request of the PRC sent an official 
circular letter to ban official visits by ministers and premiers of the RSA to Taiwan, and 
restrict access of ROC diplomats to the South African government.  South African 
ministers, premiers and officials were advised not to attend any official functions.82  
However, a professional relationship was built gradually through the Department of 
Foreign Affairs and the Taipei Liaison Office in Pretoria, and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and the South African Liaison Office in Taipei. Mr. Fasil Ismail, the Deputy Di-
rector General of the Department of Trade and Industry; Mr. Marthinus van Schalkwyk, 
Premier of the Western Cape; Mangosuthn Buthelezi, Minister of Home Affairs all visited 
Taiwan in early 2005.  In May 2005, Dr. Manto Tshabalala Msimany, Minister of Health, 
became the first Cabinet member in the ruling party to pay a visit to Taiwan. 
From Taiwan, Deputy Foreign Minister Michael Kau and Dr. Chang Fu-mei, 
Chairman of the Overseas Chinese Commission, visited SA after 2000.  In spite of these 
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visits, there were limitations in the political field because no diplomatic ties existed.  
Director Scholtz from the Department of Foreign Affairs said that to enhance political 
relations with Taiwan was not the current policy of the government of SA.83  Basically, 
South Africa insisted on the One China policy and would not provoke the PRC.  After 
Minister Buthelezi visited Taiwan, he instructed that Taiwan be listed as one of the 
countries whose citizens would not need a visa for visits of less than 90 days in SA.  This 
favourable attitude was to encourage more Taiwanese to visit and invest in SA.  The 
Government Gazette promulgated this announcement in April 2003 and put it into force 
in July 2003.  Taiwan was grateful about this friendly step and regarded it as a beneficial 
development.  However, SA terminated this policy in 2005. When Taiwan requested 
SA’s support to gain participation in the UN and WHO, South Africa either voted 
against Taiwan or remained neutral. 
According to the Department of Foreign Affair’s Strategic Plan – 2005/08, the ter-
ritory of Taiwan was mentioned as one of the largest Asian investors in South Africa.84  
Bilateral trade between SA and Taiwan reached US$1,294 million in 2003.  South Af-
rica’s main exports to Taiwan included iron and iron ore, steel, machinery and electrical 
machinery, aluminium, motor vehicles, vehicle parts, coal, wood, precious stones and 
metal, granite, organic chemicals, wool, tobacco, preserved food and fruit juice.  Tai-
wan’s main exports to SA included machinery (computer), bicycles, motorbike & auto 
parts, yarn & fabric, iron/steel products, toys, sports equipment, hand tools, rubber  and 
optical goods.  Most importantly, total bilateral trade between SA and Taiwan increased 
by 51.6 % between 2001 and 2004.85 
Taiwanese investment remained at high volume of more than US$1 billion.  There 
were over 620 Taiwanese businesses investing in SA, of which 280 were involved in the 
manufacturing sector.  These companies managed to occupy some 60% of the market 
share in SA for products such as personal computers, jerseys, sweaters, denim jeans, 
cutlery, shoes, woven plastic bags and gloves.  The companies employed between 
40,000–50,000 South Africans.  Mustek and Evergreen were two of the famous com-
panies from Taiwan. Given the high-tech nature of Taiwan’s economy, significant South 
African investments in Taiwan were unlikely.  However, South Africa could do more to 
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attract Taiwanese drect foreign investment by: 
y Reconvening the annual economic co-operation conference to promote increased in-
vestment in SA; 
y Identifying mechanisms for the enhancement of bilateral commercial relations; 
y Encouraging “a Taiwan Investment Study Mission” to visit South Africa. 
y Improving the domestic environment and advancing business-friendly policies.86 
In 2004 and 2005, with the participation of SAITEX and the Trade Mission of 
Taiwanese Businessmen to SA in November 2005, Taiwanese investments began flowing 
into South Africa again. 
In 2002, Mrs. Santosh Vinita Kalyan, a member of the Portfolio Committee on 
Health, led a delegation to Taiwan.  Dr. Boy Geldenhuys, MP in 2002 and Ms Patricia de 
Lille, MP and leader of ID, in 2003 also visited Taiwan.  From Taiwan, several MPs 
visited SA for different purposes.  Among them, Dr. P K Chiang, senior MP and former 
Deputy Speaker and Minister of Economic Affairs, led a delegation of eight MPs to at-
tend the 2005 Annual Conference of the Taiwanese Chamber of Commerce in Johan-
nesburg on March 7, 2005.  During their visits, they exchanged views on how to 
strengthen co-operation between the two countries and discussed matters of mutual 
concern with their counterparts. 
On March 4, 2004, Sherry Chen was the first Chinese from Taiwan to become an MP 
in SA.87  This businesswoman, who won the Gauteng Business Person of the Year Award 
in 1994, and was a Johannesburg City Councillor for four years, was named as Democ-
ratic Alliance Permanent Representative on the National Council of the Province.  Fur-
thermore, at the end of 2004, there were four South African Chinese MPs in Parliament of 
Taiwanese origin, representing different Parties.  This proved that more Taiwanese 
would like to represent the interests of political parties. 
On February 21, 2003, the two countries signed the Memorandum of Understanding 
on Police Co-operation to curb crime activities.88  Many Scholars and goodwill missions 
visited SA.  For example, Dr. Chang King-Yu, President of the Sino-Euro Foundation, 
attended the international conference “World Movement for Democracy, the Third As-
  262
sembly: Building Democracy for Peace, Development, and Human Rights” in January 
2004.  Dr. Chang was the principal of the National Chengchi University and conferred an 
Honorary Doctorate on F.W. de Klerk in 1991.  He said, “South Africa’s peaceful 
transfer of power to the ANC, no bloodshed, was a great achievement in world history.”89 
A Taipei Goodwill Mission led by the Taipei City Council also went to SA many 
times and talked to the Executive Mayor of Tshwane, Father Smangaliso Mkhatshwa to 
renew the friendship.  From SA many political scholars came to Taiwan, including Dr. 
Greg Mills, Director of the South Africa Institute of International Affairs, Professor 
Themba Sono, Professor Garth Shelton, Dr. Martyn Davies and Professor Aden Xhenga, 
Vice-Chancellor of the University of the Witwatersrand.  Professor Garth Shelton came 
to conduct research on topics such as democracy in the ROC, ROC-Africa relations, and 
the ROC’s economic development. 
Before 2005, Taiwan donated more than 1,000 wheelchairs to the Department of 
Social Development and Department of Health to help people in need, a deed which won 
the respect and applause of SA.  The Tzu Chi Foundation donated parcels containing 20 
kg rice, 750 ml cooking oil, 1 kg sugar and 500 g dried beans to 2,000 families in the 
Winterveld in an attempt to alleviate poverty.90  Actually, donating wheelchairs and food 
parcels to needy people was almost a routine task that lasted for 10 years, not just in one 
place, but also in Bloemfontein, Cape Town, Durban and Soweto, several times a year.  
This friendly gesture was motivated by the South African Taiwanese community.   
The Taipei Liaison Office in SA also co-operated with the Department of Music of 
the University of Pretoria on several occasions by means of Charity Concerts to raise 
funds for talented students in Pretoria.  At the same time, cultural exchange at the 
Charity Concerts was an inspiration for all concerned. In sports, the National Women’s 
Football team of Taiwan undertook a goodwill and friendship tour to SA in September 
2003.  Bafana Bafana scored a hard-fought 1-0 victory over an obstinate Taiwan side in 
an international/friendly match at Eldorado Stadium.91  The South African Dragon Boat 
Association organised teams to participate in the International Dragon Boat Competition 
in 2004 and 2005.  All these were some of the sports exchanges between the two coun-
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tries. 
The ROC government attaches great importance to the well-being of overseas 
Chinese communities and so does its utmost to look after the interests of the Taiwanese 
community in SA.  This was once again illustrated with the visit by the Minister for the 
Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission, Dr. Fu-mei Chang to SA in September 2002, 
during which she also attended the launch of the African Chapter of the Global Alliance 
for Democracy and Peace in Durban.  Most Taiwanese immigrants stay in Gauteng, 
especially in Johannesburg and Pretoria, and use the venue of Nan Hwa Temple, situated 
in Bronkhorstspruit, like a colourful Oriental Mirage for various activities.  In Gauteng, 
Waya Waya, the publication of Gauteng Tourism Authority, Nan Hwa Temple is a highly 
recommended place of peace to visit.92  With the help of the SA Tourism Authority many 
favourable impressions of Taiwanese in SA are effected, advancing interaction between 
the two countries. 
After the break of diplomatic relations, economic relations were the main interaction 
between SA and Taiwan.  These economic ties were determined by market forces.  Prior 
to January 1, 1998, political interest motivated Taiwan’s relationship with SA. Now the 
post-formal relationship centres upon economic exchange.93 
Conclusion 
In the 1990s, the internal situation in South Africa changed dramatically. Mandela was 
released from jail, and the ANC was no longer considered a subversive party. In the 
elections that followed in 1994, the ANC took power and considered dual recognition to 
be best for South Africa’s national interests. However, this option never became a po-
litical reality, and President Mandela announced over a year in advance that diplomatic 
relations between South Africa and the ROC would be terminated, an unprecedented ac-
tion. Since then, both countries have had cultural, commercial, medical and police co-
operation and signed memorandum of understanding on police cooperation. In fact, in the 
field of trade and investment, tourism, cultural exchanges and science and technology are 
the key areas for mutual co-operation.  The ROC remains the top foreign investor in 
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South Africa, and the two countries have cooperated in many different fields with mutu-
ally beneficial results. Even though these positive interactions cannot compare to the 
years from 1976 to 1997, it is a promising sign that relations are constantly improving and 
thus gradual and careful political contact may be realised in the future. 
     The ROC faces a unique situation in that most nations refuse to provide diplo-
matic recognition yet still hope to maintain substantive bilateral relations. For more 
tham 50 years, the international environment dictated ROC’s foreign relations and 
squeezed its sphere of influence. In May 2000, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) 
won the ROC’s presidential election, with the democracy, human rights and freedom 
forming its main campaign platform to distinguish itself from the previous government. 
Once the DPP gained power in May, President Chen paid official visits to Africa that 
year and two years later. The first visit covered Gambia, Burkina Faso and Chad and the 
second visit Senegal, Sao Tome and Principe, Malawi and Swaziland. 
     In President Chen’s inaugural speech for his second term (2004-2008), he empha-
sized his hope to re-position Taiwan in terms of both global competition and interna-
tional cooperation. He also stressed that Taiwan should continue to actively participate 
in the international community and support multilateral humanitarian and 
counter-terrorism endeavors. For instance, in March 2004, Taiwan donated funds to as-
sist Chad resettle refuges from the Durfur region. In July, Taiwan donated 40 metric 
tons of rice to the people of Tanzania. President Chen also expressed his wish that Tai-
wan become more involved in international NGOs to consolidate respect for the uni-
versal values of freedom, democracy and human rights throughout the world. Thus it 
was clear that the ROC not only helps to promote international economic and trade co-
operation, but also shares its experiences with other developing or least developed na-
tions. Taiwan especially wanted to provide assistance to nations and people in times of 
need. 
     One should note that, while the DPP held power, it preferred to use the moniker 
“Taiwan” for the ROC’s foreign affairs in order to more clearly differentiate itself from 
the PRC. Although the ROC’s allies in Africa seemed to support President Chen’s calls 
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for democracy, human rights and freedom in principle, such ideals were not their pri-
mary concern. They sought to increase the flow of foreign investment, technical 
know-how transfer and foreign aid. While democracy, human rights and freedom are 
universal values, they can not meet the immediate needs of these countries. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT  
CONCLUSION  
Official ties with Africa had already commenced prior to the precipitous events of 1949. 
In 1905, during the Chin dynasty, the Chinese government established the Chinese 
Consul-General in Johannesburg. In 1934, President Chiang Kai-shek attended the Cairo 
Conference, and later that year the Chinese government established the Consul General in 
Cairo. Three additional government offices then began their formal functioning: in 
Mauritius and Algeria in 1934, and Madagascar in 1945. 
In the San Francisco Conference, 1945, the Chinese asserted that they would assist 
the majority of African colonies in acquiring their independent status, and insisted that 
this position be included into the clauses of the United Nations Charter.  
Following civil war in 1949 in China, the PRC was established on October 1, 1949, 
and the ROC was forced to relocate in Taiwan. It was then that competition between the 
two Chinas, which persists until today, began. 
In the 1960s, there were only four independent states on the African continent, 
namely Egypt, Liberia, Ethiopia and South Africa. The PRC had already established 
diplomatic relations with Egypt in 1956, and the ROC had diplomatic relations with Li-
beria and South Africa. The ROC needed friendship and diplomatic recognition in order 
to assert its legitimate status in the international community, and it equally needed to keep 
its seat in the UN. These were the two pillars that helped the ROC to stand firm in the 
years of turmoil. Yet only 15 countries moved their embassies to Taipei, causing the 
situation to be unstable.  
Foreign policy needs to be realistic and decisive, and any foreign minister must 
delicately and carefully carry out diplomacy against a background of changing realities, 
needs and goals. Diplomacy is an important tool for securing national interests, for en-
hancing the substantive relations with foreign countries, and for national development. 
Every country in the world strives to extend its influence for political, economic or 
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military purposes. Nevertheless, it is ultimately national interests that remain the fore-
most priority in diplomatic consideration and decision-making. 
The ROC dispatched its first agricultural team to Africa in 1959, to Liberia. In Oc-
tober of the same year, the President of the Malagasy Republic, Philibert Tsiranana, paid 
an official visit to Taipei, making him the first African head of state from to visit the ROC. 
When 17 African states acquired independence in 1960, all 17 joined the United Nations, 
thus changing the political map of the world. It can be said that 1960 was the year of 
Africa, and naturally the ROC was keen to establish diplomatic relations with as many of 
these 17 African countries as possible, doing so with great success.  
Having secured relations with all 17 countries, the ROC sent agricultural teams to 
help the local people grow rice, invited African officials and experts to Taiwan to attend 
related courses, and invited heads of African states to visit the ROC. By stimulating in-
teraction between the ROC and Africa, the ROC was fulfilling its foreign policy of in-
creasing the number of friendly allies in Africa and strengthening its position in the UN. 
Even when the PRC established diplomatic relations with France in 1964, a setback that 
caused some French-speaking African countries to switch their recognition to the PRC, 
by 1969 the ROC still had full relations with 22 African states. By then, more than 600 
agricultural team members were collaborating with 100 diplomats in Africa, and agri-
cultural cultivation and production was at its peak. 
The visits by Minister of Foreign Affairs Shen Chang-huan and Deputy Foreign 
Minister H K Yang to Africa in 1959 and 1960, respectively, had proved to be very useful 
in laying the foundations for enhancing friendly relations and also for gaining the respect 
and promises of support of African allies. Taiwan used part of the US foreign aid it had 
received for its first foray into providing foreign aid to its African allies. Called Operation 
Vanguard, the ROC used its strengths in agricultural development to great success and 
fulfilled a basic need of its allies, that of food. In return, the African allies supported the 
ROC in the UN.   
H.K. Yang, or Mr. Africa as he was known, confessed that in those days he stayed in 
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Africa almost three months every year solely for the purpose of solidifying relations, 
lobbying different countries for support, inspecting the agricultural teams and intermit-
tently conveying African needs to Taipei. This kind of personal diplomacy, endorsed by 
the assistance of foreign aid, proved to be quite successful and effective. In October 26, 
1971, when the ROC withdrew from the UN after 21 years, the ROC had relations with 15 
African countries compared with the 26 that recognized the PRC.  
While the situation changed drastically thereafter, the ROC’s Africa Policy from 
1949 to 1971 was considered very successful. Through the efforts of its agricultural teams 
and Mr. H.K. Yang, the ROC was able to sustain itself on the world stage, while also 
focusing on the goal of making concrete progress in its national development. 
The approach to diplomacy must be continually adjusted according to the external 
environment, which for the ROC underwent enormous change in the 1970s when the 
PRC opted to play an active role in world affairs, and the ROC subsequently withdrew 
from the UN. The two pillars that the ROC had based its foreign policy on in the 1960s 
and early 1970s -- its seat in the UN and maintaining diplomatic allies -- collapsed and 
ceased to exist. This changed reality forced the ROC to try to find another way through 
the complexity of world affairs. But Taiwan was to suffer another blow when the US 
terminated diplomatic relations with the ROC in 1979, exacerbating an already crippling 
situation. If that was not enough, the Ivory Coast turned its recognition towards the PRC 
in 1985, leaving just South Africa, Swaziland and Malawi as the three African countries 
with full diplomatic relations with the ROC.  
The PRC had a vast land with a huge population, market potential, opportunities and 
membership in the UN, which attracted other important countries to join its growing list 
of allies. Under the PRC’s so-called One China policy, all countries had to make a choice 
between the ROC and the PRC. The years between 1971 and 1988 comprised a tumul-
tuous period for ROC diplomatic efforts and can be dubbed the dark days of Taiwan’s 
foreign relations.  
During this period, the ROC maintained assistance to its three remaining African 
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allies. However, the external environment had changed radically, and many agricultural 
teams were called back. Under President Chiang King-Kou’s leadership, the ROC then 
concentrated its efforts on its own national development, which went from a GDP of US$ 
449 in 1971, to US$ 6,357 in 1988. Fortunately, this Taiwan experience was to become an 
important model for developing countries to emulate. After all, according to Article 141 
of the Constitution of the ROC, “The foreign policy of the ROC shall, in a spirit of in-
dependence and initiative and on the basis of the principles of equality and reciprocity, 
cultivate good-neighborliness with other nations, and respect treaties and the charter of 
the UN, in order to protect the rights and interests of Chinese citizens residing abroad, 
promote international cooperation, advance international justice and ensure world 
peace.” 
International cooperation is the all-important goal of the ROC’s foreign policy. The 
US government’s foreign aid had formerly brought the ROC practical assistance, and this 
also allowed the ROC to provide aid to African nations with substantial results. Yet the 
tug-of-war between the ROC and the PRC for allies in Africa was allowing African 
countries to choose between the two Chinas at will and to profit handsomely.  
After President Lee Teng-hui implemented a policy of pragmatic diplomacy in 1988 
and the Tiananmen Square incident occurred in Beijing on June 4, 1989, the ROC’s for-
tunes rebounded with the establishment of diplomatic relations with Niger, the Central 
African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Burkina Faso, Gambia, and Chad: a grand 
victory for the ROC’s African Policy. The ROC upgraded its office in Liberia to full 
diplomatic relations and set up the Consul General in Lagos, Nigeria. Furthermore, the 
ROC set up official offices in the Congo, Libya, Madagascar, Mauritius and Angola with 
the full name of The Delegation of the Republic of China.  
In order to break the negative image of China that the Tiananmen Square incident 
had imposed on the world, the PRC’s foreign minister made official visits to its African 
allies every year after 1991, with the aim of proving its active participation in the inter-
national community and also to show the world that the PRC was still very popular 
among third world countries, especially those in Africa. 
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Since the PRC would not allow its African allies to accept the ROC’s existence in 
their spheres of influence, the ROC’s newly-formed delegations did not last very long. A 
further diplomatic setback came in the form of South Africa’s switching recognition to 
the PRC in January 1998. What had been close to a century of official ties, from 1905 to 
1998, came to an unfortunate end. However, this did not spell the end of relations in their 
entirety; in order to preserve and build on burgeoning economic, cultural, scientific and 
other exchanges, South Africa and the ROC reached a satisfactory arrangement after the 
severance of diplomatic relations. 
The reality today is that it is almost impossible to see the full title of “the Republic of 
China” in Africa, especially among the PRC’s allies. Before the end of 2000, there were 
eight African countries that had full diplomatic relations with the ROC. In international 
politics, diplomacy is an important and necessary tool with which small counties can 
survive. However, in the case of the ROC, which wanted to represent the whole of China, 
its attempts could not be accepted by the world. 
In May 2000, the Democratic Progressive Party won the presidential election and 
took power as the ruling party in the ROC. The DPP took a new approach to enhancing 
interactions with Africa. This included more international cooperation, humanitarian aid, 
volunteer missions, and summit, or meeting, diplomacy. As a result, the ROC president 
made fruitful visits to Africa in July 2000 and July 2002, and all the heads of state of 
Taiwan’s African allies attended President Chen Shui-bian’s second inaugural ceremony 
in 2004. During this period, the use of foreign aid, and personal and conference diplo-
macy, clearly illustrated the ROC’s intention of enhancing Africa-ROC interaction. 
Even though Liberia and Senegal switched recognition to the PRC at the end of 2005, 
and Chad was soon to follow in 2006, Burkina Faso, Sao Tome and Principe, the Gambia, 
Malawi and Swaziland have kept their diplomatic ties with the ROC. Among these 
countries, Malawi has maintained cordial relations with the ROC for 40 years since its 
independence. All these countries voice their support for the ROC in the UN and WHO 
on the basis that its exclusion in these international organizations is unfair and needs to be 
reconsidered. 
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Taiwan, with its unique status in the world, needs friends urgently and wants to ex-
tend its goodwill to the world, but owing to the PRC’s relentless intervention, the ROC 
faces an immensely difficult and rugged foreign policy terrain indeed. For over 50 years, 
a push and pull competition has existed between the ROC and the PRC, and African 
countries continue to choose which one will benefit them most as a friend. 
The following diplomatic strategies each have certain implications, the details of 
which illuminate the ROC’s Africa policy,   
1. Personal diplomacy – Mr. Africa, H.K. Yang, devoted his entire life to Africa. His 
charisma is noteworthy, especially in terms of winning the friendship of African allies. 
He helped establish formal relations with 17 African countries within two years, an 
outstanding contribution. In the early 1960s, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Shen 
Chang-huan, and then Yang Chi-cheng, visited more than 15 countries on each Africa 
trip, thus enhancing cordial relations. Also, Ambassador Chen Hsiung-fei and Dr. Joei 
both traveled extensively in West Africa to persuade countries there to support the 
ROC in its UN campaign. This kind of contact proved to be effective. After 2000, 
President Chen visited Africa twice to solidify relations. The president’s African 
counterparts, the leaders of Chad, Gambia, Burkina Faso, Malawi, Swaziland, and Sao 
Tome and Principe all visited the ROC, some of them several times. 
2. Foreign aid – The ROC has been providing foreign aid to Africa since Operation 
Vanguard began in 1959. This has included aid given through its agricultural missions, 
expanding the Kou River and building a bridge in Burkina Faso, constructing Muzuzu 
Central Hospital in Northern Malawi, and building a road in Chad. It has also estab-
lished medical and handicrafts missions and animal feeding centers, has invited agri-
cultural experts to attend courses in Taiwan, provided scholarships for outstanding 
students and sent volunteers through NGOs. In less visible ways, the ROC has also 
provided loans and grants and also shared its knowledge with SMEs, taught people 
how to be self-supporting and provided information on how to accomplish land re-
form. Emphasis has been very much on helping Africans help themselves. The Kou 
River project in Burkina Faso proved to be a real success and paved the way for the 
production of rice in the desert.  
3. Conference diplomacy: - Regular conferences, commissions or forums have been in-
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strumental in institutionalizing relations. Examples are the ROC-South Africa Eco-
nomic & Technical conference, the ROC-Burkina Faso mixed conference and the 
ROC-Liberia mixed conference, which have been held annually or biennially, de-
pending on the country, to discuss, examine and execute cooperative projects and 
mutual concerns. These conferences have been a platform for the countries involved to 
exchange views, express ideas and, of course, bargain over requests. These confer-
ences have increased in frequency in recent years and have helped improve relations. 
Also, a new trend of holding virtual conferences has emerged, allowing decision 
makers to discuss current issues directly and conveniently. However, this has also 
diminished the role of diplomats. 
4. Economic diplomacy: - Substantive relations can be promoted through direct invest-
ment, trade or debt relief. However, trade volume between Africa and the ROC remains 
limited, constituting only 1% of ROC foreign investment. While the ROC government 
has encouraged private businesses, companies and factories to invest in Africa, it has 
only really been in South Africa that positive results have been achieved. The ROC 
also bought tea and tobacco from Malawi and because of increasing energy needs had 
sought closer cooperation with Chad in exchange for crude oil transportation to Tai-
wan.  
5. Public diplomacy: - This provides an easy route for people to gain direct access to 
different cultures and peoples. For the last 20 years, sports exchanges and exchange 
visits by cultural groups and journalists have allowed people from Africa and Taiwan 
to experience each other’s cultures and form genuine friendships. Hosting Dragon Boat 
festivals and issuing commemorative stamps in both countries are some of the more 
distinguishable activities, and Africa Day and Africa Week held in Taipei have also 
attracted much attention. African students that study in Taiwan also provide opportu-
nities for civilian interaction, which helps people understand one another. While public 
diplomacy should not be underestimated as a tool for achieving foreign relations 
successes, it is of secondary importance. 
South Africa has been the most significant country in Africa for the ROC’s foreign 
relations. Full diplomatic ties were established with South Africa in 1976 when, owing to 
the similarity in their circumstances in that both were anti-Communist and isolated in the 
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world, the two nations were well-suited for mutual aid. Premier Sun brought back six 
agreements from his visit to South Africa in March 1980, ranging from economic coop-
eration to direct flights agreements. These opened a new chapter in the ROC’s history of 
diplomacy. Prime Minister P.W. Botha’s visit to the ROC in November later that year 
further reinforced the cordial relations. Since diplomatic ties with the US were severed in 
1979, South Africa became the most crucial diplomatic partner to the ROC.  
The ROC did everything it could to safeguard this crucial relationship. It was of special 
meaning when General Malan stated that ‘Taiwan looks like my second hometown’. 
Trade relations were central to ROC – RSA relations, and in 1993 the ROC was South 
Africa’s seventh largest trading partner, with a total trade volume of US$1.9 billion. More 
than 25,000 Chinese immigrants from Taiwan moved to South Africa where they settled 
all over the country. Mr. Y. K. Yang, as the ROC’s Ambassador to South Africa from 
1979-1989, brought relations of the two countries to new heights. Foreign Minister R. F. 
Botha, on behalf of the South African government, conferred the medal of Cape of Good 
Hope on Ambassador Yang for his unreserved devotion and selfless contributions. 
President de Klerk visited the ROC in November 1991 and Nelson Mandela came in 
1993.  
When the African National Congress (ANC) eventually took power in April 1994, 
they did not immediately establish diplomatic ties with the PRC, largely because of the 
range of approaches that the ROC used, including investment, setting up vocational 
training centers, making political contributions and inviting MPs and officials to visit 
Taipei. In 1994, Professor Deon Geldenhuys also asserted that dual recognition of the 
ROC and the PRC might be in South Africa’s best national interests. However, the PRC 
rejected this proposal immediately. In confronting such a difficult situation under enor-
mous pressure from the PRC, the South African government had to take the decision to 
cease diplomatic ties with the ROC, and on November 27, 1996, President Mandela 
announced that South Africa would establish full diplomatic ties with the PRC from 
January 1, 1998.  
This was a tremendous blow to the ROC, resulting in the cancellation of direct 
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flights, the recall of Ambassador Loh and the ceasing of all existing negotiations. The 
Department of Foreign Affairs of South Africa announced that South African interests in 
Taiwan would be attended to the under the name of the Liaison Office of South Africa. 
The offices of Taiwan in South Africa were to be known as the Taipei Liaison offices in 
Pretoria, Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban. 
Ambassador Loh had been the ROC’s top diplomat in South Africa from 1991 to 
1997, during which time he invited 225 members of parliament to visit the ROC. How-
ever, when President Mandela announced the severance of ties, none of these MPs spoke 
out positively on behalf of the ROC, adding insult to injury. It also proved that the par-
liament had no real role in formulating the country’s foreign policy. All that remained was 
for the ROC and South Africa to establish a framework for future interaction, which was 
done through 12 rounds of negotiations.  
For the ROC, the PRC and the African countries, conducting their foreign policies 
via diplomacy was all about protecting their own national interests. This can be said to be 
true for all countries at any time in their history. To fully grasp the landscape of the ROC’s 
Africa policy, one can elaborate by identifying the following four elements: Strength, 
Weakness, Opportunity and Threat. 
Strength: - The ROC’s policy towards Africa is plain; to win the friendship of Africans 
through assistance and aid. It tries to do this through positive measures that include in-
viting political figures from its allies to visit Taiwan, promoting summit diplomacy be-
tween African heads of state and the president of the ROC, and above all, enhancing in-
ternational cooperation through foreign aid. Foreign aid can be classified as loans, do-
nations, grants, technical cooperation and investment. To date, the ROC has dispatched 
technical missions to six African allies in the expectation that these allies will voice their 
support for Taiwan’s plight at the UN and WHO and decry the unfair treatment of Taiwan. 
The ROC does not want to compete with the PRC or to challenge its policies. 
Weakness: - Economic relations and trade should be the central focus of interactions 
between Africa and the ROC. Yet since the ROC’s investment in Africa is a rather meager 
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one percent of the country’s total foreign investment, the two sides do not have much in 
common in economic relations. Also, the two sides do not have similar political or cul-
tural characteristics, a fact which makes it difficult to integrate. Furthermore, the ROC is 
not a member of the UN and WHO, which makes its participation in international society 
marginal. The challenges that the ROC faces in this context are much more difficult than 
those faced by any other nation.  
Opportunities: - In essence, the ROC’s main interest in Africa is to win the diplomatic 
recognition and political support which has been needed for decades. The African allies’ 
interest in Taiwan is to receive the economic benefits, financial assistance and technical 
cooperation. Only when the tense relations across the Taiwan Strait improve will the ROC 
have the opportunity of winning more friends in Africa, for the ROC does not want to 
provoke the PRC or those pro-Taiwan African leaders currently in power. With the 
situation on the world stage being distinctly in the PRC’s favor, the ROC must revise its 
Africa policy prudently, taking into consideration any potential effects on the PRC. 
Threat: - Since 1949, both sides of the Taiwan Strait have proclaimed that they are the 
only legitimate government of China. The ROC’s only real threat has always been the 
PRC. With the need to accept the so-called “One China” policy as a precondition to re-
lations with the PRC, and with the PRC as a member of the UN, every country has had to 
make a choice between the two, a situation which has put the ROC in an undesirable 
position. Another threat is that African states are unstable, prone to coup d’états, civil 
wars and famine, making the political situation hard to manage or predict. The fact that 
more African allies want increased financial aid has also put the ROC in a difficult posi-
tion, to such an extent that it hesitates to respond to these requests. However, there is no 
room for pessimism in conducting the ROC’s diplomacy. Even if its position is often 
untenable, it has to face the obstacles and overcome them. The grossly unfavorable dip-
lomatic situation that the ROC faces today is one that has evolved for historical reasons, 
aggravated by the ROC’s withdrawal from the UN and the so-called One China policy, 
which the PRC insists on internationally. Despite the overall unfavorable position that the 
ROC finds itself in today, there are certain noteworthy conclusions that can be drawn. 
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Conclusion 1: The ROC and its African allies can unite with common interests. In its 
early years, the ROC needed diplomatic recognition to sustain its seat in the UN. Winning 
the friendship of African countries was therefore of paramount importance, and such 
political and diplomatic considerations became the dominant force in shaping the ROC’s 
efforts to sustain the nation. In return for recognition, the ROC provided different kinds of 
assistance in Africa. For the ROC’s African allies, economic support and aid was their 
main objective, largely for relief from poverty for their peoples. The two sides became 
friends based on their respective needs.  
Even though the ROC has not been a member of the UN for 35 years, it still needs 
international recognition and visibility. The current total of 23 diplomatic allies means a 
great deal to the ROC. While Africa is geographically distant from Asia, and it has very 
little in common economically, the ROC’s chief concern is political support and recog-
nition. From 1960-1971, the ROC’s African policy was largely successful. After 1989, 
the new era that dawned necessitated that the ROC win more friends. It is noteworthy that 
of the ROC’s six African allies, the only democratic country-Sao Tome and Prin-
cipe-still remains in favor of maintaining political ties. Nevertheless, since 2000 Presi-
dent Chen and the African heads of state pay frequent mutual visits which, to some extent, 
will be beneficial for Sino-African interactions. 
Conclusion 2: the PRC is the only factor which hinders ROC-Africa relations. The PRC 
launched their first official contact with Africa by establishing diplomatic ties with Egypt 
on May 30, 1956. The PRC then established diplomatic ties with Guinea on October 4, 
1959, thus initiating their first contact with sub-Saharan Africa. For more than four 
decades, under the zero-sum game of the so-called One China policy, African states could 
only choose either the ROC or the PRC, not both. The ROC continued to use the full 
name ‘Republic of China’ in the international community and tried to befriend 
non-aggressive countries. However, it encountered tremendous challenges from the PRC, 
which declared itself to be the only legal China, with Taiwan being merely part of China.  
In short, the ROC wanted to make friends but was restricted by the PRC factor, not 
by the African states themselves. As the PRC has grown increasingly powerful since the 
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late 1990s, African states such as South Africa, Liberia and Senegal have all been at-
tracted to it. The PRC has put much emphasis on Africa for the express reason of trying to 
banish the ROC from the African continent. This tug-of-war that has existed for more 
than five decades already will definitely continue in the future. For the time being, the 
ROC has been pushed into a defensive position, and it now faces a PRC that, with eco-
nomic ties and military cooperation with 47 African states, could even pose a threat to the 
US, the UK or France.  
Conclusion 3: Personal diplomacy, foreign aid and conference diplomacy are the main 
tools of ROC’s Africa policy. In its early days, personal diplomacy and foreign aid 
formed the backbone of the ROC’s diplomatic efforts. Once the ROC withdrew from the 
UN, however, only foreign aid was used. During the last decade, personal diplomacy, 
foreign aid and conference diplomacy have each played their part in ROC’s Africa policy. 
Sending foreign aid, medical and agricultural missions and joint venture programs re-
sulted from political motivation. More precisely, foreign aid can be said to be the ROC’s 
main tool in conducting its foreign policy. Personal diplomacy, conducted through visits 
by heads of states, has also managed to directly enhance relations; conference diplomacy, 
which utilizes legal or formal frameworks to institutionalize interactions, has also showed 
promise. On the other hand, economic diplomacy and public diplomacy have not been so 
successful, owing to very limited trade and economic opportunities and the different po-
litical settings between the ROC and its African allies.  
President Chen’s visits to Africa in 2000 and 2002 were valuable in winning African 
friendship. In the foreseeable future, providing foreign aid and inviting political figures 
from Africa to visit the ROC will continue. It is important here to mention the 39 people, 
including two ambassadors, who devoted their lives to executing the ROC’s Africa pol-
icy.  
Conclusion 4: South Africa was and still is the most important country for the ROC. 
Under similar political circumstances at the time, South Africa and the ROC upgraded 
their diplomatic relations in May 1976. The government of the ROC invested heavily in 
South Africa and encouraged ROC immigrants there to do the same. P. W. Botha, Presi-
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dent De Klerk, Nelson Mandela all visited the ROC. One embassy was established in 
Pretoria along with three consulates in Cape Town, Johannesburg and Durban, where 
more than 40 diplomats were stationed. South Africa was the ROC’s biggest ally in terms 
of size and population among the 30 diplomatic allies that remained after the cessation of 
diplomatic ties with the US in 1979. President Mandela announced the end of diplomatic 
relations 13 months ahead of time in 1997, giving both sides opportunity for negotiations 
concerning future legal frameworks. In the joint communiqué between the PRC and 
South Africa, it was agreed that there is but one China, the government of the PRC is the 
sole legal government representing the whole of China, and Taiwan is an inalienable part 
of China. 
Nevertheless, South Africa still provides the Taipei Liaison Office in South Africa 
and its staff with diplomatic privileges and diplomatic status as a gesture of goodwill, and 
has displayed interest in bilateral trading, investment and economic cooperation in its 
post-1998 policy towards Taiwan. In 2004, four South African citizens of Taiwanese 
origin were elected as new MPs in its parliament, so they can attend to the interests of 
Taiwanese immigrants while simultaneously contributing to the South African parlia-
ment. Ambassador Loh also received a medal from President Mandela.  
Conclusion 5: Less than one-fourth of African countries can be friends with the ROC. 
The underlying reason for countries shifting their recognition to China during the last 
decade has been the PRC’s ability to advance their national interests. South Africa and 
Senegal wanted to play an important role in the world, hence they recognized the PRC. 
Liberia and Guinea-Bissau wanted the UN to solve their domestic problems, and the PRC, 
being a member of the Security Council, was able to provide assistance. Zambia, Tan-
zania, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Mauritius and Guinea identified with the same ideology 
as Beijing, and they therefore wanted to create close ties. Still other countries, namely 
Liberia, Ivory Coast, Congo, Burundi, Sierra Leone and Chad, had serious problems and 
civil war. They needed China which, again as a member the UN Security Council, could 
solve their problems through mediation. Gabon, Angola and Equator-Guinea, rich in 
natural resources, needed China to exploit their markets. Some of Africa’s other major 
states, such as Nigeria, Egypt and Algeria, will not have contact with the ROC since they 
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regard China as the leader of the Third World. 
With the tendency of some African states to waver in their position from time to 
time, such as Senegal and the Central Africa Republic, which established, and severed, 
diplomatic ties with the ROC three times; and Lesotho, Niger and Benin, which did so 
twice; there are only 13 to 14 countries which the ROC might befriend. Since five of 
these countries already have full ties with Taiwan, the actual number of countries which 
could still establish ties with the ROC is only six to seven. 
Conclusion 6: diplomacy has its limits and national power is the decisive factor.  For a 
small island-state, diplomacy is a crucial and effective mechanism through which to seek 
national survival and development. Through making friends with other countries, Taiwan 
can use diplomacy to gain and then safeguard its national interest. If national power is the 
underlying reason to support diplomacy, which in turn supports foreign policy, then it is 
vital for Taiwan to have a certain number of diplomatic allies with which to assert its legal 
status as a nation in the world. This is especially true given the uniquely formidable 
situation with which the ROC is faced. 
Support for the ROC’s participation in the UN by its six African allies serves as a 
weather vane for the stability of bilateral relations with these countries. Senegal did not 
support the ROC in the UN in 2004 and subsequently severed diplomatic ties with the 
ROC on October 25, 2005. As of the end of 2005, six African countries maintained dip-
lomatic relations with the ROC. These were Burkina Faso, Chad, Gambia, Malawi, São 
Tomé and Principe, and Swaziland. Taiwan has embassies in all of these countries, which 
also maintain embassies in Taiwan. Furthermore, Taiwan has set up a representative of-
fice in Nigeria and liaison offices in South Africa, and both countries have also estab-
lished trade and liaison offices in Taipei. It is evident that diplomacy has its limits and 
cannot be relied on as a cure-all for every kind of situation between two countries. Di-
plomacy requires an attitude of give and take, not all or nothing. Yet it requires national, 
economic and military power as well as time. The example of Senegal illustrates that 
there is no such thing as all-weather friends, only all-weather national interests.  
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In assessing relations between the ROC and African countries, the PRC is the critical 
factor. The Chinese government started building the Tanzania-Zambia railway in the 
1960s and provided other kinds of donations and assistance. Recently, China cancelled 
the debt owed by African states, an act which came as a big surprise to all observers. It 
was perhaps a small price to pay for access to mineral resources and crude oil that stood to 
be gained. 
Beyond China’s commercial and economic potential and military influence, its 
permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council and its willingness to wield veto 
power like a club, provides it with huge leverage in compelling weaker countries, espe-
cially undemocratic regimes in crisis, to kowtow to Beijing. The government in Liberia 
surrendered on October 12, 2003, to the PRC’s threats and lures, resuming bilateral ties 
with China. Senegal switched diplomatic recognition to Beijing on October 25, 2005, and 
President Wade was bold enough to write a letter to President Chen saying there is no 
such thing as a forever-friend, only national interests. On August 5, 2006, the eve of 
Premier Su Tseng-chang’s departure for Chad, China forced that African nation to sever 
diplomatic relations with Taiwan. President Deby declared that he had had to make the 
decision for the very survival of his country. 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, James Huang, has said that Senegal, which switched 
diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China, “played a negative role” in influencing 
Chad, as its president chaired a meeting between the Chadian and Sudanese presidents in 
Dakar on the possibility of the restoration of diplomatic relations with the PRC. Even 
though Minister Huang had paid two visits in April and July 2006 to secure and 
strengthen diplomatic relations, and President Chen had even telephoned President Deby 
on July 27 to offer his congratulations on Deby’s upcoming presidential inauguration, 
Chad still switched recognition from Taipei to Beijing. 
The international leverage that China gains from its status at the UN, combined with 
its incessant “three alls” campaign to “take all” of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies, “block all” 
of Taiwan’s international channels and “crush all” of Taiwan’s international space means 
that the number of allies Taipei has will inevitably decrease. Chad’s decision leaves 
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Taiwan with only 24 allies, whereas China increased its number of diplomatic allies to 48 
out of the 53 African countries, a number that is likely to increase, leaving Taiwan to face 
an even tougher challenge in the future. 
For the past half century, the ROC has provided tens of millions of dollars worth of 
financial aid every year for health, agricultural and infrastructure projects to African al-
lies. Furthermore, about half of the ROC’s total foreign relations budget is available for 
international development assistance or cooperative activities. Yet this is no match for 
Beijing’s increasingly liberal and high-profile use of debt relief and huge grants. More 
importantly, with Taiwan unable to compete with China, the PRC is actually expanding 
and consolidating its global dominance and control over crucial mineral resources. 
After comparing the size of the countries, population, market, economic potential 
and international influence of the PRC and Taiwan, most African states would rather 
choose the PRC over the ROC, and have indeed done exactly that. That Taiwan is not a 
member in the UN does not help. Also, most countries in Africa that have had official ties 
with Taiwan in the past have elections, civil war, and famine, and they have requested 
increasingly more help from Taiwan with these and other emerging issues.  
Since the ROC urgently needs diplomatic allies, it is always willing to establish ties 
with other countries. Yet under continual pressure from the PRC, African states are prone 
to sever diplomatic ties with the ROC, a situation that no other country today faces. 
China’s communiqué with African countries insisting that “there is but one China in the 
world; the PRC is the only legitimate Chinese government in the world; Taiwan is an 
integral part of Chinese territory” is also strong political wording that, despite contra-
dicting fact, has forced African countries to accept the PRC, and only the PRC. 
Since 2000, the Chinese-African Forum has attracted the participation of 47 out of 
Africa’s total 53 states. In this forum, China has canceled debts amounting to more than 
US$12 billion, winning the praise of its African allies. China has also urged all African 
states to transfer diplomatic power to their parliaments to prevent any presidents, prime 
ministers and/or foreign ministers from establishing diplomatic ties out of personal will. 
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The PRC has also promulgated “China’s Africa Policy”, which covers investment, policy, 
assistance, position, aid, and cooperation. Its ambition is obvious and its real intention is 
to gain access to natural resources, crude oil, markets, political support and profits. China 
has also recently significantly increased its diplomatic presence in Africa and has ar-
ranged for high-ranking officials to visit Africa. Chinese President Hu Jintao visited Af-
rica in April 2006 and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in June 2006, signing a total of 71 
communiqués on mutual cooperation and investment agreements with seven African 
countries. 
China’s state-run enterprises have been quick to march into Africa, investing in a 
number of projects, ranging from local internet networks to infrastructure planning. This 
is in direct contrast to Taiwan where, as a democratic country, any policy needs public 
scrutiny and approval, making readily mobilizing the nation’s resources to invest in Af-
rica difficult. 
On the whole, China’s increasing might in financial diplomacy, which often takes 
the form of low-interest loans, aid grants and infrastructure projects, increasingly out-
weighs what Taiwan can offer. Therefore, Taiwan has to develop a kind of “refined di-
plomacy” that strategically focuses on its strengths and specialties. Taiwan has a com-
parative advantage in technical skills and medical advances, which could be used to build 
an internet network for its African allies and to assist them in avian flu prevention, among 
other things. Furthermore, the quality and sustainability of the aid that Taiwan provides is 
relatively higher than that offered by China, and the aims of technical missions have 
shifted from agricultural to agribusiness and from agribusiness to science and technology, 
to Taiwan’s advantage. Taiwan’s outstanding techniques in these areas have enabled it to 
share its achievements with the world. 
High-ranking official visits to Africa therefore also become even more essential. 
President Chen Shui-bian’s last visit to African allies was in 2002, when he visited 
Senegal, Sao Tome & Principe, Malawi and Swaziland. In order to strengthen bilateral 
ties in the face of increasing diplomatic competition from China, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs James Huang embarked on a seven-day overseas visit to Taiwan’s six diplomatic 
  287
allies in Africa on July 4, 2006. Minister Huang also led a delegation to Malawi to attend 
the 40th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations.  
Before any final resolution is reached between Taiwan and China, it is perhaps in-
evitable that China will gain even more allies from Africa, thus making Taiwan’s inter-
national position increasingly difficult. China is already a quasi-superpower that will use 
the zero-sum game of its One China policy to full effect in curbing the ROC’s diplomacy. 
The only way for Taiwan to exist in these complex times is to safeguard its five African 
allies, to not challenge China and to ease cross-strait tensions. While Taiwan will not 
close the door on African countries that want to establish diplomatic ties, it must however 
have an evaluation process in place in advance. High-ranking official exchanges and the 
provision of humanitarian aid from Taiwan together constitute the main thrust for rein-
forcing the ROC’s diplomatic ties with its African allies.  
Even though only five countries maintain relations with Taiwan, in contrast to 
China’s 48, certainly an uphill battle, the ROC still has some room to maneuver. So it is 
that Taiwan finds itself in a unique position. Its diplomatic relations with Africa have 
gone from 22 countries in 1969, the highest number ever, to the 1980s, when only three 
countries had diplomatic relations with the ROC. Among these, Malawi has had diplo-
matic ties with the ROC since its independence, which began over 40 years ago. Swazi-
land has also kept up its friendship with Taiwan for 38 years.  
Based on the facts, the ROC should utilize its limited international assistance re-
sources in cooperative efforts to help its African allies upgrade their living standards and 
skills in fields where the ROC has core competences, such as health, agriculture, com-
munity building and human rights. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs will continue pro-
viding scholarships to 17 Chadian students until their graduation, a move which has al-
ready come as a welcome surprise to the affected students. In the foreseeable future, the 
ROC will utilize the advantageous economic and trade opportunities available to its Af-
rican allies so as to promote their economic and trade development, which would also 
help further develop friendships. The ATEF has already done much to promote two-way 
trade between the ROC and its African friends, and further cooperation can be expected. 
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In the meantime, the ROC shall aim to assist its allies by creating business opportunities 
and improving investment conditions so as to create jobs and decrease the gap between 
the rich and the poor. The ROC looks forward to sharing its experience in economic 
development with its allies and to utilizing its advantages to assist developing countries 
grow and prosper. It is expected that the ROC will make efforts to open new strategic 
options in North Africa soon.      
The ideas contained within this thesis that are different and original are as follows: 
First, according to declassified diplomatic files, the US Ambassador Walter 
McConaughy reported to Washington after Taiwan’s UN expulsion in 1971 that then Vice 
Foreign Minister Yang told him that for Taiwan to survive it was necessary to declare that 
“the government of Taiwan is entirely separate and apart from the government on the 
mainland and that henceforth the government here will have nothing to do with the 
mainland.” Yang said that the declaration should prescribe a new designation for the 
government, namely “the Chinese Republic of Taiwan”. Yang’s foresight and efforts were 
enormous, even though unacceptable at that time. But Yang’s statements show that he 
understood that the legal status of Taiwan had yet to be determined. 
Second, the ROC has always recognized the urgent need to retain its diplomatic al-
lies. From 1960 to 1972, the ROC focused on saving its allies in Africa, because without 
them the ROC clearly would lose its seat in the United Nations. However, by 1988, only 
three nations on the continent had maintained diplomatic ties with the ROC. In 1989, 
Lesotho, Guiena-Bissau and Gambia abandoned their diplomatic ties with the PRC. As 
of 2000, only Malawi and Swaziland had been maintaining relations with the ROC 
since gaining independence in 1966 and 1968 respectively. Some nations switched rec-
ognition between the ROC and the PRC according to their national interests. President 
Chen visited Africa twice with a view to strengthening bilateral relations and escalating 
the visibility of Taiwan in international community. In brief, the ROC expected to win 
fresh political support of Taiwan’s participation in the UN and key international organi-
zations, while the ROC renewed its commitment to providing them with economic and 
other forms of substantive support. In its foreign aid, the ROC government puts priority 
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to its allies on the continent. As for the other nations in Africa in need, Taiwan’s NGOs 
still share whatever resources they can spare. 
Third, out of the five modern diplomacy methods that are widely used nowadays-- 
personal diplomacy, foreign aid, conference diplomacy, economic diplomacy and public 
diplomacy--the ROC uses personal diplomacy, foreign aid and conference diplomacy as 
the main tools for conducting its foreign policy towards Africa, an approach which has 
proved quite useful and successful. Foreign aid -- including sending agricultural and 
medical missions to African allies, cultivating the Kuo River and Bagre Reclamation 
Area in Burkina Faso and establishing the Muzuzu Central Hospital in northern Malawi – 
is particularly useful. Since economic conditions in the ROC and Africa are totally dif-
ferent, economic diplomacy could not play an obvious role in the economic development 
of Africa. In the era of globalization, Taiwan should urge the use of more public diplo-
macy in the future to publicize and vitalize both Taiwan’s interaction and current image in 
Africa. 
Fourth, of the five African regions, the ROC has established embassies or official 
offices in four, with North Africa being the sole exception. The ROC closed its Libya 
office in September 1997 and cut official contact with the whole region, which later 
would prove to be a poor decision. In general, the presence of an official overseas office 
is a sign of a nation’s power which is then acknowledged by most other nations. North 
African nations are oil exports that command a strategic geographic position and there-
fore, should be taken seriously. The ROC should reopen at least one representative of-
fice in this region as soon as possible to ensure its national interests and better serve the 
region. 
Fifth, in the 1960s and the 1970s, the ROC sent agricultural, medical and 
skill-training missions to Africa to help the people of the host countries increase crop 
productions, reduce mortality rates from diseases and learn skills with which to earn a 
living. In light of the changing times, the ROC should focus on new tasks, such as fos-
tering the creation of SMEs and a modern labor pool, providing micro-loans, attracting 
foreign investment to the area, and transferring technical know-how. More precisely, the 
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peoples of Africa have to adopt new methods, ideas and actions to meet their needs. The 
ROC has tried to use positive, concrete actions to convince its African allies that main-
taining diplomatic relations with Taiwan is in their best interest. 
Sixth, before the first direct popular election held in the ROC on March 23, 1996, 
President Lee wrote a letter (see appendix XVIII ) to President Mandela requesting “May 
I, therefore, formally invite South Africa to play the role of facilitator and carry my offer 
to the leaders in Beijing…” This proved that the ROC showed goodwill and had formally 
asked South Africa to be an influential facilitator in China-Taiwan negotiations. Most 
importantly, this unprecedented move came before the first direct presidential elections in 
Taiwan, which is meaningful in showing that the ROC had strong intentions of finding 
any possible opportunity to solve the problems across the Taiwan Strait. 
Seventh, from the time Mandela was released from prison until November 27, 1996, 
when he suddenly announced the cutting of diplomatic ties with the ROC, Mandela had 
guaranteed Ambassador Loh on many occasions that his country would not betray the 
ROC unless the ROC behaved wrongfully towards South Africa. However, Mandela 
changed his position and wrote a letter (see appendix XIX) to President Lee to explain 
why he had to make this tough decision, and to once again express his appreciation of the 
valued contribution that the ROC had made to the RDP. He also promised that after 
recognition was switched to China, Taiwan’s representation in South Africa would con-
tinue at the highest possible level, but stop just short of full diplomatic recognition. It was 
because of the friendly relations that had lasted for over 90 years since China established 
its Consulate General in Johannesburg in 1905 that this letter fixed cordial relations as 
so-called “constructive relations”. South Africa had had no choice but to make a decision 
between the two Chinas. 
Eighth, the Chinese government opened a consulate in Johannesburg in 1905. Af-
ter the ROC was founded in 1911, new government kept official ties at the consulate 
level until 1976, when the two countries upgraded their relations to full diplomatic 
status until December 31, 1997. Despite the change in South Africa’s diplomatic alli-
ance, the ROC has maintained three offices in South Africa. As for the people-to people 
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diplomacy, in 1996 Buddists from Taiwan built Nan Hua Temple, Africa’s biggest Bud-
dhist place of worship, in Bronkhorstspruit. In 2004, four South African ethnic Chinese 
of varying political parties affiliation were sworn in as members of parliament. Such 
developments have painted a clear picture that the two nations enjoy very close relations. 
The ROC has more government offices, diplomats and compatriots in South Africa than 
in any other country of Africa. More Taiwanese people visit South Africa than any other 
African nation. Likewise, Taiwan receives more official guests, tourists and white collar 
workers from South Africa than the other African states. In short, even though the two 
nations now lack formal diplomatic relations, they still maintain solid and substantive 
interaction. 
Ninth, since the DPP took power in Taiwan, its foreign policy is slightly different to 
the former ruling party, the KMT. The DPP insists on nurturing the identity of Taiwan and 
prefers to be clearly separate from China. As a result: (1) “TAIWAN” is used on the cover 
of passports for distinction; (2) All the embassies overseas use Republic of China (Taiwan) 
as their full title; (3) The official foreign aid agency, ICDF, now uses the new name 
TaiwanICDF; (4) the donation of goods and infrastructure projects contain a label indi-
cating they come from “Republic of China (Taiwan).” According to Premier Su of the 
DPP, Taiwan should build up its own image and reputation in the international commu-
nity by clearly spelling out the country’s name, adding that Taiwan should let the world 
know that Taiwan is not China. Judging from the facts, this gesture can do little to help 
Taiwan in the competition with China in Africa.  
Tenth, it is a fact that to sustain diplomatic relations with African countries, the 
ROC must provide huge assistance such as grants, loans and investments, so as to make 
relations more meaningful. Even though the ROC did whatever it could, some African 
allies switched recognition to the PRC abruptly. And since the African states could not 
pay back the loans agreed upon years before, the ROC had to eat bitter fruits. Because 
there were some setbacks in Africa, people in Taiwan have started to doubt whether it is 
worthwhile investing a lot of resources in far away, underdeveloped states. They question 
if Taiwan’s international status may be changed because of some unimportant states’ 
recognition of the ROC. Fortunately, in spite of the dissenting voices on this issue, the 
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ROC has kept on the right track in doing whatever is possible to win the friendship of 
African states and other countries as well.  
Eleventh, the ROC faces an uphill battle in its foreign affairs. All nations of the 
world are forced into choosing either the ROC or the PRC, thus putting the ROC in an 
unfavorable situation. Only two countries in the world are not members of the United 
Nations: the Vatican and the ROC. However, unlikely the Holy See, The ROC has lim-
ited diplomatic freedom, thereby making the ROC’s situation unique. After many dec-
ades of swimming upstream, the ROC has realized that the relations between it and the 
PRC are far more important than its foreign policy. If its mainland policy can not make 
a positive breakthrough, then the ROC will still have to continue facing a bitter struggle. 
Lastly, as China increasingly exerts its political and economic influence in the 
world arena, the ROC’s diplomatic space to maneuver continues to shrink. The ROC 
has little choice but to find a feasible solution to this problem, with making peace with 
China playing a key role. The ROC can not but make certain concessions in its stand-
points, principles and actions, while striving to safeguard national interests. Fundamen-
tally, these steps will benefit both sides. It has been predicted that the ROC will change 
its foreign policy, but not under the DPP steps down from power. Change in political 
party will bring results, and taking new foreign policy to make peace with China is the 
only solution for the ROC’s future. 
The Republic of China is the world’s fifteenth largest trade nation (2004), and ranks 
the third in foreign exchange reserves. However, the ROC is faced with an unfair inter-
national situation that is not commensurate with its economic standing. Through its Af-
rican policy, which has proved to be an immensely difficult form of diplomacy, it has tried 
to change this environment. The sad truth is that nowadays the long journey to diplomatic 
recognition has become even more fraught with difficulties than before. Perhaps the final 
conclusion should be that the quickest solution for the ROC would be to negotiate with 
the indomitable PRC for a way forward that is acceptable to both sides.  
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Appendix I 
 
Treaty of Amity between the Republic of China and the Republic of Liberia. Signed on 
December 11, 1937; Ratifications exchanged at Lisbon on October 16, 1941; Entered into 
force on October 16, 1941. 
 
His Excellency the President of the Republic of China and His Excellency the President 
of the Republic of Liberia, being equally animated by the desire to maintain friendly re-
lations between the two countries and to promote the mutual interests of their peoples, 
have decided to conclude a Treaty of Amity and have, for this purpose, named as their 
Plenipotentiaries: 
His Excellency the President of the Republic of China: 
  H. E. Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo,  
      Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of 
China to France; 
His Excellency the President of the Republic of Liberia: 
  H. E. M. le Baron de Bogaerde,  
      Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the Republic of 
Liberia to France; 
Who, after having communicated to each other their full powers, found in good and 
due form, have agreed on the following Articles:  
 
Article I 
There shall be inviolable peace and sincere and perpetual friendship between the Re-
public of China and the Republic of Liberia, and between the nationals of the two States. 
 
Article II 
The High Contracting Parties shall have the right reciprocally to send duly accredited 
diplomatic representatives who shall enjoy, in the country to the Government of which 
they are accredited, all the rights, privileges, immunities and exemptions generally rec-
ognized by public international law. 
 
Article III 
Each of the High Contracting Parties shall have the right to send Consuls-General, 
Consuls, and Vice Consuls to those localities in the territory of the other which shall be 
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determined by common accord. Such consular officers shall exercise the functions and 
enjoy the treatment generally recognized by international practice. Prior to their as-
sumption of office, they shall obtain from the Government of the country to which they 
are sent exequaturs which are subject to withdrawal by the said Government. The High 
Contracting Parties shall not appoint persons engaged in industry or commerce as their 
consular officers, honorary consuls being excepted. 
 
Article IV 
The High Contracting Parties agree to regulate, by special conventions, their relations 
concerning commerce and navigation as well as the conditions for the residence and 
sojourn of the nationals of either Party in the territory of the other. 
 
Article V 
The present Treaty is drawn up in duplicate in the Chinese and English languages. The 
two texts which have been carefully compared and verified shall be equally authoritative. 
 
Article VI 
The present Treaty shall be ratified as soon as possible by the High Contracting Parties in 
accordance with their respective constitutional requirements and the ratifications shall be 
exchanged at Paris. It shall enter into force on the day on which the exchange of ratifi-
cations shall have taken place. 
 
In faith whereof, the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty 
and have affixed thereto their seals.  
 
Done at Paris this eleventh day of the twelfth month of the twenty-sixth year of the Re-
public of China corresponding to the eleventh day of December, nineteen hundred and 
thirty-seven. 
 
(Seal) V. K. Wellington Koo                  (Seal) O. de Bogaerde 
 
Source: Treaties between the Republic of China and Foreign States (1927-1957), MOFA, 
ROC, 1958, pp. 309-310. 
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Appendix II 
 
Premier Chiang Ching-kuo’s speech in the Legislative Yuan, ROC: 
 
(a) February 21, 1975 
   In his last testament, Dr. Sun Yat-sen told us “to unite with all peoples who treat us as 
equals in a common struggle.” Keeping this counsel in mind, we have never ceased to 
promote international friendship on the basis of equality and reciprocity. We have no 
purpose except to contribute to world peace. In the 64 years since establishment of the 
Republic, we have never engaged in aggressive expansion. As we were in the past, so we 
are today and so we shall be in the future. 
 
At this critical moment of decisive change in a bewildering world, we reiterate that 
the Republic of China will continue its cultural tradition of peace and friendship, will do 
its utmost to assist all countries that need our help to promote domestic progress and serve 
the welfare of their people and will fulfill its responsibility to join with all peace-loving 
and justice-upholding countries to promote world peace and prosperity. 
 
-- Externally, to contribute in every possible way to the upholding of international 
justice and peace with our faithfulness, our respectability and our just stand, we shall 
meet the challenges of all changes in the situation, develop total diplomacy and enhance 
our friendship and substantial relations with all countries under the principle of adhering 
to our anti-Communist policy and safeguarding the national interest. 
 
-- To pledge that we shall never compromise with the Chinese Communists, we shall 
spare no effort in joining with anti-Communist and anti-Mao forces in Taiwan and abroad, 
and in front of and behind the enemy lines, to engage the Chinese Communists. Our 
objective of eliminating the Maoists, recovering the mainland and establishing a new 
China of San Min Chu I must be accomplished without alteration.  
 
  We are totally convinced that with our fortitude and moral courage, and our belief 
that the benevolent can conquer any enemy, we shall overcome every difficulty and open 
up a new era with roads at every turn. The country will have a bright prospect no matter 
how heavy the impact of the international situation, provided we can manifest our 
dauntless fighting spirit and self-reliance in meeting all challenges. 
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(b) September 17, 1976 
  In the past six months, the world has remained caught in the turmoil of the confron-
tation between freedom and slavery and the crossfire between cold war and hot war. The 
democracies have begun to become disillusioned about “détente” after suffering great 
losses, but we can still find that the waves of appeasement are surging high in the back-
ground of world events, if we watch developments with sober minds. There is still a 
distance to travel before we can suppress the evil and restore the good on the 
anti-Communist horizon. 
 
  The flames of war have flared often in the Mideast and in Africa, but as the Commu-
nists are, since the fall of Indochina, bent on enlarging their aggression and on carrying 
out their plan of world communization, the center of gravity in the development of world 
affairs, undoubtedly, is still in Asia and the West Pacific region. Situated in such an un-
certain and hectic times and in such a crucial region of potential crises, we feel deeply that 
we must make national security our primary task in creating opportunities and com-
manding changes. 
 
  We never overlook these two factors that might affect our national security: First is the 
changing shape of events that are not of our own make. They include the changes in world 
situation and on the Chinese mainland. 
 
  The second, which is of our own make, is to build up or strength, our national defense 
in particular. A strong national defense force is a primary pre-condition to our national 
security. In our efforts to strengthen our national security, we have adhered to the fol-
lowing principles: 
 
1. Through scrutinizing the changes in world events, we must, hold our position in 
diplomacy, win more friendly countries and friendship with sincerity, so as to know 
the changes, cope with the changes and command the changes. Then, we can 
command the world trend and create an international horizon in our favor. 
 
2. Through the strengthening of our national defense, we must complete our prepa-
rations for meeting any eventuality and able to hold an absolute military advantage 
in offense as well as defense. 
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3. Through our close watch on the development in Chinese Communist affairs, we 
must grasp the chaotic changes on the mainland so that we can deal the enemy a 
fatal blow at his weakest point in front of or behind the enemy’s lines, thus expe-
diting his total collapse. 
 
  It is undeniable that in recent years the free world’s failure in distinguishing friend 
from foe and right from wrong has added to our difficulties in the practice of our un-
yielding diplomacy. Difficult it though may be, we have never been, and will never be-
come, timid and frustrated in our diplomatic efforts. To the contrary, we will move for-
ward with tenacity. 
 
  In improving our relations with the democratic countries, we will always adhere to the 
principles of uprightness. We will never forget that we must maintain our national dignity. 
We will never do anything that may impart our identity or besmirch our national integrity. 
We believe deeply this is the way to ensure national security. 
 
  All our actions in the past, such as suspending diplomatic relations with some countries, 
walking out of the United Nations, breaking off the air routes with Japan and refusing to 
take part in the Olympic Games in Montreal, were based on this solemn principle. We 
took these actions to maintain our righteous national spirit, on which we rely for our 
victory in the struggle against Communism and for national recovery. 
 
  We are pursuing a total diplomacy today. We will try in every possible way to increase 
our international communications and strengthen our cooperation with democratic 
countries. But we must make it plain that in our dealings with various countries, we will 
never engage in the “diplomacy of special agents,” such as has been done by the 
shameless Chinese Communists. 
 
  Nor will we engage in the capricious “united front diplomacy” adopted by the Chinese 
Communists, who may regard a foreign power as neither enemy nor friend, as both 
enemy and friend, or as an enemy today and a friend tomorrow. We will deal cordially 
with democratic countries on the basis of “justice” and “friendship.” We will take a 
consistent attitude of “faithful in words and respectable in actions” to continue our con-
tributions to world justice and peace. We believe deeply in the old saying: “The virtuous 
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always have friends.” And we are sure that we can create a new horizon for world justice 
and peace and for the freedom and happiness of humankind. 
 
(c) February 25, 1977 
   The advancement of international justice and the assuring of world peace constitute 
our basic diplomatic policy, as clearly expressed in the Constitution. We shall adhere to 
this principle and never change our minds. Consequently, we shall remain firmly in the 
democratic camp and be forever determined to oppose the Communism in the present as 
we have in the past. This is because we believe that the political system and way of life 
based on democracy and freedom are consistent with the common wishes of humankind 
and the best weapons for defeating Communism. 
 
  It is true that in past years we have encountered a number of difficulties and setbacks as 
we stuck to our basic policy in a world shrouded in a miasma of appeasement. Even so, 
with the spirit of sailing against the tide, we have never become pessimistic and have 
persevered in our courageous struggle. This is because we have strong faith that justice 
will have its way and that democracy will triumph at last. 
 
  We are well aware that international developments are complicated and often influ-
enced by pragmatic considerations. Consequently, we should not approach our problems 
with one-track minds even as we faithfully adhere to the principles of benevolence and 
justice. At the least, we can advise other countries of advantages and disadvantages in our 
dealings with them and strengthen our relationship with the free world by convincing 
others that cooperation will be in the great interest of all, while divisiveness will bring 
great harm to each of us. 
 
  We also understand that diplomacy is the extension of domestic affairs and the vitality 
of a country is the strong backbone of its diplomacy. To be frank, it is also the determinant 
of “advantages and disadvantages.” In the last more than twenty years, we have worked 
hard and devotedly to promote construction and national strength with a tranquil mind 
amidst adversities. We have in every aspect demonstrated the glory of our unity and our 
unflagging and growing spirit. We have made ourselves a beacon of freedom and de-
mocracy in Asia and the anti-Communist bulwark of the Western Pacific. So it is that we 
can raise our heads and stand proudly erect and hew to the righteous position in pursuing 
our diplomacy squarely in order to assure national sovereignty, defend our national in-
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terests and shatter all international conspiracies against us. 
 
  In terms of diplomatic priorities, we should on the one hand continue to strengthen 
sincere cooperation and promote mutual friendship with all friendly countries. This is 
especially so in the case of the Republic of China and the United States. Because both 
countries are defenders of human rights, freedom and democracy, and they have a 
friendship based on an alliance of defense against aggression, they should help each other 
understand each other and unite with each other closely. On the other hand, we should 
enlarge our substantive relations with all the democracies through more vigorous eco-
nomic, trade, cultural, scientific and technological interflow and cooperation, and jointly 
fulfill.  
 
(d) September 23, 1977 
   Based on a spirit of independence and initiative and the principles of equality and re-
ciprocity, the Republic of China follows a consistent foreign policy of good neighborli-
ness with other nations, respect for treaties, the promotion of international cooperation, 
the advancement of international justice and the assurance of world peace. We shall never 
change our position of adhering to the democratic camp. We shall continue our close and 
sincere communications with all freedom-loving nations and peoples. We shall not, 
however, accept any arrangement that might jeopardize our national interest and our na-
tional dignity.  
 
Source: 行政院蔣院長對當前外交工作之指示與言論, MOFA, ROC, May 20, 1978. 
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Appendix III 
 
Consul General John Kincaid delivered a speech on the National Day of the Republic of 
South Africa, May 31, 1975. 
Excellencies, Ministers of the Republic of China; His Worship the Mayor of Taipei; 
Heads of diplomatic mission; other distinguished guests and friends: 
It is indeed a pleasure for me to see so many old friends on this happy occasion, the an-
niversary of Republic Day. 
A year ago I spoke of the need for all free countries to stand together against subversion. 
During the past year the Free World has suffered reverses in many areas but these reverses 
have not damaged old friendships nor discouraged old allies. Nor has the grievous loss to 
the Republic of China of its beloved President, the late Generalissimo CHIANG 
KAI-SHEK diminished the determination of the Chinese people to achieve their objec-
tives. 
The Republic of China and the Republic of South Africa are constitutionally both young 
countries – in fact, they are separated in age by only one year (if the fifty years in which 
South Africa was a Union inside the British Commonwealth are included). Both are vital, 
determined and well-endowed with a modern spirit. South Africa has great wealth in na-
tional reserves; China the wealth of its hard-working people. 
The past year has seen them move steadily closer together. A milestone of particular 
significance to both was the conclusion of a trade agreement in February last. Imports of 
goods produced or manufactured in the one may now be imported into the other on 
most-favoured-nation terms. Visits by manufacturers and businessmen will undoubtedly 
lead to increased commercial interest, but I feel strongly that it is up to businessmen in 
each country to work harder in making their products known. The inauguration of two 
direct flights a week in each direction between Johannesburg and Hong Kong last year 
has made travel easier and the two countries are now less than twenty-four hours apart. 
These flights should facilitate the growth of tourism, while industrial and cultural exhi-
bitions, and competition is sport, would also help to bring the two countries even closer 
together. I am sure, that this trend will continue in the coming year.  
Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, thank you. 
 
Source: Department of African Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ROC. 
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Appendix IV 
 
Ambassador H K Yang delivered a speech on the 74th Anniversary of the founding of the 
Republic of China, October 10, 1985. 
 
I shall start off by thanking all of you for being here this evening to assist us in celebrating 
our National Day, the 74th Anniversary of the Republic of China – a National Day known 
as Double Ten, meaning the Tenth Day of the Tenth Month, or October 10th, of the year. 
 
As my country and my people have always attached great importance to Double Ten as a 
day when the corrupt Manchu Dynasty was at long last brought down and the Republic of 
China, a new Republic of the people, for the people and by the people, was brought into 
being, your gracious presence this evening on this auspicious occasion is deeply appre-
ciated. Indeed, your presence has not only added luster to the occasion but also served as 
a reminder that in spite of what is being done to keep democracy an on-going supreme 
system for human dignity, fundamental freedom and economic prosperity, there are still 
evil forces of a totalitarian hue working perniciously to mislead innocent people into 
bewilderment, chaos and final destruction. 
 
As I have said before and I am saying this again now, for us Free Chinese, Double Ten is 
an occasion to reflect, to take stock, and to rededicate ourselves to the ideals for which our 
founding fathers, in bringing into being the Republic of China 74 years ago, laid down 
their lives. 
 
Double Ten also serves to remind us of the sad plight of a billion of our people on China’s 
mainland, our mainland, leading a precarious life under the whims and escapades of a 
totalitarian regime and waiting desperately for deliverance. As a matter of fact, in cele-
brating out Double Ten we purport to inject into our heart and mind a sense of urgency 
commensurate with the nature of our struggle which is still on and which, due to the 
continued poisoned international political atmosphere, calls for redoubled efforts to 
surmount obstacles which threaten to obstruct our progress towards maximum 
achievements and final successes.  
 
Indeed, for us Double Ten is more a challenge than just a holiday. To celebrate it is to 
accept the challenge. As we are gathered here to celebrate the 74th Anniversary of the 
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Founding of our Republic, we are in fact, pledging ourselves anew to accept the challenge 
in earnest and in high seriousness. And it goes without saying that in accepting the 
challenge, we have to rely heavily on our friends for understanding and support. 
 
The year which has just elapsed since Double Ten 1984 is, for my country, a year of 
consolidation and reflection with sustained development and progress and for the Re-
public of South Africa, a year of drastic changes with expectations and adjustments. If to 
consolidate achievements is difficult, then to adjust for changes, particularly when there 
are undue expectations likely to end up with disappointment and disillusion, and when 
there are evil forces determined to undermine the good results of the changes, must 
necessarily be more so. 
 
As I see it, both consolidation and change, if they are to succeed, call for conviction and 
self-confidence. Of course, in order to ensure success, positive thinking, determination 
and good-will are also needed. There is simply no room for negativism, let alone van-
dalism and hooliganism. As long as we are sure of our intents and purposes, of what we 
are doing, there can be no doubt but that we shall eventually reach the goal we set for 
ourselves. In politics, when the future of the nation is at stake or when the vital interests of 
the people are involved, it is not destruction, but constructive and tangible results that 
count – results that are good for the nation and the people. 
 
In our case, as we continue to march forward, both in the political and in the economic 
sense, under the dynamic and inspiring leadership of President Chiang Ching-kuo, on the 
road to final victory, we are convinced that before long we shall be able to return to our 
mainland and live with one billion of our compatriots in peace and freedom, under the 
banner of the Three People’s Principles. 
 
As you are aware, in 1985 there have been more defections by people from Mainland 
China. The defectors include pilots, scholars, artists, sports people, researchers and stu-
dents. In fact, in recent years, due to poor living conditions, more young people have 
managed, through bribery or other means, to flee for Taiwan or foreign lands. Indeed, the 
situation in China’s mainland under the Communist regime has long been a serious one, 
both politically and economically, - perhaps more serious than many people in the Free 
World would like to believe. Of course, Deng Shiao-ping knew this. That accounted for 
the fact that in 1979, the Chinese Communist regime under Deng went out of its way to 
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hobnob with the United States, trying hard to fool the American Government into be-
lieving that the regime sincerely wanted to be friendly and co-operative with the West in 
general and with the United States in particular and that the Chinese Communists were 
capable of making changes. My view on all this referred to above is that when Commu-
nists are desparate, they change tactics and overnight they can appear moderate and 
agreeable, and that when Communists simulate moderation and decency, they are all the 
more dangerous. For after all, a chameleon is a chameleon, no matter in what colour it 
elects to appear at the moment.  
 
In South Africa, during the year under review we were pleased to see significant changes 
taking place. Among other things we saw the new constitution brought into effect. As has 
been afore-contemplated or planned, apartheid in all its ramifications is in the process of 
phasing out. For legislature, there is now a tricameral parliament, with the Coloureds and 
Indians each having its own House: House of Delegates for the Indians and House of 
Representatives for the Coloureds. The Blacks too have been promised citizenship and 
decision-making power at the high level. Not only they shall be brought into the new 
system, but also they are to have an equitable role to play in the new dispensation. Who 
can say that these are not significant changes? As all these changes are brought to pass, 
we as friends of South Africa can do no less than to wish both its Government and its 
people well. 
 
For us Chinese, we are particularly appreciative and thankful for the official declaration 
Mr P W Botha, the State President of South Africa, made on May 30, 1985, whereby all 
the members of the Chinese Community in South Africa are to enjoy equal status and 
equal rights as the Whites. 
 
As regards the over-all relationship between the Republic of China and the Republic of 
South Africa, all I want to say is that it continued to forge ahead. In the economic field, 
the two economic Ministers met to discuss matters of mutual interests; and co-operation 
in almost all important fields continued to grow and flourish to the benefit of both 
countries. Mutual visits by important officials, parliamentarians, journalists, and business 
leaders as well as civilians were frequent. In July, our Navy squadron arrived at the east 
coast of South Africa to assist celebrating your Navy Week and also to participate in the 
activities organized by the Durban Tattoo, 1985. 
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As regards the trade and economic activities by the private sector, surely my report would 
not be complete if I were not to mention the important work being done by the South 
Africa and the Republic of China Chamber of Economic Relations in Johannesburg. We 
are pleased that as a result of new efforts made to recover lost ground and of new orien-
tation, new leadership has emerged with Mr A A Sealey of Rand Mines Ltd., elected as 
new Chairman of the Chamber and Mr A L Schlebusch, the distinguished former Vice 
President of South Africa and Chairman of the first President’s Council and presently 
Chancellor of the University of Pretoria elected as its Honorary President – a post which 
was left open after Dr Hilgard Muller passed away on July 10th this year. Here, we wish, 
first thing first, to offer once again our warmest congratulations both to Mr Schlebusch 
and to Mr Sealey as Honorary President and Chairman of the Chamber respectively. 
 
About Dr Hilgard Muller, for us, he was a founder of the Chamber and a true friend of the 
Republic of China. Recalling as I certainly do the efforts he made in his lifetime to 
promote friendship and co-operation between the Republic of China and the Republic of 
South Africa as well as to help elevate the status of the members of the Chinese Com-
munity in South Africa, together with his profundity as a scholar, his genteel manner as a 
gentleman, his thoughtfulness and kindness towards friends and his superb performance 
as a diplomat and foreign minister, I do not think I can find words adequate enough to 
evince our admiration and respects to him. All I can do here is to pray that he rest in 
peace! 
 
Finally, with your indulgence, I should like to quote a few passages by two well-known 
Americans: one is a general and he is dead and the other is a politician and he is alive, as 
a footnote to my views and comments, expunged by myself for good reasons, on the 
present world situation. 
 
The following are my quotations: 
 
“The Soviets know that war, revolution, and economic depression can destroy the fabric 
of a society and make the siren song of Communism sound sweeter. When people feel 
panic, tyranny can look attractive if it promises order. Chaos, war and revolution are thus 
the natural allies of Communism ….” 
 
“The next two decades represent a time of maximum crises for America and for the West, 
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during which the fate of the world for generations to come may well be determined. Other 
nations have much longer experience than we have in the use of power to maintain the 
peace. But they no longer have the power. So, by default, the world looks to the United 
States. It looks today with nervous apprehension, as the bulwarks against Soviet expan-
sion crumble in one nation after another, and the United States appears so lost in uncer-
tainty or paralyzed by propriety that it is either unable or unwilling to act.” 
 
“Soviet ambitions present the United States with a strategic challenge of global propor-
tion, which requires a renewed strategic consciousness and response. It requires a co-
herent national strategy based upon informed public support. Piecemeal temporizing will 
not do. Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, South Yemen, Mozambique, Laos, Cambodia and 
South Vietnam all have been brought under Communist domination since 1974; nearly 
100 million people in the last five years. Iran has been plunged into bloody chaos and 
turned overnight from a bastion of Western strength to a cauldron of virulent 
anti-Westernism, its oil treasure lying provocatively exposed to lustful Russian eyes. 
Cuba acts increasingly as an agent of wide-ranging Soviet ambitions. These are examples 
of how the pieces will continue to fall if we take a piece-meal approach…..” 
 
“The history of failure in war can be summed up in two words: Too Late. Too late in 
comprehending the deadly purpose of a potential enemy; too late in realizing the mortal 
danger; too late in preparedness; too late in uniting all possible forces for resistance; too 
late in standing with one’s friends”. 
 
If we are really concerned with the deteriorating world situation in which we now find 
ourselves, can we possibly believe that in the Soviet grand strategy to bring the whole of 
Africa into its orbit, Southern Africa does not loom big and enjoy top priority? 
 
Source: TLO files: Ambassador H K Yang’s Speech.  
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Appendix V 
 
Prime Minister P W Botha’s speech on March 11, 1980 at National Banquet in Taipei 
 
Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,  
    It is a privilege and indeed an honor this evening to welcome for first time on South 
African soil the Prime Minister of the Republic of China. On my own behalf and on 
behalf of Government and people of South Africa, I extend to you and members of your 
party a particular warm welcome. We are more than happy that you have come to South 
Africa to see for yourself a country about which you doubtless have heard a great deal. 
We sincerely hope you will enjoy your brief stay with us and return with positive im-
pressions of your visit. Your presence here today represents a milestone in the develop-
ment of our relations and the forging of bonds of friendship between our two countries. 
 
    More and more this is proving to be a mutually rewarding friendship. Your culture is 
as old as ours is young. We have both traversed difficult paths in our recent history and we 
have won through. We have much to learn from each other’s experiences, much to gain 
from continued contact. We have seen how fickle the nations and the world can be, how 
transient their relationships with one another. We both know the meaning of integrity in 
politics and integrity in friendship. Both our countries can point to phenomenal post war 
economic growth despite international problems we have had to face. Today your 
economy is one of the strongest in your region of the world and you can face the future 
with optimism. Trade between our two countries has expanded dramatically in recent 
years. Yet despite the growth already achieved in our trade with each other, there are still 
unlimited opportunities for further expansion since in many respects our economies are 
complementary. 
 
    There is also room for further development of our relations in scientific and techno-
logical fields. We have a great respect for the achievements of the Chinese people in this 
sophisticated area, and we believe that we too have much which we could offer you. It is 
accordingly with particular satisfaction that I can announce this evening that in order to 
facilitate contact over a broader spectrum and to assure more direct links between our 
countries we have today signed an agreement instituting a reciprocal air services. We 
have also signed an agreement for reciprocal exemption from taxes on income derived 
from the operation of sea and air transport. These agreements are precursors of others 
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which will benefit our commerce, communication and future mutual cooperation. I be-
lieve, Mr. Prime Minister, that visits of representatives of both public and private sector 
covering all fields of cooperation between us will be important to maintain the momen-
tum which your visits and the conclusion of the bilateral agreements between us have 
generated. Your visit has placed us on the threshold of significant development in our 
relations. We should not allow the momentum to be lost in the months and years ahead. 
Concerted efforts on both your part and ours will be required to ensure that this does not 
happen.  
 
    Mr. Prime Minster, we assure you of our friendship and goodwill and extend to you, 
your Government and people of the Republic of China our very best wishes for the future. 
 
Source: TLO files: Prime Minister P W Botha’s Visit. 
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Appendix VI 
 
Remarks made by Ambassador H. K. Yang on the occasion of the Conferment of a 
Decoration upon Dr. A. J. A. Roux at the Chinese Embassy in Pretoria on January 13, 
1983 
 
For me and my colleagues in the Chinese Embassy, the occasion for which we are gath-
ered here to-night is not only an auspicious one but also an important one. I am grateful to 
the Honourable Minister and Mrs du Plessis for their acceptance of our invitation to be 
here with us. Their presence will certainly add lustre to the occasion. I am also much 
indebted to Prof. and Mrs Joubert, Dr. and Mrs Grant and Mr and Mrs Winchiu for their 
being here to assist in this unique occasion – an occasion which is exclusively for Dr. and 
Mrs Roux. 
 
To night, I have the pleasant duty, upon the instruction of my Government, to confer upon 
Dr. Roux, on behalf of my President, President Chiang Ching-kuo, a decoration of a high 
order to show our recognition of his exceptionally high quality as a scientist and our 
appreciation of the efforts he has made throughout the years to promote friendship and 
cooperation between the Republic of South Africa and the Republic of China. 
 
As early as in the early thirties, Dr. Roux has already evinced keen interest in nuclear 
energy, although at that time his real affection was, if I am not mistaken, aerodynamics. 
 
For a little over a decade that followed, his accomplishments in the nuclear field were so 
impressive that he was generally recognized and well known not only in South Africa but 
also internationally as one of the world’s leading authorities on nuclear research and 
development. 
 
From 1952 onward, the tempo of Dr. Roux’s rise so accelerated, that by 1967 he became 
Chairman of the Atomic Energy Board and by 1970 its President – a position normally 
reserved for the Minister of Mines. 
 
During the intervening years, awards and appointments, academic and professional, some 
honorary and others active, piled up, filling five pages of his curriculum vitae. Among the 
more notable were appointments as Chairman of the Uranium Enrichment Corporation of 
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South Africa, as Member of the Prime Minister’s Scientific and Planning Advisory 
Councils and as Member of the National Council of Universities. Moreover, he was re-
cipient of honorary doctorate from all the leading universities in South Africa and of the 
Havenga Prize for Engineering, the Railway Prize and the Hendrik Verwoerd Award, the 
last of which, if my memory serves me right, his life-long colleague and friend Dr. Grant 
also shared. 
 
Mr Minister, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen: As we all know, the size of the 
territory or of the population does not make a nation great. Only the quality of its people 
does. Material things alone do not make a nation rich or make its people feel proud. 
Accomplishment of something which gives meaning to life, which reveals the secrets and 
wonders of nature, and which inspires does. 
 
Dr. Roux is not only a great scientist but also a great statesman. If we admit that 
knowledge is power, then Dr. Roux must be a very powerful man. We in the Republic of 
China feel proud of him and we respect him. 
 
Having said this, may I now have the honour of conferring upon Dr. Abraham Johannes 
Andries Roux, on behalf of the Government of the Republic of China, the Order of Bril-
liant Star with Grand Cordon. 
 
And we wish him and Mrs Roux everything of the best. 
 
Thank you. 
Source: Department of African Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ROC.  
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Appendix VII 
 
His Excellency President Lee Teng-hui’s remarks at the banquet given by His Excellency 
F.W. de Klerk, State President of the Republic of South Africa, on November 15, 1991. 
 
Your Excellency State President and Mrs. De Klerk, 
Excellencies, 
Distinguished Guests, 
Ladies and Gentlemen: 
    It is indeed a privilege and an honor for my wife and myself to attend this auspicious 
occasion. On behalf of my wife and myself as well as the Government and people of the 
Republic of China, I would like to express to Your Excellencies State President and Mrs. 
De Klerk our sincere thanks and appreciation for the splendid banquet given in our honor 
tonight. 
 
    Mr. State President, during your visit to the Republic of China, I am very pleased that 
we have the opportunity of fully exchanging views on the current international situation 
and on matters of mutual interest. This, I firmly believe, would contribute greatly to the 
strengthening of mutual understanding and friendship between our two nations. This 
would also lay a sound foundation of furthering the close ties of cooperation between our 
two countries. 
 
    The Republic of China and the Republic of South Africa have enjoyed a longstanding 
traditional friendship and a solid foundation for cooperation. This year is the eighty-sixth 
year since our two countries established consular relations in 1905. It also marks the 
fifteenth anniversary of the establishment of fifteen years, through joint efforts of our two 
Governments and two peoples, our two countries have developed close bonds of 
friendship and cooperation. Our cooperative relations now cover almost all important 
fields such as agriculture, education, health, environment, fisheries, trade, transport, en-
ergy and mining. These ties of friendship and cooperation are beneficial not only to our 
mutual interest but also to our common goal of upholding world peace and international 
justice. 
 
    The Republic of China and the Republic of South Africa have long been faithful allies. 
Throughout the years, we have worked together shoulder to shoulder to safeguard free-
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dom and democracy and to promote our economic development. Even in the face of the 
many difficulties precipitated by international politics during the last decade, both 
countries have adhered to our shared principles and rendered firm support to each other. 
 
    The trade volume between our two countries amounted to approximately US$1.9 
billion in 1990, making the Republic of China as the sixth largest trading partner to the 
Republic of South Africa. After the 11th ministerial conference for economic and tech-
nical cooperation was successfully concluded in August this year, I am sure that the co-
operation in the fields of trade, investment, commerce and industry will be further en-
hanced. I am deeply convinced that because our two economies are complementary in 
many respects, the strengthening of our cooperation will be in the long-term interests of 
our two countries.  
 
    In recent years, the Republic of South Africa, under Your Excellency’s brilliant and 
dynamic leadership, has made remarkable progress both domestically and internationally. 
Due to your progressive efforts in the international arena, the international status of the 
Republic of South Africa has been greatly elevated and almost all forms of economic 
sanctions imposed by the outside world have been lifted. Moreover, the historical reform 
policy in South Africa initialed and undertaken by Your Excellency has accomplished 
great breakthroughs. We have witnessed the final elimination of all racially discriminat-
ing laws and regulations. We are also pleased to take not of the consensus reached among 
all political parties in South Africa to carry out its constitutional reform through a process 
of negotiation. 
 
    Mr. State President, I wish to extend again, on behalf of the Government and people 
of the Republic of China, to your Excellency my heartfelt esteem and admiration for all 
your accomplishments. I sincerely hope that in the process of building a new South Africa, 
you will soon reach your goals to establish a just, democratic and prosperous nation. 
 
    Looking to the current international situation, we already see an end of the Cold War, 
the crumbling of communism in many parts of the world, and the emergence of a new 
international order. Freedom, democracy, peace, and prosperity have become the trend for 
countries all over the world. In view of the development of the new international order as 
well as the political changes taking place in our two countries, we must ensure that the 
existing close and friendly relations between us will form a firm and solid basis for fur-
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ther and expanded cooperation. Our two countries should continue to cooperate closely to 
each other in the future to further strengthen our substantive cooperation in the best in-
terest of the two nations. 
 
    Mr. State President, the visit of Your Excellencies to the Republic of China again 
fully testifies to the cordial and friendly relationship between our two countries, which, I 
am sure, will continue to grow and flourish. The singing of the Agreement of Cooperation 
on the Promotion of Investment between our two countries by your distinguished Foreign 
Minister R.F. Botha and our Foreign Minister Dr. Fredrick F. Chien during the visit has 
also further solidified our cooperation. I am confident that Your Excellency’s visit stands 
for a new milestone in the history of our bilateral relations. 
 
    Your Excellencies State President and Mrs. De Klerk, please accept my thanks and 
appreciation again. And now, ladies and gentlemen, may I ask you to join me in a toast to 
the good health and personal well-being of Their Excellencies, State President and Mrs. 
De Klerk and to the  
 
Source: Department of African Affairs, MOFA, ROC. 
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Appendix VIII 
 
Remarks made by Minister Fredrick F. Chien at the Reception Celebrating the First An-
niversary of Freedom Day of the Republic of South Africa, hosted by R.S.A Ambassador 
to the R.O.C. and Mrs. J. L. Viljoen. 
 
 
Your Excellencies Ambassador and Mrs. Viljoen, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and 
Gentlemen: 
 
It is indeed a great honour and privilege for me to attend this auspicious occasion in 
celebration of the First anniversary of Freedom Day of the Republic of South Africa. On 
behalf of the government and people of the Republic of China, I would like to extend to 
the government and people of the Republic of South Africa our heartiest congratulations. 
 
Both the Republic of China and the Republic of South Africa are freedom seeking and 
peace loving countries sharing the same aspirations in upholding world peace and in-
ternational justice. Throughout the years, our two countries have developed very close 
bonds of friendship and cooperation. During this year with the new Government of Na-
tional Unity (GNU), we have had the pleasure of greeting five cabinet ministers, five 
premiers of nine provinces, Deputy Speaker, and many member of the National Assembly 
as well as the President and the Deputy President of the Senate together with your elite 
from academic, cultural and mass media fields. Reciprocally, our Minister of Economic 
Affairs Mr. P. K. Chiang and former  chairman of Council for Economic Planning and 
Development Mr. Vincent Hsiao also led two large business and investment groups to our 
counterpart friendly country – the Republic of South Africa. I am particularly proud to 
point out that through the exchange visits and cooperation a number of projects between 
our two nations have achieved substantial results.  
 
After the historic all-race elections held a year ago today, South Africa ushered in a 
framework of a true democratic nation, the historic task of building democracy in South 
Africa is nearly completed. As President Nelson Mandela once said, since the estab-
lishment of GNU, it has attributed greatly in uniting inter-racial people together, reducing 
political tensions and easing partisan factions. In the meantime, the social harmony and 
stability has also flourished and met with great success. We are confident that the future 
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of the new South Africa will be even more illustrious.  
 
However, the rebirth of a nation also marks a new epoch for her people. The new South 
Africa will face the challenge of economic reconstruction and development. This calls for 
strong and continued support from international community. Based on the existing cor-
dial relations between our two countries, the Republic of China is obligated and willing to 
render her fullest support. We are now undertaking projects to establish a vocational 
training center for retired South African servicemen and young people. We are also pro-
viding soft loans for small farms in South Africa. We sincerely hope that our two coun-
tries will cooperate with each other even more closely in the future to enhance the 
well-being of our peoples. At this moment in time, we are opening up new chapters of 
friendship and cooperation between our two countries, which affirm the defining state-
ment of your great President as he reiterated only recently the intention of Republic of 
South Africa to maintain our strong bonds of unity. 
 
Your Excellency, I wish to take this opportunity to convey to you and your colleagues my 
deep awareness and appreciation for your outstanding contribution in bringing our two 
countries closer. 
 
Now I would like to invite all the distinguished guests and friends to join me in a toast to 
the personal well-being of His Excellency, President Mandela, and to the prosperity of the 
Republic of South Africa. 
Thank you. 
 
Source: Department of African Affairs, MOFA, ROC. 
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Appendix IX 
 
Statement regarding ROC Relations with the Republic of South Africa, 
By Lien Chan, Vice President and Premier, November 28, 1996. 
 
    The ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs has clearly set forth our government’s stand 
in response to South African President Nelson Mandela’s statement of ROC-South 
African relations. After listening to Foreign Minster Chang Hsiao-Yen’s report, I 
would like to raise a few points: 
    We understand Johannesburg’s desire to seek a new role and status in interna-
tional affairs. We have always believed that the profound friendship and common 
interests shared by the peoples of our two countries would allow us to work together 
at opening up new horizons in bilateral relations and within the international com-
munity. Therefore, we have striven with great commitment to maintain ROC-South 
African relations. We deeply regret the South African government’s November 27 
statement that it would most likely make adjustments to its policy that would be in-
imical to the friendship and interests our nations have shared. 
    Of course, the source of this trouble ultimately lies with the Chinese mainland 
regime. This incident and similar ones in the past have demonstrated time and again 
the Chinese communist authorities’ relentless efforts to box the ROC into a diplo-
matic corner and belittle its international status, completely disregarding the rights 
and interests due the 21 million people of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu. 
    I would like to remind the Peking authorities once more that each side of Taiwan 
Straits is ruled by a separate political entity at present, and the Chinese nation is not 
yet reunified. National reunification at some point in the future must be built on a 
foundation of mutual respect. The use of this kind of underhanded tactic by the 
Chinese communists to undermine the ROC’s diplomatic relations and buy foreign 
friendship has gravely harmed the fraternal feelings shared by the Chinese people on 
both sides of the Taiwan Strait; it in no way helps further cross-Strait relations or the 
cause of national reunification. 
    I must stress that for several decades the Republic of China has played an active 
and positive role in the international community. We are a participant, cooperative 
partner, contributor, and a respectable member of the world community. Our resolve 
to continue assertively working toward raising out international profile remains un-
deterred and we shall do what we must to accomplish this.  
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    I wholeheartedly support the views expressed and measures taken by our Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs regarding ROC-South Africa relations. And the Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs should (1) reiterate our unswerving stance to the Republic of South Africa, and (2) 
ask the Republic of South Africa to carefully reconsider all decisions pertaining to this 
policy decision. continued prosperity of the Republic of South Africa. 
  
Source: Government Information Office, Executive Yuan, ROC. 
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Appendix X 
 
Remarks by H. E. Vincent C. Siew, Premier of the Republic of China at the Banquet in 
honor of H. E. Charles G. Taylor, President of the Republic of Liberia, November 7, 1997 
 
Your Excellency President Taylor, Madame Taylor,  
Distinguished Guests, 
Ladies and Gentlemen, 
It is indeed a great pleasure for my wife and me to host this luncheon today in your honor. 
I should like, first of all, to extend my warmest welcome to Your Excellency and Madame 
Taylor and all the members of your delegation. 
 
May I express my heartiest congratulations on your victory in the recent election. This 
year marks the one hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the Republic of 
Liberia, a significant year in which you have been given an overwhelming mandate by the 
people of Liberia. In March last year, the Republic of China held the first direct election 
of its president in the history of China. Dedicated to freedom, the governments of both the 
Republic of Liberia and the Republic of China have already made important achieve-
ments in the full democratization of our political institutions and demonstrated our 
commitment to the welfare of the people. I firmly believe that, under the dynamic and 
inspiring leadership of Your Excellency, the future of the Republic of Liberia, which is 
endowed with abundant natural resources, will be brilliant and prosperous. 
 
Since the resumption of diplomatic ties in 1989, our two countries have enjoyed very 
cordial relations. Understandably so, for the people of both countries share the same 
commitment to democracy, freedom and international justice. Your visit to my country is 
further evidence that you and your government attach great importance to the relationship 
between our two countries. 
 
Your Excellency, we have solid confidence in democracy and the free enterprise system. 
Based on this confidence, we have successfully transformed our country into a dynamic 
economy. We are willing to share our experience and technology with friendly countries 
such as yours. As a matter of fact, the bonds of cooperation between our two countries 
date back to 1961. The first ever ROC agricultural mission assigned to Africa was the 
Republic of Liberia in November of that year. Over the years, the service provided by our 
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agricultural mission proved to be quite fruitful in the past. I have no doubt that this visit of 
Your Excellency will help to build even closer cooperation between our two countries, to 
the mutual benefit of both nations. 
 
There is an old saying, “A friend in need is a friend indeed.” So I wish to take this op-
portunity to express our heartfelt gratitude to Your Excellency and all the Liberian people 
for the strong support extended to us in international affairs, in particular with respect to 
our bid to rejoin the United Nations. The voice of justice and righteousness raised by the 
Republic of Liberia has resounded around the world. Your honorable deed will long be 
cherished by the people of the Republic of China.  
 
Your Excellency, we in the Republic of China have been observing with utmost concern 
and profound sympathy the tribulation through which Liberia has been passing and I am 
delighted to see peace and stability finally return to the country. It is my sincere hope that 
Liberia, under the able leadership of Your Excellency, will be developing rapidly into a 
prosperous country and before long will once again be playing an important role in Af-
rica. 
 
Ladies and gentlemen, may I invite you now to join me in a toast to the continued pros-
perity of the Republic of Liberia and to the good health and well-being of His Excellency 
President Taylor and Madame Taylor. We wish that hope and cheer will prevail forever in 
the land of the pepperbird.  
 
Source: Government Information Office, Executive Yuan, ROC. 
  319
Appendix XI 
 
Remarks by the Chairman of the African Group of Ambassadors and Representatives in 
Taipei, H.E. Ambassador John Cummings, Ambassador of the Republic of Liberia to 
Taiwan, R.O.C. on the occasion of the OAU Day, May 25, 2001. 
 
Your Excellency, the Vice President of the Republic of China, 
Your Excellency, the Vice Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
R.O.C., 
Your Excellencies, members of the Diplomatic Corps & Representatives, 
Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, 
 
It was exactly 38 years ago, when 32 leaders of independent African countries met in 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and signed the Charter establishing the Organization of African 
Unity, OAU. The establishment of the OAU was the actualization of the Pan-Africanist 
sentiments that was deeply engrained in the psyche of all Africans including those in the 
Diaspora. It thus symbolizes African aspirations, unity and solidarity. Since 1963, the 25th 
of May every year is celebrated as the OAU Day as a mark of respect and salute to the 
wisdom of the founding fathers of the continental organization. It is in this wise that our 
group, Ambassadors and Representatives of African countries in Taiwan wish to share 
with you this momentous occasion. 
 
Considering the fact that many African countries were under colonial domination at the 
time the OAU was founded, the emphasis of the founding fathers of the organization was 
then on the total liberation of the continent from the vestiges of colonialism and racial 
oppression. Through concerted efforts and sheer determination, the objective of the OAU 
towards the total liberation of Africa from colonialism and apartheid was achieved. 
Though, there are other important challenges facing the OAU for which it has not been 
that successful, such as the scourges of internecine conflicts, under development, diseases 
like malaria and HIV-AIDS, these adversities were not allowed to deter the leaders of our 
great continent from forging ahead with their pursuits to better the lots of the people of the 
continent.  
 
In this regard therefore, the focus of African leaders has now shifted towards issues of 
economic development and democracy. Landmark efforts in this regard include the 
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Zimbabwe declaration, the adoption of the Lagos Plan of Action and the Abuja Treaty 
establishing the African Economic Community in 1991. In the Zimbabwe declaration, 
African leaders firmly resolved for democratization, multi-party system and protection of 
human rights. The Lagos Plan of Action on the other hand, encouraged the establishment 
of regional economic groupings such as Southern African Development Community 
(SADC), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Economic Com-
munity of Central African States (ECCAS), The Arab Magherb Union (UMA), etc as a 
prelude to the establishment of the African Economic Community. 
 
Ladies and gentlemen, it is heartening to note that the progress being made by our leaders 
towards the economic, political and social integration of our continent is so encouraging 
to the extent that next year by now, we may not be celebrating OAU Day, rather, we may 
be celebrating the African Union. This is as a result of the historic Sirte declaration on 9th 
September, 1999 by African leaders in which they resolved to establish the African Union. 
With the ratification by two thirds of the member states of the OAU on 26th April, 2001 
the Constitutive Act of the African Union will come into effect from tomorrow, 26th May, 
2001. By tomorrow therefore, the Sirte declaration will become a political and legal re-
ality. From that date onwards, the OAU will begin to wind up and transform into the Af-
rican Union. 
 
Unlike the OAU, the African Union will have a Pan-African Parliament, the Executive 
Council, the African Court of Justice, the African Central Bank, the African Monetary 
Fund, the African Investment Bank, etc. The objectives of the African Union include 
among others achieving unity and solidarity among African countries, defending the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states, accelerating political and 
socio-economic integration of the continent, promoting and defending African common 
positions on issues of interest to the continent and its people as well as promoting de-
mocracy, good governance and human rights.  
 
On this auspicious occasion, it is the hope of the Group of African Ambassadors and 
Representatives in Taiwan to forge closer collaborative relationship between our conti-
nent and Taiwan. With the highest block of membership in the UN, Africa can be a for-
midable partner towards the re-integration of the R.O.C. into the UN and other Interna-
tional Organizations. Africa on the other hand, stand to benefit from Taiwan’s experience 
in economic development, trade and investment. In this regard, our Group is calling on 
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the government of the R.O.C. to consider the idea of holding periodically, an Afri-
can-ROC Economic Forum. It is our belief that such a body will foster greater under-
standing as well as economic well-being of the participating countries. 
 
At this juncture, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, I would like to express, on 
behalf of our Group, our sincere appreciation to H.E., the Vice President of the R.O.C. 
and other top government and business leaders that spared their precious time to share 
with us this important occasion. I would also like to thanks officials of the Asia Pacific 
Public Affairs Forum (APPAF) for the series of activities they organized in support and 
solidarity with us on this occasion. It is our sincere hope that the efforts and resources 
APPAF committed in this regard will come to fruition. Finally, I want to thank my col-
leagues, members of the African Group of Ambassadors and Representatives for their 
support for me and untiring efforts towards the success of this occasion. 
 
Adieu OAU and long live the African Union, long live the Republic of China. 
 
I would now like to propose a toast for the progress and well-being of our people. 
 
Thank you. 
 
Source: Embassy of the Republic of Liberia, Taipei. 
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Appendix XII 
 
Vice President Lu Hsiu-lien delivered a speech on May 25, 2001. 
Your Excellency Ambassador Cumming, Ambassadors of our African allies, 
I am pleased to learn that today marks the 38th anniversary of Africa Day. I wish to extend 
my warmest and sincerest congratulations to all of our African friends on this auspicious 
occasion. 
On May 25th, 1963, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was established in Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia. The Organization has since contributed greatly to the regional devel-
opment of the African continent. Its outstanding accomplishments have won praise from 
the world community. After the Constitutive Act of the African Union entering into force 
tomorrow, May 26th, 2001, the OAU will be gradually transformed into the African Union. 
I firmly believe that it will further enhance and promote the unity and development of 
Africa. 
The government and people of the Republic of China value greatly the friendship and 
relations with African countries. We are willing to share “Taiwan Experiences” with our 
African allies in their national developments. The essence of “Taiwan Experiences” is 
characterized by the “Soft Power” of Taiwan people. Unlike rigid economic autocracies 
and military might, Soft Power makes use of noble and attractive moral, philosophical 
and value systems to lead the development of domestic society, economy and politics. As 
far as Taiwan is concerned, the principal areas where Soft Power of Taiwan people is 
expressed are democracy, human rights, peace, love and hi-tech. In fact, Taiwan’s Soft 
Power and influence have been carried abroad and are spreading around the entire world. 
As the African countries have been progressing in social, economic and political devel-
opments, the African Union will play a more and more important role in international 
community. You may rest assured that the Republic of China will further cooperate with 
the African states in the future. 
Your Excellency Ambassador Cummings, Ambassadors of our African allies, let me 
convey my highest respect for your efforts to make this 38th Africa Day activities very 
successful. Let me also convey my best wishes to the continued prosperity and well-being 
of Africa and the everlasting friendship between Africa and the Republic of China. 
 
Source: Office of the President, ROC. 
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Appendix XIII 
 
President Chen Shui-bian’s address at the CKS airport on returning from the Tour of 
Mutual Cooperation and Care, July 10, 2002. 
 
  I am happy that the 10-day visit to four of our diplomatic partners was successful and 
productive. It is wonderful to be home again. I view this “Tour of Mutual Cooperation and 
Care” a complete success. We brought heartfelt humanitarian concerns abroad, and, in 
return, we were rewarded with warm and sincere friendship. The tour took me to Senegal, 
São Tomé and Príncipe, Malawi, and Swaziland. Each of these countries has its own 
distinct culture and customs, but each showed similar affection for Taiwan. We were 
really impressed by their sincerity.  
 
  In the past, people called Africa the “dark continent.” This is not true. Our delegates 
personally saw Africa as a land of sunshine and smiles. The optimistic African people 
with their bright smiles impressed me very much. The innocent and lovely children there 
are just like Taiwan’s children – they are all children of heaven. I saw hope in their clear 
bright eyes, and we felt honored that the hope was partially nurtured by compassion and 
love from Taiwan. 
 
  Centuries ago, Christian missionaries arrived in Africa and spread the gospel. Today, 
Taiwan sends medical and technical teams to different parts of Africa to provide service. 
During the past several decades, medical and technical teams spread humanitarian con-
cerns, giving warmth and hope to the people of our diplomatic partners, just like the 
messengers of God did in the past. We admire and respect all our citizens stationed 
overseas, including those serving on the medical and technical teams and those working 
as an alternative military service. 
 
  Many African countries and their peoples suffered greatly in the early stages of de-
velopment. In the post-colonial period, building a nation is not easy and is replete with 
hardship. The spirit and efforts of our African allies deserve our respect. During the trip, I 
have managed to develop a close friendship with the heads-of-state of the four countries 
through dynamic, face-to-face discussions. I thoroughly dedicated myself to winning the 
support of our diplomatic partners, and they greatly appreciated the concerns of the 23 
million Taiwan people. They will definitely speak conscientiously for Taiwan in the in-
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ternational community, act as the voice of Taiwan, and continue to be a solid foundation 
for Taiwan’s international participation.  
 
  Even though Beijing uses every effort, combining threats with inducements against us, 
Taiwan’s active contributions to the international community cannot be denied or altered. 
Neither can the international community accept Beijing’s high-handed tactics against 
Taiwan’s international humanitarian acts. 
 
  Several decades ago, Taiwan also received foreign aid and eventually was able to be-
come self-sufficient. Now, we are a contributor to the international community and 
should be proud of our achievements. The “Tour of Mutual Cooperation and Care” could 
therefore also be called a “Tour of Warm Friendship and Success.” Let’s express our 
heartfelt thanks to all the staff and delegates of the trip and, in particular, to the business 
leaders, legislators of the governing and opposite parties, and heads of local governments.  
 
  Their participation proves that our efforts to enhance diplomatic relations and to expand 
Taiwan’s international relations transcends differences between the government and the 
private sector, between governing and opposition parties, and between the central and 
local governments. The trip has been a great success, as a result of the careful and atten-
tive arrangements made by the domestic and overseas staffs of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and the related departments. Everyone recognized their meticulous care and the 
earnest service provided by China Airlines. We are here to express our sincere thanks to 
them. 
 
  We gained a lot during the past 10 days and have been in a pleasant mood. We lost no 
weight but came back with beautiful tans; and the friendship with our diplomatic partners 
deepened. 
  
Source: Tour of Mutual Cooperation and Care, Office of the President, 2002, pp.90-92. 
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Appendix XIV 
 
Representative of the Liaison Office of South Africa Horst Brammer delivered a speech 
on the National Day of the Republic of South Africa, 26 April 2004. 
 
Ladies and Gentlemen 
 
In 2003, South Africa’s largest manufacturer of personal computers, laptops and printers, 
Mustek, became the first South African company ever to list on the Taiwan Stock Ex-
change. Thank you, Tony Wang for all your hard work and I hope Mustek will continue to 
grow from strength to strength. 
 
The South African Standard Bank office in Taipei reported an increased amount of Tai-
wanese investments flowing into South Africa in 2003. The year was so successful that 
Standard Bank SA has doubled its staff in Taipei and moved to new premises to ac-
commodate the growing demand. Thank you, Michael Swo, for all your hard work. 
 
And thank you, Vena Cheng, for your commitment and dedication to ensure that Nedbank 
SA continues to do so well here in Taiwan. 
 
SARS really had a bad impact on tourism to South Africa from Taiwan last year. Despite 
the setback, however, we saw an average of 1000 Taiwanese citizens traveling to South 
Africa every month in 2003. Thank you, Sophia Chen and your team at South African 
Airways in Taiwan for all your hard work and co-operation. 
 
Every single BMW 3-series vehicle driving on the streets of Taiwan was manufactured in 
South Africa. 
 
Last year was a good one for bilateral commercial relations between South Africa and 
Taiwan. Total bilateral trade increased by nearly 18% to US$ 1.3 billion. Once again, the 
trade balance was in our favour. 
 
It is my sincere wish that this positive trend will continue and that commercial relations 
between Taiwan and South Africa will break trough new barriers this year. 
Ladies and gentlemen 
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Welcome to all of you this evening, and thank you for coming. 
Ten years and one month ago, South Africa was extremely tense. 
 
Mediators were desperately trying to get the Inkatha Freedom Party of Mangosuthu 
Buthelezi to participate in South Africa’s first fully representative elections, which were 
set for 27 April 1994. But they failed, as Buthelezi stubbornly reiterated his position that 
he and his party would boycott the elections. 
 
Violence was rife on the streets of South Africa. Blood was flowing in the township of 
Boipathong and in Kwazulu-Natal as conflict between the IFP and the ANC was fuelled 
by a sinister “Third Force”, members of the old security establishment of apartheid South 
Africa. 
 
The Johannesburg Stock Exchange, the world’s 15th largest, was buffeted by a tumbling 
Rand, a declining gold price and massive buying and selling by both foreign and domestic 
investors. 
 
Inflation stood at 16.8% 
 
Pre-election stockpiling of non-perishables had spread country-wide as panic-buying 
emptied the shelves at supermarkets throughout the country. 
 
Political violence in Natal had prompted Australian officials to cancel a rugby tour to 
Durban. 
 
However, the leadership refused to be derailed by the bleak reality presenting itself in the 
streets and towns of South Africa. They had committed themselves toward building a new 
South Africa of the future, and were not deterred by the destabilizing events of the present. 
In his book, The Last Trek: A New Beginning, then President FW de Klerk writes: 
 
“We negotiated under fire. South Africa was burning with violence, but no one allowed 
himself the luxury of believing that we could wait with negotiations until the violence 
ceased.” 
 
At the last moment, all political parties – including the IFP – agreed to participate in the 
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election and more than 20 million ballot papers, which had already been printed, had to be 
amended in record time. 
 
On 27 April 1994 South Africa became free from the shackles of the past. Nelson Man-
dela, who had spent 27 years of his life in prison, became South Africa’s first fully rep-
resentative and legitimate head of state. 
 
He formed a Government of National Unity, which included members of the major po-
litical parties – even bitter enemies of the past – and preached the message of this new 
South Africa where there were not be winners and losers of the election – all were de-
clared winners. Because all South Africans had become liberated. 
 
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission under the able leadership of Nobel Peace 
Laureate Desmond Tutu played a pivotal role in revealing the atrocities of our past. By 
opening these wounds and cleansing them with truth, reconciliation could take place 
without vengeance and retribution, and the divisions of the past could begin to be bridged. 
 
So what has happened in South Africa over the past ten years? 
 
 We were re-admitted to the world family of nations and have become a champion of 
the developing world at all international fora; 
 
 Tourism has blossomed and nearly seven million people came to visit this land of 
peace and reconciliation in 2003, and Johannesburg was found by a global survey to 
be the cheapest major city in the world; 
 
 Inflation is down to 4.5%; our GDP has shown consistent annual growth of 3% and 
more; in an effort to relieve the burden of the poor, personal income tax has been cut 
by more than R50 billion since 1995; South Africa’s export boom, achieved without 
subsidies, is larger than the boom that Japan experienced in the 1950s and 60s; and we 
have the cheapest Big Mac hamburger in the world; 
 
 South Africa has hosted numerous international conferences like CHOGM and the 
WSSD; we hosted the Rugby World Cup, the Cricket World Cup, the All-Africa 
Games, and we hope to be host to the Football World Cup in 2010; 
  328
 
 Since 1992, we have produced four Nobel laureates, two for peace and tow for lit-
erature; 
 
 Twelve days ago we saw the third fully democratic elections take place in South Af-
rica and tomorrow Thabo Mbeki will be inaugurated for his second and last term as 
President; 
 
 Clean water has been brought to 9.1 million homes; electricity has been connected to 
4 million new homes, and people with houses increased from 64% to 77%. 
 
As Pliny the Elder Roman writer said nearly two thousand years ago: “Ex Africa simper 
aliquid novi”: Something new always comes out of Afirca. And although much, much 
more needs to be done to create more jobs and alleviate poverty, to reduce crime rates, to 
combat HIV/Aids and to ensure sustainable development, we believe there is reason to 
celebrate. 
 
Ladies and gentlemen 
 
Please charge your glasses and join me in a toast to South Africa’s continued growth, 
stability and prosperity and to continuing good relations with Taiwan. 
 
Source: Liaison Office of South Africa in Taiwan.  
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Appendix XV 
 
Malawi President Bingu wa Mutharika’s speech in the UN, September 8, 2005. 
 
As part of the reform of the UN system, I wish to bring to the attention of the General 
Assembly an important aspect of the reform of the United Nations. This involves the 
determination of eligibility for membership in the United Nations. As you now, the 
United Nations Universal Declaration on Human Rights guarantees the right of all peo-
ples of the world to belong to the United Nations and that no country should be denied 
membership in this organization. Malawi believes that the Unites Nations was founded on 
the principle of inclusivity in its membership. 
That is why we in Malawi call for the admission of the Republic of China (Taiwan) as a 
member of the United Nations. 
This request is made on the premise that following the collapse of communism in Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union, the new states that emerged there from had expressed their 
desire to become sovereign and independent members of the United Nations. These 
countries were Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. 
These countries were accepted and were readily admitted as members of this organization. 
This was a political decision. 
In the same way, when Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia broke up into separate 
states of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, and 
Slovenia, each state was admitted in the United Nations. This was a political decision. 
Czechoslovakia broke up into the Czech Republic and Slovakia, and each state was ad-
mitted into the United Nations.  
In South East Asia, Singapore pulled out of the Federation of Malaya and became a 
member of the United Nations. Later, East Timor broke away from Indonesia and was 
also admitted as a member of the United Nations. These were also political decisions. 
Mr. President 
The Government of Malawi is therefore puzzled that the Republic of China, which took a 
similar political decision, is denied membership in the United Nations. How can the 
United Nations stand for equity and justice when it is denying membership to over 23 
million people who contribute significantly to global trade and development? How can 
the United Nations justify its denial of membership to Taiwan when the countries listed 
above were admitted? Why is Taiwan being discriminated against by the United Nations? 
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Unless these questions are honestly answered, observers will conclude that the United 
Nations is applying double standards. The Government of Malawi believes that the 
United Nations should use the same standards to grant membership to the Republic of 
China.  
I am therefore appealing that the United Nations should extend membership to the Tai-
wanese people in the same way as it has done for countries of the Eastern Europe, and 
South East Asia. 
This will enable the dynamic and resourceful people of Taiwan to play their rightful role 
in global affairs, industrialization, trade and social development. I believer that the ad-
mission of the Republic of China (Taiwan) in the United Nations will also bring credi-
bility to the Universal declaration of Human Rights. 
 
  
Source: Department of International Organizations, MOFA, ROC. 
  331
Appendix XVI 
 
Letter from Consul General John Kincaid to Deputy Foreign Minister H.K.Yang, August 
19, 1975.  
 
Your Excellency, 
 
I have the honour to extend to you, on behalf of Dr. H. Muller, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
an invitation to visit South Africa at your convenience as a guest of the Department of 
Foreign Affairs. 
 
Despite your many visits in the past, your duties have not permitted you to see as much of 
South Africa as we would have wished; not has there always been time enough for you to 
meet many persons in government and the private sector with whom you might have been 
able to discuss matters of concern in the world to-day. 
 
While I am aware that your many preoccupations may prevent you from accepting Dr. 
Muller’s invitation within the near future, it is my sincere hope that you will be able to do 
so before many more months pass. I should be grateful to receive in due course an indi-
cation of the period that might be most convenient to you. 
 
Please accept, Your Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration. 
 
John Kincaid 
CONSUL-GENERAL 
 
Source: Department of African Affairs, MOFA, ROC. 
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Appendix XVII 
 
Letter from Premier of the Republic of China Sun Yun-Suan to Prime Minister of the 
Republic of South Africa His Excellency Mr. P. W. Botha, December 19, 1979. 
 
Your Excellency,  
 
I acknowledge with thanks receipt of your letter dated 5 December, 1979 which was 
forwarded to me by Ambassador H. K. Yang immediately upon his arrival in Taipei from 
Pretoria. 
 
It was very kind of you to extend a formal invitation to me to visit your noble country and 
I accept it with great pleasure. 
 
If it is agreeable to you, I would like to pay my official visit to the Republic of South 
Africa in March 1980. Certainly I will inform you, through our Embassy in Pretoria of the 
exact dates and other details of my visit in due course. 
 
Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurance of my highest consideration. 
 
Sun Yun-Suan 
Premier of the Republic of China 
 
Source: Liaison Office of South Africa in Taiwan. 
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Appendix XVIII  
 
Letter from President Lee Teng-hui to President Nelson Mandela, March 20, 1996. 
 
Dear Mr. President: 
Ambassador I-Cheng Loh has reported to me in detail on your conversation with him 
when you honoured him with a meeting and dinner on February 26. 
I deeply appreciate your firm friendship and personal interest by taking time out of your 
extremely busy schedule, when externally and internally various pressing matters de-
mand your personal attention, to offer your good offices to bring about renewed nego-
tiations at a high level between my government and mainland China. 
By sheer coincidence, on February 23 at my first press conference this year, I offered to 
negotiate a peace agreement with Beijing. I take great pleasure in enclosing a transcript of 
exactly what I said at that conference, attended by about 150 local and foreign media 
people and carried live by CNN, among others. 
May I, therefore, formally invite the Republic of South Africa to play the role of a fa-
cilitator and carry my offer to the leaders in Beijing. As long as we are treated as their 
equals, we are prepared to enter into negotiations with them for such a peace pact and we 
attach no other preconditions thereto. We will meet them at a time and at a venue ac-
ceptable to both sides. 
As you are aware, the Republic of China will hold its first ever direct popular election of 
its President and Vice President on March 23. Myself and Premier Lien Chan will bear the 
standard of the Kuomintang (National Party) in a field of four contesting teams. We ex-
pect to win although it will be a tough contest.  
I understand that a high-level South African delegation is being formed to visit both sides 
of the Taiwan Straits. I take great pleasure in inviting your delegation to come to Taipei 
immediately after March 23. I await eagerly your response to this cordial invitation. 
Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest esteem and consideration. 
 
/s/ Lee Teng-hui 
 
Source: TLO files: Correspondence between two Presidents. 
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Appendix XIX 
 
Letter from President Nelson Mandela to President Lee Teng-hui, November 28, 1996. 
 
Dear President Lee 
 
I thought that I should personally write to you about my statement to the media on 27 
November 1996 concerning South Africa’s relations with the Greater China region. 
 
Mr President, I wish to give you the assurance that the statement was one of the most 
difficult I have had to make since assuming office. It was only made after long and ago-
nising thought and extensive deliberations both within South Africa and abroad. 
 
Mr President, as I stated, I am personally very much aware and appreciative of the valued 
contribution that the Government of the Republic of China has made to the RDP and 
specifically of the commitment of the Government of the Republic of China to encourage 
greater participation by the Taiwanese business sector in the economic development of 
South Africa. The smooth transition to democracy in South Africa was greatly facilitated 
by the active and generous participation by the Government of the Republic of China. For 
this, I will always have enormous appreciation and the people of Taiwan will always 
enjoy my heartfelt gratitude and sympathy. 
 
I would also like to extend my appreciation to Ambassador Loh I-cheng for his personal 
sacrifices and endeavours in this regard. During our many private discussions, he has 
become a close personal acquaintance of mine and it is my sincere belief that no gov-
ernment can wish for a better representative. Both Ambassador Loh and his wife are held 
in the highest regard by the foreign diplomatic community in South Africa of which 
Ambassador Loh is the doyen. They are sensitive and loyal Ambassadors of your country. 
 
Mr President, as you are aware, there are times when one has no option perforce of cir-
cumstances to act in the larger interest of one’s country. One wrestles in solitude over 
such decisions which can be most painful, especially where it can be expected that deci-
sions will hurt close and trusted friends. In this case I could, however, no longer ignore 
international realities. 
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Mr President, in my statement to the media I said that South Africa would like to conduct 
constructive relations with Taiwan. It is my sincere desire that the friendly relations that 
have been built up over the years would continue and that Taiwan would stay fully en-
gaged in South Africa. 
 
Representatives from both sides will have to come together during the next twelve 
months to reach a modus vivendi on our future relations. I wish to convey my personal 
assurances, Mr President, that I shall do my utmost to see that Taiwan’s interests in South 
Africa are sufficiently safeguarded and that Taiwan’s representation in South Africa will 
continue at the highest possible level short of full diplomatic recognition. There is no 
reason, to my mind, why South Africa and Taiwan cannot continue to develop mutually 
beneficial relations.  
 
Mr President, please be assured of my highest personal consideration and commitment to 
the resolution of the matter in this difficult period. I trust that we will be able to find ways 
of continuing the warm relations that have been built up between our two countries. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
NR MANDELA 
 
Source: TLO files: Correspondence between two Presidents. 
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Appendix XX 
 
NO Subject Date 
1 Trade Agreement between the Government of ROC and the Government of RSA. 26/02/1975 
2 
Agreement Concerning the Exchange of Postal Parcels con-
cluded between the postal Administrations of ROC and 
RSA. 
11/01/1977 
3 Agreement between the ROC and the RSA on Mutual Fish-ery Relations. 26/01/1978 
4 
Agreement for Technical Cooperation between the National 
Bureau of Standards of ROC and the South African Bureau 
of Standards of RSA. 
29/10/1979 
5 
International Express Mail Agreement between the postal 
Administration of ROC and the postal Administration of 
RSA. 
21/01/1980 
6 Agreement between the Government of RSA and the Gov-ernment of ROC (on Defense Industry Development). 11/03/1980 
7 Agreement between the Government of ROC and the Gov-ernment of RSA for the Reciprocal Treatment of Navigation. 11/03/1980 
8 
Exchange of Notes between the Government of ROC and the 
Government of RSA Constituting an Agreement on Scien-
tific and Technological Cooperation. 
12/03/1980 
9 
Agreement on Scientific Cooperation between the National 
Science Council (NSC) or ROC and the Council for Scien-
tific and Industrial Research (CSIR) of RSA.  
18/03/1980 
10 Exchange of Notes between ROC and RSA Constituting an Agreement on Meteorological Cooperation. 04/02/1983 
11 
Exchange Agreement on Scientific Cooperation between the 
National Science Council of ROC and the Medical Research 
Council of RSA.  
28/03/1983 
12 
Exchange of Notes between ROC and RSA for Mutual Im-
plementation of the International Convention on Tonnage 
Measurement of Ships, 1969. 
19/05/1983 
13 
Exchange Agreement on Scholarly Cooperation between the 
National Science Council (NSC) of ROC and the Human 
Science Research Council (HSRC) of RSA.  
26/09/1983 
14 
Agreement between the Government of ROC and the Gov-
ernment of RSA Relating to Cooperation in Mineral and 
Energy Affairs.  
22/04/1985 
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NO Subject Date 
15 Treaty of Extradition between the Government of ROC and the Government of RSA. 30/10/1987 
16 
Agreement on Medical Cooperation in Providing Advanced 
Training for Medical and Nursing Personnel between the 
Government of ROC and the Government of RSA. 
12/01/1988 
17 
Agreement for the Cooperation and Exchange on Science 
and Technology Information between the Science and 
Technology Information Centre, NSC and the Division of 
Information Services, CSIR. 
24/02/1989 
18 
Agreement between the Government of ROC and the Gov-
ernment of RSA on Matters Relating to Co-operation in the 
Field on Population Development. 
15/06/1989 
19 Agreement between the Government of the ROC and the Government of RSA Relating to Cultural Matters. 19/06/1989 
20 
Arrangement for Programmed Contracts and Cooperation 
between Agricultural Scientists and Institutions of the 
Council of Agricultural of ROC and the Agricultural Re-
search Council of RSA. 
03/07/1992 
21 
Arrangement for the Exchange of Plant Material between the 
Council of Agriculture of ROC and the Department of Ag-
ricultural Development of RSA. 
03/07/1992 
22 
Agreement of Mutual Recognition of National Measuring 
Standards Memorandum of Agreement made and Entered 
into by and between: Industrial Technology Research Insti-
tute( ITRI) of ROC and the Council for Scientific and In-
dustrial Research (CSIR) of RSA. 
04/02/1991 
23 
Bilateral Scientific Exchange Agreement between the Na-
tional Foundation for Science and Technology (NFST) of 
ROC and the Foundation for Research Development (FRD) 
of RSA. 
11/07/1991 
24 
Protocol between the China External Trade Development 
Council and the South African Chamber of Business for the 
Implementation of the ROCSA Carnet System. 
31/07/1991 
25 
Agreement between the Government of ROC and the Gov-
ernment of RSA on the ROCSA Carnet for the Temporary 
Admission of Goods.  
09/08/1991 
26 Amended Bilateral Air Services Agreement between the Government of ROC and the Government of RSA. 15/11/1991 
27 
Agreement of Cooperation on the Promotion of Investments 
between the Government of ROC and the Government of 
RSA. 
15/11/1991 
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NO Subject Date 
28 
Technical Undertaking on mutual Recognition of the Na-
tional Calibration Services between the Chinese National 
Laboratory. Accreditation of the ROC and the National 
Calibration Services of the RSA. 
06/11/1993 
29 Agreement on the Training of Small-scale Farmers in RSA. 25/11/1993 
30 
Agreement between ROC and RSA for the Avoidance of 
Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with 
Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital gain. 
14/02/1994 
31 
Agreement on Cooperation for peaceful uses of Atomic En-
ergy between the Atomic Energy Council, ROC and Atomic 
Energy Corporation of South Africa Limited. 
29/09/1994 
32 
Amended Annex to the Amended Bilateral Air Services 
Agreement between the Government of the ROC and the 
Government of RSA. 
17/11/1994 
33 Loan Agreement between Chiao Tung Bank Co., Ltd and Development Bank of Southern Africa. 29/11/1994 
34 
Guarantee Agreement Between the Chiao Tung Bank Co, 
Ltd, of ROC and RSA, represented by the Minister of Fi-
nance of RSA. 
06/01/1995 
35 
Agreement between the Government of RSA and the Gov-
ernment of ROC regarding Technical Assistance for the Es-
tablishment of a Vocational Training Centre.  
07/12/1995 
36 
Memorandum of understanding on the Exchange of Infor-
mation between The Securities and Exchange Commission 
of ROC and The Financial Services Board of RSA. 
01/04/1996 
37 
Agreement between ROC and RSA on the Establishment of 
Community Forestry Projects in the Republic of South Af-
rica. 
29/08/1996 
38 Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of ROC and the Government of RSA on Education Support. 29/08/1996 
39 Agreement between the ROC and RSA on Technical Coop-eration in the Field of Endangered Species Conservation. 02/09/1996 
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Appendix XXI 
                       
Country 
Year Diplomatic rela-
tions with the ROC es-
tablished 
Year Diplomatic rela-
tions with the PRC es-
tablished 
Algeria  1958 
Angola  1983 
Benin 1962, 1966 1964, 1973 
Botswana 1966 1975 
Burkina Faso 1961, 1994 1973 
Burundi  1963, 1971 
Cameroon 1960 1971 
Cape Verde  1976 
Central African Republic 1962, 1968, 1991 1964, 1976, 1998 
Chad 1962, 1997 1972, 2006 
Comoros  1975 
Congo 1960 1964 
Cote d’Ivoire 1963 1983 
Djibouti  1979 
DR. Congo 1960 1972 
Egypt 1934 1956 
Equatorial Guinea  1970 
Eritrea  1993 
Ethiopia  1970 
Gabon 1960 1974 
Gambia 1968, 1995 1974 
Ghana  1960, 1972 
Guinea  1959 
Guinea-Bissau 1990 1974, 1998 
Kenya  1963 
Lesotho 1966, 1990 1983, 1994 
Liberia 1957, 1989 1977, 2003 
Libya 1959 1978 
Madagascar 1963 1972 
Malawi 1966  
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Country 
Year Diplomatic rela-
tions with the ROC es-
tablished 
Year Diplomatic rela-
tions with the PRC es-
tablished 
Mali 1960 1960 
Mauritania 1960 1965 
Mauritius  1972 
Morocco  1958 
Mozambique  1957 
Namibia  1990 
Niger 1963, 1992 1974, 1996 
Nigeria  1971 
Rwanda 1962 1971 
São Tomé and Principe 1997 1975 
Senegal 1960, 1969, 1996 1964, 1971, 2005 
Seychelles  1976 
Sierra Leone 1963 1971 
Somalia  1960 
South Africa 1905 1998 
Sudan  1958 
Swaziland 1968  
Tanzania  1963 
Togo 1960 1972 
Tunisia  1964 
Uganda  1962 
Zambia  1964 
Zimbabwe  1980 
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南非台北聯絡代表處檔卷:中斐學術會議。 
南非台北聯絡代表處檔卷:中斐關係。 
南非台北聯絡代表處檔卷:中斐體育交流 1987。 
南非台北聯絡代表處檔卷:加拿大與我斷交。  
南非台北聯絡代表處檔卷:合作協議書。 
南非台北聯絡代表處檔卷:朱部長撫松訪斐(1981 年 5 月 28 日至 6 月 16 日)。 
南非台北聯絡代表處檔卷:狄克勒總統訪華。 
南非台北聯絡代表處檔卷:波塔總理訪華。 
南非台北聯絡代表處檔卷:南非 Deon Geldenhuys 訪華案。 
南非台北聯絡代表處檔卷:南非外次傅履訪華 
南非台北聯絡代表處檔卷:南非國際文宣。 
南非台北聯絡代表處檔卷:財長徐立德訪問南非，1983 年 10 月。 
南非台北聯絡代表處檔卷:孫院長訪斐。 
南非台北聯絡代表處檔卷:席蘇魯訪華。 
南非台北聯絡代表處檔卷:張部長來斐出席中斐經濟會議。 
南非台北聯絡代表處檔卷:教育部長訪華。 
南非台北聯絡代表處檔卷:第二屆經技合作會議。    
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南非台北聯絡代表處檔卷:黃特使參加就職大典 1989 年 9 月 15 日。 
南非台北聯絡代表處檔卷:塞內加爾與中共建交及中塞關係。 
南非台北聯絡代表處檔卷:楊大使演講。 
南非台北聯絡代表處檔卷:楊特使繼曾參加喀麥隆獨立慶典並訪非案。 
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1981 至 85 年我國與中共對外貿易情況比較分析，經濟部國貿局，民國 76 年 3 月。 
1998 非洲各國大事紀，外交部非洲司。 
1998-1999 海外市場經貿年報：中東非洲篇，經濟部國際貿易局/中華民國對外貿易
發展協會合編 民國 87 年 9 月。 
一九九七中共年報，中共研究雜誌社，1997 年 6 月。 
了解台灣－跨越認知差距，總統府，民國 88 年 11 月。 
中共利用金援手段拉攏與收買外交之具體資料，外交部，民國 79 年 12 月。 
中共問題資料輯要，外交部新聞文化司，第 245 期，民國 77 年 2 月 29 日。 
中共發表 2005 年「外交白皮書」，大陸情勢雙週報，民國 94 年 1 月 5 日，頁 21-26。 
中共與各國建交聯合公報彙編，外交部新聞文化司，民國 83 年 6 月。 
中非年刊（Sino-African Annual），1985 年第 2 期，中華民國非洲友好協會，民國
74 年 9 月。 
中非年刊（Sino-African Annual），1992 年第 8 期，中華民國非洲友好協會，民國
81 年元月。 
中非年刊（Sino-African Annual），1992 年第 9 期，中華民國非洲友好協會，民國
81 年 10 月。 
中國大陸綜覽，第 4 版，新店：展望與探索，民國 92 年 9 月 30 日。 
中國與世界，國防研究院，民國 53 年 10 月。 
中華民國八十七年外交年鑑，外交部。 
中華民國八十八年外交年鑑，外交部。 
中華民國八十九年外交年鑑，外交部。 
中華民國九十二年外交統計年報，外交部。 
中華民國出席聯合國大會第廿六屆常會代表團報告書。 
中華民國外交大事日誌（51 年至 52 年）。 
中華民國外交大事日誌（53 年至 54 年）。 
中華民國外交大事日誌（69 年）。 
中華民國外交大事日誌（56 年）。 
中華民國外交大事日誌（75 年）。 
中華民國年報，九十年，行政院新聞局。 
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中華民國非洲友邦投資環境簡介，外交部非洲司，民國 88 年 3 月。 
中華民國出席第 26 屆聯合國大會代表團報告書，外交部，民國 61 年 4 月。 
中華民國教育部訪問團訪問南非及視察駐歐文教機構報告書，1988 年 4 月。 
中華民國國際貿易發展概況 2003-2004，經濟部國際貿局，民國 92 年 6 月。 
中華民國農業，行政院農委會，第 10 版，民國 82 年 10 月。 
中華民國與南非共和國現行有效條約協定輯編，外交部，民國 85 年 12 月。 
世界各國簡介暨政府首長名冊，外交部禮賓司，民國 88 年 5 月。 
台灣對外技術援助 45 週年慶紀念專刊，國際合作發展基金會，2005 年 7 月。 
中華民國外交年鑑 77 年。 
中華民國外交年鑑 78-79 年。 
中華民國外交年鑑 80 年。 
中華民國外交年鑑 82 年。 
中華民國外交年鑑 85 年。 
外交施政報告，外交部，民國 85 年 4 月 15 日。 
外交部，政府各部門施政績效簡介，行政院新聞局，第三版，民國 85 年 5 月。 
外交部，第一期駐外館長返國述職講習。 
外交部公報第 49 卷第 1 號，民國 82 年 3 月 31 日。 
外交部公報第 50 卷第 3 號，民國 83 年 9 月 30 日。 
外交部公報第 54 卷第 3 號，民國 87 年 12 月 20 日。 
外交部公報第 56 卷第 1 號，民國 98 年 6 月 15 日。 
外交部公報第 57 卷第 3 號，民國 90 年 12 月 20 日。 
外交部公報第 59 卷第 4 號，民國 93 年 3 月 31 日。 
外交部公報第 60 卷第 1 號，民國 93 年 6 月 30 日。 
外交部駐外使領館沿革一覽表，外交部檔案資料處，民國 69 年 2 月 20 日。 
外交部聲明及公報彙編（75 年元月 1 日至 12 月 31 日）。 
外交部聲明及公報彙編（76 年元月 1 日至 12 月 31 日）。 
外交部聲明及公報彙編（84 年元月 1 日至 12 月 31 日）。 
外交部聲明及公報彙編（85 年元月 1 日至 12 月 31 日）。 
外交報告，朱撫松，中國國民黨第 12 次全國代表大會。 
外交報告書：對外關係與外交行政，外交部，民國 81 年 12 月。 
本會援外工作及美援運用概要彙編，行政院國軍退除役官兵輔導委員會，民國 71
年 11 月出版。 
「台灣邦交國數目」新聞研析座談會報告，國際現勢新聞研析座談報告彙編 (民
93/7-12)，外交部研究設計委員會編。 
民主外交，友誼之旅，行政院新聞局，民國 89 年 11 月。 
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立法院公報，第 66 卷第 36 期。 
立法院公報，第 77 卷第 38 期。 
立法院公報，第 77 卷第 60 期。 
合作互助、關懷之旅－陳水扁總統出訪非洲國家紀實，行政院新聞局，民國 91 年
9 月。 
行政院俞院長七十六年言論集(下集)，行政院新聞局，民國 77 年 7 月。 
行政院孫院長六十七年言論集。 
行政院國科會，台灣的故事－科技篇，行政院新聞局，民國 89 年 5 月。 
行政院蔣院長對當前外交工作之指示與言論，外交部，民國 67 年 5 月 20 日。 
我國手工藝技術合作成果專輯，海外技術合作委員會，民國 86 年元月。 
我國與世界各國關係一覽表，外交部條約法律司，民國 67 年 1 月。 
我國與非洲國家技術合作之執行與成效，外交部非洲司/海外技術合作委員會祕書
處，民國 65 年 6 月。 
李登輝言論選集，行政院新聞局。 
吳東野，中共在非洲加強經貿工作對我國之影響暨我國的因應政策，中華民國外
交部專案委託研究計畫，民國 90 年 6 月 25 日。 
吳榮義，拓展非洲貿易市場之研究，台灣經濟研究院，民國 80 年 6 月。 
沈昌煥先生言論集，外交部新聞司，民國 88 年 2 月。 
周煦主編，中華民國史外交志（初稿），國史館，台北縣新店市，民國 91 年 12 月。 
奉獻與奮鬥，行政院新聞局，民 84 年 5 月。 
非洲駐華經貿聯合辦事處，非洲駐華經貿聯合辦事處，第二版，民國 93 年 4 月。 
林德昌，如何強化我國的國際發展合作，中華民國外交部專案委託研究計畫，民
國 90 年 3 月。 
芮正皋，我國與非洲國家擴展實質及正式關係之評估，台北:行政院研考會，民國
80 年 6 月。 
赴非工業合作考察團報告書，經濟部，1980 年 11 月。 
南非共和國對外貿易現況及經濟統計分析，約翰尼斯堡商務專員處，民國 67 年 
9 月 20 日。 
南非投資指南，中華民國駐南非大使館經參處，民國 76 年 4 月。 
胡自強，邁向新世紀，行政院新聞局，民國 83 年 10 月。 
海外技術合作簡訊，第 161 期，海外技術合作委員會編印，民國 75 年 6 月。 
海外技術合作簡訊，第 173 期，海外技術合作委員會編印。民國 84 年 1 月。 
海外技術合作簡訊，第 174 期，海外技術合作委員會編印，民國 84 年 4 月。 
海外技術合作簡訊，第 177 期，海外技術合作委員會編印，民國 84 年 10 月。 
海外技術合作委員會歷經 36 年之回顧（民國 55 年 5 月--86 年 6 月），民國 86 年 6
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月出版。 
援外的世界潮流(Seminar on Global Trades in International Development)，國際研討
會，國際合作發展基金會，民國 93 年。 
國合會訊，第 3 期，民國 88 年 7 月。 
國合會訊，第 14 期，民國 91 年 6 月。 
國際合作發展基金會援外策略及中程業務規劃，國際合作發展基金會。 
國際現勢新聞研析座談報告彙編（民國九十三年一月至六月），外交部研究設計員
會，民國 93 年 10 月 10 日。 
國際經濟合作方案之研究，第二部份:各國及國際組織國際經濟合作經驗之探討，
中華經濟研究院，民國 79 年 2 月。 
國際經濟合作方案之研究，第三部份：非洲地區，中華經濟研究院，民國 79 年 2
月。 
從務實外交邁向互惠雙贏，行政院新聞局，民 85 年 6 月。 
訪問報告，中西非及南非投資貿易訪問團編撰，中華民國對外貿易發展協會，民
國 60 年 11 月。 
連院長言論選集 
陳水扁總統談話輯要(二)，迎接挑戰奮鬥向前，行政院新聞局，民國 91 年 3 月。 
陳總統水扁先生九十二年言論選集(上)，行政院新聞局，民國 93 年 4 月。 
陳總統水扁先生九十三年言論選集(上)，行政院新聞局，民國 94 年 6 月。 
葛永光，台灣的故事－政治篇，行政院新聞局，民國 87 年 8 月。 
當前外交施政，胡自強，外交部，民國 87 年 3 月 18 日。 
當前外交施政，程建人，民國 88 年 12 月 8 日，外交部。 
當前外交施政，程建人，立法院第 34 屆第 2 會期。 
僑務委員會，華僑經濟年鑑，民國 81 年 6 月 30 日。 
劉達人、謝孟圜著，中華民國外交行政史略，台北縣新店市：國史館，民國 89 年
5 月。 
駐外大使館、公使館歷任館長銜名表，外交部。 
駐非各技術工作隊工作概況，中非技術合作委員會秘書處編印，民國 58 年 3 月 31
日。 
錢復，外交施政及最近國情勢，外交部，民國 84 年 3 月 6 日。 
謝順景主編，海外技術合作委員會歷經卅六年之回顧，海外技術合作委員會秘書
處，民國 86 年 6 月。 
 
回憶錄 
沈大川，寧靜致遠 美麗人生，沈昌煥先生紀念文集，台北：沈大川，民國 90 年
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10 月。 
陸以正，微臣無力可回天，台北：天下遠見，民國 91 年 4 月。 
錢復，錢復回憶錄（卷一、卷二），台北：天下遠見，民國 94 年 2 月。 
 
訪談人士 
訪談甘居正(中華民國前駐南非大使館經濟參事)，民國 92 年 8 月 17 日。 
訪談申佩璜(中華民國外交部條約法律司司長)，民國 93 年 4 月 21 日。   
訪談江丙坤(中華民國前經濟部長)，民國 94 年 3 月 11 日。 
訪談杜稜（南非台北聯絡代表處代表），民國 92 年 4 月 29 日。 
訪談李辰雄（外交部非洲司司長），民國 94 年 6 月 8 日。 
訪談林松煥（中華民國前駐德班總領事），民國 92 年 4 月 29 日。 
訪談唐飛(中華民國前國防部長)，民國 91 年 6 月 24 日。  
訪談張京育(中華民國前政治大學校長)，民國 93 年 1 月 31 日。 
訪談陸以正(中華民國前駐南非大使)，民國 92 年 11 月 4 日。 
訪談傳迪(中華民國前駐開普敦總領事)，民國 93 年 9 月 27 日。 
訪談楊子葆(國際合作發展基金會秘書長)，民國 93 年 12 月 5 日。 
訪談楊梁鴻英(楊大使西崑夫人)，民國 91 年 8 月 19 日。 
訪談歐陽瑞雄(外交部常務次長)，民國 94 年 6 月 7 日。 
訪談葉乾坤(中華民國前駐南非大使館文化參事)，民國 93 年 3 月 28 日。 
訪談黎昆鯤（中華民國前駐南非大使館新聞參事），民國 94 年 10 月 6 日。 
訪談酆邰(中華民國前駐約翰尼斯堡總領事)，民國 92 年 11 月 16 日。 
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龐中英譯，外交理論與實踐 (Diplomacy: Theory & Practice) ，北京大學出版社，
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王福春主編，外事管理學概論（An Introduction to Foreign Affairs Administration），
北京：北京大學出版社，2003 年 5 月。 
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何鳳山，外交生涯四十年，香港：香港中文大學，1990 年。 
吳燕玲、張貝雯、羅融，公益旅行家，台北：新新聞文化，2003 年 4 月。 
李怡志等撰稿，迎向世界的台灣 NGO：微笑、關懷、行動，台北：外交部非政府
組織委員會，2006 年 7 月。 
李國威，國際關係新論，台北：台灣商務，民國 77 年 8 月。 
李萬來，外交風雲，台北：中央通訊社，1999 年元月。 
沈錡，在別人眼裡，台北：聯經，2004 年 6 月。 
沈錡，敝帚自珍集，台北：聯經，2004 年 11 月。 
邢福泉，新國際關係論，台北：黎明文化，二版，民國 73 年 10 月。 
周平、王德鑫等譯，尼日利亞外交政策 (1961-2002)，北京：世界知識出版社，2005
  380
年 11 月。 
周弘主編，對外援助與國際關係，北京：中國社會科學出版社，2002 年 3 月。 
周煦，聯合國與國際政治，台北：黎明文化，1993 年。 
林玉珮主編，台灣心/世界情，台北：新自然主義，民國 91 年 9 月。 
林碧炤，國際政治與外交政策，台北：五南圖書，民國 82 年 11 月。 
林德昌，海峽兩岸援外政策之比較研究，台北：成文出版社，民國 88 年 3 月。 
武冠雄，台灣貿易發展經驗，台北：智庫文化，1999 年 7 月。 
邵玉銘，海內外智識份子國事討論集，民國 72 年 11 月 15 日。 
邵玉銘，國際局勢與中國前途，台北：黎明文化，民國 76 年 6 月。 
威廉·漢得森（Conway W. Henderson）著，金帆譯，國際關係：世紀之交的衝突與
合作（International Relations: Conflict and Cooperation at the Turn of the 21st 
Century），海口：海南出版社、三環出版社，2004 年 4 月。 
金桂華，外交謀略，北京：世界知識出版社，2003 年 1 月。 
俞正梁等著，全球化時代的國際關係，上海：復旦大學出版社，2002 年 8 月。 
約翰·羅克爾(John T. Rourke)編著，舞台上的國際政治(International Politics on the 
World Stage)，北京：北京大學出版社，2005 年 3 月。 
徐雲鳳，南非憲政改革之研究，台北：華泰書局，民國 73 年月。 
高英茂編輯，九十二年度外交工作創新發展研討會實錄，外交部，民國 92 年 4 月。 
高振寰，公眾外交，台北：中國出版公司，民國 70 年 4 月。 
高朗，中華民國外交關係之演變（1972-1992），台北：五南，民國 83 年 4 月。 
康綠島（L. Sophia Wang），李國鼎口述歷史，1993 年 11 月 4 版，台北：卓越文化。 
張力行，楊西崑與非洲，台北：中華文物出版社，(無日期)。 
張京育，國際關係與國際政治，台北：幼獅文化，民國 72 年 12 月。 
張京育，從台北看世界，台北：幼獅文化，民國 76 年元月。 
張慧英，超級外交官—李登輝和他的務實外交，台北：時報文化，1996 年 1 月 10
日。 
張慧英編輯，外交縱橫（The Diplomatic Beat），中華民國外交記者聯誼會，民國
74 年 11 月。 
結在異鄉的果實，行政院新聞局。 
「我國外交政策與實務」講座演講文集，嘉義：南華大學國際關係學系，民國 90
年 7 月。 
張學斌，經濟外交，北京：北京大學出版社，2003 年 2 月。 
淦克超譯，外交政策分析，台北：黎明文化，民國 68 年 3 月。 
陳啟懋編著，中國與非洲，中國政府對外關係，吉虹資訊，民國 89 年 3 月，頁
242-312。 
  381
陳鐵魂，馬拉加西共和國華僑概況，台北：正中書局，民國 78 年 8 月。 
陸以正，微臣無力可回天，台北：天下文化，民國 91 年 4 月 15 日。 
陸庭恩，非洲問題論集（Treatises on Africa），北京：世界知識出版社，2005 年 
1 月。 
彭懷恩，八Ｏ年中華民國外交，台北：風華論壇，民國 79 年 2 月。 
彭懷恩，中華民國政治體系的分析，台北：時報文化，民國 76 年 6 月 30 日。 
彭懷恩，國際關係：Q&A，台北：風雲論壇，民國 81 年 11 月。 
楊允達，西行采風誌，台北：幼獅文化，民國 74 年 6 月。 
楊逢泰，非洲問題論叢，台北：台灣商務印書館，民國 62 年。 
楊福昌主編，2001 年外交學院“科學周”論文集，北京：世界知識出版社，2002 年
10 月。 
黃剛編撰，世界相關各國與中華民國終斷使領關係之述論，政大國關中心，民國
87 年 4 月。 
威廉·內斯特（William Nester）編著，國際關係：21 世紀的政治與經濟（International 
Relations: Politics and Economics in the 21st Century），北京：北京大學出版社，
2005 年 7 月。 
僑聲報社論廿年選輯，南非僑聲報，民國 54 年 6 月。 
趙既昌，美援的運用，台北：聯經，1985 年。 
劉必權，非洲列國誌，台北：川流出版社，民國 70 年 10 月 10 日。 
劉志政，中華民國在聯合國大會的參與：外交政策、國際環境及參與行為，台北：
台灣商務，民國 74 年 1 月。 
劉志聰主編，世界年鑑 2005，台北：中央通訊社，民國 93 年 12 月。 
歐鐵，南非共和國華僑概況，台北：正中書局，民國 80 年 4。 
蔡百銓譯，非洲的阿拉伯國家，台北：中華民國阿拉伯文化經濟協會，民國 83 年
12 月 3 日出版。 
蔡明燁譯，Gory Rownsely 著，推銷台灣，台北：揚智文化，2003 年 6 月。 
蔡政文等著，我國對外政策及行動取向，國家政策研究中心，台北：國家政策，
1991。 
蔡瑋主編，中華民國與聯合國，政治大學國關中心，民國 82 年 4 月。 
衛民，中華民國政治雙邊外交，國家政策研究中心。 
魯毅等著，外交學概論，北京：世界知識出版社，2007 年 7 月 2 版。 
蕭曦清，外交風雲，台北：牧村圖書，2004 年 4 月。 
錢其琛，外交十記，香港：三聯書店，2004 年 1 月。 
錢剛鐔，中國外交政策與策略，台北：黎明文化，民國 72 年 5 月。 
謝益顯主編，中國外交史：中華人民共和國時期（1979-1994），河南人民出版社，
  382
1998 年 5 月。 
邁向新世紀—全方位政策規劃，中國國民黨中央政策委員會，民國 87 年 8 月。 
關中，變動世界秩序中的國際關係，台北:時報文化，民國 71 年 3 月。 
龐中英譯，外交理論與實踐 (Diplomacy: Theory & Practice) ，北京大學出版社，
2005 年 8 月。 
續伯雄，華府隨筆，台灣日報社，民國 83 年 8 月。 
 
期刊 
卜幼夫，非洲外交拓荒者，蓋棺論定陳雄飛功在國家，展望雜誌，民國 93 年 3 月
號，頁 26~29。 
霜木，評“弱國無外交”，外交學學報，2001 年第 1 期，頁 54-57。 
2003 年中國外交，現代國際關係，2003 年第 12 期，頁 32-41。 
中共加強與非洲「建交國」關係，大陸情勢雙週報，第 1304 期，民國 88 年 1 月
20 日，頁 31-38。 
中共積極前進非洲，海外學人，1996 年 7 月。 
尹慶耀，從中共外交政策的演變看中共當前的基本外交政策，問題與研究，第 23
卷第 10 期，民國 73 年 7 月，頁 8-20。 
丘宏達，丘宏達縱論我國外交，亞洲與世界文摘，第 12 卷第 2 期，民國 79 年 2
月，頁 22-25。 
包宗和，爭辯中的中華民國政治體制：內閣制或總統制？，問題與研究，第 27 卷
第 11 期，民國 77 年 8 月，頁 52-67。 
如何加強中華民國的國際映象，中央月刊，民國 68 年 11 月，頁 82-95。 
白思康，從 1956 到 1970 年中共對非洲的外交政策，問題與研究，第 27 卷第 1 期，
民國 76 年 10 月，頁 79-93。 
我與南非關係生變，海外學人，287 期，民國 85 年 12 月，頁 6-7。 
汪勤梅，中非關係巨大發展的 20 年，外交學院學報，1999 年第 1 期，頁 48-54。 
邢永平，中國與非洲：雖非唇齒，注定相依，〈西亞非洲〉雙月刊，2000 年，第 3
期，頁 69-71。 
李瑞芬，In arduous Terrain-Traces of Footprints and Sweat，中外畫刊，民國 83 年 11
月，頁 56-60。 
李國雄，外交是內政的延長，國魂，第 523 期，民國 78 年 6 月，頁 19-21。 
我與南非加強合作的政治意義，中央月刊，第 12 卷第 4 期，民國 69 年 4 月，頁
9-10。 
林碧炤，台灣的非傳統外交，戰略安全研析，第 10 期，民國 95 年 2 月，政大國
關中心，頁 7-15。 
  383
林碧炤，國際關係權力概念的解析，問題與研究，第 27 卷第 4 期，民國 77 年 1
月，頁 23-47。 
林碧炤，經濟外交的理論與實際(上)，問題與研究，第 28 卷第 1 期，民國 77 年 10
月，頁 71-82。 
林碧炤，經濟外交的理論與實際(下)，問題與研究，第 28 卷第 2 期，民國 77 年 11
月，頁 12-31。 
林德昌，中共的「援外政策」－外交目標或經濟利益？，問題與研究，第 33 卷第
10 期，民國 83 年 10 月，頁 35-47。 
林曉光，日本官方發展援助政策探析，現代國際關係，北京：中國現代國際關係
研究所，2003 年第 2 期。 
林慧生，加強對外合作關係的具體作法，中央月刊，第 14 卷第 2 期，民國 70 年
12 月 1 日，頁 120~121。 
邵玉銘，從台北看中華民國前途，問題與研究，第 24 卷第 11 期，民國 74 年 8 月
10 日，頁 1-10。 
邵玉銘，國際社會對中國問題的一般看法及我們的立場與信念，問題與研究，第
24 卷第 12 期，民國 74 年 9 月 10 日，頁 1-8。 
非洲地區，中華民國年鑑，行政院新聞局，民國 94 年 11 月，頁 487-488。 
非洲國家投資環境簡介，非洲駐華經貿聯合辦事處，2006 年 7 月。 
芮正皋，南非何去何從：革新抑或革命？，問題與研究，第 25 卷第 8 期，民國 75
年 5 月 10 日，頁 91-103。 
芮正皋，務實外交的理論基礎，中華戰略學刊，民國 80 年 12 月 31 日，頁 100-122。 
芮正皋譯，台灣經濟成功事例及前瞻，問題與研究，第 25 卷第 3 期，頁 87-90。 
洪恕博，甘比亞來鴻─記故栗達隊長銅像揭幕及楊西崑特使講話，傳記文學，第
17 卷第 5 期，頁 86-88。 
柯玉枝，當前日本對外援助政策分析，問題與研究，第 40 卷第 6 期，民國 90 年
11、12 月，頁 31-52。 
南非政局與中斐關係，台北論壇基金會，民國 83 年 4 月。 
唐小松、王義桅，試析美國公共外交及其局限，北京：現代國際關係，2003 年，
第 5 期。 
唐正平，前景廣濶的中非農業合作，西亞非洲，2002 年第 6 期，頁 13-17。 
翁明，小小銀球旋轉乾坤－記中美“乒乓外交”，外交學院學報，1997 年第 4 期。 
馬拉威總統莫魯士拜會農委會洽談中馬農技合作事宜，海外技術合作簡訊，第 175
期，民國 84 年 6 月，頁 8。 
張莉，《非洲發展新伙伴計劃》與中非合作，〈西亞非洲〉雙月刊，2002 年，第 5
期，頁 9-13。 
  384
畢英賢，美蘇莫斯科高峰會議，問題與研究，第 27 卷第 10 期，民國 77 年 7 月 10
日。 
許長亨，中華民國對外技術合作政策之探討，問題與研究，30 卷 10 期，民國 80
年 10 月。 
連戰，當前國際情勢與中華民國的外交政策，問題與研究，第 28 卷第 7 期，民國
78 年 4 月 10 日，頁 1-11。 
喬一名，中共對非洲外交的轉變，中國大陸研究，第 30 卷第 3 期，民國 76 年 9
月 15 日，頁 36-42。 
陳長文，突破外交逆境，中央月刊，14 卷 10 期，民國 71 年 8 月，頁 22-23。 
高惠宇，南非動亂中的政治課題，中央月刊，1995 年 9 月，頁 93-94。 
高靖雅，台商奮鬥史正在非洲上演，新新聞，929 期，2004 年 12 月 23 日-12 月 29
日，頁 90-93。 
高靖雅，要找對人，黑人不會騙你，新新聞，930 期，2004 年 12 月 30 日-2005 年
1 月 5 日，頁 92-93。  
舒遠國，外援在非洲經濟發展中的作用，西亞非洲雙月刊，2001 年第 2 期，北京，
頁 35-40。 
畢雲紅，信息時代話外交，世界知識，2000 年，第 17 期，頁 38-40。 
馮耀曾，外交實務館長甘苦談─「查德憶往」，外交部通訊，1995 年 7 月，第 20
卷 12 期，頁 52-61。 
楊西崑，聯合國與非洲，大陸雜誌，第 26 卷第 6 期，民國 52 年 3 月。 
楊逢泰，中華民國的外交政策，問題與研究，第 27 卷第 5 期，民國 77 年 2 月 10
日，頁 1-22。 
國際關係專題研討報告，中華民國聯合國同志會國際關係研究委員會，民國 78 年
10 月。 
葉伯棠，「利用矛盾」－中共外交政策的指導原則，匪情月報，第 24 卷第 8 期，
民國 71 年 2 月 15 日，頁 33-38。 
葉伯棠，一年來中共的外交活動，問題與研究，第 24 卷第 5 期，民國 74 年 2 月，
頁 13-22。 
葉伯棠，一年來中共對非洲的活動，中國大陸研究，第 28 卷第 9 期，民國 75 年 3
月 15 日，頁 53-59。 
趙建民，中華民國外交拓展之中共因素分析，問題與研究，第 29 卷第 13 期，民
國 79 年 10 月 10 日，頁 73-91。 
趙紫陽非洲十一國之行，匪情月報，第 25 卷第 8 期，民國 72 年 2 月 15 日，頁 11-20。 
彭慧鸞，資訊時代國際關係理論與實務之研究，問題與研究，第 39 卷第 5 期，民
國 89 年 5 月，頁 1-15。 
  385
蔣忠良，中共之石油戰略與其對非洲關係，問題與研究，第 42 卷第 4 期，民國 92
年 7、8 月，頁 105-127。 
鄭向恒，追念陳雄飛大使，展望雜誌，民國 93 年 3 月號，頁 30-33。 
鄭端耀，務實外交的發展與抉擇，問題與研究，第 37 卷第 4 期，民國 87 年 4 月，
頁 1-20。 
薛毓麒，我國外交困境之分析與突破，中央月刊，民國 77 年 5 月，頁 70-73。 
黎芳，國際交涉，中外畫刊，375 期，民國 76 年 9 月，頁 24-29。 
黎芳，縱橫外交三部曲，中外畫刊，375 期，民國 76 年 9 月，頁 30-33。 
蕭曦清，南非的新外交攻勢，問題與研究，第 28 卷第 5 期，民國 78 年 2 月 10 日，
頁 81-88。 
錢復，後冷戰時期之國際新秩序－中華民國之角色，亞洲與世界月刊，民國 80 年
4 月，頁 2-4。 
羅建波，非洲逐步走出困境中非關係穩步發展，西亞非洲（雙月刊），2003 年第 2
期，頁 68-70。 
嚴震生，賴比瑞亞的內戰，區域衝突及國際介入，問題與研究，第 42 卷第 4 期，
民 92 年 7、8 月，頁 75-103。 
顧章義，新非洲與當代世界(上)，西亞非洲（雙月刊），2003 年第 5 期，頁 19-26。 
顧章義，新非洲與當代世界(下)，西亞非洲（雙月刊），2003 年第 6 期，頁 24-26。 
 
報紙 
中國要以新方式接觸非洲，非洲時報，2005 年 9 月 29 日。 
仇佩芬，萬隆會議 50 周年，聯合報，民國 94 年 4 月 18 日。 
尤鎧，文革前後中國援外耗費多少錢財，南非華人報，2004 年 5 月 12 日。 
江慧真，我須慎防西非友邦骨牌效應，中國時報，2005 年 10 月 26 日。 
鮑達外長訪華就南非今日處境與我溝通，自由時報，民國 75 年 9 月 9 日。 
李國雄，讓經貿力量作外交先鋒，中國時報，民國 83 年 2 月 17 日。 
李崇道，我國農技援外成就與影響，香港時報，民國 78 年 10 月 16 日。 
杜稜，一個新時局的挑戰，華僑新聞報，1998 年 2 月 10 日。 
所謂「中國代表權」問題在聯大歷年表決結果，中央日報，民國 59 年 11 月 19 日。 
雨行，非洲先生足跡遍佈黑色大陸，宏觀報，民國 84 年 4 月 11 日。 
俞劍鴻，南非與國際經濟制裁，台灣新聞報，民國 75 年 8 月 12 日。 
徐孝慈，時勢造英雄 英雄造時勢，中國時報，民國 92 年 10 月 25 日。 
張慧英，南非不會做出不利中斐邦交之事，中國時報，民國 80 年 11 月 16 日。 
許宗林，我與非洲甘比亞，僑聲日報，2002 年 7 月 27 日。 
陳總統：推動全方位外交，宏觀報，2002 年 12 月 26 日。 
  386
陸以正，走過外援，談援外，聯合報，民國 88 年 6 月 22 日。 
陸以正，國安密帳與鞏案是兩回事，中國時報，民國 92 年 11 月 8 日。 
陸以正，從國際宣傳到公共外交，中國時報，2005 年 7 月 25 日。 
陸以正，塞內加爾  非洲楷模，聯合晚報，民國 91 年 7 月 2 日。 
塞內加爾與中國復交，華僑新聞報，2005 年 10 月 27 日。 
楊逢泰，中斐關係變化應未雨綢繆，中華時報，民國 80 年 2 月 4 日。 
葛傳宇，為援外政策解套，中國時報，台北，民國 92 年 8 月 23 日。 
僑胞應協助台灣走入國際社會，宏觀報，民國 88 年 11 月 18 日。 
劉永祥，一紙聲明 看外交四面楚歌，聯合報，2005 年 10 月 26 日。 
劉曉鵬，面對國家失靈友邦 調整外交步伐，聯合報，民國 92 年 6 月 15 日。 
劉曉鵬，斷交不能斷後路，中國時報，民國 94 年 11 月 5 日。 
戴瑞明，外交不可能有拼就會贏，聯合報，民國 94 年 10 月 27 日。 
嚴震生，塞國轉向中共國際影響力，聯合報，民國 94 年 10 月 27 日。 
洪孟啟，共黨又在非洲作亂，中央日報，民國 72 年 5 月 29 日。 
洪孟啟，積極進取的外交工作，中央日報，民國 72 年 6 月 19 日。 
梁嘉木，南非施展鐵腕維護安定，中央日報，民國 75 年 6 月 21 日。 
梁嘉木，英美堅持對斐公正政策，中央日報，民國 75 年 7 月 26 日。 
梁嘉木，登輝先生敦睦邦交成績斐然，中央日報，民國 77 年 2 月 8 日。 
梁嘉木，舉世關注南非動盪，中央日報，民國 74 年 8 月 3 日。 
楊力宇，從中賴復交展望我國對外形勢，中央日報，民國 78 年 10 月 9 日。 
 
網站 
http://iir.nccu.edu.tw/# 
http://africa.org.tw/news_chinese_l.asp?C=1 
http://mofa.gov.tw/webapp/sitemap.asp 
http://www.ey.gov.tw/np.asp?ctNode=8&mp=1 
http://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/Links/index.htm 
http://www.icdf.org.tw/chinese/c_affair_invest.asp 
http://www.president.gov.tw/l_president/layer2.html 
http://www.southafrica.org.tw/ 
http://w2kdmzl.moea.gov.tw/index.asp?Pl=sitemap 
 
學位論文 
王文隆，外交下鄉，農業出洋：中華民國農技援助非洲的實施和影響（1960-1974），
台北：政大歷史所，碩士論文，2003 年 6 月。 
  387
張正昇，經濟制裁與外交政策工具之研究，台北：政大外交所，碩士論文，民國
75 年 6 月。 
曾三訊，南非種族問題與外交政策（1978-1984），台北：政大外交所，碩士論文，
1986 年 6 月。 
楊榮藻，非洲新興國家入會後對聯合國的影響，台北：政大外交所，碩士論文，
1966 年 6 月。 
 
Documents in both Chinese and English from the Republic of China’s Ministry of For-
eign Affairs have been used for this academic research. 
